In contemporary healthcare services, managers are required to create and support environments that are complex in nature and are subject to competing forces that place significant demands on both the system and individuals contributing to productivity. Often, people assume that being held to account is something negative that usually happens only when things go wrong. However, accountability can be viewed as something that can be utilised to ensure success. Holding to account can be difficult if the perceptions and expectations of management and staff differ. We cannot assume that people share the same understanding of what they are accountable for, or the standards expected of them, unless they are made explicit and clear.

This introduction to the book begins with a narrative of the prevalence of gun violence in the United States and the trafficking of gun violence into Mexico and Latin America. It canvasses the current statistics of gun-related murders, suicides, mass shootings, and school shootings compiled by the CDC, the Pew Research Institute, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Giffords Center, and other agencies collecting gun violence data. The introduction sets forth the themes of the book, including locating the landscape of firearms litigation in the history of mass tort litigation, the ineffectiveness of various gun regulatory initiatives, the historical immunity of the firearms industry from liability for gun harms, and the recent inroads on the ability to sue firearms defendants through the enactment of targeted consumer protection and public nuisance firearms accountability statutes. The introduction suggests the argument that the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement demonstrated that impervious, dangerous product industries could finally be held accountable, and that the Sandy Hook Elementary School litigation marked a pivotal point in opening a pathway toward suing the firearms industry and holding it accountable for gun harms.

Most research on education governance begin with the premise that school boards are the natural default and that locally elected school boards must be defended. This chapter demonstrates why this assumption is wrong. I show that: (1) most voters don’t have school-aged kids and thus lack sufficient “skin in the game” to prioritize academic achievement; (2) voters don’t hold school board members accountable for student learning; and (3) local school board elections are uncompetitive, with nearly 80 percent of the turnover driven by incumbent retirements rather than Election Day defeats. Several case studies, focused on school districts in San Francisco (California) and Easta Ramapo (New York) illustrate why broken elections have negative impacts on education quality. At best, school board elections are extremely low-turnout affairs, in which a small and highly unrepresentative group of adults impose their parochial, self-interested, and often uninformed views on the rest of the community. At its worst, school district governance devolves into an absolute clown show, where performative politics takes precedence over serious policy meant to serve the academic interests of students.

The rise in the use of AI in most key areas of business, from sales to compliance to financial analysis, means that even the highest levels of corporate governance will be impacted, and that corporate leaders are duty-bound to manage both the responsible development and the legal and ethical use of AI. This transformation will directly impact the legal and ethical duties and best practices of those tasked with setting the ‘tone at the top’ and who are accountable for the firm’s success. Directors and officers will have to ask themselves to what extent should, or must, AI tools be used in both strategic business decision-making, as well as monitoring processes. Here we look at a number of issues that we believe are going to arise due to the greater use of generative AI. We consider what top management should be doing to ensure that all such AI tools used by the firm are safe and fit for purpose, especially considering avoidance of potential negative externalities. In the end, due to the challenges of AI use, the human component of top corporate decision-making will be put to the test, to prudentially thread the needle of AI use and to ensure the technology serves corporations and their human stakeholders instead of the other way around.

It is natural to see in the Republic’s concern with self-mastery a Platonic account of autonomy. But Plato’s understanding of self-rule in the Republic has more to do with cognition, and rather less to do with independent agency. Indeed, in the ethically motivated epistemology of the Republic, it is aiming at ideal knowledge that transforms one ethically and engenders many of the features centrally associated with the notion of ‘autonomy’. Being able to explain reality independently makes one independent of the illusions and confusions caused by pleasure, pains, and public pressures, and even restructures the desires, pleasures and other affects liable to arise. Moreover, the ability to give accounts is what makes us accountable to one another for our cognitive condition — and for the judgements, feelings and actions based on this.

This chapter explores how international law and its legitimacy could be improved and made more aligned with the demands of justice. It focuses on two types of requirements. First, there are the principles and accompanying procedures on the basis of which actors ask their agency (and their rights) to be recognized by international law and its culture of legitimacy. These principles are consent, justification, accountability, consistency, representation and participation, and non-abuse of power. Second, there are the topics around which this quest for the recognition of agency (and rights) takes place. They are better universality of international law, human rights as a benchmark of the legitimacy of sovereignty, compliance/enforcement/accountability, and human rights supported by public goods. These two kinds of requirements have been at the center of the efforts to make international law more inclusive as well as more legitimate, and they need to be taken more seriously in the future.

