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This chapter explores the growing economic influence of China and its implications for state development. It develops a measure of China’s economic hierarchy and finds that Chinese support increases state capacity through different mechanisms than American hierarchy, primarily by enabling leaders to remain in power longer. The chapter also examines the interaction between American and Chinese economic hierarchies, revealing that their coexistence can undermine state capacity. It discusses the future trajectory of Chinese influence and its potential impact on partner states.
During the 1970s–1980s, “self-reliance” (al-i‘timad al-thati/al-i‘timad ‘ala al-nafis) or “auto-centric” was a central Arab (and indeed Third World) theory of development. Thinkers and institutions broke with models of import-substitution and export-oriented industrialization that dominated developmental planning in republics and right-wing regimes, stemming from notions of development based on integration with the capitalist world system. They created a model implicitly or explicitly based on the Chinese experience of agrarian reform, self-reliance, and sovereign industrialization as the necessary steps to rupture with colonial underdevelopment. These economists, sociologists, and agronomists developed anticolonial and anti-imperialist theories of development based on self-reliance vis-à-vis macroeconomic architecture, technology, agriculture, and industrialization. This essay offers a preliminary genealogy of those ideas, tracing the emergence of these theories across space and time, through the work of major Arab thinkers such as Samir Amin, Mohamed Dowidar, Azzam Mahjoub, and Ismail-Sabri Abdallah.
To explore the longitudinal associations between an Chinese healthy diet and the progression of cardiometabolic multimorbidity (CMM) development among Chinese adults. A prospective analysis was conducted utilizing data from 18,720 participants in the China Health and Nutrition Survey, spanning from 1997 to 2018. Dietary data were collected by three consecutive 24-hour dietary recalls combined with weighing method. An Chinese healthy diet score was developed by assigning scores to various food components. CMM was defined as the coexistence of two or more cardiometabolic diseases (CMDs), including myocardial infarction, stroke, and type 2 diabetes, diagnosed through blood indicators and clinical diagnosis. We employed a multistate model to examine the associations between the Chinese healthy diet and the longitudinal progression from being free of CMDs to first cardiometabolic disease (FCMD), then to CMM. Quantile G-computation was utilized to evaluate the relative contribution of each food component. Over a median follow-up period of 7.3 years, 2,214 (11.8%) participants developed FCMD, 156 (0.83%) progressed to CMM. Comparing participants in the highest quintile of dietary scores to those in the lowest, we observed a 55% lower risk of transitioning from baseline to CMM (HR = 0.45, 95% CI: 0.23 - 0.87), and a 60% lower risk of transition from FCMD to CMM (HR = 0.40, 95% CI: 0.20 - 0.81). Fresh fruits contributed to 42.8% and 43.0% for delaying CMM and transition from FCMD to CMM, respectively. Our study revealed that greater adherence to the Chinese healthy diet is negatively associated with the risk of CMM.
The upbringing and professional career of Wu Jian (1462–1506) and his uncle, Wu Cong, shed light on two key issues. First is the gradual transformation of merit nobles within the Ming polity, particularly their role in dynastic defenses. Second is the dynasty’s continued efforts to secure military ability through instituting new practices, including the education and training of young merit nobles and entrusting capable civil officials with substantial military responsibilities. Before turning to Wu Jian’s career, however, we first consider the experiences of his mother and other women, whose abilities both in managing large, complex households and negotiating with the dynastic state, were essential to the fortunes of all merit noble families.
Recounting the experiences of Wu Ruyin and his son, Wu Weiying, who between them held the title of Marquis of Gongshun in succession from 1599 to 1643, this chapter and the preceding one address two overarching issues. First, they explore how institutions and administrators persevere amidst crisis. It may be tempting to caricature late Ming bureaucrats as obdurately clinging to the past, but men like Wu Ruyin and Wu Weiying adapted to new demands by incorporating new technologies and new ways within established frameworks. Few felt the need to abandon the “institutions of the imperial forefathers.” Second, these chapters examine the place of merit nobles in late Ming society. Wu Ruyin and Wu Weiying were not men of the people, but by function of their social circles, they actively engaged in the capital’s broader cultural activities, and by virtue of their jobs as senior military administrators, they commanded surprisingly detailed information about common soldiers and officers, war captives and refugees, and even rumors circulating through Beijing. This chapter first examines Wu Ruyin’s role as the emperor’s representative in ceremony, which included officiating at rituals, offering prayers, and hosting banquets, and second, considers his experiences as a military administrator in a time of acute challenges.
