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In line with Singapore’s vision of the separation of powers, the courts’ duty is primarily to give effect to domestic law; the political branches take the lead in engaging with international law. A study of Singapore’s interface with international law would therefore be incomplete were it to consider only the courts’ role and not the political branches’ model of international law as primarily a guarantor of Singapore’s sovereignty and standing as a participant on the international stage. The political branches have been circumspect in engaging with international law in other areas, such as human rights, preferring a specifically Singaporean vision of rights. A symmetry emerges: the courts and political branches engage strongly with sovereignty-related norms; take other areas of international law as inspiration for developing domestic law; and take human rights law seriously even as their fidelity is ultimately to a specifically Singaporean legal framework for rights protection.
Chapter 9 examines the principle of the duty of care in the context of climate litigation. The authors explore how this principle has been invoked in a growing range of jurisdictions, in different ways, to hold governments and corporations accountable for their respective contributions to climate change. By analysing judicial decisions in prominent cases such as Urgenda and Milieudefensie in the Netherlands, Neubauer in Germany, and Notre Affaire à Tous in France, the authors explore the potential of the duty of care principle to compel more ambitious climate action in pending and future cases. The emerging best practice they identify suggests a growing willingness of courts to recognise a duty of care for governments and corporations towards citizens in relation to climate change.
How should a constitutional state – one that respects subjects’ basic rights – treat civil disobedients? This chapter presents and critically engages with some of the most prominent answers legal scholars, political theorists, and philosophers have given to this question. On what I call punitive approaches, which I present in section 1, civil disobedience is first and foremost an act of resistance that threatens the constitutional order, and thus a public wrong worthy of punishment. Theorists of civil disobedience have challenged this approach since the 1960s, especially by conceiving of civil disobedience as a kind of dissent, which liberal democratic societies ought to and can ‘make room’ for. Sections 2 and 3 examine these ‘constitutionalizing’ approaches, with section 2 focusing on the case for leniency, and section 3 on the case for broad accommodation. Section 4 examines the costs of constitutionalizing approaches and reclaims the understanding of civil disobedience as a kind of resistance, alongside its uncivil counterparts, that is sometimes justified and even necessary in constitutional democracies.
“Cost-benefit analysis” (CBA) denotes the class of qualitative or quantitative methodologies that evaluate governmental policy choices in light of overall well-being. CBA plays a major role in non-constitutional U.S. public law. Executive agencies are required by Presidential order to employ CBA; courts construe ambiguous statutory language as permitting or requiring CBA; and courts also frequently find that administrative agencies’ mistakes in applying CBA are “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act. By contrast, CBA plays virtually no role in US constitutional law. It is generally absent not only from constitutional rights doctrine, but also from separation-of-powers and federalism doctrines. If overall well-being indeed plays a significant ethical role in determining the ethical status of governmental choices – which is what would justify the centrality of CBA to non-constitutional U.S. public law – its absence from constitutional law is quite puzzling. This can’t be justified by the premise that constitutional rights “trump” overall well-being (since CBA is absent even from those various parts of constitutional law where no such trumps are in play); nor the Constitution’s text (since the actual practice of the Supreme Court is only loosely textualist); nor original meaning (since the Court’s doctrines, on many questions, are not originalist); nor democratic legitimacy (since the Court could accommodate democratic legitimacy via a deferential version of CBA).
Constitutional rights are often seen as invitations to engage in all things considered moral reasoning about how public authorities should act. The Impasse of Constitutional Rights challenges this widely accepted view by showing that it generates an irresolvable deadlock between rival theories of constitutional rights that share the same defects. This Element develops the alternative idea that rights-based constitutional order has its own distinctive moral project, which consists in rendering public authority accountable to the inherent rights of each legal subject. Taking this project seriously requires reconceiving the basic building blocks of rights-based constitutional order: justification, purposive interpretation, and proportionality. The resulting account both escapes the impasse to which the leading contemporary theories of constitutional rights succumb and expounds the normative connection between rights-based constitutional order and its most fundamental doctrines.
This chapter argues that, in practice, a constitutionalized right to vote does not on its own provide a guarantee that the right to vote will be meaningful. The right to vote is both multidimensional and institutional, which suggests that that the subconstitutional components of the right make a far greater difference to the reality of voting than the bare fact that the right is constitutionalized. As a normative matter, however, constitutions should recognize the right to vote. A constitutionalized right to vote plays a crucial expressive function by promoting democratic values. However, the expressive function of constitutional rights can, paradoxically, undermine democracy by providing autocrats in competitive authoritarian regimes with democratic cover while they are undermining constitutional safeguards. That being said, the right to vote, even when heavily manipulated, may nonetheless exert some constraints on elected autocrats. For this reason, the claim that the right to vote ought to be constitutionalized is normatively justifiable.
