The Feyerabend lectures on natural right is Kant’s first clear statement of a view on punishment that balances retributivist and deterrence concerns. Kant’s earlier views, shown by other course lectures on ethics, were largely focused on deterrence. As Kant developed his view of human autonomy, he shifted his reasoning about punishment to include concern for the honor and dignity of the victim as well as the criminal, including right of criminals to be treated no worse than they treated others.

This chapter introduces the vision of contract law adopted in this book, based on two concentric spheres: an inner sphere encompasses an economic realm rooted in values such as freedom and sanctity of contract, reflecting a non-interventionist approach that can accommodate imbalanced transactions and an outer sphere shaped by public policy concerns, which embodies social values such as the protection of relational autonomy and human dignity. The chapter justifies the structure of the book, the choice of legal frameworks examined, as well as the relevance of this study for disability equality and contract legal research.

This chapter highlights the interconnection between economic and social values in the contractual realm, rooted in a perception of people as holder of rights and a broad interpretation of autonomy and human dignity that looks beyond individualistic values. With a focus on grossly asymmetrical contracts, it promotes an understanding of vulnerability in the contractual context based on the circumstances of the transaction, rather than on people’s medical conditions. The chapter reflects on the merits and drawbacks of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) as a potential benchmark for promoting a vision of contract law that responds to both economic and social concerns and recognises the equality of all human beings. The second part considers how English contract law could be brought closer to the equality vision promoted by the UNCRPD, proposing an understanding of the contractual realm based on concentric economic and social spheres, shaped by fluid boundaries, and reflecting on the relevance of contract law as part of a broader set of measures to ensure a fairer society.

This chapter brings together the idea of bridges between economic and social concerns. The discussion reinforces the need to recognise the outer sphere of contracting in holding these connections together, recognising the role of contract law in protecting both economic values (including freedom and sanctity of contract) and social values (including relational autonomy and human dignity). A suggested path to succeed in these endeavours is to embrace the idea of complementarity in contract law, which enables us to accept the coexistence of ideas that may appear, initially, to be mutually exclusive. The idea of complementarity in contract law enables us to see economic and social values not as antagonistic, but as coexisting parts of interconnected spheres.

The human being is freely ‘self-determined’ rather than determined through some external authority (whether theological or teleological). This dichotomy conveniently expresses the usual understanding of modern political thought’s divergence from preceding tradition. By comparison, pre-modernity is teleological, anthropomorphic, realist; in a word, naïve – with its substantively rational nature, dictating essential ends to which we are subject. These received truths are past due for a re-examination. Just how naïve or dogmatic was the Greek understanding of freedom and nature? In this chapter, I argue that Plato’s view of man as naturally political is more complex and multivalent than our historical categorizations allow. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which, for him, politics does indeed depend upon a natural model. That model, however, is the Idea of the Good. And here, where Plato seems furthest from us, lies his greatest challenge to contemporary understandings of nature and freedom.

In this chapter, I argue that a comprehensive picture of Platonic autonomy must be balanced by attention to mutual interdependence and the ways that ideas arise through interpersonal dialogue. Philosophical ideas arise in a social context, and to this degree, even ideas that are now ‘my own’ have come to be mine in part through the reasoning of other persons. Moreover, as a result of human fallibility, even the fully developed Platonic philosopher still requires conversational partners to both learn and to test out ideas. Rather than overvaluing self-sufficiency, a philosophical life includes being open to challenges to one’s ideas, tolerating a state of not knowing fully, and learning that one needs others due to the limits of individual reasoners.

This chapter analyzes the Republic’s theory of the tripartite soul regarding the question of self-rule and autonomy. Only when the soul is in the ideal position of having reason positioned as sovereign ruler can a person be seen as acting autonomously. But it is not clear that when reason rules, it also motivates actions. Christine M. Korsgaard has argued that personal decision-making should be seen as analogous to political decision-making. She conceives of political decisions as a process where requests for action spring from the people, while rulers suffice to say yes or no. This chapter claims that this analysis is inadequate as a theory of how Plato portrays the relationship between the parts of the soul and of decision-making in general, and offers an alterantive interpreation in terms of what is called the Complex Model of Decision-Making.

The third bridge is explored in chapter five and focuses on the connection between constitutional values and private law. The analysis concentrates on the values of autonomy and human dignity and their interplay with the principle of freedom of contract in English contract law. The discussion also reflects on the link between the UNCRPD, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, and English contract law, and suggests that rather than looking for a seamless bridge that links the UNCRPD directly with English contract law, we should look for steppingstones connecting the UNCRPD, the ECHR, the HRA and domestic private law. This chapter also discusses the values of participation and inclusion, with a focus on the idea of influence vulnerability explored in the previous chapter, and reflects on the need to enhance the influence of persons with disabilities and DDPOs in shaping legislative developments in English law, including consumer contract law.

It is natural to see in the Republic’s concern with self-mastery a Platonic account of autonomy. But Plato’s understanding of self-rule in the Republic has more to do with cognition, and rather less to do with independent agency. Indeed, in the ethically motivated epistemology of the Republic, it is aiming at ideal knowledge that transforms one ethically and engenders many of the features centrally associated with the notion of ‘autonomy’. Being able to explain reality independently makes one independent of the illusions and confusions caused by pleasure, pains, and public pressures, and even restructures the desires, pleasures and other affects liable to arise. Moreover, the ability to give accounts is what makes us accountable to one another for our cognitive condition — and for the judgements, feelings and actions based on this.

The emerging awareness of self and other, especially with regard to compatible and conflicting aims, opens up dramatic new meanings for the toddler. Being able to be deliberately contrary gives the child experience with disruption and repair of the relationship and lets them explore the boundaries of appropriate behavior. The toddler also has a beginning capacity to control impulses and manage behavior, but doing this adequately requires continued scaffolding and guidance from parents. Meanings surrounding parental reliability brought forward from infancy impact how readily children now accept parental guidance. At the same time, clear, firm, and warm guidance can increase the child’s confidence regarding parents. This is how the transactional model works.

The issue of whether technology is inherently motivating for learners and teachers has often been discussed in the literature around computers and language learning. Yet, there is more to this relationship than initially meets the eye. This chapter outlines the ways in which symbolic power plays a part in both personal and institutional motivations for the adoption of technology. The chapter also looks at the way motivation is often credited as a key to success, though rarely with much empirical evidence. Finally, the article takes on a practitioner’s viewpoint to share several motivational techniques that can assist with practice and research.

Literacy is the ability to make use of visible language, and it is fundamental to language education. This chapter focuses on what teachers should know about digital technologies but begins with broad background and context related to multiliteracies, metaphors, and cultural dimensions of technology use. It then focuses on four key areas where teachers play an important role in the development of their students’ language and literacy abilities via technology: autonomy, mobility, creativity, and communities. It then discusses two controversial areas of current pedagogical research and practice: artificial intelligence and machine translation. It concludes with a call for greater attention to two additional areas highly relevant to language development: literacies related to film and digital communication in the context of study abroad.

In this chapter of Complex Ethics Consultations: Cases that Haunt Us, the author encounters a 50-year-old woman who is requesting her arm be amputated to alleviate her complex regional pain syndrome. This is not a usual indication for an amputation, but a surgeon is willing to offer the procedure. The author attempts to bring about clarity even in the face of uncertainty. Moral distress played a substantial role in the consultation.