Many societies allocate wealth and status through competitions. These competitions may be seen as unfair if the playing field is uneven or if the competitors are of unequal strength. We run two experiments to document the extent to which people are willing to compete against others in situations with varying fairness concerns. In a between-subject experiment, we show that people’s willingness to compete is largely unaffected by the impact their choice has on the payoff of an opponent, no matter whether the opponent had a choice about whether to compete or not. In a within-subject experiment, we show that most people are willing to compete against opponents who have been exogenously disadvantaged or are known to be weaker. People who choose competition against weak or disadvantaged opponents are also more willing to give themselves an advantage by sabotaging the performance of their opponent.

We report the results of an experiment on selective exposure to information. A decision maker interested in learning about an uncertain state of the world can acquire information from one of two sources that have opposite biases: when informed on the state, they report it truthfully; when uninformed, they report their favorite state. A Bayesian decision-maker is better off seeking confirmatory information unless the source biased against the prior is sufficiently more reliable. In line with the theory, subjects are more likely to seek confirmatory information when sources are symmetrically reliable. On the other hand, when sources are asymmetrically reliable, subjects are more likely to consult the more reliable source even when prior beliefs are strongly unbalanced and this source is less informative. Our experiment suggests that base rate neglect and simple heuristics (e.g., listen to the most reliable source) are important drivers of the endogenous acquisition of information.

We introduce the “Fork Game,” a graphical interface designed to elicit higher-order risk preferences. In this game, participants connect forked pipes to create a final structure. A ball is then dropped into the top opening of this structure and follows a downward path, randomly turning left or right at each forked joint. This construction is effectively isomorphic to the apportionment of binary-outcome lotteries, allowing participants to construct complex gambles. Furthermore, the game is easily comprehensible, highly modular, and provides a flexible means of assessing risk aversion, prudence, temperance, and even higher-order risk preferences.

We conduct an economic experiment to examine the causal impact of social ties on the preference for competition. Participants decide whether to engage in a competition or not. Across four treatments, potential competitors vary based on their relationship with the decision-maker: whether they had a conversation with the decision-maker prior to the competition, whether they are expected to chat after the competition, or both, or neither. We find that the process of chatting increases social closeness. This increase in social closeness tends to reduce the preference for competition when participants are expected to meet again after the competition. However, it does not change the likelihood of opting for competition if there is no prospect of further interaction. Through this experiment, we thus uncover previously unknown implications of managerial practices, such as team-building exercises and remote work options, that influence the formation of social ties.

In the presence of a default option, the optimal search rule for an agent with a reference-dependent utility and a search cost predicts: (i) the default increases the reservation utility due to the reference effect, leading to a better choice, and (ii) those with higher reservation utility will self-select into search and are more likely to find a superior option. Our experiments document the presence of both effects. Those who reject the default are likely to find higher-ranked options in their active search, supporting the self-selection effect. Even when the self-selection channel is shut down, the reference effect remains.

This paper is a single-project meta-analysis of four experiments that model charitable giving as individual contributions to a multiplicity of competing threshold public goods. We pool 17,136 observations at the individual level to summarize the project and investigate the role of learning, gender, and risk attitude, since the included studies are inconclusive in this regard. We find that equally effective coordination devices are the existence of a single contribution option that stands out on its merits, learning, and delegation as long as the intermediary is formally obliged to pass along a high enough percentage of the transferred resources. Women delegate less than men, and consequently prefer direct contributions. Risk tolerance increases overall donations but decreases individual earnings. We discuss possible implications of our findings.

Efficient coordination is a major source of efficiency gains. We study in an experimental coordination game with 727 children and teenagers, aged 9 to 18 years, the strategies played in pre-adulthood. In our one-shot, experimental coordination game, we vary the incentives for reaching the more efficient equilibrium and the number of subjects within a group. Looking at strategy choices dependent on age, we do not find robust age effects in the aggregate. Yet, we see that smaller group sizes and larger incentives increase the likelihood of choosing the efficient strategy. The larger strategic uncertainty in larger groups is obviously harmful for overall efficiency. Regarding incentives, we find that increasing the profits in the efficient equilibrium seems to work better than providing a cushion in case of miscoordination. Beliefs play an important role as well, as subjects are more likely to play the efficient strategy when they expect others to do so as well. Our results are robust to controlling for individual risk-, time-, and social preferences.

The money-burning game (MBG) is widely used to study anti-social or destructive behavior. We extend the design of the MBG to separate three motives that could lead subjects to burn their partner’s money – spite, reciprocity, and inequality aversion. We detect that reciprocity is the dominant reason: Most of our subjects would only burn their partner’s money if they believed that their partner would burn theirs. This finding has important implications for the interpretation of the behavior of the game.

