This introduction argues against analyzing the Democrat Party in terms of strict binaries such as liberal–illiberal, center–periphery, secular–reactionary, or victim–perpetrator. While the divisions that scholars emphasize are real enough to affect the lives of people in Turkey, these divides are multiple and cross-cutting. Instead, I present an account of the Democrat Party, its role in Turkey’s democratization, and its engagement with the emerging Cold War order that is mindful of the divides in Turkey but that also acknowledges the party’s ability to transcend those divides – or, at least, embody their multiple contradictions. This book presents a portrait of the Democrat Party that encompasses these contradictions while also emphasizing Democrat Party leaders’ connections to the domestic political order that preceded them and to the international order of the 1950s.

This chapter weaves together the biographies of the Democrat Party’s four founders up until early 1946, when they established the party. Each of these founders (Mahmut Celal Bayar, Bekir Refik Koraltan, Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, and Ali Adnan Menderes) played an important role in Turkey’s politics long before their break with the single-party regime. While accounts of the Democrat Party typically note that these men had once been members of the regime, few accounts give more than thumbnail sketches. By contrast, this chapter emphasizes the extent of their involvement in the politics of both the late Ottoman Empire and the early Republic of Turkey, crafting economic, educational, and legal institutions.

This chapter covers 1946–50, when the Democrat Party challenged the ruling Republican People’s Party, looking at some of the young activists whose efforts helped the party achieve victory. These include Samet Ağaoğlu, a well-connected bureaucrat and intellectual, who played a key role in promoting the Democrat Party as a “liberal” party seeking to limit the role of the state. The chapter also looks beyond campaigns in Istanbul and Ankara to consider the ways in which the party took shape in the provinces, specifically Balıkesir and Malatya. The first was a province on the west coast with a majority Sunni/Turkish population; the second was an eastern province with a sizeable Kurdish/Alevi population. In both cases, we see that political parties were closely allied with wealthy landowners, and the difference in affiliation tended to depend on which local faction had established a closer relationship with the state c. 1946. In other words, while intellectuals such as Ağaoğlu promoted the DP as an anti-statist party, in tune with postwar liberalism, we see from early on that, at the provincial level, supporters were more concerned with who controlled the state.

This chapter summarizes the main findings, arguments, and contributions of the book. It reviews the theoretical arguments and discusses promising avenues for further research on revolution and counterrevolution. Then it explains how the book’s findings speak to a number of scholarly and public debates. First, for scholars of violence and nonviolence, who have argued that unarmed civil resistance is more effective at toppling autocrats than armed conflict, the book raises questions about the tenacity of the regimes established through these nonviolent movements. Second, it speaks to scholarship on democratization, highlighting the important differences between transitions effected through elite pacts versus those brought about through revolutionary mobilization. Third, it offers lessons about how foreign powers can help or hinder the consolidation of new democracies. Next, the chapter discusses implications for Egypt and the broader Middle East, including the possibility that future revolutions might avoid the disappointing fates of the 2011 revolutions. The chapter ends by reflecting on what the book has to say about our current historical moment, when rising rates of counterrevolution appear to be only one manifestation of a broader resurgence of authoritarian populism and reactionary politics worldwide.

Chapter 1 introduces the main arguments, findings, and contributions of the book. Counterrevolution is a subject that has often been overlooked by scholars, even as counterrevolutions have been responsible for establishing some of history’s most brutal regimes, for cutting short experiments in democracy and radical change, and for perpetuating vicious cycles of conflict and instability. The chapter reveals some of the most important statistics from the book’s original dataset of counterrevolution worldwide. These statistics raise a number of puzzling questions, which motivate the theoretical argument about counterrevolutionary emergence and success. After previewing this argument, the chapter discusses the main contributions of the book, including to theories of revolution, democratization, and nonviolence; to ongoing debates about Egypt’s revolution and the failures of the 2011 Arab Spring; and to our understanding of the present-day resurgence of authoritarianism worldwide. It finishes by laying out the multi-method research strategy and providing an overview of the chapters to come.

The expansion of the press in the late nineteenth century – Britain and America leading the way; Germany and other countries soon following – reinforced its self-proclaimed role as representative of the public. Politicians could no longer ignore newspapers and needed to (appear to) take into account public opinion. However, sensitivity to news related to the security of a political position: monarchs remained most shielded from public opinion and the press, followed by non-elected insiders, non-elected outsiders, elected insiders, and elected outsiders. Both journalists and politicians posited that ‘the press’ shaped the parameters of political manoeuvrability and provided politicians with the daily information needed to perform their duties. Politicians’ choice of newspapers, seen to affect their decisions, became subject to debate in newspapers themselves. Politicians were portrayed as bourgeois readers, reinforcing their participation in an imagined community of readership that developed in this period, particularly in the major urban centres. Despite the expectation to heed the voice of the people, journalists also expected politicians to stand above the clamour of the press and to lead public opinion in pursuit of national interests. In response to these contradictory expectations, politicians increasingly sought to steer the press themselves.