Using Wu Jin’s tenure as Marquis of Gongshun from 1449 to 1461, this chapter explores issues of ability and difference in a time of upheaval at the Ming court. It traces the Wu family as it shifted from immigrant family at the empire’s western edge to members of the capital elite. The chapter also explores the divergent experiences of other Mongolians and merit noble families within the Ming polity.
Recounting the experiences of Wu Ruyin and his son, Wu Weiying, who between them held the title of Marquis of Gongshun in succession from 1599 to 1643, this chapter and the next address two overarching issues. First, they explore how institutions and administrators persevere amidst crisis. It may be tempting to caricature late Ming bureaucrats as obdurately clinging to the past, but men like Wu Ruyin and Wu Weiying adapted to new demands by incorporating new technologies and new ways within established frameworks. Few felt the need to abandon the “institutions of the imperial forefathers.” Second, these chapters examine the place of merit nobles in late Ming society. Wu Ruyin and Wu Weiying were not men of the people, but by function of their social circles, they actively engaged in the capital’s broader cultural activities, and by virtue of their jobs as senior military administrators, they commanded surprisingly detailed information about common soldiers and officers, war captives and refugees, and even rumors circulating through Beijing. This chapter first examines Wu Ruyin’s role as the emperor’s representative in ceremony, which included officiating at rituals, offering prayers, and hosting banquets, and second, considers his experiences as a military administrator in a time of acute challenges.
Using Wu Jijue’s career as a focal point, this chapter explores the power of appointment, the process of assessment, and the culture of patronage, before offering a few overarching observations about Wu Jijue’s experiences and what they say about China in the second half of the sixteenth century. The chapter also throws into clear relief how dramatically contemporary perceptions of the Wu family had changed from the early fifteenth century to the late sixteenth century. Once newly arrived immigrants at the edge of the realm whose Mongolian names and origins were obvious to all, the Wu family were now unquestionably “one-percenters,” a capital family ranking among the elites of the elites and whose foreign origins were completely overshadowed by its century-old ties to the imperial throne and service in the highest echelons of the dynastic administration.
The Wu family’s experiences illustrate in clear and human terms how institutions change over time. Far from lapsing into an ornamental or parasitic existence after the horrific purges of the Hongwu and Yongle reigns, merit nobles remained integral to the Ming dynasty. Reviewing the careers of the Wu men across the generations, we see their role change from field commanders, to a mix of field command and senior administration, and finally to exclusively capital administration. Rather than a caricatured image of corrupt irrelevance, merit nobles, properly considered, serve as a salutary reminder that military institutions, like other institutions, adapted to new circumstances. Examination of the Wu family yields a sharper understanding of who actually administered the dynasty’s core military institutions, what functions they served, and how they interacted with civil officials, palace eunuchs, officers, and the throne. Civil officials came and went, eunuchs held posts for longer, and military officers led campaigns, but merit nobles provided much of the continuity in personnel so essential for the operation of the Capital Training Divisions and Chief Military Commissions, pillars of the dynastic military.
Chapter 1 traces the experiences of Batu-Temür, his wife, their sons, and some 5,000 followers, who in 1405 migrated from the Mongolian steppe to the northwestern corner of the still-new Ming dynasty. In recognition of the military contributions of Batu-Temür and his sons, and their steadfast loyalty on refusing to join a local Mongolian insurrection, the Ming emperor granted the family a series of high-level military posts, gifts, honorary titles, a Chinese surname (Wu), and eventually investiture of Batu-Temür as Earl of Gongshun, a title that his descendants would hold until the mid seventeenth century. The Wu family’s experiences show both the Ming dynasty and recently arrived immigrants actively attempting to advance their interests in a time of rapid geopolitical change.
