Literature review

Our memory only holds certain events, and we often forget many past histories. History textbooks are one of the sites of social memory that emphasize, de-emphasize, or even fail to mention historical occasions (Zerubavel Reference Zerubavel2003, 2). In this sense, states use history textbooks for political and patriotic education to shape citizens’ identities and to serve as agents for socialization (Hobsbawm Reference Hobsbawm1992; Wang Reference Wang2008; Zajda Reference Zajda and Zajda2009). Although political regimes may change, successive governments often rely on similar approaches in historical narratives, such as highlighting national heroes and celebrating ancestors for the purposes of nation-building (Salem–Gervais and Metro Reference Salem–Gervais and Metro2012).

At the same time, history textbooks are no longer mere spreaders of state patriotism, but they negotiate compromises and incite ideological tensions to engage with various demographics (Christophe et al. Reference Christophe, Bock, Fuchs, Macgilchrist, Otto, Sammler, Fuchs and Bock2018, 413–15). According to Apple and Christian–Smith (Reference Apple and Christian–Smith1991, 3), “What is included and excluded in textbooks signifies more profound political, economic, and cultural relations and histories. Conflicts over texts are often proxies for wider questions of power relations.” For instance, while Turkey’s policy statements highlighted its membership negotiations with the European Union, the social studies textbooks produced after the 2005 curriculum reform reflected a limited and exclusive view of nationalism and citizenship, rooted in origin myths, ethnocentrism, and rigid essentialist ideas (Çayir Reference Çayir2009). Educational bureaucracy enhances power without explicit ideological commitment, discouraging publishers and textbook writers from challenging dominant historical narratives (Nishino Reference Nishino2008). However, publishers and the academy compromise when writing textbooks (Heilenman Reference Heilenman1993). For example, history textbooks can be sources of controversies and compromises, including an emphasis on “self” and “other” (Podeh Reference Podeh2010; Fukuoka Reference Fukuoka2011; Nozaki Reference Nozaki and Vickers2005), an invitation to reconciliation (Pingel Reference Pingel2008; Korostelina and Lässig Reference Korostelina and Lässig2013) and an intricate production of the history textbooks (Sammler et al. Reference Sammler, Müller, Otto and Macgilchrist2016).

Finally, when school textbooks reach classrooms, teachers negotiate the content, and some may oppose or challenge the “official” narratives presented in the texts while exercising their autonomy. The negotiation of history extends beyond the classroom to school events, visits to museums and monuments, as well as discussions with family members at home, who shape the knowledge learned in the classroom (vom. Hau Reference vom. Hau2009). The biographies of school teachers influence their classroom dynamics, reflecting their personal histories. Achugar (Reference Achugar, Richardson, Krzyzanowski, Machin and Wodak2014), based on 102 interviews with teachers in Uruguay, reveals that when discussing the 1973 coup d’état, teachers incorporate their own social memories into the classroom, thereby expanding on the textbook’s discussion. Similarly, interviews with history teachers in Texas, USA, show that the standardization of curricula and the emphasis on preparation for mandatory tests result in certain topics, such as women and minorities, being inadequately covered in textbooks (Noboa Reference Noboa2021).

