Quantitative Content Analysis

To determine the extent to which moral considerations influenced parole decisions (0 = denial, 1 = release), a quantitative-inductive content analysis (Krippendorff, Reference Krippendorff2018) of the categories appearing in the cases was conducted in three stages: (1) establishing content categories. I analyzed fifty cases (equally divided between murder and manslaughter) to establish content categories. Thirty categories were identified in this process: fifteen positive (e.g., “admits guilt” or “actively participates in prison treatment”), twelve negative (e.g. “severe crime,” “disciplinary misconduct,” “insufficient treatment”), and three additional categories representing the positions of the AGRs, the SVs, and the police; (2) Coding. Three law/criminology students coded the cases according to the categories identified in the previous stage. In cases of disagreement, discussions were held until a consensus was reached. I also reviewed and confirmed the students’ coding: (3) grouping categories into factors. Based on criminological and penal theory literature, the categories were conceptually divided into four groups: utilitarian factors consisting of (a) risk and rehabilitation, and retributive factors consisting of (b) crime-related, (c) moral character-related, and (d) punishment-related factors.Footnote ¹⁵

Qualitative Content Analysis

To achieve a rich description of the narratives involved in parole hearings, I conducted an in-depth qualitative analysis of the hearings for all parole actors and utilized inductive-oriented thematic coding of the transcripts (Charmaz, Reference Charmaz2006). I focused on the conceptual and relational meaning of narratives that emerged from the meaning of whole sentences rather than individual words (Elo et al., Reference Elo, Kääriäinen, Kanste, Pölkki, Utriainen and Kyngäs2014). As in similar qualitative studies of parole decision-making (Appleton, Reference Appleton2010; Ruhland, Reference Ruhland2020; Young & Chimowitz, Reference Young and Chimowitz2022), the transcripts were thoroughly read three times to identify connections, associations, and preliminary interpretations. Similar statements were coded and grouped into categories. To enhance transferability, I aimed to provide a “thick” description of the hearings, including rich examples (translated by a bilingual translator); contextualize the analysis; conceptualize the findings at a more abstract level; and acknowledge the study’s limitations (Charmaz, Reference Charmaz2006). To preserve anonymity, all personal details about the actors were omitted in reporting the findings.

Reaffirming Judicial Authority

The AGRs’ arguments were based on the written materials in the parole dossier; the AGRs did not call witnesses and resisted applicants’ attempts to call them. The arguments presented by AGRs typically began with a quotation or paraphrase of the key normative and factual determinations made at trial and sentencing. With very few exceptions, the AGRs devoted a substantial portion of their argument – often, more than half – to repeating the court’s narrative and comparing it to the applicants’ story of the crime in minute detail, as found among U.S. parole decision-makers (Young & Chimowitz, Reference Young and Chimowitz2022). Seventy-eight AGRs meticulously policed even the slightest deviation in the applicants’ account from the judicially established narrative, including discrepancies such as the specific weapon used, the exact location of the body, or the number of wounds inflicted. The AGRs juxtaposed the official legal “story” of the crime as expressed in the verdict and sentencing remarks, and the applicants’ “story” of the crime as expressed in the police interrogation, trial testimony, sentencing hearing, in front of correctional officers or during the parole hearing. One may wonder about the significance of reciting at length the judicial narrative that took place decades before the hearing as part of an allegedly future-looking parole hearing. The board itself wondered the same. Nonetheless, the AGRs consistently insisted on this repetition, justifying this practice by emphasizing its importance in highlighting the discrepancies between the official narrative and the applicants’ version of events:

The AGRs required the applicants to fully internalize and identify with the judicial, official story of the crime and sternly criticized applicants who were viewed as failing to do so. Such applicants were perceived as failing to show “insight” into their crime (sec. 5.4.3), and their rehabilitation was deemed superficial:

As part of endorsing the judicial narrative, the AGRs expected applicants to acknowledge their crime as a public-legal wrong rather than merely a private conflict between two individuals: “I expect that when the prisoner comes before the board, he will stand up honestly and say: ‘I killed a human being, I understand that I committed … the most serious violent crime in the criminal code’” (case-40977-03-19).Footnote ²⁵ In such cases, the AGRs essentially acted “as if” the sentencing judge were there at the hearing, becoming an absent-present actor at the hearings.

The rehearsal of the judicial narrative of the crime, and the requirement that applicants reaffirm this narrative, enabled the AGRs to advance three aims. First, they could frame the applicants as “juridical” rather than purely “clinical” subjects (Bourdieu, Reference Bourdieu1987; Foucault, Reference Foucault1977). As such, the moral lens of guilt and desert, the locus of homicide sentencing, becomes as significant to their assessment as their therapeutic needs or risk. Second, the applicants’ reaffirmation of the judicial narrative in their own words reinforces the judicial authority as symbolically present in the hearing in a process that could, in and of itself, be viewed as undermining the court’s authority to impose a life sentence (or significant prison term). Finally, in internalizing the judicial story, the applicants exclude any alternative explanation for their crime, reaffirm their lack of moral standing to demand their release, and display their remorse during the hearing as morally expected.

Subordinating Parole to Sentencing

Along with reaffirming the judicial authority, in cases of especially serious homicide (e.g., multiple victims, murder of a child), the AGRs subordinated the board’s decision-making to the court’s judgments regarding the applicants’ crime and character. This narrative positioned the judicial process as a moral frame, and a source of pressure on the board, to “re-censure” the applicants (Aviram, Reference Aviram2020; Dagan, Reference Dagan2023):

This narrative aimed to ensure that the board adhered to past judicial censuring determinations without deviating by releasing the applicants:

In this narrative, 29 AGRs sought to amalgamate sentencing and parole messages and the general punitive voices of the unforgiving SVs (sec. 5.2.1), public opinion, and/or the media, which served as a “moral memory bloc” to bind the board to the court’s censure (Aviram, Reference Aviram2020). In this way, as much as unjustified parole release undermines sentencing justice, a justified parole denial reaffirms the court’s moral authority:

As this narrative suggests, the AGRs established an “intertextuality” (Eco, Reference Eco1985) between sentencing and parole moral labor, emphasizing that both should serve to promote broader societal “values” and the “public interest,” objectives that extend beyond rehabilitation and risk. The reframing of the board as not merely a “rehabilitative board” means that the criteria of “justice” and “values” are also applied to parole decision-making. Furthermore, as connected to the public meaning of sentencing, some AGRs even encouraged the board in severe cases to open its closed doors, to achieve a moral and public impact similar to that of a sentencing hearing. As one AGR articulated, “punitive considerations should apply to parole, it concerns the public interest, and the public has the right to know” (case-35845-12-16). In rendering parole decisions public, the AGRs reframed the board as a second court, public and punitive, beyond the real sentencing courtroom.

Refocusing Moral Attention

Finally, the AGRs harnessed the court’s determinations to redirect the board’s moral attention toward the severity of the crime and the victims’ suffering, rather than the applicants’ pains, rehabilitation efforts, or post-release plans. Fifty AGRs encouraged the board to save their empathy for the SVs rather than for applicants, suggesting a “zero-sum game”: “When considering the difficulty of the prisoner and his family, please remember that [the victim], a boy loved by his family and friends, had his life cut short by a stab which pierced his heart” (case-31357-07-21). They also established through the court’s judgments a “moral boundary” between the victim’s image as kind, moral, and innocent, and the applicant’s immorality and inhumanity (Herbert, Reference Herbert2024): “The court defined the murder as a cynical, despicable, and inhuman act toward his good friend … someone who was like a saving angel for the prisoner, a good and supportive figure whom he could rely on” (case-56855-12-20).

