Perhaps the most debated question in Arnauld scholarship is whether Arnauld follows René Descartes in holding that God freely creates the eternal truths (the creation doctrine). In this chapter, I offer the first systematic treatment of this issue in Arnauld’s early texts from the 1640s. I begin by distinguishing between two versions of the creation doctrine: the metaphysical and the epistemic. According to the former, God in fact freely creates the eternal truths, while according to the latter we do not know whether God creates the eternal truths, and we should not say that God did not create the eternal truths. I then trace Arnauld’s view through the early texts. I argue that in his earliest texts Arnauld does not hold either version of the doctrine, but likely holds a version of voluntarism in line with his early nominalism and I also compare his early view with Ockham’s. I then argue that in the later texts from the 1640s Arnauld’s view changes and by 1648 he likely held the epistemic creation doctrine.

In this chapter, I develop Arnauld’s account of God’s nature, focusing on his account of divine simplicity and whether God acts for reasons. I begin by arguing that Arnauld holds an account of divine simplicity according to which: (i) God and all of God’s attributes are identical; (ii) God, God’s action, and God’s attributes are merely conceptually distinct; and (iii) there are no conceptual priorities among God, God’s action, and God’s attributes. I then argue that Arnauld thinks that whether God has reasons in any sense is beyond the scope of rational knowledge for finite beings, but finite beings can know that, if God does have reasons, they are not practical reasons.

In Chapter 7, I consider Arnauld’s modal metaphysics and his actualist view of possibility. Specifically, I argue that Arnauld endorses an essence-based modal actualism. Arnauld develops his view in correspondence with Gottfried Leibniz, so I begin the chapter with a discussion of the beginning of the correspondence, Leibniz’s account of the complete concept theory of substance as well as his account of modality. I then consider Arnauld’s response to Leibniz in three parts: his account of his own nature, his rejection of purely possible substances, and his positive account. I conclude by suggesting Arnauld’s modal metaphysics, with a few modifications, has much to be said for it and could be developed into a plausible view in its own right.

In this chapter, I introduce the reader to the life and thought of Antoine Arnauld through an overview of his key philosophical texts. I divide Arnauld’s life into four broad periods based on key events in his life. The first set of texts is from the 1640s and surrounds his time at the Sorbonne and his early interactions with René Descartes. The second set of texts is mostly from the 1660s and concerns the time between his expulsion from the Sorbonne and his going into exile. The third set of texts is from 1679 to 1689 and was written while in exile. And finally, the fourth set of texts - also written while in exile - occurs from 1689 to his death in 1694. This fourth set of texts is distinct from the others because in these texts Arnauld’s thought seems to shift towards Thomism.

Chapter 6 focuses on Arnauld’s account of human freedom in its historical context. Arnauld’s early Jansenist view is compatibilist, but his view evolves and there is much debate about whether his later view remains compatibilist. I begin the chapter by considering several concepts relevant to Arnauld’s account and three possible positions: compatibilism, incompatibilitist-libertarianism, and compatibilist-libertarianism. I then discuss some important context, including the views of freedom and grace of Molina, Bañez, and Jansen. I proceed to look at some of Arnauld’s letters where he discusses his later view of human freedom and highlight three key themes in these letters as well as discussing some ambiguities in his use of various concepts and examples. I continue to consider several of his later texts, most notably De Libertate, and argue his later view is a version of incompatibilist-libertarianism. I close the chapter by arguing that the key cases and passages that have been the focus of much scholarship on Arnauld’s view are not intended to illuminate human freedom, but are instead meant to defend efficacious grace, and that Arnauld’s ambiguity in their presentation is intentional.

Chapter 5 focuses on Arnauld’s account of ideas and perception. Scholars are divided on whether Arnauld is an indirect or direct realist. I begin by distinguishing between these two views as well as a related taxonomy: act theories of idea, act-object theories of ideas, and object theories of ideas. Arnauld’s most detailed treatment of these issues occurs in his debate with Malebranche and in Section 5.2, I offer a brief overview of Malebranche’s indirect realism and object theory of ideas. In Section 5.3, I distinguish between two debates between Arnauld and Malebranche: One is methodological, and one concerns the nature of perception itself. In Section 5.4, I argue that Arnauld’s account of sensory perception is best described as a direct realism, though with several caveats. I also consider some objections to a direct realist reading of Arnauld, especially his account of objective reality and certain passages which seem to reject direct realism. I conclude with some taxonomical considerations and suggest that, while Arnauld’s account of sensory perception is best thought of as a direct realist account, his overall account of perception eludes straightforward categorization.