The last Marquis of Gongshun, Wu Weihua, not only survived but thrived during the traumatic transition from the fallen Ming dynasty to the newly founded Qing dynasty. His elder brother died in an epidemic of unprecedented scale in the capital, leaving vacant the title of marquis. His nephew was murdered in a rebel occupation of Beijing without parallel in the dynasty. His sovereign perished at his own hand (another unique event during the Ming period), and the Ming ruling house crumpled before his eyes. Wu Weihua then hurled himself across the dynastic divide, offering his services to the new Manchu regime in exchange for the title his family had held without interruption since the early fifteenth century. In addition to dogged pursuit of that title, he worked tirelessly to secure the survival – even prosperity – of his family in a new age, winning posts for his brothers and brokering at least one marriage alliance with the new Manchu elite.
The Introduction lays out the book’s arguments, organization, and significance. The basic arguments are: (1) there was more to the military than war; (2) there was more to government than civil officials; and (3) there was more to China than the Han majority. The story of the Wu family is told at three levels: (1) the professional and family lives of each generation of the men to hold the title Marquis of Gongshun, (2) broader events and trends occurring in Ming politics, society, economics, religion, and ethnic relations, and (3) periodic consideration of the big picture, that is, thinking about the Ming dynasty in its Eurasian context. Nearly all polities confront issues of ability and difference as they secure people of ability through means such as hereditary status, meritocratic evaluations, and patronage. Simultaneously, polities like the Ming dynasty developed institutional means to acknowledge and whenever possible leverage differences such as ethnicity, gender, professional training, and relation to the throne.
This chapter explores the career of Wu Kezhong from 1418, the year he succeeded his father’s investiture as Marquis of Gongshun, to 1449, the year he fell in combat. Like his father, Wu Kezhong served the Ming throne as a Mongolian specialist and military commander. Batu-Temür had offered his loyalty to the Ming throne at the head of some 5,000 supporters, and Wu Kezhong too acted as a patron and protector for the Mongolian community. Despite such similarities, both the dynasty and the place of Mongols in the polity were changing. Wu Kezhong was among the first generation of his family to live through imperial successions as first the Yongle and then Xuande emperor died, leaving the throne to new sovereigns who actively sought the support of proven commanders such as Wu Kezhong. The new sovereigns, especially the man for whom Wu Kezhong and his brother died, differed importantly from their forefathers not only in their styles of rulership but also in their policies. That mattered because, even more than his father, Wu Kezhong pursued patronage through imperial institutions, which required knowledge of salary structures, commutation rates, and the shifting balance of power at court.
This chapter begins with Wu Jijue’s early years and upbringing, including his family and his education, with an eye toward the strategies that capital elites like the Wu family used to protect their status. It then turns to his long – nearly half a century – career in the capital and the provinces. As the sovereign’s man, Wu Jijue – like all merit nobles – performed a wide variety of tasks, and this chapter offers a series of snapshots to give a sense of the range of his duties, including (1) ritual officiant, (2) envoy to princely courts, (3) regional commander, and (4) participant in imperial reviews. The following chapter traces Wu Jijue’s service as a senior administrator in key military institutions with special attention to the light it sheds on the dynasty’s regularized assessment and reward of administrative performance.
This chapter is organized into four sections. First, using Wu Shixing as a focal point, it examines the role of merit nobles as envoys of the throne in missions to provincial courts and in offerings to the souls of the imperial house’s deceased members. Second, it briefly reviews the heightened prominence of military affairs during the reign of Zhengde (1505–21), including important changes to the organization of the Capital Garrisons, which was where Wu Shixing and other merit nobles held posts. Third, it considers the military laborscape of the early sixteenth century, with particular attention to how the Ming court addressed issues of ability and difference in the suppression of a series of large-scale rebellions. Fourth, this chapter returns to debates at the Ming court surrounding the education and training of merit nobles like Wu Shixing.
In 1405, a family left their home in the Mongolian steppe and moved to China. This daring decision, taken at a time of dramatic change in eastern Eurasia, paved the way for 250 years of unlikely success at the Ming court. Winning recognition for military skill and loyalty, the family later known as the Wu gained a coveted title of nobility and became members of the capital elite until the dynasty's collapse in 1644. By tracing the individual fortunes of a single family, David Robinson offers a fresh and accessible perspective on the inner workings of Ming bureaucracy. He explores how the early-modern world's most developed state sought to balance the often contradictory demands of securing ability and addressing difference, a challenge common to nearly all polities.