An examination of textbooks and curriculum changes within the context of Central Asian countries demonstrates a scholarly view of textbooks reflecting the dominant ideology’s political aspirations to instill citizenship and belonging for dominant ethnic groups as part of the nation-building project, while this research complements these studies by adding an aspect of the competing and conflicting discourses in the textbooks (Ismailova Reference Ismailova2004; Kissane Reference Kissane2005; Asanova Reference Asanova2007; Blakkisrud and Nazimova Reference Blakkisrud and Nozimova2010; Durrani et al. Reference Durrani, Miller, Kataeva, Bekjanova, Seitkhadyrova and Badanova2022; Burkhanov and Sharipova Reference Burkhanov and Sharipova2024). For example, Ismailova (Reference Ismailova2004) reveals that the Kyrgyzstani textbooks’ indigenization reflects the political aspirations of the state to counterbalance the Russian hegemonic view. Blakkisrud and Nazimova (Reference Blakkisrud and Nozimova2010) assert that state control over history textbooks demonstrates Tajik’s “Self” and Uzbek’s “Other.” In the same way, Kissane (Reference Kissane2005) argues that the reflection of de-Sovietised re-Kazakhified history teaching in Kazakhstan represents the state’s official stance on moving away from its Soviet legacies. Burkhanov and Sharipova’s (Reference Burkhanov and Sharipova2024) research hinged on the currently used textbooks that represent the official view of transitioning from the Soviet narratives towards postcolonial Kazakhstani narratives. In the same way, Durrani et al. (Reference Durrani, Miller, Kataeva, Bekjanova, Seitkhadyrova and Badanova2022) suggest that Kazakhstani textbooks practice great power and legitimacy given the centralized education system, which limits the options for schools and teachers to decide which textbooks to use in the classroom. Few scholars have argued about the heterogeneous discourses in textbooks, which are sometimes at odds with the governmental view in Central Asian states. Umetbaeva (Reference Umetbaeva2015) finds that while the Soviet Union is depicted as “colonial” in southern Kyrgyzstan, it is a redeemer and founder of the nation in the northern part. Nourzhanov’s (Reference Nourzhanov2015) examination of the Basmachi movement’s portrayal in Tajik history textbooks as the victim of Soviet states demonstrates a certain leeway in the textbooks from presidential narratives, which viewed the Soviet Union as helping and hindering development in Tajikistan. This article reveals that the analyzed textbooks demonstrate competing and conflicting discourses between the official and Jeltoqsanshylar narratives when remembering the 1986 protests. However, the official narratives do not control the entirety of the portrayal of Jeltoqsan.

Curriculum, textbooks, and nation-building

The studied textbooks were produced based on a single state-approved standard curriculum designed by teachers, methodologists, subject experts, and education officials. The curriculum describes the overall values and themes but does not provide guidance on canon and tones of interpretation (Turlygul Reference Turlygul2003).Footnote ² This curriculum defines the purposes of the History of Kazakhstan subject more generally as “to cultivate historical consciousness, Kazakhstani patriotism, respect for the history and culture of one’s country, and a sense of pride in the achievements of one’s ancestors. It aims to instill national and universal values and develop research, critical thinking, and communication skills” Kazakhstan Respublikasy Oqu–aqartu Ministrligi, 2022).

As of January 16, 2025, Kazakhstani textbooks have changed thrice since 1992. Each textbook change required several reprints because textbooks are updated and revised every five years to incorporate recent developments. Practiced since 1992, a single textbook was issued per grade for each school subject. This was expanded to two textbooks per grade in 2005. The intention was to enable schools to select their preferred textbook, which led to the privatization of textbook production. The examined textbooks printed in 2019 and onwards reflected the latest renewal, which incorporated a shift toward a student-oriented critical thinking approach. Although the requirement for at least two textbooks per grade remains, the Ministry of Education (MOE) has suggested introducing a single textbook only for history textbooks to avoid discrepancies (Informburo 2020).

The presence of competing narratives in the textbooks can be explained by the government’s ambiguous nation-building project, which sends mixed signals to diverse societal groups, including those involved in the textbook process. A legacy of the Soviet-period nation-building project is evident in Kazakhstani officials’ combination of ethnic and civic understandings of the nation-building project (Laruelle Reference Laruelle and Omelicheva2014; Insebayeva and Insebayeva Reference Insebayeva and Insebayeva2022). At the same time, the emergence of the official and alternative (Jeltoqsanysylar) narratives in the textbooks can be explained by the production of the textbooks by multiple stakeholders who exercise their influence by using these signals to interpret the content. The government’s approval of textbooks with competing narratives underlines the balancing of ethnic and civic nation-building to appease diverse societal groups. The textbook variances in each of the four themes – a greater emphasis on Qonaev, the use of the “uprising” descriptor, and an implicit reference to the ethnic element of Jeltoqsan – highlight a leaning towards the ethnic discourse of Jeltoqsan, with more substantial support for Jeltoqsanshylar narratives. In contrast, a neutral portrayal of Qonaev, the absence of commitment to a single descriptor (event, movement, or uprising), and a non-ethnic rendition point to the civic discourse of Jeltoqsan, aligning more closely with official narratives. The theme of Nazarbaev’s role attempts to refocus on both ethnic and civic discourses.

