To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
In 2011, the Brazilian Government began dismantling the country’s robust framework for Indigenous land rights by enacting measures to deny Indigenous Peoples’ access to their ancestral lands. From 2019 to 2022, the government did not recognize or title a single hectare of Indigenous lands, despite more than 700 pending requests for demarcation (or formal designation and titling). A change in government and six land demarcations in 2023, however, show signs of a new era for Indigenous Peoples’ rights and relationship with the state. This chapter analyzes evolving Indigenous land rights pre- and post-constitutionalization in 1988, the result of intense political mobilization and shifting colonialist perceptions of Indigenous Peoples. This chapter also discusses the main obstacles faced by Indigenous Peoples in enforcing Brazil’s protective land rights framework, accounting for the structures of settler colonial states – structures that permit institutional and physical violence against Indigenous Peoples by state and non-state actors alike. Finally, this chapter examines the opportunities created since the change in government in 2023, proposing new avenues to advance Indigenous Peoples’ constitutional land rights in Brazil.
The established economic historiography asserts that Brazil’s per-capita GDP stagnated in the 19th century and that it grew extremely slowly in the period of the monarchy (1822–1889). We argue that these conclusions are based on inadequate methods, insufficient statistical evidence, and disregard for available historical evidence. Building on the methodology followed by one of us in a previous article, with the use of new databases, and a reasoned exploration of alternatives, our best estimate is that over the 1820–1900 period, Brazil’s per-capita income grew at a trend rate of 0.9% per year, a performance like Western Europe and other Latin America countries. Only a sharp economic contraction at the end of the period dulled Brazil’s performance in the 19th century.
Between 1847 and 1876, the textile factory Todos os Santos operated in Bahia. During these almost three decades, it was the largest textile factory in Brazil and came to employ more than four hundred workers. Until recently, many aspects of the factory’s labour force were hidden. There was a hegemonic narrative that all of these workers were free and waged individuals and that their living and working conditions were extremely progressive for the period. Meanwhile, there was a silence about the employment of enslaved people in the institution as well as a lack of in-depth analysis concerning the legally free workers. This article analyses labour at the Todos os Santos factory. On the one hand, it provides evidence on why the myth about the exclusive use of free and waged workers in the factory was formulated and the interests behind this narrative. On the other, through analysis of data from newspapers, philanthropic institutions, and legal and government documents, it reveals the profiles of the supposedly different classes of free and enslaved workers employed at Todos os Santos—men, women, and children of different colours—showing how complex, and often how similar, their living and working conditions were.
The objective of this study is to analyze the debate surrounding the transformation of the Bank of Brazil into a central bank in 1923. The article seeks to answer the question: What was the role of a central bank for Brazilian policymakers at that time? Unlike other Latin American countries that established their central banks during this period, Brazil’s institution was not the result of any foreign mission. While central banks in other countries were primarily concerned with maintaining the gold standard, in Brazil, the main impetus for establishing a central bank was the need to address cash shortages and expand credit, rather than focusing on monetary discipline. Advocates for the creation of a central bank in Brazil were inspired by the model of Germany’s Reichsbank, and part of their theoretical influence came from the German Historical School. Other references cited in the debates included the works of Keynes and Cassel, and the participants of the debate made parallels with other sciences, such as comparing the central bank to elements of mechanical physics. Beyond controlling the money supply, the central bank was seen as an element for the economic development of the country, and there was an emphasis on the bank’s private management.
We derive optimal road fuel taxes for gasoline, diesel and ethanol for Brazil. Fuel-related externalities, including carbon emissions and air pollution, and distance-related externalities, such as accidents, congestion and road damages, are added as Brazil has today no other way to effectively tax these components. A value-added tax (VAT) of 26.5 per cent is added to the tax for gasoline and ethanol, but not for diesel which is mostly an input and not final consumption. On this basis, we find that the optimal gasoline, diesel and ethanol taxes are US$1.03, 0.85 and 0.58 per litre, of which the respective carbon taxes, excluding VAT, are about US$0.14, 0.16 and 0.04 per litre given a carbon price of US$60 per ton of CO2. The largest externality component for gasoline and ethanol is accidents followed by congestion and carbon emissions. For diesel, air pollution is most significant, followed by accidents and congestion.