In re-focusing the board’s moral focus, the AGRs also sought to shift the emphasis of the hearing from the applicants’ rehabilitation to the public meaning of their crime as expressed through sentencing:

Seeking to shift the attention away from the applicants, AGRs frequently criticized applicants for overemphasizing their suffering or losses rather than focusing on their victims: “He focuses on the private price he pays … and the harm suffered from not being able to have a family” (case-17636-05-16). These AGRs thus demarcated a boundary between the SVs’ suffering, which deserved recognition as morally legitimate, and the applicants’ suffering, which became largely irrelevant to the parole decision-making and did not deserve to be recognized.

In sum, the AGRs harnessed and expanded the legitimacy and symbolic capital of the “juridical field” of parole (Bourdieu, Reference Bourdieu1987), allowing them to legitimize the board as an extension of the court’s moral communication. Further, the use of judicial rhetoric allowed the AGRs to be viewed as merely citing past judicial reasoning, subtly “bypassing” possible criticism for transforming parole hearings into punitive re-censuring forums.

Between Risk Objects and Moral Subjects

Alongside judicializing parole, the AGRs focused, in largely every case, on analyzing the correctional data in the parole dossier, including clinical reports, psychological risk assessments, or records from prison officers. Unlike the crime-oriented work of sentencing, here the AGRs conducted a deeper examination of applicants’ character. The AGRs constructed a hybrid risk/character assessment that adopted the strictest interpretations of neoclassical and positivistic theories. Often, doing so included presenting the applicants’ immorality on the basis of their crime and their depraved character:

However, as the argument progressed, the AGR shifted to framing the applicant as “dangerous” and “out of control,” “anti-social,” “schizophrenic,” and having “abnormal thinking”:

By oscillating between neoclassical and positivistic discourses, the AGRs effectively framed the applicants as the “worst of the worst” of both worlds, being both “risk objects” and “moral subjects” (Hannah-Moffat, Reference Hannah-Moffat1999). On the one hand, they were depicted as being able to distinguish right from wrong and thus were deemed deserving of strict retribution for failing to conduct themselves morally. On the other hand, they were portrayed as pathological “others,” subject to deterministic psycho-socio-biological forces and thus should be imprisoned as long as possible for public safety (Garland, Reference Garland2001). The categories of risk/character for the AGRs were thus fluid, shifting between different, possibly conflicting, discourses, that could reinforce each other.

Between Real and Hidden Character

The risk/moral matrix was further used by the AGRs to question the very epistemological possibility of fully “knowing” the applicants’ character. The AGRs implied, both directly and indirectly, that the applicants were merely presenting an idealized-performative version of themselves, offering a compelling “front” as truly reformed desisters, tailored to impress their parole audience (Goffman, Reference Goffman1959/1980). According to this perspective, fifteen applicants were projecting a moral “false” public self while concealing a “real” self that was immoral and dangerous. Applicants were often framed as giving a misleading performance, as one AGR argued: “He is Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. He tells the board what the board wants to hear … We need what he does, not what he says to the board” (case-35845-12-16). Thus, to expose this hidden immorality and risk, the AGRs emphasized the necessity of cultivating suspicion, allowing them to know applicants’ “hidden layer”:

To “cultivate suspicion,” the AGRs used the judicial or correctional assessments, sometimes determined decades ago, regarding the applicants’ “true” character, as one AGR argued (even using the word “defendant” in his statement):

Such portrayals of the applicants conveyed AGRs’ sense of mistrust regarding the authenticity of their character transformation: “I believe there is always a need for skepticism. Anybody that makes decisions must exercise extreme caution … the impression is of a prisoner who is manipulative, cold-blooded, and sophisticated” (case-77504-12-20).

Deeply suspicious of applicants’ perceived “double self” (Goffman, Reference Goffman1959/1980), AGRs demanded a perfect and constant moral character performance, which should be “high and stable” (case-52425-07-17) and “flawless” (case-59589-01-18). As one AGR argued: “The process must be perfect and whole. Whole about the way [in which it is carried out], and perfect concerning the substantive achievements” (case-15008-07-20). By requiring perfection, the AGRs effectively demanded no less than “risk elimination” (case-77504-12-20), imposing a “very heavy burden” on the applicants (case-41810-12-18).

The narrative of character perfection and overall performance, however, was challenged by the applicants and their counsel as being unrealistic for long-term prisoners. One board decision called for more realistic expectations:

In sum, the AGRs essentially extended the past-looking, punitive, and adversarial sentencing to the parole hearings, to reinforce the immorality of the applicants’ crime. The immoral character that emerged from the applicants’ crimes even “bled” into decision-making that was meant to be based on their changed character. Later, both clinical and risk discourses were harnessed to construct the applicants’ character as both immoral and dangerous, and thus fixated and unchanged.

Embodying Biological and Social Death

Applicants detailed the destructive realities of life imprisonment and its profound impact, aligning their experiences with the key pains of long-term imprisonment described in the literature (Crewe et al., Reference Crewe, Hulley and Wright2020; Hulley et al., Reference Hulley, Crewe and Wright2016; Kazemian & Travis, Reference Kazemian and Travis2015). Lifers, in particular, emphasized the unique suffering associated with ageing or illness. They vividly described the physical deterioration caused by illness, which they perceived as a dehumanizing experience, and portrayed themselves as having transitioned from “criminals” to barely functioning “patients” due to severe conditions such as diabetes, respiratory diseases, or cancer:

The applicants’ biological deterioration had implications for the justice and humanity of their continued imprisonment, as one applicant’s counsel argued:

Applicants’ narratives of physical powerlessness, particularly those of elderly and chronically ill applicants, exemplify the destructive impact of life imprisonment on their present and future lives. The release of such applicants is therefore portrayed as less morally problematic, and in some cases, even morally deserved. Six applicants framed themselves as being reduced to a state of (almost) sheer biological existence, and their release was presented less as the beginning of a new life outside prison and more as the possibility of a dignified death.

Twenty applicants emphasized that their punishment not only destroyed their physical well-being but also eroded their social identity and connectedness to others, resulting in what they described as a form of “social death”: “I know nowhere aside from prison; I have destroyed my life” (case-59207-06-16). They highlighted the loss of parenthood or marriage caused by long-term imprisonment: “I have no family, I am helpless” (case-28965-11-15) or “My marriage was destroyed” (case-4865-04-21). These applicants also described a sense of “biographical rupture” in their lives, attributing the rupture to their prolonged incarceration, which had consumed the majority of their adult years (Crewe et al., Reference Crewe, Hulley and Wright2020). They conveyed a kind of self-eulogy in which they lamented their shattered and wasted lives, mixing depression and a realistic acceptance of their status:

For some applicants, their perceived social death was closely tied to the anticipated challenges they would face after release: “If you release me to the street, like a cat, I’ll have no idea what’s going on outside … for me, it’ll be a new world” (case-26776-03-22).

The applicants were acutely aware of their stigmatization, which they perceived as being “mirrored” back to them through both prison life and society (Ievins, Reference Ievins2023): “I look all the time at other people around me as injurious people, hostile, the worst; when I look in the mirror I see the same” (case-31992-02-22) or “I’ll have a stain my whole life after what I did” (case-53261-10-21). They further argued that even if released they would continue to face stigma and significant challenges in finding employment, housing, or new relationships: “Because of my stigma, I will need to move to another place” (case-55058-01-16).

Through these narratives, the applicants sought to convey that their punishment had become equivalent to death by incarceration. Thus, they argued that even if released, they were irreparably broken and could not return to their pre-punishment biological or social condition.

