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Central to all the cases studied in this book is a power struggle between business, workers and communities over rights, norms and resources. Business strategies erode community strength and divide communities and co-opt nationalist and development narratives. Business models reduce transparency and obfuscate their responsibility. Applying the fields of struggle lens, Chapter 5 explores the factors that enable some communities and workers to achieve remedy, however rare and minimal. As might be expected, success is driven by cohesion and solidarity within worker and community groups, as well as robust networks with sustained local and international networks of campaigners. Notably, the analysis also reveals that in the cases we examined where some remedy was achieved, elite business networks or key businesses in value chains espoused ethical and sustainable business norms, which were leveraged effectively by civil society networks to provide the basis for (albeit fragile) alliances between civil society and business networks against errant businesses harming communities and worker groups. Non-judicial mechanisms, as interventions in these struggles, were most helpful when they not only added their normative weight to the grievance but also reshaped the boundaries of the field to integrate and legitimate supportive allies.
In this chapter, we turn our attention to labor unions and their role in providing countervailing power. Congress recognized the consequences of individual employees having to negotiate with large employers. For the most part, individual employees have no bargaining power and face all-or-nothing offers that reflect monopsony power. Consequently, Congress passed legislation that would permit employees to unionize and thereby create a labor monopoly. The idea was to level the playing field so workers could not be abused. This chapter provides a brief review of the statutes and the scope of the labor exemption.
The formation of a union converts a monopsony into a bilateral monopoly. The economic effects of a bilateral monopoly are generally positive. Employment and output expand. Thus, both employees and consumers are better off. We explain this analysis and illustrate it with reference to professional sports. This chapter also explores the antitrust conundrum arising from bilateral monopoly.
In some situations, it may be advantageous for a government to allow buyers or sellers to cooperate on prices and output to keep a lawful monopolist or a lawful monopsonist, respectively, in check. Although it may seem anticompetitive at first, allowing this behavior is a way to even the playing field and can lead to a socially optimal solution. The parties will find it in their mutual self-interest to select the quantity that maximizes the surplus, which is the competitive quantity. This market structure with actors on both sides acting as a single monopolist is known as bilateral monopoly. In many local markets for physician services, reimbursement rates (payment for services) are dictated by large health insurers who wield monopsony power. In an effort to blunt the buying power enjoyed by the health insurer, physicians have attempted to collectively bargain for the sole purpose of negotiating reimbursement rates. In this chapter, we examine the case for collective bargaining by physicians.
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