This article examines how subnational fiscal competition over foreign direct investment affects both the siting of new projects and the ability of local governments to raise tax revenue for social spending. We leverage a quasi-natural experiment, an unexpected declaration by the Brazilian Supreme Court in 2017 that reduced states’ ability to offer investors differentiated tax subsidies. Our results show that disadvantaged regions did not see a major shift in investment patterns after the change in investment law. We do not find a consistent relationship between the incentive law change and state revenue generation, but we do find that incentives are associated with less revenue. The results are consistent with arguments that investment incentives exacerbate inequality by reducing states’ capacity to collect revenue while doing little to affect investment location. Our results illustrate that economic agglomeration is difficult to reverse through tax policy and that fiscal federalism often cannot provide strong enough inducements to drive investment into less advantaged regions.
Does decarbonization depend on policy stability that makes climate policies and institutional development irreversible, or does it depend on mastering a messy political conflict with uneven progress that might be inherent in large political economy transitions? This chapter draws on case studies of two large emerging powers, Brazil and South Africa, to argue that politicization of climate action seems inevitable in decarbonizing energy transitions. Fossil fuel coalitions are too powerful and the threat to them too existential to avoid politicization as they defend their interests. At the same time, Brazil shows that policy stability was a critical step in a large expansion of wind power there – not a full energy transition itself but providing an important alternative to fossil fuels. Both countries show that allies in the struggle against fossil fuels can be won and lost in non-climate political economies of energy transition. The potential for new industry and job creation, enhanced energy security, and impacts on communities that host infrastructure are all important to energy transition, with each following a political economy logic that may or may not focus on climate change.
This article explores the intersection of carceral geographies and climate (in)justice in Brazil, home to one of the world’s largest incarcerated populations. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, interviews and an analysis of reports from monitoring organisations examining facilities across the country, we ask how thermal conditions are part of a national project of inflicting suffering within the prison system. Conductive building materials, a lack or excess of water and ventilation, as well as overcrowding, exacerbate exposure to scorching heat or bone-chilling cold, subjecting prisoners’ bodies to extreme temperatures. We argue that this constitutes a form of thermal violence, in which heat and cold are weaponised to harm and punish.
Chapter 7 explores the reasons why Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela experienced relatively stable authoritarianism during the early twentieth century. All three countries professionalized their militaries during this period, which helped bring an end to the frequent revolts that had undermined their prospects for democracy in the nineteenth century. None of the three countries developed strong parties, however. The absence of strong parties impeded democratization in several ways. First, party weakness allowed presidents to concentrate authority and extend their hold on power in some cases. Second, and even more importantly, the weakness of opposition parties meant that the opposition had little chance of winning elections or enacting democratic reforms, particularly in the face of widespread government electoral manipulation. As a result, the opposition frequently abstained from elections, which only deepened authoritarian rule in these countries. In some instances, the opposition also encouraged the military to intervene to overthrow the president, which undermined otherwise mostly stable authoritarian regimes.
Since the early 1900s in Brazil, futebol has been an instrument of nation building, used to articulate a proud, masculine national identity. During the culture wars of the 1930s and today, the sport has served as a tool for fascists insisting on gender differentiation and masculine displays of strength. Conversely, gender dissidents have formed futebol teams as part of their antifascist struggles for rights and recognition. This chapter explores the creation and visibility campaigns of one such group: the Meninos Bons de Bola, Brazil’s first trans soccer team. I examine the team’s strategic use of nude images (2016–18), amidst the rise of ultra-right candidate, Jair Bolsonaro. Drawing on two semi-naked photoshoots with the MBB, and on an oral history with team’s founder, Raphael H. Martins, this essay asserts that the Meninos’ defiant disrobing during this period of governmental change reveals their resistance to the machinations of Brazilian fascism.
The “Critically Endangered” Cherry-throated Tanager Nemosia rourei is endemic to the Atlantic Forest of south-eastern Brazil, and extremely rare for reasons that are not yet fully understood. We monitored reproductive activities of the only known individuals of the species, at two sites, between October 2018 and November 2023. The birds foraged in social groups of 5–8 individuals. Ten nests, built in trees at heights of 12–26 m, were monitored through continuous direct observation. Most reproductive activity occurred between October and end of November, with one further nest found in March. Clutch size was 3–4 eggs, the incubation and nestling periods were 16 days, and the chicks were fed mainly on invertebrates. Up to six nest helpers, likely young from previous seasons, assisted with the collection of nest material, feeding the chicks, and defending the nest. Reproductive success was 50%, with losses due to climatic conditions (rain and cold) and predation, but may have been enhanced by the efforts of the researchers in scaring away potential predators including Spot-billed Toucanet Selenidera maculirostris and Black Capuchin Sapajus nigritus. These findings reinforce the value of detailed observation of social groups and their nests, and continuing efforts to deter predators. Further research could address how parental care and nest helpers affect reproductive success. The availability of large trees with abundant lichens may be a limiting factor for the reproductive success of species in the long term, and so protecting and restoring habitat with such features is crucial for the long-term conservation of this species.