Private publishers manage textbook production. With educational reforms requiring high-quality textbooks, including in English, the number of publishers has expanded. However, the History of Kazakhstan textbooks are produced by two publishers: Mektep and Atamura. For example, a study by Bekzhanova (Reference Bekzhanova, Durrani and Thibault2024) on the gender aspect of the textbooks shows the difference between Mektep and Atamura, with the latter offering a fairer depiction of females. In my interview request in July 2019, one of the leading publishers’ top management asked me whether I would portray their textbooks in a positive or negative light, subsequently rejecting my interview requests on several occasions. The other publisher was more open, allowing me to meet with their top management and editors. These instances suggest that these publishers aim to dominate the textbook market while targeting different audiences. Although explicit differences between the two textbook publishers are not apparent regarding Jeltoqsan, Atamura selects more senior historians with authority (for example, Burkitbai Aiagan and Ziabek Qabuldinov, both holding senior positions in leading history institutions). In contrast, Mektep focuses on academic historians who teach at universities (such as Qanat Jukeshev, Qanat Oskembaev, and Zauresh Saqtaganova).

Publishers select the textbook authors who write textbooks based on the curriculum. The interviews cited throughout this article demonstrate that neither the editors at the publishing houses, who send the final version for official approval, nor the reviewers have guidelines on canon, tone, or interpretation; instead, they evaluate a textbook’s style, delivery, and age-appropriateness. Each textbook is created by a team of at least three authors, including a qualified scholar historian and two subject-specific educators. Usually, publishers select senior historians to get an official approval. In contrast to the Soviet Union, there was no strictly censored, top-down ideological line for producing school history textbooks. Authors retained agency in reflecting the prevailing societal discourse. However, their positions were constrained by personal accountability for the content in the published textbooks, as any critiques from readers were directed at them. This could influence their future participation in textbook writing. While this does not imply that the MoE did not approve the textbooks, it highlights that authors exercised their agency during the writing process. This point is supported by an interview with one of the textbook authors. According to them, the authors’ perspectives developed and were shaped to align with the public opinion of the time. Within Kazakhstan’s historical circles, certain value judgments began to emerge. Notably, the authors reached a consensus on the interpretation of specific events and, in some cases, demonstrated forward-thinking views. Additionally, they speculated about certain events where documentary evidence had yet to be established (interview with textbook author #1, August 17, 2019, Almaty)

Publishers conduct internal reviews with subject matter reviewers and at least two external experts. Finally, the Ministry of Education’s Republican Scientific and Practical Center for Examination of Education Content (PCEEC) performs scientific and pedagogical pre-approval reviews involving a scholar, two or more teachers, and a PCEEC subject expert to approve, reject, or request revisions. Approved textbooks are tested in schools and teacher associations through experimental teaching. A commission of scholars and highly qualified teachers determines whether a textbook is added to the core or general list (with up to five alternatives per subject) or rejected (Adilet Zan 2012). Teachers are able to use either of them based on their preferences.

The textbook’s approval guidelines and evaluation criteria do not contain any specific interpretation of certain events, which in turn explains the presence of conflicting and competing discourses. As per the guidelines for textbook authors, the MOE requires the authors to promote cultural understanding, gender equality, and socio-economic awareness while fostering national and universal values, with a focus on inspiring pride in Kazakhstan’s history, achievements, and heroes, encouraging environmental respect; and introducing students to various professions with an appreciation for diverse contributions. Additionally, textbooks must avoid content that justifies violence or extremism, provokes negative thoughts, or reinforces stereotypes (Adilet Zan 2022). The evaluation criteria for textbooks cover structure, content, teaching strategies, language level, and design (PCEEC 2024).