Making Room for Self-punishment

Sixty applicants presented to the board a transformed, desisting self, drawing on themes recognized in reintegrative shaming (Makkai & Braithwaite, Reference Makkai and Braithwaite1994), desistance (Maruna, Reference Maruna2001), self-presentation (Goffman, Reference Goffman1971), and post-traumatic growth theories (Crewe et al., Reference Crewe, Hulley and Wright2020). Prison rehabilitation, according to these narratives, had allowed applicants to humanize themselves, find a listening ear, express themselves in a way that was not centered on the murderer stereotype, and make themselves believe they were morally “redeemable,” as has been found in other “redemption narrative” contexts (Maruna, Reference Maruna2001):

These applicants described how they had “knifed off” (Laub & Sampson, Reference Laub and Sampson2003) their old, “false,” negative lives in favor of a new, “true,” positive existence:

The process of “splitting” between their past and present selves was described by these applicants as slow and uneasy, often attributed to the corrections officers’ efforts (Goffman, Reference Goffman1971): “This change took me 19 years; I didn’t build myself overnight, but slowly through hard work” (case-12104-06-18). These applicants identified significant “turning points” in their lives: “After half of my sentence I was mature, became sane, and understood my acts” (case-13842-08-14). Portraying themselves as changed moral individuals, these applicants described themselves as “good,” “humane,” “reliable,” “mature,” “responsible,” and “reformed” as is common in “redemption narratives” of ex-offenders (Maruna, Reference Maruna2001) (Grace, 2022):

As expected, these applicants expressed a deep sense of remorse, contrition, and self-condemnation, consistent with findings in similar correctional contexts (Weisman, Reference Weisman2009; Young & Chimowitz, Reference Young and Chimowitz2022). Some applicants conveyed general remorse to the board, expressing regret for “what I have done,” the “incident,” “act,” “lifestyle,” or for “those whom I have harmed.” Mostly, however, their remorse was directed personally toward the SVs: “I want to take advantage of the deceased’s family being here; for 22 years I have been waiting to tell them that I understand their pain” (case-47246-06-20). These applicants also acknowledged the unlikelihood of receiving forgiveness from the SVs, given the severity of their crimes: “[The] parents will not forgive me. If I were in their place, I wouldn’t forgive myself either” (case-30749-10-21).

A key aspect of these remorseful expressions was the portrayal of the applicants’ inner pain (31 applicants). In these moments, the focus of moral engagement shifted inward and toward deep regret over their own perceived inner immorality. Seeking to make their invisible pangs of guilt visible, the applicants’ performance of remorse often involved crying and displays of brokenness and self-loathing:

These applicants’ sense of the “moral weight” of their crime was described as a static and unchanging inner punishment, remaining unaffected by any personal changes during imprisonment or potential post-release, as has been found by scholars (Crewe et al., Reference Crewe, Hulley and Wright2020). Importantly, such self-punishing pangs of guilt were described as something that would extend beyond the conclusion of their formal punishment: “My punishment is much greater than imprisonment; my punishment is with me every day” (case-63374-06-22) or “I’ll carry this [pain] with me to the grave and I don’t even know what awaits me after I leave this world (crying)” (case-49910-02-23).

Some applicants even inflicted permanent physical “stigmata” on themselves as a way to ensure their crime would never be forgotten: “I was afraid that I would forget what I did … so I stubbed out a cigarette on my shoulder so it would always remind me … the scar is here and also in my mind, and will be with me my whole life” (case-28683-11-19). Mirroring the SVs’ narratives (sec. 5.2.1.), the dissonance between the applicants’ continued lives and the unlived lives of their victims served as a constant reminder of their guilt: “The hardest thing for me is to see my children grow up and at the same time look at the victim’s family” (case-53991-03-19).

Consumed by a sense of guilt, some applicants, particularly lifers, described inflicting real or imagined pain upon their bodies as signifying their atonement. Five applicants recounted suicide attempts, which they viewed as manifestations of their enduring guilt, particularly during the initial, most distressing period of their imprisonment. Others expressed a martyr fantasy, wishing to sacrifice their lives in exchange for the imagined resurrection of the victim:

By portraying their inner suffering as omnipresent, the applicants presented themselves as moral and able to identify with and mirror the SVs’ pain. Furthermore, because of such voluntary inner pain, they could be released from formal punishment, to “make room” for their informal self-imposed retribution, which was more severe and never-ending.

Punishment and Memory

Finally, the applicants connected their pangs of guilt to the memory surrounding the deceased. The applicants and their counsel usually acknowledged the status of SVs as being beyond dispute, often describing it as sacred: “The deceased’s family statement is sacred, with no dispute, and it is naturally right; this is our starting point” (case-54100-03-19).

Seven applicants conveyed how they not only respected but had internalized the memory of the victims. Such a narrative is in line with the retributive notion that punishment is a moral way to keep faith with the victim and honor their memory for future generations (Ignatieff, Reference Ignatieff2000). What these applicants sought was to break the link between memory and suffering. They described how they carried the burden of memory and strove to preserve and reproduce the victim’s memory for future generations. They argued that they were symbolically, emotionally, or physically engaged with the absent victims, positioning themselves as active “memory workers” dedicated to preserving their victims’ memory both in prison and, if released, in the outside world (Kidron, Reference Kidron2003). For some applicants, this memory work took place within prison cells: “I have an electric memorial candle [for the victim] in my cell (crying); even if I’m released this will be with me for the rest of my days” (case-61872-02-18). Others wrote symbolic letters to their deceased victims, prayed for their memory, or visited their graves during furloughs: “I have already visited his grave and asked for his forgiveness. I will continue to pray for his family” (case-1476-05-17). Some applicants also pledged to construct physical or symbolic memorials for their victims upon their release: I want to build a monument to [the victim’s memory] in the place where I took his life. I will work hard for this my whole life. Every year I will do a memorial service for him in the synagogue. I will dedicate myself to helping young children. (case-62820-07-21)

As the applicants took on the role of memory workers for their victims, they implicitly suggested that further formal punishment was unnecessary for embodying the victims’ memory in reality. Furthermore, the applicants emphasized that their guilt could be addressed not only through passive suffering but also through active acts of atonement and memory within the law-abiding community. Finally, this narrative indicates that despite their identity “split” between past and present, they did not dissociate completely from their criminal past. The enduring thread of memory underscores their identity continuity from the past through the present into their future.

Context-Sensitive Proportionality

The board’s proportionality assessment is based on two judicial tools: “balancing” and “precedents.” The board can deviate from the classic straightforward implementation of parole factors, “weighing” and “balancing on scales” the relevant considerations, as in judicial decision-making (McFadden, 1987). For example, the board can try to strike a balance between retributive and rehabilitative considerations: “The offenses are of great severity, which outweighs the rehabilitation process that the prisoner has undergone” (case-15677-05-19). In a court-like way, the board also “distinguishes” between cases based on their severity, by using prior parole decisions submitted by the parties, which serve as “precedents.” For example, the board distinguished between the applicant’s case and that of another applicant (T.), based on their different crime severity:

In order to justify release, in line with applicants’ narratives (sec. 5.3.1.-5.3.2.), the board individualized the retributive meaning of the applicants’ crime and punishment.

In terms of individualizing the crime, the board made distinctions between different types of murder based on the question of culpability, providing nuance for the murder label. For example: (a) There were fourteen cases of mental impairment that did not meet the trial standard for an insanity defense or for diminished culpability-based sentencing mitigation: “Before the crime, the prisoner stopped psychiatric treatment … Her mental state deteriorated; delusional thinking was at the root of committing the crime” (case-28683-11-19); (b) there were fourteen cases of young age: “Given his relatively young age at the time of the crime … his judgment was not sufficiently developed. In light of his hardships, there is room to exercise a somewhat lenient judgment despite his severe and unacceptable act” (case-41810-12-18); and (c) there were three cases of battered women who killed: “Her background was characterized by severe and constant abuse [by the victim] which she internalized into her personality … she decided to rid of her husband, in a relationship that was forced upon her” (case-38017-08-18).