Please find the abstract below: Between 2020 and 2022, China’s digital platform sector underwent a substantial regulatory shift, marking a clear departure from the previously lenient approach toward digital platform firms. While much of the existing research has focused on external factors—such as the unchecked growth of tech giants, the Chinese Communist Party’s goal of “common prosperity,” and the U.S.–China rivalry—this paper highlights internal institutional changes that facilitated this regulatory transformation. Specifically, it explores how the 2018 bureaucratic restructuring within China’s regulatory apparatus fostered “domain-specific centralization,” concentrating regulatory power within agencies overseeing key domains such as financial regulation, antitrust, and data security. It argues that such centralization reduced regulatory overlaps and gaps, allowing the state to control major digital platforms more directly. Using case studies of Ant Group’s suspended initial public offering, Alibaba’s antitrust fine, and Didi’s data security investigation, this paper shows how variations in centralization across domains shaped regulatory outcomes. The findings provide new insights into China’s evolving regulatory governance and offer broader implications for the relationship between the state and business in the digital economy.
In China’s pastoral regions, both formal and informal rules are embedded in society and are continually negotiated and reassembled according to social, cultural and political contexts. In particular, the de facto rules governing rangeland use and access are much more intricate and dynamic than de jure property rights as set forth by statutory law. Through the lens of legal pluralism, this article examines the multiplicity of customary practices in Saga, a pastoral village in Amdo Tibet, where pastoralists develop rangeland practices in multiple contexts to manoeuvre in their struggle for inclusion in wealth building and the right to access rangeland and natural resources. Through three cases of customary practices – grazing bans, pasture patrols and communal summer grazing – this research demonstrates how pastoralists interpret and tailor rangeland governance to meet their expectations. A plural context-based hybrid rangeland governance is visible in Saga, where in response to changing de jure rules, de facto rules are deeply rooted in social, cultural and emotional dimensions. Rather than becoming fixed, de facto rules and practices are always evolving in response to the local context where multiple types of de jure rules apply.
While often described as a unified process imposed by external actors on weak, conflict-ridden countries, international state building increasingly comprises a variety of actors involved in different ways in (re)building a diverse set of institutions. Civilian preferences are often excluded from this fragmented environment. We identify and explicate three dimensions along which postconflict state building meaningfully varies: the actor involved, the type of institution targeted, and the form of involvement. We then examine how variation along each dimension impacts civilians’ state-building preferences with two rounds of original survey experiments fielded in Liberia. We find that Liberians largely prefer state-building processes overseen by a subset of international actors; that they prefer state building focused on security-oriented institutions over non-security-oriented institutions; and that different forms of involvement in the process meaningfully influence their preferences. We also find that these preferences depend on civilians’ characteristics. Ultimately, we provide an initial, conceptual mapping of the diversified landscape of international state building, as well as an empirical “unpacking” of the conditions that may shape civilians’ preferences toward the process.
This study examines the transformation of environmental public interest lawyering in China within an ever-tightening legal order, where activists confront both state suppression and co-optation. Utilizing qualitative methods, including in-depth interviews with 49 environmental lawyers and activists, participant observations, and online ethnography, the research delineates two divergent models of legal mobilization. The conventional model prioritizes compliance with state regulations, employing impact litigation and consensus-building with state institutions to drive incremental environmental reforms, often at the cost of aligning with state priorities. In contrast, guerrilla lawyering emerges as an innovative strategy, leveraging decentralized networks, experimentalist litigation, flexible funding, and diffused media tactics to sustain activism while preserving autonomy. By transforming courts into platforms for generating critical information and exposing systemic vulnerabilities, guerrilla lawyering resists assimilation into state-controlled schemes. This approach not only ensures movement survival amidst repression but also enriches theoretical understandings of legal mobilization under authoritarianism by addressing the understudied risk of co-optation. These findings illuminate the resilience and ingenuity of activists in China’s constrained environmental advocacy landscape and offer a transferable framework for resistance for social movements in other authoritarian contexts, amid the global rise of authoritarian legality.