This chapter seeks to strengthen the account of the Principle of Multispecies Legality offered in the previous chapter by responding to potential queries and concerns around the proposal’s structure, scope, and feasibility. The outlined concerns are as follows: that the PML is an attempt to redefine legal personhood; that a focus on interests is too inclusive, in that in opening the doors of legal inclusion to a relatively wide range of beings and entities it would put undesirable constraints on human activity; that a focus on interests is too limited in that it doesn’t capture the full scope of animals’ capabilities; that the PML will result in the equal treatment of humans and all other animals; that we shouldn’t base a being’s worth on their possession of a particular characteristic; and that the PML will be too unfeasible to implement.

This chapter asks: how did notions and practices of individual equality arise out of the experience of the Reformation and of the religious pluralism that it engendered across Europe?

This chapter asks: how did the Enlightenment bring together and interweave the various germinating strands of individual equality, and how did enlightened writers translate the notion into political ideas and institutional schemes?

The introductory chapter explains and legitimates the approach of the book: why does it make sense to write the long-term (pre)history of democracy as a history of two distinct phenomena – pluralistic participation and individual equality – and of their convergence? Why can it be argued that this convergence was not unavoidable and is not irreversible?

This chapter asks: how did notions and practices of individual equality arise out of the growing marketisation and monetarisation of economic production, exchange and consumption?

This chapter asks: how did notions and practices of individual equality arise out of state centralisation?

Chapter 2 explores an important premise which underlies this critique of the law: it examines the idea that disfigurement inequality is a problem which merits a legal response – namely the granting of protective rights under the Act. It concludes that, despite some uncomfortable distinctions, there is a compelling case for a legal response in this area. The nature of law’s current response is then laid out. Relevant parts of the international legal framework – including EU law, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’) and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) applying the European Convention on Human Rights – are explained by reference to the models of disability which implicitly inform them.

This chapter asks: how did notions of individual equality arise out of – and contribute to – the intellectual traditions of natural law and contract theory?

This chapter asks: how did institutionalised political participation, individual equality and, in particular, their fusion survive into and develop during the nineteenth century, and what can we learn from the historical genesis of democracy as a composite of two different elements, as sketched in this book, for the predicament of democracy today?

Chapter 3 probes the meaning of the word ‘equality’. It outlines a multidimensional, substantive conception of equality, as adopted by the UN Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. But it notes the Act’s lack of engagement with some aspects of this ideal. The Act’s scope is both more limited and more individualised than this substantive concept might demand. Making sense of what law might intend to contribute to meeting equality ideals is difficult but necessary, as it can provide a benchmark against which to evaluate the law. With this in mind, this chapter proposes five potential objectives, which are guided by the Act’s scope. These range from changing attitudes and shaping perceived social norms through to influencing behaviours or compensating victims of negative treatment. These potential objectives are used as a framework for assessment of law’s contribution throughout the rest of the book.

In his Doctrine of Right, Kant claims that freedom is the only innate right. The Feyerabend Lectures, in contrast, contains a list of many innate rights. I compare Kant’s conception of innate right with Achenwall’s as well as those of Heineccius, Meier, and Hutcheson. Although in Feyerabend Kant lists various innate rights (plural), they roughly correspond to the “authorizations” that Kant develops in the Doctrine of Right from the single innate right of freedom, and even in Feyerabend they are linked to freedom. Not only did Kant have a different basis for right in freedom, his explanation of what the others call innate rights in terms of freedom better explains their importance.

Throughout this book, you have been challenged to look at the role the Arts play in society and in education. Various methodologies have been suggested and each specific Arts area has been broken down for you. The tools are now in place for you to organise Arts learning and teaching in your classroom. You also have reflective tools to apply to the learning and teaching you undertake. In this final chapter, we challenge you to imagine your Arts-rich classroom. What do you want the Arts to look like and how do you want your students to engage in them? These decisions will reflect your vision and rationale for teaching the Arts and your many experiences in working with the Arts as you have progressed through this book. These decisions are best made by the person who decides the ‘what’ and ‘how’ for their students every day: you.

This chapter introduces the book’s motivation: to understand how activists use identity to manage the apparent contradiction between the promises of legal inclusion and persistent forms of marginalization. The chapter illustrates the importance of the issue through discussion of the activism of two lesbian groups – Free Gender in Cape Town, South Africa, and La Fulana in Buenos Aires, Argentina – that form the focus on the book. Both organizations strategize sexual identity in tandem with other racial, class, and gender identities, albeit in different ways. The chapter presents the conceptual background of the book, which adopts a historical approach to understanding LGBT inclusion into citizenship and explains the relevance of intersectionality to contemporary LGBT organizing. The chapter previews the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1 that accounts for key differences in how the two organizations strategically use multiple identities. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the methodological aspects of the research and presents the plan for the rest of the book.

This chapter focuses on digital collaboration when learning an additional language (L2), a specific type of learner–learner interaction. In CALL contexts, collaboration has almost exclusively been researched in connection with writing, which will be the focus of this chapter. The chapter first provides a definition of collaboration versus cooperation and then a literature review of digital collaboration, mainly in writing contexts. We conclude with a list of strategies for promoting collaboration and suggestions for future collaboration contexts and research.

This chapter claims that in the new millennium, religious conservatives succeed in their struggles to control women’s bodies and to turn their private prejudices into public policy through the misappropriation of human rights and by gaining unwarranted religious exemptions. By allegedly demanding the protection of their own rights to religious liberty, conscientious objection, equality, and multicultural accommodations, religious conservatives are reversing the progress in women’s rights and using liberal rights and concepts as a weapon against women. The chapter argues that, contrary to popular belief, the separation between religion and the state cannot protect women’s rights against the religious conservative attack. It compares the religious conservative attack on women’s rights in the USA, where religion is separated from the state, to the religious conservative attack on women’s rights in Israel, where there is no separation between religion and the state, and shows that despite the very different religion–state relations, the religious conservative attack in the USA and Israel is similar in both method and success.