In terms of individualizing the punishment, the board might balance the seriousness of the crime with the severity of the punishment as emerged from applicants’ “pains of imprisonment” narratives. The board considered the applicants’ excessive prison hardship under three sets of circumstances: (a) there were four cases of foreign applicants who had limited access to furloughs, visitations, or treatment due to language barriers, and for them “prison conditions are more complex and difficult than those of other prisoners” (case-20370-06-16); (b) there were two cases of long periods in solitary confinement, with such applicants being subject “to different conditions than are regular prisoners” (case-31992-02-22); and (c) there were twenty-nine cases of severe medical conditions (that did not justify medical parole), such as kidney or eyes diseases, and such prisoners “deal with complicated bodily suffering” (case-55097-05-19).

In sum, the board promoted justice, being the judge of both crime and punishment at the back-end of the CJS continuum. The board built a scale of moral “deservingness” of parole, indicating that certain murders were “not as bad” as others. The board also built a scale for the deservingness of punishments based on prison experience.

Penal Resonance: Echoing Censure over Time

The board’s individualization work was not undertaken solely for the purpose of justifying parole. In particularly severe cases – such as the murder of a child, murder that murder that had been thoroughly premeditated or cases involving multiple victims – the board acted as a “re-sentencing” authority, a role found in several U.S. jurisdictions (Aviram, Reference Aviram2020). In twenty-nine cases, the board demarcated the immorality of different types of murder, individualizing the blanket message of mandatory life sentencing, and describing its role as “social-moral” (case-38419-01-19). In these cases, the board explicitly rejected parole as it wished to “promote general deterrence and preserve the public trust, even when the prisoner’s characteristics and risk factors might otherwise justify parole” (case-38419-01-19). The board emphasized that such punitive parole denials serve to counter the “wrong message to society that human life does not have a great value” (case-61169-07-18) and “give due weight to the sanctity of life” (case-14782-07-19). In these severe cases, in line with the AGRs’ narratives (sec. 5.1.1), the board constructed an “intertextual dialogue” (Eco, Reference Eco1985) between sentencing and parole. By paraphrasing or directly quoting sentencing remarks, the board intertwined the narratives. Parole punitive discretion thus was legitimized as a continuation of the original censure, rather than an illegitimate act of out-of-court justice:

Through such a re-censuring message, the board echoed the court’s original condemnation, years after sentencing, reflecting on the enduring aftershocks of the crime on the community’s sentiments and on the victim, resisting any claim that censure is no longer “fitting” over time (Na’Aman, Reference Na’Aman2020). The applicants, SVs, and broader public were repeatedly confronted with the moral “resonance” of the social trauma caused by the crime even decades later:

The board thus offered a moral education to the public at large, suggesting that in very serious cases penal censure is static and immune to the passage of time. In such cases, the “collective memory” requires further censure to inform and reinforce the core values of the community (Durkheim, Reference Durkheim1893/1997):

The board, however, was careful to demarcate the preservation of public trust in the CJS from “parole populism” that would render the board’s decisions illegitimate and emotive (Annison & Guiney, Reference Annison and Guiney2022). The board was aware that in homicide cases, negative public opinion was the rule: “All crimes of the kinds that were conducted by the prisoner are severe and naturally can raise a public outcry, and are punished severely by law” (case-17620-06-14). To tame the use of “harm to public trust” for parole denial, the board interpreted this “test” as normative rather than empirical, and as protecting primarily the moral integrity of courts:

Thus, the board even declined a request to reject parole for an applicant convicted of murdering a police officer. Rejecting parole, in this case, would have been an act of retribution, considering the time already served by the applicant, and would thus not have met the normative criteria of “harm to public trust”:

The board also stressed the exceptionality of punitive discretion, suggesting that it should be saved for cases of “especially severe moral deficiency” (case-24850-01-22), “motivated by an ideological element” (case-17620-06-14), or “severe and inconceivable circumstances of the crimes” (case-22214-14).

The board thus justified cases of punitive discretion as completing and individualizing sentencing justice. By doing such work, the board sought to preserve the judiciary’s legitimacy rather than to perform an emotive penal populism. By extending sentencing morality, the board was legitimized as a back-end court, giving nuance to sentencing justice and thus serving rather than undermining retributivism.

The Normative Meaning of Risk Assessment

The board very rarely defines its risk theory. In practice, the board offers several levels of risk that can be raised or lowered according to its discretion (Hawkins, Reference Hawkins1983), such as requiring “risk elimination,” “risk reduction,” “risk minimization,” “lack of risk,” “risk that could be managed,” or “satisfactory decreased risk.” The board also does not define the type of risk assessed (e.g., technical violation of parole conditions or new crime), its outcome (e.g., re-conviction or re-incarceration), the period assessed (e.g., during the license period or even after the sentence), or the weight given to psycho-diagnostic, clinical, or actuarial risk assessment, in its decisions.

The board views risk in a hybrid way, as an amalgamation of moral, clinical, and actuarial assessments of needs and risk (24 cases) (Hannah-Moffat, Reference Hannah-Moffat2013; Werth, Reference Werth2017). Such hybrid risk theory includes normative and values-based elements:

The board’s assessment encompasses the applicants’ overall life course and utilizes all types of “character evidence” from law enforcement, correctional officers, and legal sources (Lacey, Reference Lacey2016). The risk/character assessment often begins in childhood: “The prisoner from early childhood absorbed harsh and difficult criminal values into his personality” (case-17636-05-16) or “Impulsivity, displacement of responsibility, social alienation, and rebelliousness characterized him in his youth … and have been ingrained into his personality” (case-41810-12-18). When judging applicants’ character, the board gives special attention to their crime and its immorality, couched in sensational language, often with the addition of applicants’ criminal history: “[He] took the life of the deceased in an animalistic manner that the soul abhors, in a despicable way for which words cannot adequately express the villainy of the act that the prisoner committed” (case-1920-02-18). Applicants’ character is also explored through their conduct during the criminal process: “Throughout criminal proceedings, from the police interrogation, [she] didn’t take responsibility … and she didn’t seem bothered by her conscience” (case-15883-10-23). Such character judgments are stated in terms such as: “[His] essence reflects violent patterns” (case-55097-05-19) or “Criminality is deeply rooted within him” (case-13032-07-18). These hybrid character-risk judgments cut through positivistic and neoclassical discourses to arrive at a “values-based” assessment.

The Normative Meaning of Victim Recognition

The board placed a high rhetorical value on applicants’ victim compensation, similar to that which occurs in several other jurisdictions (e.g., France) (Herzog-Evans & Padfield, Reference Herzog-Evans and Padfield2015), expressing this sentiment explicitly (20 cases): “The board is very sensitive to the need for compensation for the victims” (case-69937-12-20). The compensation was so important that its payment was included in the license release conditions. The board also postponed the hearing time to allow applicants to pay at least a “symbolic sum” (case-74933-10-18):

The board regarded the compensation payment as more than mere compliance with the sentencing order. In fact, it served two key moral functions.

First, payment served as evidence of “moral reform” (McNeill & Maruna, Reference McNeill and Maruna2010), demonstrating the sincerity of the applicant’s “insight” into their crime and their internalization of its severity: “The payment of compensation is a very significant touchstone for the internalization of the insight (case-7514-11-20) or “Compensation is the clearest sign of remorse, repentance, and atonement” (case-30504-05-19). Conversely, the failure to provide compensation served as a “moral barometer” (Maslen, Reference Maslen2015), reflecting the authenticity of the applicants’ internal moral labor: “the fact that he still has not paid at least part of the compensation indicates that his remorse is insincere and inauthentic” (case-59508-11-19). Put differently, the board performs a financial evaluation of the applicants’ morality.

