The endogenous money approach has a long history and development, but the proponents of Modern Monetary Theory point out that it can be extended by Chartalism and the leading role it gives to money created by the State. In this paper, we test this assertion by making a critical analysis of their contributions and reviewing the opposing positions. We conclude that, indeed, the integration of the endogenous money and state money views in a same theorical framework seems to offer a coherent explanation of monetary phenomena.

The green transition to reduce greenhouse gas emissions requires substantial investments in a narrow time window to avoid climate-related disruptions, adding two new dimensions for monetary policy and exacerbating the trade-offs that central banks face. First, climate-related physical disruptions lead to higher inflation (i.e., Climateflation). Second, the rush to green technology may result in inflation due to supply bottlenecks (i.e., Greenflation). As a consequence, central banks implement restrictive monetary policy that have a detrimental effect on the high up-front costs of renewable energy projects. This slows down the dynamics of green technologies adoption. We build a dynamic non-linear model to study these interactions under reasonable parameterizations. Both Climateflation and Greenflation are quantitatively significant, creating a dilemma for central banks between raising interest rates to counteract inflation and easing them to facilitate renewable investment. We further show that, under specific stochastic scenarios, the trade-off between inflation control and green transition can improve when structural costs for green technologies decrease or when supply-side constraints relax.

The rise of U.S. inflation in 2021 and 2022 and its partial subsiding have sparked debates about the relative role of supply and demand factors. The initial surge surprised many macroeconomists despite the unprecedented jump in money growth in 2020–21. We find that the relationship between consumption and the theoretically based Divisia M3 measure of money (velocity) can be well modeled both in the short- and long-runs. We use the estimated long-run relationship to calculate the deviation of actual velocity from its long-run equilibrium and incorporate it into a P-Star framework. Our model of velocity significantly improves the performance of the P-Star model relative to using a one-sided HP filter to calculate trend velocity as used by other researchers. We also include a global supply pressures index in the model and find that recent movements in U.S. inflation largely owed to aggregate demand driven macroeconomic factors that are tracked by Divisia money with a smaller role played by supply factors.

Within a new Keynesian model of monetary policy with both backward- and forward-looking variables, we investigate the impact of risk aversion by assuming that the central bank is endowed with recursive preferences à la Hansen and Sargent (Hansen and Sargent, 1995). We establish that, since in this model inflation and output are forward-looking, under discretion the optimal policy is found by solving two distinct fixed-point problems: the former pertains to the central bank’s optimization exercise, the latter to the identification of the equilibrium expectations of the forward-looking variables. We show that, in the presence of forward-looking variables, the optimal policy differs from the robust policy chosen by a central bank endowed with quadratic preferences and subject to Knightian uncertainty, confuting the equivalence established by Hansen and Sargent (2008) when only backward-looking variables enter into the laws of motion regulating the dynamics of the economic system. Through our analysis we show: i) how a risk-averse central bank selects a more aggressive policy than one furnished with the standard preferences of a canonical DSGE model; ii) that the “divine coincidence” established within traditional linear-quadratic formulations between inflation and output stabilization no longer holds.

This paper commemorates the 50th anniversary of the 1973 recession during Salvador Allende’s government by offering a comprehensive analysis of macroeconomic populism. Focusing on the lessons from this historical episode, it is argued that the lax economic policies in 1970 and 1971 triggered the boom of 1971, culminating in a financial crisis in 1972 and an economic recession in 1973. The examination encompasses an evaluation of Chilean macroeconomic populism, delving into the impact of these lax policies on the business cycle. Furthermore, it addresses prevalent misinterpretations of the 1973 recession in the context of recent Latin American events. The paper concludes by extrapolating broader insights from the Chilean experience, offering valuable lessons for shaping effective economic policies in Latin America.

We explore the international transmission of monetary policy and central bank information shocks originating from the United States and the euro area. Employing a panel vector autoregression, we use macroeconomic and financial variables across several major economies to address both static and dynamic spillovers. To identify structural shocks, we introduce a novel approach that combines external instruments with heteroskedasticity-based identification and sign restrictions. Our results suggest significant spillovers from European Central Bank and Federal Reserve policies to each other’s economies, global aggregates, and other countries. These effects are more pronounced for central bank information shocks than for pure monetary policy shocks, and the dominance of the US in the global economy is reflected in our findings.

This paper sets up a small open economy two-agent model and addresses the size of output multiplier of government spending associated with taxation either on constrained households or on unconstrained households. The paper shows that the tax financing rule matters to real resource allocations in the small open economy with flexible prices and equal tax burden at the steady state, contrasting to the finding of Monacelli and Perotti (2011) in closed economies. The output multiplier in open economies is larger than the multiplier in closed economies when taxes are levied on constrained households, while the reverse holds under taxations on unconstrained households.

