Chapter 8 turns to a paired comparison of secondhand smoke prevention policies, which offer a more optimistic picture of sociolegal change. In addition to more nonsmoking rules, changing social norms and declining smoking rates were conducive to realizing reforms—and benefited from them. This chapter details the contributions of tobacco control advocates through lobbying, educational activities, and lawsuits related to secondhand smoke, especially in workplaces and at subnational levels. Their multi sited activism is a necessary part of understanding why one is now much less likely to be exposed to secondhand smoke in Korea and Japan.

This chapter considers the various means and methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes as envisaged under the UN Charter and associated mechanisms. The key provisions of the UN Charter are considered, followed by an assessment of various methods of dispute settlement: negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation, arbitration and adjudication. Given its significance to international law, particular attention is given to the ICJ and its jurisdiction in contentious cases and to deliver advisory opinions. The relationship between the ICJ and the Security Council is assessed, as are trends in dispute settlement.

This chapter considers examples of State enforcement of international law, including in cases of war crimes and genocide. It then assesses collective enforcement under mechanisms provided for in the UN Charter, giving particular consideration to UN sanctions, including Australian law and policy approaches giving effect to sanctions, and peacekeeping.

The chapter outlines the requirements for creating a valid pledge, including the necessity of an agreement and the transfer of possession.

The chapter then explores the concept of a lien, which grants a creditor the right to retain possession of a debtor’s property until the debt is satisfied. It explains the conditions under which liens arise, typically through the provision of services or materials that enhance the value of the property.

A significant portion of the chapter is dedicated to discussing the priority of claims. It explains how pledges and liens interact with other security interests and the legal rules that determine the priority of creditors’ claims. The chapter also details the enforcement mechanisms available to creditors, including the sale of the pledged or liened property and the distribution of proceeds.

By analyzing these aspects, the chapter provides a thorough understanding of the legal intricacies of pledges and liens, emphasizing their practical implications for securing and enforcing debts in China.

This title delves into the mechanisms and processes of international human rights litigation, focusing on the various judicial and quasi-judicial bodies that adjudicate human rights complaints. It examines the diversity of international complaints mechanisms, including regional human rights courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as nonjudicial bodies such as the Human Rights Committee and other treaty bodies. The section discusses the conditions of admissibility for international complaints, the procedures for examining claims, and the standards of proof and evidence. It also explores the role of provisional measures in protecting human rights during litigation and the challenges in enforcing international human rights decisions. By providing insights into the litigation process, this title highlights the importance of access to justice and the role of international bodies in holding states accountable for human rights violations.

This chapter employs ethnographic insights to develop a generalizable theory of criminalized governance. The theory accounts for why gang organizations and their members engage in varying levels of coercion and benefits provision to residents living in areas where they operate. When gangs compete, they rely more on coercion and violence as they demand heightened levels of obedience from local communities. When police are actively enforcing against gangs, however, they will provide more responsive benefits to local populations to gain resident support in their effort to avoid detection and arrest. Although gang-level incentives may seem to predominate, the role of residents is crucial. The chapter describes how resident responses within these various security environments can shape the nature of the threats to gangs and, thereby, governance outcomes. The chapter concludes by describing the dynamics that should be observed within each of the ideal-typical criminalized governance regimes and addresses several alternative factors that may shape these outcomes.

This chapters traces the evolution of the Nova Holanda gang’s governance practices from the mid-1990s until the occupation of Maré by the Brazilian Military in April 2014 through the analysis of newspaper archives, oral histories with residents and gang members, and a dataset of anonymous gang denunciations. Following its integration into the Comando Vermelho faction, CVNH maintained a benevolent dictator regime, combining high levels of coercion with responsive benefits, until several years of warfare with their primary rival led to the use of extreme forms of coercion against residents as disorder prevailed. By 2004, the war between CVNH and Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) had ended though enforcement continued to be active and frequent, leading to a social bandit regime, in which the gang offered significant benefits and engaged in low levels of coercion. Then, following the resurgence of TCP in 2009 until the arrival of the Brazilian military, CVNH can be considered a benevolent dictator gang once again. They ramped up their coercive behavior in response to TCP’s more aggressive posture while providing significant benefits to avoid frequent police enforcement efforts.

The navigational freedoms are unavoidably curtailed to some degree in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as compared with the traditional high seas freedoms. One of the main reasons for this compromise was to accommodate coastal States’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the newly established maritime zone. Nevertheless, the limitation of the navigational freedoms by the coastal State can only be justified if they are made in accordance with the formula of the attribution of rights and freedoms in the EEZ and must be exercised in good faith and by giving due regard to the exercise of these freedoms and rights. It is noteworthy that coastal States have been able to utilise mechanisms developed by competent international organisations to adopt and implement some of these limitations through the rules of reference, particularly regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment from international shipping. This chapter first identifies the scope of the preserved freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, then examines how they may have been affected by the exercise of a coastal State’s rights and jurisdiction, before discusses the remedies to address these impacts.

Chapter 5 focuses on the enforcement of credit contractual agreements and questions the meaning of trust in credit networks. Despite the norms of solidarity, cooperation, and fairness that characterized pre-industrial society, breach of agreement did occur. When lenders and debtors had exhausted all the possibilities available to settle their disagreement, taking the matter to court was often the last resort. The aim was to recover the money owed, but often the emotional and social implications of a lawsuit went beyond the simple economic dimension. Throughout the period, the burden of debt increased rapidly, as well as the number of discontented creditors. The apparent dichotomy is intriguing: on the one hand, financial arrangements were flexible and renegotiable, but on the other, contract enforcement at court was sought after. These lawsuits are rich sources of information for the historian. They highlight the shortcomings and failures of debtors, and the (im)patience of creditors. But above all, they display the dynamics of complex and multiple layers of social and economic relationships. Overall, this chapter reconstructs both transactional and dispute resolution practices in

In practice, there are several obstacles to the application of the substantive legal framework analysed in the previous chapters. First, there is a risk of contractual provisions that deviate from the legal norm. The qualification of certain rules as mandatory law may prevent such contractual deviation. Even so, effective recourse to the protective regimes throughout the course of the contract is not guaranteed. Reference may be made to the possibility for corporate partners to have recourse to trade secret protection and the apparent limited invocation of the protective legal framework. Collective enforcement may contribute to enhanced transparency throughout the music value chain and counter musicians’ fear of commercial retaliation. Further bolstering extra-judicial enforcement is likely to fulfil an important complementary role.

This chapter brings together the research findings and answers the main research question, namely how the legal framework can contribute to a achieving a fair(er) balance between the interests of musicians and their main corporate partners. It summarises the potential bottom-up initiatives, as well as the possible regulatory action identified throughout the book.

This chapter tests observable implications of localized peace enforcement theory at the individual level using two experiments conducted in Mali. First, the chapter presents the results of a study designed to measure willingness to cooperate using a trust game where participants send money to an anonymous partner from a different ethnic group. A randomly assigned group of participants is told that two patrolling officers (from either the UN or France) will punish any low partner contributions with a fine. While the UN treatment increased participants’ willingness to cooperate, the France treatment had no effect. Follow-up interviews confirmed the importance of perceptions of the UN’s impartiality. Second, the chapter outlines the results of a survey that presents respondents with a vignette describing a communal dispute. Respondents were then randomly assigned to a control, UN, or French treatment group. Assignment to the UN treatment group – but not the French treatment group – reduced the likelihood that respondents said a communal dispute would escalate. To probe the plausibility of localized peace enforcement theory specifically, the chapter concludes with an analysis of specific questions about individuals’ perceptions of peacekeepers from the survey.