Representation of Jeltoqsan in School History Textbooks

The main plot in all the surveyed textbooks describes the accumulated problems associated with the KSSR over many years, and sparked by Qonaev’s departure, gives these as the genuine reasons for the mobilization at Jeltoqsan. Depending on the textbook, that setting of the narrative underlines various reasons for the mobilization, such as socio-economic problems, the neglect of rural needs by the central budget, the loss of sovereignty, Russification, and the closure of Kazakh language schools. Based on the preferred textbooks, the main “self” actors range from the broad to the narrow, such as republic youth, detained boys and girls, Kazakh youths, a group of working and student youths of Almaty, the young democrat Qairat Rysqulbekov, and many other names of those who stood out, were killed, or who became imprisoned Jeltoqsanshylar (Aiagan et al. Reference Aiagan, Nurpeisov and Jaksylykov1993, 92–94; Zhukeshov et al. Reference Zhukeshov, Kozybaev and Nurpeis2005, 85–92; Aiagan et al. Reference Aiagan, Shaimerdenova and Tkashenko2005, 265–275; Qoigeldiyev et al. Reference Qoigeldiyev, Toleybaev, Qasimbaeva, Dalaeva and Qalieva2007, 70–75; Turlygul et al. Reference Turlygul, Joldasbaev and Kojaqeeva2007, 66–70; Aiagan et al. Reference Aiagan, Satenov and Satanov2019, 73–78; Oskembaev et al. Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019, 90–98). When defining “others,” the textbooks shift from a vague center to a specific name for Moscow officials and incorporate law enforcement authorities from Soviet Kazakhstan as perpetrators. Reference was made to the command-administrative system, ideological totalitarianism, bureaucracy, the CPSU, the Party, the Kremlin, Moscow, the country’s leadership, the XVI Congress of the CPK, Kolbin, and the names of law enforcement officials. Vocabulary associated with “other” includes wording such as “ineffectiveness, alienation from the people, lifelessness, voluntarist decision, contradictions and errors, arbitrariness, and injustice” to describe the brutality of this “other.” Aiagan et al. Reference Aiagan, Nurpeisov and Jaksylykov1993, 92–94; Zhukeshov et al. Reference Zhukeshov, Kozybaev and Nurpeis2005, 85–92; Aiagan et al. Reference Aiagan, Shaimerdenova and Tkashenko2005, 265–275; Qoigeldiyev et al. Reference Qoigeldiyev, Toleybaev, Qasimbaeva, Dalaeva and Qalieva2007, 70–75; Turlygul et al. Reference Turlygul, Joldasbaev and Kojaqeeva2007, 66–70; Aiagan et al. Reference Aiagan, Satenov and Satanov2019, 73–78; Oskembaev et al. Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019, 90–98). Of note is that the names of non–KSSR political and law enforcement officials prevail.

In addition to the text, visual elements vary in the analyzed textbooks. Oskembaev et al. (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019, 93–99) highlighted depictions of non-action, contrasting with action-inviting pictures. The textbooks include photos of an empty Republican Square where the Jeltoqsanshylar protested, people peacefully marching, protestors standing to hear the court decision, and the “Dawn to the Independence” monument. The teacher guide for this textbook defines the core learning purpose of the topic on Jeltoqsan as avoiding the occurrence of such protests (Oskembaev et al. Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019). On the contrary, Aiagan et al. (Reference Aiagan, Satenov and Satanov2019, 79–80) added pictures of the Jeltoqsanshylar being beaten and contained, forming rings, shouting, holding banners, and showing how the police took to the protestors. The teacher and methodologist authors of this textbook included these action-related pictures as an assignment to describe the actions that occurred at Jeltoqsan. Interdiscursively, Oskembaev et al. (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019) endorse the official view on cautioning and avoiding the protest, while Aiagan et al. (Reference Aiagan, Satenov and Satanov2019) suggest provoking critical thinking on the nature of the mobilization.