Using US quarterly data (1967–2023), including inflation’s post-pandemic surge and decline alongside monetary policies characterized by quantitative easing before refocusing on the 2% target, we utilize traditional and novel econometric tools to assess the stability of key macroeconomic variables’ responses to monetary shocks. Our findings confirm the relevance of a broad Divisia aggregate in understanding monetary policy transmission and highlight its empirical importance in explaining output and price dynamics across decades. Time-varying impulse response functions (IRFs) reveal consistent and puzzle-free price responses to Divisia-based monetary shocks throughout the sample, aligning with theory. Time-varying IRFs indicate that pandemic-related outliers in GDP (2020Q2) do not disrupt results. In contrast, Fed Funds rate or shadow policy interest rate shocks often yield puzzling outcomes across earlier and extended periods.

This study develops a two-country New Keynesian model incorporating deep habits in consumption to analyze macroeconomic dynamics under the optimal coordinated monetary policy. The central bank adjusts interest rates more aggressively in response to structural shocks in an open economy than in a closed economy. Deep habits strengthen the central bank’s incentive to adjust terms of trade through interest rates due to habit formation and counter-cyclical markup behavior, creating price inelasticity in demand. Deep habits also lead to deviations from the law of one price, reflected in goods-specific real exchange rates, which the degree of home bias influences. Finally, this study compares international policy coordination to noncoordination to analyze welfare gains, showing that they depend on key structural factors like price rigidity, deep habits, and home bias. Policy coordination stabilizes domestic output and inflation by internalizing externalities in terms of trade and consumption.

Differences in labour market institutions and regulations between countries of the monetary union can cause divergent responses even to a common shock. We augment a multi-country model of the euro area with search and matching framework that differs across Ricardian and hand-to-mouth households. In this setting, we investigate the implications of cross-country heterogeneity in labour market institutions for the conduct of monetary policy in a monetary union. We compute responses to demand and supply shocks under the Taylor rule, asymmetric unemployment targeting, and average inflation targeting. For each rule we distinguish between cases with lower or higher weight on the unemployment gap. Across all rules, responding to unemployment leads to lower losses of employment. Responding to unemployment reduces cross-country differences within the monetary union and consumption inequality between rich and poor households within each country.

I investigate the welfare maximizing steady-state inflation rate in a heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian model with Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity (DNWR). After matching the annual wage change distribution in the U.S., I demonstrate that DNWR has a significant impact on the economy, particularly when the inflation target is set low. The optimal inflation rate is estimated to be as high as 8.8%, and increasing the inflation target to the optimal level yields a welfare gain of nearly 3.50%. While the results exhibit sensitivity to parameterization, a broad range of calibrations indicates that the optimal inflation rate is consistently above 3%.

This paper explores the role of the cost channel in a behavioral New Keynesian model where households and firms have different degrees of cognitive discounting. Our findings are summarized as follows. First, we demonstrate how the degree of cognitive discounting significantly affects the determinacy condition through the cost channel model. Second, a high degree of cognitive discounting attenuates the response of inflation to a monetary tightening shock, and the cost channel amplifies this effect. Third, the degree of cognitive discounting significantly impacts the effect of the cost channel on the design of optimal monetary policy.

This paper studies the role of central bank communication for the monetary policy transmission mechanism using text analysis techniques. In doing so, we derive sentiment measures from European Central Bank (ECB)’s press conferences indicating a dovish or hawkish tone referring to interest rates, inflation, and unemployment. We provide strong evidence for predictability of our sentiments on interbank interest rates, even after controlling for actual policy rate changes. We also find that our sentiment indicators offer predictive power for professionals’ expectations, the disagreement among them, and their uncertainty regarding future inflation as well as future interest rates. Policy communication shocks identified through sign restrictions based on our sentiment measure also have significant effects on real outcomes. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of the tone of central bank communication for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, but also indicate the necessity of refinements of the communication policies implemented by the ECB to better anchor inflation expectations at the target level and to reduce uncertainty regarding the future path of monetary policy.

In this paper, I propose a new method called the auxiliary state method (ASM) for solving highly nonlinear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with state variables that exhibit a non-elliptical ergodic distribution. The ASM method effectively avoids most improbable states that, while never visited, can create issues for numerical methods. I then demonstrate the ASM method by applying it to a model with highly asymmetric nominal rigidities, which are necessary to match the skewness of the U.S. inflation distribution. The ASM method can handle the high level of asymmetry, whereas the standard projection method cannot. Additionally, the ASM method is significantly faster than the standard projection method.