An intriguing question regarding the relationship between international financial institutions (IFIs) and their Latin American borrowers concerns how and why regime type influences the degree to which the parties are prepared to sign loan agreements. Some scholars highlight a ‘democratic advantage’, while others argue that, on the contrary, a ‘democratic disadvantage’ is evident. This article engages with this scholarly debate, offering a historical perspective on the World Bank’s (WB) lending patterns vis-à-vis Latin America during the Cold War, and more specifically between 1948 and 1988, a period that witnessed both democratic and authoritarian regimes in the region. Drawing on never-before-examined documents from the WB archives and additional primary sources, and analysing WB lending to its four largest Latin American borrowers – Mexico, Colombia, Argentina and particularly Brazil – the article posits a third option, arguing that neither a democratic advantage nor a democratic disadvantage was evident during the period under study. Adhering to its self-declared principle of ‘political neutrality’, as outlined in its Articles of Agreement, and emphasising economic factors, the WB exhibited a clear tendency toward pragmatism and ‘political indifference’. This approach enabled the Bank to maintain its involvement in politically unstable countries like Brazil with minimal interruptions.
Plasmodium simium, a parasite of platyrrhine monkeys, is known to cause human malaria outbreaks in Southeast Brazil. It has been hypothesized that, upon the introduction of Plasmodium vivax into the Americas at the time of the European colonization, the human parasite adapted to neotropical anophelines of the Kerteszia subgenus and to local monkeys, along the Atlantic coast of Brazil, to give rise to a sister species, P. simium. Here, to obtain new insights into the origins and adaptation of P. simium to new hosts, we analysed whole-genome sequence (WGS) data from 31 P. simium isolates together with a global sequence dataset of 1086 P. vivax isolates. Population genomic analyses revealed that P. simium comprises a discrete parasite lineage with greatest genetic similarity to P. vivax populations from Latin America – especially those from the Amazon Basin of Brazil – and to ancient European P. vivax isolates, consistent with Brazil as the most likely birthplace of the species. We show that P. simium displays half the amount of nucleotide diversity of P. vivax from Latin America, as expected from its recent origin. We identified pairs of sympatric P. simium isolates from monkeys and from humans as closely related as meiotic half-siblings, revealing ongoing zoonotic transmission of P. simium. Most critically, we show that P. simium currently causes most, and possibly all, malarial infections usually attributed to P. vivax along the Serra do Mar Mountain Range of Southeast Brazil.
In 2021, the Brazilian Supreme Court issued a landmark decision which declared that a portion of Section 40 of the Brazilian Patent and Trademark law violated the constitutionally enshrined right to health. The challenged provision automatically extended the terms of certain patents for up to ten years, a much longer period than permitted under any other patent regime in the world. It was adopted following lobbying from foreign pharmaceutical companies over the objections of local elites. The impugned provision qualified as an example of ultra-orthodoxy, defined here as the adoption of radically neo-liberal legal institutions in developing countries as a result of the lobbying efforts of industries with substantial economic power. The ruling by the Brazilian Supreme Court merely brought Brazilian law into line with the TRIPS agreement, the benchmark for legal orthodoxy. At the same time, the ruling was heterodox in several respects, including the interpretation of the right to health as a collective human right, the value given to independent academic opinions, and the attention paid to comparative law, particularly involving other countries from the Global South. It remains to be seen whether backlash against the decision will mute its potentially beneficial distributive effects.
Brazil and the United States adopted contrasting approaches to protection of tenants against eviction during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the United States, the legislature adopted protective measures for tenants early in the pandemic that were later overturned by the Supreme Court. In Brazil, the legislature failed to adopt significant protective measures during the early phases of the pandemic; the first important protective measure was an interim decision of Brazil’s Supreme Court handed down over one year after the beginning of the pandemic. In this sense, Brazil’s overall approach was heterodox while the approach in the United States was orthodox. At the same time, the actions of the Brazilian legislature and executive branch were highly orthodox, based on the argument that measures that served to protect tenants might harm vulnerable landlords. In fact, economically vulnerable tenants are likely to be much more common in Brazil than economically vulnerable landlords. This episode shows that a heterodox system may contain orthodox institutions that deny the distributional potential of private law. It also shows that a heterodox system may be less effective than an orthodox system at enforcing social rights.