Presentation of Dinmukhamed Qonaev

The analyzed textbooks illustrate a discursive competition between official accounts and Jeltoqsanshylar interpretations of Qonaev. Official narratives present Qonaev as a product of the Soviet system to distance Nazarbaev’s presidency from his Soviet background and emphasize his role as the first president of an independent country. At the same time, official narratives placed less emphasis on Jeltoqsanshylar remembrance of Qonaev as a statesman who positively contributed to the development of Kazakhstan to foreground Nazarbaev’s significant contribution to shaping development since 1991.

The official narratives on Qonaev prevailed in the textbooks of early independence. Aiagan et al. (Reference Aiagan, Nurpeisov and Jaksylykov1993) illustrated a similar narrative plot. Although Qonaev was part of a top-down Soviet command and administrative system, he was accountable for the adverse effects of the Soviet system on the KSSR. Qonaev’s leadership was described negatively using both active and passive voices. “In his work, D.A. Qonaev often showed recklessness and arbitrariness. Among his closest circle, there were many individuals who abused their official positions for selfish purposes. Under the watch of Kazakhstan’s leadership, the Aral Sea perished, the use of the Kazakh language diminished, continuous nuclear tests were conducted at Semipalatinsk and other sites, and the perpetual companions of the administrative system thrived: bribery, favouritism, rampant alcoholism, and social apathy among the population. Mass unrest in Tselinograd in 1979 remained unnoticed and concealed from the wider public” (Aiagan Reference Aiagan, Nurpeisov and Jaksylykov1993, 93). The provided passage resembled Nazarbaev’s address to the commission on investigation of Jeltoqsan in April 1990, where he alluded to Qonaev as an “adherent and spokesperson of the vicious command and administrative system, the same apologist for the stagnation in Kazakhstan as Brezhnev in the country [referring to the Soviet Union]” (Abdigali and Tabeev Reference Abdigali and Tabeev2011, 23).

At the same time, the context behind the domination of Soviet historical narratives is another factor in explaining such portrayal of Qonaev. One of the textbook authors of this period underlined the prevalence of the Soviet discourse on national history since public sentiment strongly opposed the idea, as the collapse of the Soviet Union was deeply felt, especially among the older generations who had lived through it (interview, August 2019, Almaty).

Even though official narratives on Qonaev did not change, textbooks from 2005 and onwards competed to offer Jeltoqsanshylar renditions of Qonaev, or endorsed official narratives by omitting the name of Qonaev. This demonstrates that the discursive contestation between the official and ethnic national narratives, including those of the Jeltoqsanshylar, became more pronounced. For example, the construction of the Tauelsizdik Tany (The Dawn of Independence in Kazakh) monument dedicated to the Jeltoqsanshylar in Almaty in 2005 later became a site of discontent, where mourners sought greater symbolic recognition from the government (Muqanqyzy Reference Muqanqyzy2010).

One of the authors of the textbook of this period highlights that “authors should keep their fingers on the pulse of society” when writing history textbooks. According to them, there should be no conceptual requirements from official institutions, and authors should follow the public demand when writing their history textbooks (interview, September 2019, Almaty).

Aiagan et al. (Reference Aiagan, Shaimerdenova and Tkashenko2005, 270) interpreted Qonaev’s term closer to Jeltoqsanshylar. This textbook provided a narrative plot on the positive contribution of Qonaev to the development of Kazakhstan’s agriculture, construction, literature, and art in the description of his biography (254). This textbook dropped the phrase “under the leadership of the republic,” which referred to Qonaev, and replaced it with “in the 1980s” (272).

Comparingly, Zhukeshov et al. (Reference Zhukeshov, Kozybaev and Nurpeis2005) illustrated the textbook’s endeavour to integrate official accounts and Jeltoqsanshylar memories to demonstrate diverse societal voices. The narrative plot in this textbook was although Qonaev believed in the ideas of communism and was a Brezhnev ally, the socio-economic accomplishments, extensive extraction of natural resources, growth of heavy industries, and development of national intelligentsia rose to a new quality level during Qonaev’s time. This textbook did not use any negative descriptors. Zhukeshov et al. (Reference Zhukeshov, Kozybaev and Nurpeis2005, 154) considered Qonaev being part of the command-administrative system as an achievement of his career growth. For example, his membership in the Politburo and involvement in domestic and foreign affairs of the Soviet Union were examples of his successful career path. It was an element of re-contextualization, as indicated by Klerides (Reference Klerides2008, 37) when the perpetrator of Jeltoqsan as the command and administrative system was placed within the context of Qonaev’s career growth.

