Chapter 5, makes the case for labelling the period of 1979–1989 the ‘defining decade’ in the history of the Convention.

It shows how, after decades of hesitation, the courts sprang into action in the eighties and unleashed a veritable avalanche of legal activity. They were supported by the recently formed professional academic study of (European) human rights, and went further than had previously been considered possible.

Yet as European human rights emerged as legalized tools, they also lost the revolutionary appeal which had made them into a desirable action language. The shift in the 1980s was, in that sense, a limited expansion.

Even so, it was simultaneously the decade in which governmental support, which had been substantive in the previous decade, wavered. Although the government had been crucial in the activation of the system, a caution surrounding the activities of the European Court began to seep in during the eighties, not just in the Netherlands but also in the other signatory states. As the activities of the European Court of Human Rights seemed to be expanding the reach of European human rights, it is vital to note these were consistently met with brakes from the states.

This chapter examines the political control mechanisms under the European Convention on Human Rights, focusing on the role of the Committee of Ministers and the judicialization of the supervisory process. It discusses the legal framework governing the supervision of the implementation of the European Court of Human Rights’ judgments, the increasing involvement of the Court in the execution process, and the impact of these developments on ensuring compliance with human rights standards. The chapter also explores the challenges and opportunities in balancing political and judicial oversight and the role of various stakeholders in the implementation process.

This chapter examines how the Council of Europe sought to promote the rule of law in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev’s ambition to construct a “common European home,” to be pursued in concert with European states and international organizations, was advanced by Russian president Boris Yeltsin and, at least initially, by his successor as president, Vladimir Putin. But after roughly a decade of concrete reforms, that effort foundered, reversed, and then collapsed. Russia descended again into authoritarianism and, shortly after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe. Thus, this story now has a beginning, a middle, and an end. This chapter explores that story and how the dynamics of Russia’s pursuit and rocky course of membership in the Council of Europe affected both the Russian state and the international organization that sought to admit it to membership.

Chapter 6 propose the CoE pursues a more proactive, judicious, rapprochement with areas of conflict in Europe in line with the object and purpose of the organisation. This rapprochement requires political will, but can be substantially shaped by and based on the vision and associated initiatives of the Secretary General. It seeks to reflect on several legal, political or operational activities might contribute to satisfying the ordre public imperative described in Chapter 3. The objective is to begin to identify practical initiatives which could be pursued in accordance with the Statute to enable progress in a fully impartial, standards-based manner.

Chapter 3 considers the concept of shared, or collective, responsibility, a term which developed its own ambiguous ecosystem over the ten-year Interlaken process, but which reduced its meaning to an overly narrow focus on the ECHR control system. I propose that the protection of human rights in grey zones is a matter of first principles, which requires us to consider the object and purpose of the Council of Europe, which itself was established as a direct consequence of war. I argue that systemic and persistent limitations in the functioning of the broader CoE system in areas of conflict must consequently change the nature of the response. I suggest that such situations give rise to an ordre public imperative shared amongst all Member States. I further suggest that public order, when used as a tool for the intra-territorial effectiveness of the ECHR, constitutes a legal norm as it creates an exception to the state’s right to act voluntarily (i.e. it limits the possibility to declare a diminished level of responsibility for a particular region) on one hand, and it generates an imperative to act collectively, on the other.