In this chapter, I begin my interpretation of Arnauld’s God by outlining Arnauld’s account of our epistemic access to God. I first consider four prominent positions among Arnauld’s peers and predecessors: the empirical model, the divine illumination model, the innatist model, and the Dieu caché. I then go on to examine Arnauld’s account of our innate idea of God as well as considerations that Arnauld raises that limit the scope of knowledge we can derive from his idea. This places his view as a surprising amalgam of the innatist model and the Dieu caché. I also consider Arnauld’s rejection of the empirical model and the divine illumination model as well as briefly discussing his account of knowledge of God via faith.

One of the central themes of this book is that, contrary to usual treatments, Arnauld has a consistent and subtle method and that once this method is appreciated the consistency of his philosophical thought emerges. Chapter 2 plays a central role in that overall argument by offering an account of Arnauld’s method and basic epistemological commitments. I argue that Arnauld distinguishes between three sources of knowledge - the central two being faith and reason - and each has a distinctive method for its use. I continue to outline Arnauld’s general rationalist commitments concerning reason. Finally, I argue for a central, and overlooked, difference between Arnauld’s and Descartes’s epistemological commitments revolving around their respective uses of clear and distinct ideas and accounts of judgment. This difference allows Arnauld to endorse many of the aspects of Descartes’s rationalism, while maintaining stricter limits on the scope of such knowledge.

In Chapter 4, I consider Arnauld’s account of the mind-body union while also discussing some issues in causation. I begin by introducing efficient causation, occasional causation, and the theory of occasionalism, all of which are central to the main threads in the chapter. I then consider Arnauld’s early objections to (or at least concerns about) Descartes’s account of the mind-body union from the Fourth Objections and the New Objections as well as Descartes’s replies. I continue to engage the account of sensation from the Port-Royal Logic and argue that the best reading of this text is one in which Arnauld, and his co-author Pierre Nicole, defend an occasional cause account of body-to-mind causal relations. Finally, I consider Arnauld’s account in later texts, especially the Examen, and argue he ultimately endorses a mitigated version of occasionalism, according to which only God is a true cause with respect to body-to-mind and mind-to-body causal relations.

In this chapter I offer an account of Arnauld’s ontological commitments, specifically of his dual dualisms: a substance-mode ontology and a mind-body substance dualism. According to the former, only substances and their modes exist, while according to the latter only two types of finite substances exist - namely, minds and bodies. I also consider Arnauld’s early objections to Descartes’s argument for substance dualism from the Sixth Meditation, often called the ‘real distinction argument,’ especially Arnauld’s objections concerning Descartes’s use of the conceivability-possibility principle. After considering Descartes’s replies, I then consider Arnauld’s seeming endorsement of the real distinction argument in some of his later texts.

In this chapter I continue my treatment of Arnauld’s account of the creation doctrine. Building on the distinction in Chapter 10 between the metaphysical and the epistemic versions of the doctrine, I argue that Arnauld holds the epistemic creation doctrine in these later texts. I begin by offering my prima facie case for this interpretation based on his method and epistemic commitments outlined in Chapters 2 and 8. I then consider several arguments that Arnauld is committed to the metaphysical version of the creation doctrine on account of his treatments of divine freedom and divine simplicity. I show that Arnauld has the means to block any commitment to the metaphysical version of the doctrine from either of these other positions. I also consider why Arnauld remains silent on the matter of the creation doctrine and offer an account that explains his silence and shows it to be an intentional choice. All told, I conclude that Arnauld holds the epistemic creation doctrine.

In the seventeenth century there was still no clear distinction between the child’s interiority and the adult’s, since ‘saving’ grace could arrive at any point in the lifespan. However, a rudimentary developmental idea was already defining the category of childhood more sharply by calendar age. This becomes clear in the principles behind the experimental primary schools established by the Jansenist wing of French Catholicism, including figures such as Antoine Arnauld and the Abbé de Saint-Cyran, as an alternative to Jesuit education. The Jansenist schools aimed at preserving the purity of children assumed to be elect (i.e. those of their own families) from contamination by the surrounding mass of reprobates in thrall to the Devil. The educational method was precisely not religious instruction but a secular, humanist curriculum based on reason. This went hand in hand with close control of the children in a panopticon; school discipline switched from physical punishment to moral shaming. The history of education as an academic discipline shows an unwitting bias towards being a history of the elect child.