Previous studies have shown that an oath can reduce lying in individual settings. Can it reduce lying in groups, a context where lying is more prevalent? Results from a lab experiment reveal that the impact depends on the incentive structures and procedures. A mandatory oath reduces lying when group members’ payoffs are independent, but only has a marginal effect when payoffs are dependent. Voluntary oath-taking enhances the effectiveness under both incentive structures by fostering intrinsic motivation to keep promises. The findings highlight the importance of peer effects and oath-taking procedures on the effectiveness of an oath in group settings.

Although evidence suggests men are more generous to women than to men, it may stem from paternalism and could reverse when women excel in important skills for one’s career success, such as cognitive skills. Using a dictator game, this paper studies whether male dictators allocate less to female receivers than to male receivers when these receivers have higher intelligence quotients (IQs) than dictators. By exogenously varying the receivers’ IQ relative to the dictators’, I do not find evidence consistent with this hypothesis; if anything, male dictators allocate slightly more to female receivers with higher IQs than to male receivers with equivalent IQs. The results hold both in mean and distribution and are robust to the so-called “beauty premium.” Also, female dictators’ allocations are qualitatively similar to male dictators. These findings suggest that women who excel in cognitive skills may not receive less favorable treatment than equally intelligent men in the labor market.

People, across a wide range of personal and professional domains, need to accurately detect whether the state of the world has changed. Previous research has documented a systematic pattern of over- and under-reaction to signals of change due to system neglect, the tendency to overweight the signals and underweight the system producing the signals. We investigate whether experience, and hence the potential to learn, improves people’s ability to detect change. Participants in our study made probabilistic judgments across 20 trials, each consisting of 10 periods, all in a single system that crossed three levels of diagnosticity (a measure of the informativeness of the signal) with four levels of transition probability (a measure of the stability of the environment). We found that the system-neglect pattern was only modestly attenuated by experience. Although average performance did not increase with experience overall, the degree of learning varied substantially across the 12 systems we investigated, with participants showing significant improvement in some high diagnosticity conditions and none in others. We examine this variation in learning through the lens of a simple linear adjustment heuristic, which we term the “δ-ϵ” model. We show that some systems produce consistent feedback in the sense that the best δ and ϵ responses for one trial also do well on other trials. We show that learning is related to the consistency of feedback, as well as a participant’s “scope for learning” how close their initial judgments are to optimal behavior.

Social interactions frequently take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma as driven predominantly by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides a causal test of the importance of social preferences in such contexts. In a series of pre-registered experiments, we show that high levels of cooperation can be sustained when prosocial individuals interact in segregated groups. By comparing their behavior with that of mixed and selfish groups, we highlight the conditions under which other-regarding motivations matter in repeated interactions.

Wrong-doers may try to collaborate to achieve greater gains than would be possible alone. Yet potential collaborators face two issues: they need to accurately identify other cheaters and trust that their collaborators do not betray them when the opportunity arises. These concerns may be in tension, since the people who are genuine cheaters could also be the likeliest to be untrustworthy. We formalise this interaction in the ‘villain’s dilemma’ and use it in a laboratory experiment to study three questions: what kind of information helps people to overcome the villain’s dilemma? Does the villain’s dilemma promote or hamper cheating relative to individual settings? Who participates in the villain’s dilemma and who is a trustworthy collaborative cheater? We find that information has important consequences for behaviour in the villain’s dilemma. Public information about actions is important for supporting collaborative dishonesty, while more limited sources of information lead to back-stabbing and poor collaboration. We also find that the level of information, role of the decision maker, and round of the experiment affect whether dishonesty is higher or lower in the villain’s dilemma than in our individual honesty settings. Finally, individual factors are generally unrelated to collaborating but individual dishonesty predicts untrustworthiness as a collaborator.

How do bribes and lobbying distort judgment? In our experiment, referees are tasked with judging a worker’s performance, and awarding a bonus to workers who score above a certain threshold. We find that bribes and lobbying are both distortionary, but in different ways. Whereas lobbying increases the number of workers receiving a bonus, bribes weaken the relationship between performance and success, with bonuses mostly being awarded to workers who bribe. We discuss implications for anti-corruption interventions.

Narrow bracketers who are myopic in specific decisions would fail to consider preexisting risks in investment and neglect hedging opportunities. Growing evidence has demonstrated the relevance of narrow bracketing. We take a step further in empirical investigation and study individual heterogeneity in narrow bracketing. Specifically, we use a lab experiment in investment and hedging that elicits subjects’ preferences on rich occasions to uncover the individual degree of narrow bracketing without imposing distributional assumptions. Combining prospect theory and narrow bracketing can explain our findings: Subjects who invest more also insure more, and subjects insure significantly less in the loss domain than in the gain domain. More importantly, we show that the distribution of the individual degree of narrow bracketing is skewed at two extremes, yet with a substantial share of people in the middle who partially suffer from narrow bracketing. Neglecting this aspect, we would overestimate the severity of narrow bracketing and misinterpret its relation with individual characteristics.