Second, compensation held a relational meaning, signifying recognition of the SVs’ suffering, aligning with restorative justice scholarship (Daly & Proietti-Scifoni, Reference Daly, Proietti-Scifoni and Tonry2011; Sharpe, 2013). Unlike the passive act of serving prison time, victim compensation was viewed as an active relational act made toward one’s fellow citizen. Prison reform, the board (and AGRs) stressed, cannot be “engaging in some kind of platonic process with yourself in some cave, but being in interaction with the other, looking him in the eyes” (case-77504-12-20). Thus, failing to compensate the SVs showed the applicants’ immorality, as such applicants “missed the opportunity to ease, at least minimally, the suffering caused” (case-28683-11-19). The board thus constructs the relational process of compensation to the SVs as evidence of the applicants’ character improvement. The reformed character is measured and valued through solidarity and empathy with the wronged parties rather than through an isolated process.

The Normative Meaning of Prison Obedience

The board assessed whether the applicants’ release was “appropriate” under the law (s.5), primarily through the lens of prison discipline, which functions as another tool for showing character improvement in some cases. Usually, the board’s analysis of the applicants’ disciplinary records was relatively “flat,” brief, and technical, often limited to simply counting the number of infractions and noting their temporal proximity to the hearing: “Against the prisoner are four disciplinary offenses, the last one from 2019, and one deprivation of privileges” (case-19892-03-23). Rarely did the board reflect on the criminological meaning of the disciplinary infractions or the reasons behind them. Where the board delved into the implications of discipline (12 cases), it portrayed prison rules as intense, strict, and “tight,” compared to the more relaxed norms of a community (Crewe et al., Reference Crewe, Hulley and Wright2020). A violation of prison rules, however, put into question an applicant’s ability to obey the norms of the community:

In some cases, the board demanded perfect obedience to prison rules as a prerequisite for earning its trust in an applicant’s ability to conform to the law outside prison: “When a man causes harm to others barbarically and cruelly … such a person should be released only when his prison conduct is flawless” (case-19975-07-22). Applicants who managed to achieve perfect compliance with prison rules were regarded as morally transformed and trustworthy. These individuals adhered to the strict and “hyper-legal” and harsh prison regime (Calavita & Jenness, Reference Calavita and Jenness2015):

In making this connection, even though the correlation between prison discipline and recidivism is unclear (Cochran et al., Reference Cochran, Mears, Bales and Stewart2014), the board linked the normative significance of “law” both within and outside the prison. Good prison conduct was interpreted as evidence of moral transformation and a predictor of future compliance with a community’s laws, given the inherent difficulty of adhering to strict prison rules.

The Normative Meaning of “Insight”

By law, the board should determine for lifers whether they “notably and tangibly changed in terms of understanding the severity of their acts” (s.10(b)). This criterion has been quantitatively identified as one of the most prevalent (144 cases) and strongest predictors of parole release and was regularly applied by the board in the manslaughter cases analyzed. Throughout its decisions, the board referred to insight-related concepts such as “internalization,” “guilt,” “reflection,” “responsibility-taking,” “remorse,” or “regret,” and applicants were typically expected to develop such “insight” through correctional rehabilitation experts.

The board broadly defined the “notable and tangible change” requirement as “processing the criminal act, its reasons, results, and implications for the present and future … taking responsibility for one’s exact part in the crime and its meaning for present life and the future” (case-62363-12-18). The board also connected insight to the ability to control criminal impulses: “[the] development of mechanisms for responsibility, discipline, and internal boundary-setting” (case-33285-11-18). However, the board rarely analyzed the reasons behind an applicants’ failure to demonstrate “insight,” whether applicants lacked empathy, shame, a need to preserve a moral self-image or something else (Maruna & Mann, Reference Maruna and Mann2006; Piquero, Reference Piquero2017; Proeve, Reference Proeve2023; Tangney et al., Reference Tangney, Stuewig and Martinez2014). The board also did not rely solely on correctional officers’ insight assessment but took an active role in independently judging it (28 cases). In doing so, the board distinguished between merely “doing” insight and genuinely “being” insightful (Weisman, Reference Weisman2009): “Despite the correctional opinion regarding [his insight], the prisoner was given the right to speak before [us] … apart from a long speech and stories … we were struck that he didn’t raise a hint of acceptance, regret, or empathy” (case-23536-02-18). The demonstration of “insight” was linked by the board to three moral purposes:

First, in line with applicants’ narratives (sec. 5.3.2.), the board viewed their “insight” as reflecting a painful identification with the harm caused by the crime:

Without such painful insight, the board observed, the rehabilitation process becomes overly “sterile” and detached, lacking the necessary connection to the full relational meaning of the crime and the profound burden of causing immense suffering to others:

Second, and in line with U.S. parole decision-making, the board rejected external explanations for the applicants’ crimes, and required applicants to gain insight into themselves instead, constructing a causal link between character and crime (Shammas, Reference Shammas2019; Young & Chimowitz, Reference Young and Chimowitz2022). Applicants were required to engage in deep soul-searching, where they confronted their “true” character as the source of their crime and hence their risk: “He should delve into himself deeply, so the full significance of the murder and its source will be understood” (case-63771-03-15). Similarly, the board ruled that an applicant who “is not willing to face himself as he is … cannot be defined as someone who has undergone a significant and real change” (case-1162-05-18). The board criticized applicants who attributed their crimes to external factors: “He prefers circumstantial explanations for his problems” (case-2651-01-19) or “He finds difficulty in looking inside for the reasons for his violent choices” (case-55097-05-19). Truly insightful applicants, according to the board, could identify the cause of their crime within their character and demonstrate how they had learned to control their character flaws:

Such insightful applicants acknowledged the “nexus” between their character and their crime, and consequently, their risk (In re Shaputis, 2011). Furthermore, implicitly, through requiring insight, the board validated correctional work as a crucial tool in supporting applicants’ moral improvement.

Third, the board linked applicants’ “insight” to their renewed commitment to shared social values: “The prisoner’s criminal consciousness has undergone a complete transformation into a healthy and amended civic consciousness” (case-38711-03-17). Insightful applicants, as “community members and citizens” (case-56041-09-16), were expected to acknowledge the judicial authority’s legitimacy as a prerequisite for reintegration: “The prisoner might be ready to integrate into society … However, such readiness is meaningless as it does not result from taking genuine responsibility and accepting his [the court’s] judgment as true” (case-22214-08-14).

In sum, the board’s construction of “insight” thus ensured that applicants could morally reflect upon their crime and had the inner capacity to act as moral agents autonomously and not just out of fear of the law. Relatedly, the board ensured that applicants understood the source of their crime to be from within their core selves rather than from external social forces or as being an out-of-character single failure. Successful applicants were viewed as those who could process, control, and manage their inner or external strains in a normative way. Furthermore, the board reaffirmed the court’s judgments via the applicants’ own words before their release, reinforcing the work of the courts as just and accurate (sec 4.1.2; Young & Chimowitz, Reference Young and Chimowitz2022).

Parole Hearing as a Back-End Court

The moral labor conducted in parole hearings may follow an “if it looks like a duck” logic. Despite its administrative label, parole involves sentencing-like features: the potential for significant reductions in prison time in case of release, the curtailing of applicants’ hope for release after years behind bars in case of denial, and discretionary decision-making headed by a judge with legal actors. Parole actors thus treat parole hearings as what they functionally are: a judicial-like late sentencing process. Put differently, the moral-social sentiments toward crime and character do not vanish just because the label “in the books” of parole is utilitarian. Parole actors engage with the penal reality as it is rather than how the law imagines it.