The durability of democracy among modern political systems is based on its ability to provide for its own self-enforcement without recourse to outside compulsion (North, Summerhill, and Weingast 2000; Przeworski 1991). Recourse to outside enforcement is always dangerous because loss of self-restraint by that authority raises the dilemma of “who guards the guardians” (Hurwicz 2008), and holds out the possibility of dictatorship.

For more than seven and a half decades, India has enjoyed the moniker of “world’s largest democracy.” In addition to this distinction, the country is the most enduring democracy in the developing world. India adopted universal suffrage in 1947, despite an extremely low per capita income. Since then, the country has sustained its commitment to democratic governance despite poverty, inequality, unprecedented diversity, and sprawling geography (Varshney 2013). This makes India both an important outlier as well as an exemplar for poor, multiethnic democracies the world over (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011).

This chapter discusses the judicial review of international decisions using the model of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It examines the jurisdiction, implementation, and monitoring of the Court’s judgments, highlighting its role in ensuring compliance with human rights standards. The chapter explores the procedures for reviewing and enforcing the Court’s decisions, the challenges in achieving compliance, and the impact of the Court’s jurisprudence on the development of international human rights law. It also highlights the importance of judicial review in promoting accountability and strengthening the protection of human rights.

This part explores the principles and mechanisms for the reparation of human rights violations and the enforcement of decisions rendered by international human rights bodies. It discusses the obligation of states to provide full reparation for harm suffered as a result of human rights violations, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of nonrepetition. The sections examine the legal standards for determining and quantifying reparation, the procedural aspects of reparation processes, and the role of international and national bodies in monitoring and enforcing reparation awards. Additionally, this part focuses on the enforcement mechanisms and challenges in implementing international human rights decisions. It discusses various models of enforcement, including judicial review, hybrid monitoring, and political and diplomatic control. The part highlights the importance of effective enforcement in ensuring the realization of human rights and the accountability of states for human rights violations. By providing insights into the reparation and enforcement processes, this part emphasizes the critical role of comprehensive and effective mechanisms in achieving justice and reconciliation for victims of human rights violations.

Guarantor institutions (such as electoral commissions and anti-corruption watchdogs, which supposedly comprise the so-called ‘fourth’ or ‘integrity’ branch of the state) are increasingly of interest to constitutional scholars. In a given political context, a guarantor institution is a tailor-made constitutional institution, vested with material as well as expressive capacities, whose function is to provide a credible and enduring guarantee to a specific non-self-enforcing constitutional norm (or any aspect thereof). Arguing that guarantor institutions are more trustee-like than agent-like in character, this chapter defends the claim that the design of any guarantor institutions should seek to ensure that it has: (i) sufficient expertise and capacity to perform its functions effectively; (ii) sufficient independence from political, economic, or social actors with an interest in frustrating the relevant norm it is meant to guarantee; and (iii) sufficient accountability to bodies with an interest in upholding the relevant norm.

Regulation is a pervasive feature of contemporary capitalism. How to ensure, in democratic states, that those to whom regulatory power and functions have has been delegated act in line with constitutional norms and values is a perennial, and much explored, question. This chapter seeks to do two things: first to set out a framework for analysing regulatory systems, and second, to use that framework to explore how constitutional actors seek to regulate, or more specifically to constitutionalise, the regulators they have created. In using a regulatory framework to analyse this element of constitutional systems, it thus proposes to ‘flip’ the usual perspective, and not just look (down) at regulatory systems from a constitutional perspective, but also look (up) at constitutions from a regulatory perspective. This flipped perspective will be used to conceptualise constitutions not from the starting point of established constitutional, legal or political theory but from a particular regulatory theory, that of decentred or polycentric regulation, and to explore the different ways in which ‘regulators are regulated’ through the interplay of the constitutional governance system with the regulatory systems it creates: through the goals and values each seeks to pursue, the techniques, organisations and individuals through which each acts, the particular sets of ideas or cognitive and epistemological frameworks those actors bring, and with a continual need both for, and in constant pursuit of, trust and legitimacy in the eyes of those on whose behalf they purport to govern.