This chapter explores the principal constitutional challenges to laws that regulate unhoused persons and public property. Municipal ordinances have been challenged on the grounds that they are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, impose cruel and unusual punishments, violate the right to travel, or infringe the right to equality. This chapter discusses the successes and shortfalls of these challenges. Its concluding parts discuss how U.S. and Canadian courts have rejected a positive right to housing.
This chapter touches upon the very large topic of how individual rights interact with the police power. In what sense and to what degree do rights contravene state and local exercises of the police power? It is a shibboleth that regulatory power is constrained by rights. But this chapter interrogates these issues in more depth and detail, by discussing how rights claims are framed in connection with the police power and how the government’s assertions of power are circumscribed by particular doctrines and arguments in courts. Further, the chapter considers how the debate over the nature and content of so-called positive rights implicates the police power questions, questions concerning authority and content.
This article details the concept of constitutional embedding and demonstrates its utility in four country-rights cases. Constitutional embedding refers to the process by which some understanding of constitutional rights comes to take root in everyday life, moving from words on paper to something that shapes expectations and behavior. The degree of constitutional embedding varies along two dimensions: social and legal, or how individuals and groups operating in the social sphere understand and relate to constitutional rights, and how those working in the formal legal sphere do so. In a global political climate defined by democratic backsliding, powerful vested interests, and backlash against moves toward equality, the status of constitutional rights and how they become and remain embedded is doubly important. The constitutional embedding framework highlights how interactions between legal elites and ordinary citizens constitute the extent to which constitutional law influences daily life. The framework has broad applicability across contexts and rights domains.
This article explores the global spread of domestic codifications of academic freedom norms by mapping constitutional provisions over time and space. Drawing on the new Academic Freedom in Constitutions dataset, the study evaluates several hypotheses that may explain the norm’s geographically diverse, yet comparatively limited, adoption in 52 per cent of constitutions today. The descriptive analysis of constitutional adoption patterns suggests that the as yet large pockets of absence are a result of the fact that academic freedom was not included as a fundamental right from the early days of constitution-making, combined with its close link to higher education development, thus locking many countries into a path dependency of early constitutions exclusive of academic freedom norms. The availability of relevant models in nearby countries, together with higher education expansion, are key facilitators of academic freedom adoption at the critical time of a constitutional reform process. Diverse countries in different regions acted as norm entrepreneurs, often motivated to domestically protect academic freedom, thus leading to the emergence of regional and other clusters of academic freedom reference types. A sizeable proportion of insincere adopters further suggests that, in some regions, academic freedom serves as a legitimizing international norm.
Despite the growing influence of constitutional rights over the regulation of horizontal (private) relations, many aspects of this trend remain under-theorized. This article criticizes four ideal-typical constitutional horizontality models for failing to accommodate moral reasons that must shape this regulatory practice: the state action model ignores basic consequentialist aspects of political morality; the direct application model ignores basic relational aspects of interpersonal morality; the strong indirect model recognizes both but subordinates the latter to the former; and the partitioned indirect model recognizes both but separates them too strongly. This article claims that a composite indirect model, which reflects basic features of the common law, can better realize constitutional rights through private law in conditions of moral pluralism: it can expose private law to constitutional rights-based and reform-oriented scrutiny without ignoring, eroding, or distorting the unique normativity of private relations and practices or their underlying values.
Young people are increasingly impacted by the effects of the climate crisis, which are causing significant mental health harms. They are aware that government policies and decision-making have furthered reliance on fossil fuels, even in the face of the known dangers of climate change. To protect their human rights and future well-being, young people are turning to courts to hold their governments accountable for protecting their rights to a life-sustaining climate. Some courts around the world are granting young people access to seek remedies, while in other places, including the United States, such access is still denied. While access to justice is vital, young people have yet to see courts use the best available climate science as the basis for defining and protecting their rights. This article explores the obstacles young people face today in seeking and obtaining legal remedies, identifies human rights that are implicated by the climate crisis, and discusses why access to courts is a crucial aspect of the quest for a legally binding, science-based legal remedy for climate change that protects the rights of young people.
This chapter explores the question of what it means for a lawmaking institution to speak and act in our name. We maintain that different institutions can do so in different ways; even identical laws may have different meanings and significance depending on their institutional source.
We challenge the commonly held assumption that the institutional source of a legal norm – be it the constitution, legislation, and so on – does not affect its nature. We argue that institutions are not merely vessels through which norms get public recognition. When different institutions use identically worded norms, say, “everyone is equally entitled to X,” they may nevertheless produce different norms and provide different goods. For instance, a constitutional protection of a basic right differs from a statutory right to the same right, not because the former is less likely to be changed but because a constitutional decision marks the right in question as one that makes no essential reference to the actual choice of the majority of the political community. We extend this argument to other institutional settings, especially the common law tradition of judge-made law. We further discuss the doctrinal implications of the argument, defending a new kind of remedy: institutional remedies.