The specific institutional and socio-legal context in Israel is particularly relevant here. The board operates under the judiciary branch (Judicial Authority, 2023) and functions within a predominantly retributive-oriented sentencing system (Roberts & Gazal-Ayal, Reference Roberts and Gazal-Ayal2013). The board’s work has also been linked by courts to the broader functions of criminal law (Doe v. Israel, Reference v State2022), and the board is authorized to consider punitive factors in exceptional cases (s.10(a)). Finally, prison rehabilitation programs in Israel often emphasize moral-related themes (e.g., responsibility-taking), which may contribute to the alignment of the board’s decisions with this correctional culture (Haviv et al., Reference Haviv, Hasisi and Weisburd2020). Future research is needed to confirm and further explore these dynamics.

The personal backgrounds of parole chairpersons as judges might impact their parole work, bringing their judicial “tool kit” (e.g., judicial tools of “balancing” and “distinguishing”) and their sentencing philosophy to the parole process (Ruhland, Reference Ruhland2020). In this regard, the observed moral labor of the board also reflects an “institutional isomorphism,” whereby the board adopts judicial norms to gain legitimacy in managing the inherent uncertainties of risk prediction, reinforcing the legitimacy of its decisions through both retributive and utilitarian discourses (DiMaggio & Powell, Reference DiMaggio and Powell1983). It might be that such moral labor serves to increase the board’s professional capital and identity vis-a-vis the correctional actors and the courts (Bourdieu, Reference Bourdieu1987). When conducting moral labor, the board is not just technically applying correctional officers’ recommendations or undermining sentencing determinations. Instead, the board’s moral labor suggests that it has its own moral agenda that is not only justified in its own right, but even reinforces, completes, and amends sentencing justice.

The Moral Dimensions of Risk and Rehabilitation

Risk assessment is often regarded by retributive theorists as being in “direct and obvious conflict with desert” (de Keijser et al., Reference de Keijser, Roberts, Ryberg, de Keijser, Roberts and Ryberg2019, p. 3). However, the findings suggest that the boundaries between these concepts for parole actors are often fluid. The board, as shown, applied a broad and hybrid assessment of risk that spanned from the time of the crime to the court’s assessment, including the entire prison phase and during the parole period (if released). Tracing the trajectory of a moral character for a long period ultimately embodies the inescapable moral dimensions inherent in assessing risk and rehabilitation. The board’s broad and hybrid risk assessment in this way aligns with studies suggesting that risk assessment is an essentially moral judgement (Hannah-Moffat, Reference Hannah-Moffat1999; Lynch, Reference Lynch1998; McNeill et al., Reference McNeill, Burns, Halliday, Hutton and Tata2009), that parole risk assessment is primarily past-looking (Pogrebin et al., Reference Pogrebin, Stretesky, Walker and Opsal2015), and that retributive and utilitarian frameworks can be closely related in practice and in theory (Ball, Reference Ball2011; du Bois-Pedain, Reference du Bois-Pedain, Coppola and Martufi2024; Efodi, 2014; McNeill, Reference McNeill2012; Rotman, Reference Rotman, Coppola and Martufi2024).

The Pluralistic Nature of Retributivism

Nearly a century ago, Burgess (Reference Burgess1936, p. 494) argued: “The failures of our entire system of criminal justice … accumulate and become evident in parole.” This critique can also be extended to the shortcomings of retributive sentencing, which might account for the moral labor of parole found in this study. Offering a more pluralistic retributive theory, parole hearings allow one to address the neglect of moral character, the (in)justice of crime judgments, and the indifference to the subjective experience of imprisonment under traditional retributive theory.

First, regarding the neglect of moral character, traditional retributivists regard offenders as rights-bearing agents who should be judged solely for their crimes rather than their character (Ashworth & Horder, Reference Ashworth and Horder2013). However, ignoring offenders’ character by focusing solely on their crime is morally problematic and shows an indifference to the extreme complexity and uniqueness of individual character (Smith, Reference Smith2016) and the realistic possibility of character change with time (Crewe et al., Reference Crewe, Hulley and Wright2020).

The neglect of character at sentencing ignores the fact that censure is imposed on human beings, not on acts, and that “our sense of justice requires us to consider the whole person” (Whitman, Reference Whitman2014, p. 148). Indeed, research suggests that the very possibility of ignoring human character when passing moral judgments is questionable, considering subconscious intuitions that capture both crime and character (Atari et al., Reference Atari, Haidt, Graham, Koleva, Stevens and Dehghani2023; Bartels et al., 2016; Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, Reference Slobogin and Brinkley-Rubinstein2013). Thus, the board’s character-oriented moral labor possibly balances the neglect of character in the crime-oriented mandatory sentencing, completing the narrow view of sentencing through the back-end holistic judgment of parole.

Second, regarding the perceived (in)justice of crime judgments, in mandatory life sentencing all murder cases are treated equally, with any specific moral distinctions between acts that fall under the umbrella definition of “murder” being neglected. Such a sentencing policy harms proportionality and justice, mislabels crimes and offenders, and diverges from community views that individualize murder according to offenders’ specific blame-worthiness (Mitchell & Roberts, Reference Mitchell and Roberts2012; Robinson, Reference Robinson, Ogletree and Sarat2012). This moral labor, therefore, may be seen as an effort to address the shortcomings of mandatory life sentencing, seeking to capture the nuances of murder not recognized by mandatory sentences – a proper respect of the ordinal ranking of proportionality. Such respect is achieved through echoing censure over time in especially severe murder cases, or by contextualizing murder within broader criminological contexts of strains, peer pressure, or poor social control. This notion may explain the parole actors’ “talismanic” attraction to crime severity (In re Shaputis, 2011, p. 275).

Furthermore, the division of moral labor between sentencing and parole allows the CJS to capture the immorality of murder on different levels (Dan-Cohen, 1983). At the sentencing level, mandatory sentencing equally censures every unlawful intentional killing. At the parole level, however, the lower visibility of parole allows for a refinement of the judicial work in a more individualized way.

Relatedly, parole may serve as an antidote to the “silent” nature of mandatory sentencing. At sentencing, the parties are largely silent, with little opportunity to alter the sentence, and applicants may be emotionally overwhelmed in the face of their expected sentence (Schinkel, Reference Schinkel2014). Thus, the moral labor operating at parole board hearings may help to address the communicative void caused by the “deafness” of mandatory sentencing.Footnote ²⁹ During parole hearings, after years, the applicants can actively respond to the sentencing censure as ethical and morally reformed agents (Crewe et al., Reference Crewe, Hulley and Wright2020; Jarman, Reference Jarman2020). In turn, they can “hear” the community’s response to their “answer” through the reaffirmation of their agency and trust during post-release hearings. After all, reintegration – like sentencing communication – is a “two-way process” and cannot be fully achieved without society’s recognition (McNeill, Reference McNeill2012; Maruna, Reference Maruna2011). This reciprocal process ideally marks the closure (or movement toward closure) of the penal dialogue that began at sentencing.

Third, regarding the indifference to subjective experiences, traditional retributivists often view sentencing as an “abstract” and “disembodied” assessment of censure, measured by quantitative units of liberty deprivation imposed by a formal court (Garland, Reference Garland2011; Kolber, Reference Kolber2009). In contrast, applicants viewed their punishment as a qualitative painful experience. The pains of long-term imprisonment, as they viewed them, were bodily and socially destructive, in prison and even after release, for themselves and their families, and went well beyond liberty deprivation. They also viewed their punishment as including the pains of their informal self-imposed pangs of guilt (Harrison & Duff, Reference Harrison and Duff1988). For SVs, parole hearings allowed them to express more fully the private meaning of the crime that had taken over their lives. Looked at in this way, parole allow a more pluralistic retributive theory of punishment. If public-objective messages stand at the heart of sentencing, over time, the private-subjective meaning of punishment may also be considered through parole hearings.