Qoigeldiyev et al. (Reference Qoigeldiyev, Toleybaev, Qasimbaeva, Dalaeva and Qalieva2007, 184) demonstrated support for Jeltoqsanhsylar narratives. It offered a narrative plot that underlined Qonaev’s resistance to the command of Moscow and as one who defended Kazakhstan’s interests. This textbook employed the active voice, referring to Qonaev to assert his agency over Soviet rule in Kazakhstan. For example, Qonaev openly disagreed with the Soviet Union’s policies but had to obey Moscow’s command (181). Qonaev raised the issue of the Aral Sea with Moscow. The sea was shrinking due to river diversions for irrigation purposes (184). Another example highlighted that during Qonaev’s leadership, the number of ethnic Kazakh officials increased in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. It lessened the number of ethnic Russians in official positions, even though they were the majority in Soviet Kazakhstan. (185). The depiction of Qonaev as a statesman who dissented from Moscow to care for his fellow Kazakhs came from Kazakh-speaking postcolonial histories that romanticized Qonaev’s period. However, the same year, the Turlygul et al. (Reference Turlygul, Joldasbaev and Kojaqeeva2007) textbooks omitted the name Qonaev to accentuate Nazarbaev’s role in contributing to restoring the historical justice of Jeltoqsan, which is discussed in the following sections.

The fifth volume of the multi-volume book Kazakhstan Kone Zamannan buginge dein (in Kazakhs the History of Kazakhstan from Ancient Times to the Present Day), printed in 2010, served as a point of consultation to avoid discrepancies across textbooks. A senior historian familiar with the production of this volume was surprised by the minimal coverage of Qonaev in its content. Qonaev governed the KSSR for over twenty years, during which most historical events were related to his term in office. According to this historian, this reflects the political will dominant in the post-1991 period (interview, September 2019, Astana).

Oskembaev et al. (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019) compromised between the official and Jeltoqsanshylar narratives of Qonaev by an attempt to offer a neutral narrative plot. The plot de-emphasized Qonaev as a political figure by describing him as a great example of a hard-working person who grew from an engineer to a statesman. Along with Qonaev, this textbook highlighted the political roles of the Stalin-era leader of Soviet Kazakhstan, Jumabai Shaiakhmetov, and the Council of Ministries Chairman in Brezhnev’s times, Jumabek Tashenov. Oskembaev et al.’s (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019, 65) textbook underlines Tashenov’s opposition to the potential expulsion of northern regions and the transfer of some southern lands to Uzbek SSR for agricultural planning. This suggests that the political discourse in the textbook aims to solidify Nazarbaev’s presidency by offering a neutral view of Qonaev.

Aiagan et al. (Reference Aiagan, Satenov and Satanov2019, 57) avoided evaluating Qonaev’s place in history and his role as a statesman without assessing it alone. The same narratives about Qonaev appear in the re-run versions of the Oskembaev et al. (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2024, 89–96) and Aiagan et al. (Reference Aiagan, Satenov and Satanov2024, 83–86) textbooks, despite the growing prominence given to his role in official narratives. President Toqaev emphasized the remembrance of Qonaev by signing a decree on renaming a city after him and historians draw connections between the two leaders (Togaibaev Reference Togaibaev2022).