In Chile, many commentators, academics and political leaders have spent years arguing that the limited nature of the social rights in the national constitution is partially responsible for the country’s economic and social inequality. It is thus unsurprising that changing the scope of the country’s social rights was a major focus of the recently failed constitutional reform effort. However, we argue that the long-running claim that Chile’s social problems were due to the limited nature of social rights can be thought of as social rights scapegoating, by which we mean that commentators blamed outcomes on constitutional rights, even though there is little evidence that countries’ socio-economic outcomes are a product of their social rights.
UK public law is often viewed as a sophisticated power struggle between rival institutions, an approach encouraged by the assumption that the law is ultimately dependent on such contingencies as the existence of an official consensus about its sources. From that perspective, legal judgments should be read as strategic moves within the political power-game. We can make better sense of public law if, instead, we interpret it as the articulation and enforcement of standards of legitimate governance, inspired by universal ideals of individual freedom and human dignity. The rule of Law denies the legal validity of arbitrary, unjustified assertions of power inimical to those ideals. Positive law is, at root, an instantiation of natural law, as the interplay of legal rule and underlying principle, characteristic of common law reasoning, confirms. There are important implications for our understanding of the constitutional foundations of judicial review, the limits of parliamentary sovereignty, the nature of the principle of legality, and the scope and content of fundamental rights.
The right to petition was the ‘cornerstone’ of all other liberties, petitioners frequently argued. In the UK the right to petition was based on precedent, conventions and popular constitutionalism and was not, as in polities established in revolutionary contexts, a codified constitutional right derived from the idea of popular sovereignty. The right to petition was a contested right formed through a continuous, dynamic struggle between petitioners and Parliament. The right to petition was open to all subjects, and not limited by class, gender, race, literary, property or the franchise. There was little restriction of the content, as opposed to the form, of petitions to Parliament, and the decreasing limitations on petitioning in relation to association and assembly, ensured it became the key mode in connecting, legitimating and underpinning other political activities. Finally, petitioners successfully pressed for a popular, open right to petition, but politicians were able to resist attempts to expand the right of petition into a right of presence or audience. The contest over the right to petition was one of the ways in which politicians sought to retain their discretion and uphold parliamentary sovereignty while acknowledging popular rights.
This chapter explores how proportionality analysis has been incorporated into the case law of the Chilean Constitutional Court and what role it has played in the review of bills that sought the introduction of transformative policies in the country. The analysis contrasts judicial reasoning in cases that are part of ordinary practice and in landmark rulings where important projects of the progressive agenda were at stake. We suggest that, while proportionality has been applied inconsistently in both ordinary and high-profile cases, in the latter, it becomes part of the different strategies that the Court uses to mediate political conflicts. Proportionality works here more as a rhetorical tool than as a method of judicial reasoning, and the outcomes of the cases seem to depend more on the political composition of the Court at the time of the decision, the strength of citizen demand for changes and the influence that interest groups exert on the Court.
The literature on America’s unwritten constitution is rigorous and compelling, but it tends to focus almost entirely on how the federal Constitution has evolved through informal processes. In this chapter, I argue that our understanding of America’s unwritten constitution would be improved if we broadened the inquiry to include state constitutions. Unlike the federal Constitution, where Article V’s near-impossible amendment rules force essentially all reforms into informal pathways, the states have designed amendment rules and facilitated political cultures that encourage frequent formal amendment of constitutional text. Consequently, to the extent that unwritten constitutional commitments exist in the states, they are not the product of necessity, and they may shed new light on how constitutional rules evolve. In this chapter, I show that in various significant areas, states have indeed fostered robust unwritten constitutions and that state constitutionalism is characterized by a complex, competitive, and highly contextual interaction between codified and unwritten constitutional commitments.
With its emphasis on emerging and cutting-edge debates in the study of comparative constitutional law and politics, its suitability for both research and teaching use, and its distinguished and diverse cast of contributors, this handbook is a must-have for scholars and instructors alike. This versatile volume combines the depth and rigor of a scholarly reference work with features for teaching in law and social science courses. Its interdisciplinary case-study approach provides political and historical as well as legal context: each modular chapter offers an overview of a topic and a jurisdiction, followed by a case study that simultaneously contextualizes both. Its forward-looking and highly diverse selection of topics and jurisdictions fills gaps in the literature on the Global South as well as the West. A timely section on challenges to liberal constitutional democracy addresses pressing concerns about democratic backsliding and illiberal and/or authoritarian regimes.
This chapter discusses legal-ethical challenges posed by the emergence of emotional artificial intelligence (AI) and its manipulative capabilities. The focus lies on the European legal framework and on the use of emotional AI for commercial business-to-consumer purposes, although some observations are also valid for the public sector, or in the context of political micro-targeting or fake news. On the basis of a literature review, the chapter addresses privacy and data protection concerns, challenges to individual autonomy and human dignity as overarching values. It also presents a number of responses, specifically those suggesting the introduction of new (constitutional) rights to mitigate the potential negative effects of such developments and it provides the foundation for a future research agenda in that direction.