In sum, the moral labor of parole reflects the “multi-vocal” nature of retributivism, which is multi-staged and pluralistic (Cottingham, Reference Cottingham1979, p. 238). Parole pluralistic retributivism, from this perspective, requires methodological and conceptual shifts in what retributivism does and how it is measured over time. Such moral labor addresses key internal limitations of retributive sentencing – through a more dynamic, private, subjective, and morally diverse retributive theory.

Penal Theory

The findings reflect a divide between how traditional retributivists conceptualize crime and punishment and how parole actors experience them. As seen, contrary to the tenets of traditional retributivism (von Hirsch, Reference von Hirsch2017), for example, parole actors adopt a broad timeframe of culpability, are morally character-oriented, and view penal suffering in qualitative terms.

Traditional retributivists might contend that the findings, at best, highlight the imperfections of penal reality (e.g., excessive prison suffering) rather than the deficiencies in retributive theory itself. Some may even contend that retributivism concerns only the determination of sentencing length and has no significance after the sentencing judge’s gavel falls. However, even without fully resolving the complex relationship between retributive theory and reality, one should recall that retributivism has real-world implications – sometimes devastating – for people’s lives (Hanan, Reference Hanan2020). Furthermore, retributive theory seeks to offer ethical guidance for practical decision-making and protect such decision-making from abuse (Ryberg, Reference Ryberg2025). Thus, it seems reasonable to connect retributive sentencing to its intended and unintended effects on human beings during and after prison, including what retributivism does, to whom, where, and when. At the very least, retributivists should acknowledge any gaps between retributive ideals and their real-world application, taking these gaps into consideration when developing theory and appreciating its potential limits (Duff, Reference Duff2010). Otherwise, retributivism risks losing its moral force to guide policy (Robinson & Holcomb, Reference Robinson and Holcomb2021) or might even be viewed as a form of legal “violence” rather than a moral way of doing justice (Cover, Reference Cover1986).

A greater attentiveness by retributivists to the realities of prison, parole, and reentry is a key lesson from this study. Recent developments in homicide law in Israel show the significance of this lesson. In 2019, a major legal reform in Israel, motivated by retributive values, individualized blame in homicide cases by legislating new homicide offenses (Penal Law, Reference Law1977 [2019]).Footnote ³⁰ The reason for this reform, as stated in the bill (2015), was that the single category of “murder” was “excessively narrow, on the one hand, and excessively broad on the other” (p. 166; Kremnitzer Report, Reference Report2011). Although this reform did not affect the cases analyzed, the findings shed empirical light on it. As shown, parole actors expressed dissatisfaction with the unidimensional category of “murder” and attempted to introduce shades of color into the black-and-white framework of murder law. Parole actors believe that not all murderers are created morally equal; rather, they should be distinguished according to individual culpability, which should be more context-sensitive (e.g., the reasons for the crime). The findings support the need for the 2019 reform, at least from the parole actors’ perspective. At the same time, the findings also raise questions for future studies: How parole hearings emerging from a more nuanced homicide law would look, and what kind of moral labor, if any, they would include.

Criminological Theory

The findings highlight the importance of revisiting prevalent criminological theories, such as the “new penology” (Feeley & Simon, Reference Feeley and Simon1992) or the “culture of control” (Garland, Reference Garland2001), which have portrayed punishment administration as a phase of risk management, and as bureaucratic and devoid of moral, particularly retributive, significance (Kerr, Reference Kerr2019). In contrast to such portrayals, the findings suggest that parole hearings for homicides may function as a moral forum. In this way, the moral labor found to have been done by the board aligns with other examples of field-level actors who have deviated from a risk-management policy toward a more individualized, even moral, logic (Lynch, Reference Lynch1998; Maurutto & Hannah-Moffat, Reference Maurutto and Hannah-Moffat2006).

The overall picture found here reinforces the “moral turn” in criminology and extends it to punishment administration work (Bottoms & Jacobs, Reference Bottoms, Jacobs, Bottoms and Jacobs2023; Messner, Reference Messner2012). The findings invite a more careful examination of the moral labor embedded within the ostensibly purely utilitarian process. Criminologists should engage to a greater extent with punishment administration practices through a moral lens, including the communicative, symbolic, and performative moral discourses that take place within administrative and quasi-judicial bodies outside of courts, and how punishment administration authorities are connected to, echoed by, or resisted to the work of courts. For example, criminologists could take into consideration the moral dynamics of prison discipline and classification, community supervision, or reentry decision-making. In other words, criminologists must also be willing to engage to a greater extent with moral themes that are traditionally dominated by legal scholars, such as censure, atonement, repentance, or moral restoration, and their implications for criminological theory and policy. They should also offer a more nuanced metric for punishment administration work that measures its moral performance as well.

The AGRs’ Role at Parole Hearings

As the findings suggest, the AGRs treat the hearings as an adversarial and punitive forum, evoking elements of a “disintegrative shaming” process (Makkai & Braithwaite, Reference Makkai and Braithwaite1994). The traditional prosecutorial ethos is that of court-oriented, legal, and “crime-fighting” agencies (Green & Roiphe, Reference Green and Roiphe2020). Thus, the AGRs naturally construct the parole hearings as “legal combat” between themselves and the applicants who were convicted by law of serious crimes. The result is that parole rejection is viewed by the AGRs as a success (Dagan, Reference Dagan2023; Padfield et al., 2022). On these grounds, the AGRs’ punitive and judicially-oriented approach requires rethinking under a future-looking parole process that seeks to promote re-entry and public safety. Even from a retributive perspective, it is unclear what new values the AGRs bring to the parole decision-making table by repeating the sentencing remarks for re-censuring the applicants’ crime and character.

The rise of “community prosecution” or “progressive prosecution” in some U.S. jurisdictions demonstrates the possibility of a less adversarial and more problem-solving-oriented approach to prosecution parole work (Green & Roiphe, Reference Green and Roiphe2020; Murcia, Reference Murcia2022). Another alternative is for the state to be represented at parole hearings by probation or prison officers who are more oriented toward risk and rehabilitation (Hardwick, Reference Hardwick2018; Ministry of Justice, 2022). In recent years, there has been a growing prosecutorial awareness in Israel of evidence-based policy, with efforts invested in alternatives to imprisonment (e.g., community courts) and a greater willingness to engage with public legitimacy (Dorner Report, 2015; Pedan, Reference Pedan2019; State Attorney, 2018). These shifts may signal a different future for prosecution involvement in parole work that is less punitive and more nuanced. Future research will help to confirm this notion.

The SVs’ Role at Parole Hearings

The law emphasizes that victim impact statements (VISs) should focus on the expected risk of releasing a prisoner (s.19). However, consistent with previous studies, the SVs rarely added a risk-related value to the hearings. Instead, they expressed frustration about the perceived injustice of the CJS (Padfield, Reference Padfield, Manikis and Watson2025; Riches & Dawson, Reference Riches and Dawson1998; Roberts & Erez, Reference Roberts and Erez2004) or they put pressure on the board to reject parole (Caplan, Reference Caplan and Kinnevy2010; Hritz, Reference Hritz2021; Roberts, Reference Roberts2008). This reaction is to be expected, given the irreversible harm caused and the possibility of victims referring to the subjective emotions and impact of the crime (State v. Ganame, 2009). The following suggestions might make VISs more useful and less of a step in a never-ending cycle of resentment (Dhami, Reference Dhami2016).

First, parole for homicide cases holds significant emotional weight for SVs, as they involve deciding the liberty of those who killed their loved ones. However, as in other contexts, legal discourse is often opaque to laypeople (e.g., the definition of “life sentence”) (Stygall, Reference Stygall, Tiersma and Solan2012). The SVs’ understanding of the parole board’s work is part of parole’s (and possibly the CJS’s) moral legitimacy. Therefore, the SVs should be provided with a basic understanding of what the parole decisions entail and their rationale, at least in broad terms. Of special importance is the relationship between the moral functions of sentencing and parole. In England and Wales, for example, SVs are instructed that the board “cannot consider whether it thinks further punishment is necessary” (UK Parole Board, 2015, p. 7).

