Technology is often a crucial input to innovation, but so are knowledge and ideas. Indeed, technological change emerges out of ideas and, as we will see, knowledge stands in an interesting relationship to the generation of the novel ideas that you could say are essential raw materials for innovation. First, Galenson’s work provides some nuance to the nature of ideas and of knowledge, suggesting that knowledge can be both a prerequisite for and an impediment to the development of ideas, depending crucially on what kind of ideas we are dealing with. Then, the papers by Ward and Shane present two contrasting views of how knowledge can shape imagination, highlighting how one’s prior knowledge might overstructure, enable, or narrowly focus ideation. Finally, Jones’ paper zooms out to the macro level, inviting us to think about why it appears to be getting harder and harder to have ideas early in life.

This essay first describes how legislation and doctrine create the temptation to build “like race” or “like sex” paradigms for age. It then argues that advocates should resist this temptation for both empirical and strategic reasons. It demonstrates how unmooring the age discrimination paradigm from traditional civil rights models allows us to apprehend it better by considering the distinctive fears older individuals conjure about our own mortality. Finally, it considers how such insights might be incorporated into antidiscrimination law and politics.

In the mid-twentieth century, income and wealth inequality was declining, leading to an era of comparative economic equality and a large middle class. But since the early 1980s, income and wealth inequality has been on the rise. The 100-year life describes how increasing life expectancy could transform the course of individual lives in detail – but how does this trend intersect with our age of inequality? And what does it mean for law and policymaking more generally? The dark side of rising life expectancy is that it is unequally shared. The first part of this chapter briefly discusses how age and inequality are connected – that is, that not everyone shares in rising life expectancy equally and that those who are living longer share many common attributes. The second part considers the possible impact of the skew in rising life expectancy on representative government. Inequality skews politics to favor the wealthy; inequality by age will likely do the same. The fundamental problem is that power is held unequally in most societies. The third part, on age and institutional design, outlines some ways in which political structures might be crafted to account for age-related differences.

Examines the concept of hoarding, what it is and how some animals and most people have a tendency to collect items beyond their immediate requirements. The distinction is made between a hoard and a collection. The types of items which are hoarded are discussed along with a description of animal hoarding.

Social aspects of hoarding. We address the stigma of hoarding and how this can be treated by society, along with discussion of the shame and humiliation which prevents many people with hoarding problems from seeking help. This stigma can be reinforced by “helping” agencies who may view it as a “lifestyle choice” rather than a condition which requires help. Then looking at the role the media has played in perpetuating the myth that hoarders should be able to deal with it themselves.

Hoarding is a symptom rather than a distinct diagnosis and may be found in many conditions but there is a specific condition with characteristic features known as Hoarding Disorder. Some possible causes of hoarding are then described followed by a more detailed examination of the diagnosis of Hoarding Disorder

Finally, the chapter examines t what age hoarding arises and introduces the idea of hoarding in childhood.

Chapter 7 considers the boundary for the end of girlhood under international law. It applies Welby’s Meaning Triad to discuss the sense, meaning and significance of the current definition of child in the CRC. It argues that this definition is problematic on several grounds: absence of a minimum age for the end of girlhood, discrepancy between the end of girlhood and emancipation, possibility of unequal treatment on the grounds of gender, national domicile, and between girls under domestic law. It examines positive features of the CRC and the benefit for girls to be covered until eighteen years. It also analyzes ‘childist’ provisions of the CRC and empowering provisions of other treaties, and whether girls should reach majority before eighteen years. It conducts case studies of child justice and child marriage. Finally, it employs semioethics to identify amendments to the definition of child in the CRC that would tackle its shortcomings.

Chapter 2 provides a history of the recognition of the girl child in the international legal framework, from the universalist to the qualified universalist approach, and finally to the girl child as a distinct rights holder under international law. Chapter 2 thereafter conducts an examination of the definition of girl child in the English language. It critically studies the terminology presently used to define her and explores the etymology of the expression ‘girl’ and its semiotics of inferiority and subordination throughout history. The chapter analyzes the two vectors of identity of the girl child: femalehood and childhood. It examines the conceptions of girlhood and its 1) dimensions, 2) boundaries and 3) divisions. It discusses age-based and competence-based boundaries, and parameters for the end of girlhood in the English language and in the law, including definitions concerning puberty, youth and majority. It also suggests divisions within girlhood, namely young girls and adolescent girls.

This chapter uncovers the unintended trajectory of Taiwanese women’s freedom among younger adopted daughters in the Japanese colonial courts. Family-centric, gender-based physical unfreedom continued to be one of the salient administrative and legal problems in Taiwan from the precolonial period to the late 1910s. Male household heads were not ready to follow the judicial construction of women’s freedom of movement during the early to mid-1920s. However, Japanese judges involved with female litigants shifted their focus to women’s freedom of choice – defined by intent and contractual freedom among adopted daughters – as a new boundary delineating their relationships with households in civil and criminal cases in the late 1920s. Women’s choice continued to be a central point of dispute when adopted daughters became targets of their parents and strangers. These daughters’ ambiguous capacity regarding their age, class background, and sexual integrity was misrepresented to legitimize their adverse labor and life conditions, including sex work. Yet, it was within the flexible contours of choice that the courts protected women’s agency, which, in turn, became a constitutive part of colonial history.

In this chapter we explore a manually annotated subset of data from the corpora studied in this book, which have been analysed to show the presence of narratives as understood by researchers studying this concept. In this narrative study we return to an exploration of differences arising from L1 and cultural background and, inter alia, conclude that cultural background may have an important role to play in the frequency and nature of narrative. In drawing such conclusions, we refer, where appropriate, to existing research on SLA and narrative. Overall, the study suggests that, while there are similarities between L1 and L2 narrative use, there are also differences, some attributable to the learner, others to the task/context in which the data was gathered.

Human rights are granted to all humans based on their humanity. The justification for human rights is that every individual is born free and equal in possession of a rational mind. The CRC does not define the begining of childhood, only its end at the age of 18. The monist construction of the child-rights identity is unique because, depending on national legal regulations around abortion, it is possible to apply it from the moment of conception and does not require being live-born.

Making the child-rights identity detached from its social context and the possibility of self-identification serves to protect the child from traditional and social harmful practices directed toward children. At the same time, the monist identity of the child becomes placed out of reach of democratic deliberations and self-determination. The intersectionality of race and gender becomes two socially constructed concepts that cannot be addressed within the child-rights identity, which both serves to protect the child from discrimination but also risks making child rights detached from addressing crucial structural inequalities based on race and gender.

This introduction to the Cambridge Companion to the Electric Guitar offers a concise synopsis of the dominant narrative surrounding the instrument, and establishes the ways in which the current collection seeks to expand the existing framework for considering the electric guitar’s history and cultural impact. It also discusses the provisional development of “guitar studies” as an academic field, highlighting trends in conferences, journalistic and special interest publications, and discussions surrounding music technology, the electric guitar industry, and socio-demographic issues such as gender, race, and age. While electric guitar scholarship has made significant progress, it has not fully established itself as a distinct field. Currently, there is no dedicated journal or professional organization for researchers in this area. “Guitar studies” may not yet have come to fruition, but its foundation is being laid, to which this Cambridge Companion intends to contribute.