Research on individual decisions from experience reveals a robust tendency to behave as if rare events are underweighted. Experimental studies of strategic interactions often exclude probabilistic outcomes, thus neglecting the potential extension of this tendency to strategic games. Our study addresses this gap by examining how players in games adjust their strategies when confronted with low-probability, high-impact outcomes. We introduce two finitely repeated, asymmetric games with lottery-based payoffs. These games, when simplified by replacing lotteries with their expected values, yield straightforward equilibrium predictions based on dominant strategies. However, results from three experiments reveal players strongly deviate from these predictions, instead behaving consistently with underweighting of rare events. The results additionally indicate that social preferences also play a role in shaping behavior. To explain these observations, we propose the simplistic Reciprocal Altruistic Sampler (REALS) model. This model posits that players’ decisions are a result of the interplay between reliance on small samples of past experiences, altruistic tendencies, and strategic considerations. We experimentally compare behavior in variants of the games that disentangle the behavior to these three components, and show that the REALS model, despite its simplicity, effectively captures their complex interactions. Our results additionally demonstrate that players can often choose strictly dominated strategies in a sophisticated effort to react to underweighting of rare events by other players. Overall, this study enhances our understanding of strategic decision making by highlighting the crucial impact of rare events and the interplay of different uncertainties in influencing players’ choices.

In two sets of novel laboratory experiments, we show that the mere presence of an existing alliance at the onset of coalition formation may lead managers to form economically suboptimal alliances. Study Set 1 considers alliance formation when a focal firm is already embedded in an existing coalition. These studies show evidence of a status quo bias: participants managing the focal firm tend to include the current partner in alliance offers and thus are less successful in forming optimal alliances compared to those in an unattached control condition. Study Set 2 examines the extent to which an unattached focal firm attempts to ‘poach’ away attractive coalition partners from their embedded alliances. Our results show evidence of poaching avoidance: participants make fewer offers to, and are less likely to partner with, an attractive firm already in an alliance. However, this tendency to avoid poaching may be attenuated when the existing coalition is perceived as a powerful threat and/or alternate partners are unavailable. These findings provide behavioral insights into how judgmental biases can constrain alliance formation. We conclude with a discussion of how selected environmental, firm, and decision-maker characteristics (e.g., turbulence, embedded relationships, and risk orientation) may moderate these results.

Information about the consequences of our consumption choices can be unwelcome, and people sometimes avoid it. Thus, when people possess information that is inconvenient for another person, they may face a dilemma about whether to inform them. We introduce a simple and portable experimental game to analyze the transmission of inconvenient information. In this game, a Sender can, at a small cost, inform a Receiver about a negative externality associated with a tempting and profitable action for the Receiver. The results from our online experiment (N = 1,512) show that Senders transmit more information when negative externalities are larger and that Senders’ decisions are largely driven by their own preferences towards the charity and their own use of information. We do not find evidence that Senders take the Receiver’s preferences into account, as they largely ignore explicit requests for information, or ignorance, even if Receivers have the option to punish the Sender.

Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate complexity in decision problems as a cause of failures in contingent reasoning. For this purpose, we introduce three dimensions of complexity to a decision problem: the number of contingencies, the dominance property of choices, and reducible states. Each decision problem is designed to reflect variations in complexity across the three dimensions. Experimental results show that the number of contingencies has the most significant effect on failures in contingent reasoning. The second dimension, the dominance property of choices, also has a statistically significant effect, though the effect size is smaller than in the existing literature. In contrast, the third complexity dimension has no impact; presenting the decision problem in a reduced or reducible form does not change subjects’ performance on contingent reasoning. Additionally, we examine the Power of Certainty and show its existence. This effect is particularly pronounced when the number of contingencies is large.

A growing number of studies use “real” effort designs for laboratory experiments where subjects complete an actual task to exert effort rather than using a stylized effort design where subjects simply choose an effort level from a predefined set. The commonly argued reason for real effort is that it makes the results more generalizable and field relevant. We investigate the nature of modeling effort provision by first trying to provide a clear theoretical understanding of the nature of effort costs. We then empirically examine claims about the differences between real effort and stylized effort. A key to our examination is ensuring that we compare the two modes of effort provision keeping effort costs constant, which is a point overlooked in many past examinations. In our data, when controlling for effort costs, we find no differences in behavior between real and stylized effort. Given the importance of effort costs and the lack of a generally accepted way to include them in real effort designs, we provide a simple add-on that any researcher can use with their real effort experiments to incorporate a theoretically appropriate and controlled cost of effort even in a real effort setting. We also discuss ways to better approach modeling effort costs in experiments, whether one is conducting real or stylized designs, to improve inference on research questions.