Incorporating environmental aspects in monetary and macroprudential policies poses a series of questions in terms of central banks’ effectiveness, independence, neutrality, and legitimacy. Most analyses of this matter rely on a purely economic approach, underestimating the trade-offs it entails and thus being biased in favor of central banks’ interventions. We develop a political-economy setting based on a Walsh contract, which can be interpreted as a memorandum that the government and central bank can implement. Through it, the former legitimizes, or pushes for, the intervention of the latter under the aegis of an elected authority. This setting eliminates the bias, unveiling the trade-offs that could result: accounting for and tackling climate risks could lead central banks to miss their policy targets, not necessarily making “brown” firms greener, and result in welfare distortions. Yet, thanks to this memorandum, the possibility of a green transition favored by the central bank is made possible. We conclude that central banks should keep a cautious stance when deciding to enter the climate arena, and that different evaluations of these risks can be interpreted as a reason why central banks around the world have adopted different degrees of climate interventionism.

Central banks are increasingly communicating their economic outlook in an effort to manage the public and financial market participants’ expectations. We provide original causal evidence that the information communicated and the assumptions underlying a central bank’s projection can matter for expectation formation and aggregate stability. Using a between-subject design, we systematically vary the central bank’s projected forecasts in an experimental macroeconomy where subjects are incentivized to forecast the output gap and inflation. Without projections, subjects exhibit a wide range of heuristics, with the modal heuristic involving a significant backward-looking component. Ex-Ante Rational dual projections of the output gap and inflation significantly reduce the number of subjects’ using backward-looking heuristics and nudge expectations in the direction of the rational expectations equilibrium. Ex-Ante Rational interest rate projections are cognitively challenging to employ and have limited effects on the distribution of heuristics. Adaptive dual projections generate unintended inflation volatility by inducing boundedly-rational forecasters to employ the projection and model-consistent forecasters to utilize the projection as a proxy for aggregate expectations. All projections reduce output gap disagreement but increase inflation disagreement. Central bank credibility is significantly diminished when the central bank makes larger forecast errors when communicating a relatively more complex projection. Our findings suggest that inflation-targeting central banks should strategically ignore agents’ irrationalities when constructing their projections and communicate easy-to-process information.

This paper introduces a global banking system in a small open economy DSGE model and features global relative price adjustments with incomplete asset market to investigate the role of international financial imperfections. We show that credit policy could be more powerful than monetary policy to alleviate foreign financial shocks since an expansionary monetary policy and alternative policy rules are not a sufficient tool in the global financial crisis. In particular, credit policy based on international credit spread outperforms credit policy based on domestic credit spread since the former attempts to remove distortions from international financial imperfections and reduces real costs of foreign loans. Accordingly, the lower costs of external finance further boost investment and effectively stabilize the economy without substantial asset purchases.

We study the effects of professionals’ survey-based inflation expectations on inflation for a large number of 36 economies, using dynamic cross-country panel estimation of New-Keynesian Phillips curves. We find that inflation expectations have a significantly positive effect on inflation. We also find that the effect of inflation expectations on inflation is significantly larger when inflation is higher. This suggests that second-round effects via the effects of higher inflation expectations on inflation are more relevant in a high-inflation environment.

This paper studies the dynamic interactions between the money supply and the shape of the yield curve in the context of a regime-switching latent factor model. Estimates show that the money supply has important implications for the level, slope, and curvature of the yield curve. Moreover, the Divisia aggregates can provide more information than simple-sum aggregates based on parameter estimates and impulse response functions in understanding the dynamics of the yield curve. The favored broad Divisia aggregate could especially be associated with changes in the yield curve’s level, slope, and curvature over the business cycle. Therefore, this paper highlights the important role of Divisia aggregates in the linkage between financial markets and monetary policy.

We investigate two findings in Gali and Monacelli (2016, American Economic Review): (i) the effectiveness of labor cost adjustments on employment is much smaller in a currency union and (ii) an increase in wage flexibility often reduces welfare, more likely in an economy that is part of a currency union. First, we introduce a distorted steady state into Gali and Monacelli’s small open economy model, in which employment subsidies making the steady state efficient are not available, and replicate their two findings. Second, an endogenous fiscal policy rule similar to that in Bohn (1998, Quarterly Journal of Economics) is introduced with a government budget constraint in the model. The results suggest that while Gali and Monacelli’s first finding is still applicable, their second finding is not necessarily valid. Therefore, an increase in wage flexibility may reduce welfare loss in an economy that is part of a currency union as long as wage rigidity is sufficiently high. Thus, there is scope to discuss how wage flexibility benefits currency unions.