The Age of Empire formed a historical window of opportunity in which mass media and imperial politics temporarily coalesced to create a new kind of ‘publicity politician’ in a system of ‘transnational media politics’. Mass media expanded the scope of politics, and media politics encompassed political subsystems such as government politics, party politics, and monarchical politics. While Wilhelm II, Bülow, Chamberlain, Rhodes, Leopold II, and Roosevelt were particularly media-savvy or mediagenic, they shaped the system of media politics, setting standards for both their contemporaries and successors. Media became central to the acquisition and exercise of political power. Politicians became media consumers, media influencers, and media objects. Throughout history, political leaders had publicized themselves through various media, but now media management became central to politics, making leaders visible to the public on a global scale impossible before. This heightened visibility was crucial to politicians’ survival in this new era of mass democracy. Media-savviness, mediageneity, or media celebrity alone did not suffice for survival – the publicity politician combined these qualities. The direct mediation of politics contained the seeds of both democratization and de-democratization, and subsequent media developments reinforced this paradoxical potential over the course of the next century.

This chapter examines the intended and unintended consequences of American hierarchy on partner states. It analyzes the impact of increased state capacity resulting from American economic hierarchy on civil conflict, human rights, democratization, and inequality. The results suggest that economic hierarchy reduces conflict, human rights abuses, and promotes democracy primarily through direct effects rather than via increased state capacity. However, both economic and security hierarchy exacerbate political inequalities. The chapter highlights the complex implications of American hierarchy.

This brief conclusion summarizes the main thesis of the book, noting that both conservative and progressive critiques of social media lack strong empirical justifications, and that many if not most of the regulatory proposals directed at social media are not only likely to be found unconstitutional, but are also wrong-headed. It then argues that it is time we all accept that the old, pre-social media world of gatekeepers is over; and further, that this development has important, positive implications for the democratization of public discourse in ways that free speech theory supports. Finally, the Conclusion analogizes the modern hysteria over the growth of social media to earlier panics over changes in communications technology, such as the inventions of the printing press and of moving pictures. As with those earlier panics, this one too is overblown and ignores the positive potential impacts of technological change.

The Introduction introduces the central research questions of the study and summarizes the main arguments. It also lays out the research design and discusses the key concepts and how it measures them. Finally, it provides summaries of all of the chapters in the book.

While not ignoring individual differences, this book assumes that generalizations can be made across the different processes of school adjustment. Following a short overview of the history of schooling, this chapter discusses what the term “school” stands for and the essential features that turn any setting into “school.” The origin of the word is the Greek word scholē, which stands for “leisure.” However, in most modern schools the emphasis is on working hard and gaining knowledge. Interestingly, across the various formats, goals, and articulations of school throughout history, several aspects are common: institutional life, adults’ decisions, transfer of knowledge, skills acquisition, fluency in languages, delivery of values, exposure to social life, and invasion into students’ private life. The differences between schools appear in the level of intensity that each of the components gains within a given school, rather than a completely different conceptualization of what the term school stands for. Thus, these suggested universal components are of special importance to understand students’ school adjustment.

Chapter 1 lays out the central theoretical arguments of the book. It argues that three factors played a key role in the emergence of democracy in region: the professionalization of the military, the rise of strong opposition parties, and splits within the ruling party. It analyzes what led to the professionalization of the military and the rise of strong opposition parties and it shows how they led to varying regime outcomes in different South American countries. This chapter also discusses why existing theories of democratization cannot fully explain the emergence of democracy in the region

The Conclusion summarizes the main arguments in the book and discusses to what extent the factors that shaped regime outcomes in the early twentieth century mattered post-1929. It also examines the broader theoretical implications of the book, analyzes the extent to which the arguments work in Mexico and Central America, and lays out an agenda for future research on historical democratization.

The worldwide scope and depth of the present international system and its sense of legitimacy have not been applied in the same way everywhere. There is still much diversity among countries and the courses of action and the policies that they embrace. This explains, in part, the tensions and disagreements concerning the nature and dynamic of this international system as well as the claims of legitimacy in it. The redistribution of power currently underway at the international level, epitomized by the rise of China, could create more stress in the future. Nevertheless, overlooking the scope and depth of the present international order and its culture of legitimacy would be a mistake. The scope and depth of the present international order and its culture of legitimacy are the manifestations and the products of the following elements working together: position of power dominance, means of penetration and integration, values and norms, and secularization and democratization.

Chapter 2 situates the activism of La Fulana and Free Gender in historical contexts. The chapter draws on the theoretical framework of the previous chapter to argue that an intersectional approach illuminates the roles that race, class, and gender have played alongside sexuality in the historical process of constructing citizenship. The chapter advances this argument first with examination of the construction of the colonial state in each context, which instantiated strong norms of race, class, gender, and sexuality. The chapter then shows how these interlocking systems of power mediate organizations’ contemporary interactions with the political system, with other social movement organizations, and with opposition and oppositional discourse. The chapter discusses each of these factors for both organizations, first showing how the democratic transitions and adoption of human rights discourse affected La Fulana and Free Gender’s identity strategizing by providing new political and discursive opportunities. Next, the chapter explains how La Fulana’s and Free Gender’s interactions with the broader LGBT movement influenced their identity strategizing. Finally, the chapter explores the impact of anti-LGBT opposition and oppositional discourses on each organization’s identity strategies.