Second, as the findings show, the moral labor of parole for SVs brings up emotional burdens and frustrations. Thus, SVs should be made aware of the benefits or drawbacks of testifying before the board, the possibly upsetting implications of parole release, and the fact that despite prison time possibly coming to an end, their pain will continue (Victims’ Commissioner, 2024). Parole hearings can be an opportunity to identify the SVs’ needs and frustrations, and direct them to legal and/or clinical counseling, restorative justice programs, or community health resources, in order to help them process their grief and address their financial and emotional needs (Caplan, Reference Caplan2012; Riches & Dawson, Reference Riches and Dawson1998; Padfield, Reference Padfield, Manikis and Watson2025). These suggestions may help to alleviate some of the abovementioned concerns. Future research is much needed in this regard.

The Board’s (and Applicants’) Role at Parole Hearings

The Israeli board, like many parole jurisdictions in the United States and Europe (Rhine et al., Reference Rhine, Petersilia and Reitz2017; van zyl Smit & Corda, Reference van Zyl Smit, Corda and Reitz2018), is discretionary and holds authority to reevaluate all aspects of the original sentence. The board’s assessment, as found, combines clinical, moral, and risk elements, raising concerns about inconsistent and potentially biased decision-making (Young & Pearlman, Reference Young and Pearlman2022). Given that the board performs retributive labor, and assuming that such work is desirable, parole criteria should reflect moral considerations transparently to ensure consistency and fairness, and achieve comparable outcomes (Hritz, Reference Hritz2021; Ruhland & Laskorunsky, Reference Ruhland and Laskorunsky2025; Young & Pearlman, Reference Young and Pearlman2022). Transparent criteria and application are essential for advancing proportionality, an aim rooted in an equal distribution of justice. Punitive discretion in parole decision-making should be performed cautiously, as “it is easy for parole to become a re-sentencing exercise” (Padfield, Reference Padfield, Manikis and Watson2025, p. 278). Another possibility to achieve proportionality is through parole guidelines for homicide cases, as seen in some U.S. jurisdictions (Rhine et al., Reference Rhine, Petersilia and Reitz2017). Without exhausting this issue here, such guidelines could reflect the moral tensions that arise in homicide cases, including presumptive release dates that incorporate aggravating and mitigating factors in a way that balance both utilitarian and retributive values. In any case, applicants should be informed of what to expect at the hearing and the grounds on which their future freedom will be decided. At the very least, parole law should provide clarity regarding the real threshold for release either on risk or retributive grounds.

Furthermore, the moral labor found in this study raises a challenging question about how parole hearings should be structured. Some jurisdictions advocate for the judicialization of parole, at least in some respects (e.g., France, for reducing the minimum period to be served) (Herzog-Evans & Padfield, Reference Herzog-Evans and Padfield2015). However, such judicialization excludes considerations of retribution and general deterrence from the parole decision-making (Herzog-Evans & Padfield, Reference Herzog-Evans and Padfield2015). In the United States, a “second look” by a “judicial panel” was proposed by the drafters of the Model Penal Code, to allow the “modification” of long-term sentences on both retributive and utilitarian grounds (ALI, 2017, s.305.6).

The moral labor found in the current study suggests that parole hearings should be made public. Echoing censure over time or individualizing proportionality normally justifies open hearings. Even character judgments and reaffirmations of citizenship status may be more effectively promoted through public hearings, which could “reverse” the public condemnation of sentencing by fostering public inclusion within the community (Maruna, Reference Maruna2011). Without dismissing the advantages of closed hearings (e.g., greater privacy and candor), parole hearings ideally should occur under a “presumption of openness” in an open court or other public community settings, as seen in some jurisdictions (e.g., Australia) (Fitzgerald et al., Reference Fitzgerald, Freiberg, Dodd and Bartels2023; Hardwick, Reference Hardwick2018). This perspective also invites a reconsideration of the formalities surrounding the hearings, such as applicants wearing prison uniforms versus civilian clothing, the board’s attire (e.g., robes versus ordinary clothing), and the language used (e.g., legal, clinical, or everyday language), and how these elements might influence parole decision-making. These complex issues warrant further exploration in future studies

Moreover, the way in which the board communicates during hearings requires greater attention. As the findings suggest, the communication of parole rejection by the board often involves stigmatizing and re-censuring messages regarding the applicants’ crime and character, effectively becoming a “status rejection” ceremony that denies applicants the opportunity to earn the reformed moral status they believe they deserve (Herbert, Reference Herbert2024; Pogrebin et al., Reference Pogrebin, Stretesky, Walker and Opsal2015). Thus, policymakers should develop meaningful ways to communicate parole denial without further stigmatizing applicants by implying that their core morality is depraved. After all, as the “Iron Law of Imprisonment” teaches, except for a few, every person we send to prison will eventually return to live with us (Travis, Reference Travis2005). Thus, even in cases of parole denial, the board’s messages should not permanently stain the applicants, prolonging the court’s moral condemnation and extending it to society. Overall, the board should convey its decisions to the applicants in non-stigmatizing and ordinary language, recognizing the moral progress they have made (even when the release threshold is not met) and affirming that they are regarded before the law as fellow citizens with moral and social potential rather than merely as risk objects. Additionally, the board should clearly specify what applicants can do to improve their chances of parole in the future. This approach could enhance both the moral and reintegrative potential of parole. As with other aspects of parole communication, further research is needed to explore these considerations.

Before concluding, it’s important to acknowledge the limitations of the qualitative analysis. The findings may reflect the specific moral labor within a relatively small yet ethnically, socially, and culturally diverse society (Smooha, Reference Smooha, Fraiman and Phillip-Bell2023). Future studies should explore the moral meaning of parole in other socio-legal contexts. Additionally, other interpretations of the data, which may fail to capture the full “unsaid” dynamics during the hearings, are possible (Presser, 2022). Other quantitative (e.g., vignette studies, computational linguistic analysis) and qualitative methods (e.g., ethnography, interviews with various parole legal and correctional actors) could help provide a more complete picture regarding the relations between moral, rational, and emotional considerations (e.g., the relation, if any, between questions of class and race regarding the moral labor used). Such complementary methods should allow us to look beyond a board’s post-hoc decision to the real underlying decision-making processes (Dalke & McConnell, Reference Dalke and McConnell2024). Such methods would also provide the connection, if any, between the moral work relating to the individual case and the wider shared or nonshared ethnic/moral/religious context.

Furthermore, applicants may be incentivized to present a manipulative “parole script” drawing on the experiences of their cellmates or lawyers, and others may feel ashamed to share their feelings openly (Read, Reference Read2024; Warr, Reference Warr2019). It is important to recognize, however, that the potential for concealment, embellishment, or deception is inherent in any form of human communication. Moreover, regardless of the accuracy of the applicants’ narratives, they provide valuable insights into what applicants believe is important for their parole, may still influence their own and others’ experiences, and can mobilize transformation and recovery (Maruna & Liem, Reference Maruna and Liem2021). Furthermore, as positive change is undoubtedly possible for at least some individuals (Maruna & Liem, Reference Maruna and Liem2021), dismissing all applicants’ narratives as inherently insincere would constitute an “epistemic injustice” toward their voices (Fricker, Reference Fricker2007). Despite these limitations, this study, I hope, provides a much-needed analysis of the hidden moral world of parole. Future research should further examine the moral meaning of other areas within punishment administration theory, policy, and practice.