In this article, we argue that Brazilian tan lines constitute a new site of race and class struggle on and over women’s bodies. Popular in Rio’s socially and geographically marginalized periphery, fita (electrical tape) bikinis leave sharp and shocking tan lines that call attention to the contrast between lighter and darker skin. Brazil’s funk music sensation Anitta brings this aesthetic practice to the global stage as part of her brand, disrupting hegemonic beauty norms and attracting attention for herself and her fans. Through the public display of their bronzed sensuality, Brazilian women accrue “visibility capital” as they create new forms of bodily value and self-esteem in what we call a look economy. While global beauty hierarchies continue to promote and glorify whiteness, Anitta and fita tanners simultaneously turn heads (in person), attract eyeballs (online), and lay claim to the right to represent Brazil.
In South America, investment chapters have been used by some governments, notably in Chile, Colombia and Peru, to replace outdated bilateral investment treaties and extend countries’ investment protection commitments. In other countries, such as Brazil, investment chapters are a means to rethink the governance of foreign investment altogether. This chapter traces the evolution of South America’s PTA investment chapters from 2001 to 2022, focusing on the types of reforms adopted and the domestic factors that shape the reforms governments are willing to accept. It finds that PTA investment chapters exhibit an increasing diversity of reforms over time, although the vast majority of agreements are designed to maintain traditional investment protection standards. This variation is partly driven by the legitimacy crisis of international investment law. Arguably, this crisis has created more political space for South American preferences in investment treaty lawmaking. However, who dominates reform debates is just as important for countries’ reform preferences as their experience with investor-state arbitration. Regardless of reform preferences, the main outcome of PTA investment chapters has been further fragmentation in an already complex and incomplete area of international economic law. This fragmentation, if allowed to continue, may exacerbate the very challenges that governments are seeking to address through their reform efforts in order to promote sustainable and inclusive development.
This chapter examines the origins of the Anti-China sentiment observed in Brazilian foreign policy during the Bolsonaro presidency (2019–2022). This first part of the chapter shows that responses to the impact of Chinese trade are asymmetric in Brazil; whereas residents in localities hurt by Chinese competition tend to hold more negative views about economic ties with China, those living in localities benefited by export shocks to China did not exhibit more positive views than Brazilians unaffected by Chinese trade. Similarly, interest groups that lost from Chinese trade have been far more vocal than winners in the period. Next, we explore potential explanations for the puzzling behavior of winners from Chinese trade, with a focus on soy-producing municipalities. We argue that low levels of vertical integration of the soy value chain prevent producers, and therefore the population living in soy-producing localities, from understanding the impact of Chinese trade on their welfare.
This chapter analyses Latin American trade policy trends from post-2008 to 2018 and offers in-depth case studies of Brazil and Mexico. At both aggregate and more detailed levels of analysis we document the significant rise in protectionism, and non-tariff measures (NTMs) in particular, in the decade following the 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis. We focus on the preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that govern Mexico’s trade under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Brazil’s trade in the context of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). We report two main findings regarding Latin American trade and commercial policy trends in the 21st century. First, PTAs – long considered as key trade and investment-creating conduits – are now emerging as venues within which NTMs (e.g., non-transparent interventions, import bans, licensing requirements, controls on safety standards) are simultaneously increasing. That is, members within the same scheme are deploying NTMs against each other. The good news is that membership in these PTAs has mitigated some intra-bloc protectionism, albeit against a backdrop of rising NTMs within these PTAs, nonetheless. Second, the rapid trade and investment integration of China into Latin America markets since 2002 has directly shaped trade policy patterns and responses in this region. In the end, neither Brazil nor Mexico has risen to the occasion in terms of generating a pro-growth trade strategy that delivers compelling distributional and productive returns. Some of these shortcomings are due to path dependence within each PTA, as policymakers in both countries have failed to update approaches that have clearly failed to deliver over time. Outside of these PTAs, the stale macroeconomic response of each country to dynamic and competitive challenges emanating from the global economy risks an extenuation of long-term patterns of political and economic underperformance.
Christian evangelicals now represent a significant share of the global population. Notably, they are expected to soon outnumber Roman Catholics in several low- and middle-income countries. This paper examines whether such episodes of religious minority growth can reshape electoral politics. To address this, I combine novel data spanning over two decades (1994–2018) of Christian evangelicals’ expansion across Brazilian municipalities with indicators of structural changes in electoral politics: voter turnout, competition, polarization, and conservatism. Regression models with unit and year-fixed effects reveal no impact of the evangelical boom on electoral competition and polarization, suggestive evidence of increasing conservatism in recent years, and a clear and robust negative effect on turnout. Regression discontinuity design estimates, leveraging an exogenous and discontinuous growth of Christian evangelicals in Brazil’s rural areas, support these findings. The results suggest that the rise of religious minorities may drive gradual transformations in electoral politics.