Role of Nursultan Nazarbaev

Nazarbaev’s role in restoring the historical justice of Jeltoqsan shifted from total absence in some textbooks to explicit emphasis, to implicit de-emphasis, or to his competition with other officials. Before Nazarbaev consolidated presidential power and early independence, the plot of the narrative in Aiagan et al. (Reference Aiagan, Nurpeisov and Jaksylykov1993, 87–91) did not mention his role in Jeltoqsan, although highlighting such a role was already present in the official realm. This demonstrated the textbook’s support of the Jeltoqsanshylar narratives. Quite the opposite, this textbook commended the role of Mukhtar Shakhanov, whose speech on the need to investigate the Jeltoqsan at the People’s Deputies Congress of the Soviet Union with a phrase “moved the stone wall of silence” (91). After Nazarbaev’s power strengthened, although Aiagan et al. (Reference Aiagan, Shaimerdenova and Tkashenko2005) included examples from the Shakhanov Commission’s report, his portrayal was predominantly as an activist who fought against the environmental deterioration of the Aral and Balqash lakes. This demonstrates the greater impact of the official narratives.

Zhukeshov et al. (Reference Zhukeshov, Kozybaev and Nurpeis2005) offered a narrative plot highlighting the restoration of historical justice to Jeltoqsan. As per Zhukeshov et al. (Reference Zhukeshov, Kozybaev and Nurpeis2005, 164), Nazarbaev skillfully managed the economic and socio-political turmoils of the late 1980s and 1990s with his new democratic government. The following examples associated with the restoration of historical justice: under Nazarbaev’s leadership, some Jeltoqsanshylar were rehabilitated at CPK, and the CPSU decreed blame for Jeltoqsan on “Kazakh nationalism” was removed. Another example states that during Nazarbaev’s tenure, a law for Kazakh and Russian language equality was adopted, and the fates of the Jeltoqsanshylar and Soviet-repressed Kazakh intelligentsia were acknowledged.

However, the plot of the narrative in Qoigeldiyev et al. (Reference Qoigeldiyev, Toleybaev, Qasimbaeva, Dalaeva and Qalieva2007) implicitly dissociated Jeltoqsan with Nazarbaev by supporting Jeltoqsanshylar narratives. This textbook presents protestor Rysqulbekov using a distinct Kazakh word, Otanshyldyq, to refer to bravery for the sake of nationhood and devotion to the homeland. Rysqulbekov, a 22-year-old student at the Architectural Institute in Almaty, was initially sentenced to death, later reduced to 20 years in prison for the alleged murder of the druzhinniki member Sergey Savitskii, for “organizing mass disorder, and for inciting ethnic hatred” during Jeltoqsan. He allegedly hanged himself in Semei jail while being escorted to a prison in Sverdlovsk oblast, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Authors use the passive voice to exclude Nazarbaev’s name as the person who signed and conferred the title of “People’s Hero” to Rysqulbekov in 1996. The passage states, “By the Decree of the Republic of Kazakhstan, a brave Qairat Rusqulbekov was awarded the title of People’s Hero” (77). This textbook used the passive verb to illustrate how the “Dawn of the Independence” monument dedicated to the Jeltoqsanshylar was opened in Almaty without referring to Nazarbaev by name, unlike in the Turlygul et al. (Reference Turlygul, Joldasbaev and Kojaqeeva2007) textbook. Perhaps one of the textbook authors, being from the same region as Rysqulbekov, adds a component emphasizing the role of Rysqulbekov.

The narrative plot on Nazarbaev’s role as a chief articulator for Jeltoqsan competed with officials from his presidency with the prevalence of the former for the discursive hegemony in the Turlygul et al. (Reference Turlygul, Joldasbaev and Kojaqeeva2007) textbook. The authors of this textbook commended the Almaty mayor’s office for the remembrance of Jeltoqan, who organized meetings, created the respected Commission, and provided moral and material support for Jeltoqsanshylar, including some receiving apartments. At the time of the publication of Turlygul et al. (Reference Turlygul, Joldasbaev and Kojaqeeva2007), the then-mayor of Almaty, Imangali Tasmagambetov, was known for his support of Kazakhness-led cultural initiatives. However, after the end of Tasmagambetov’s mayorship, the revised version of Turlygul et al. (Reference Turlygul, Joldasbaev and Kojaqeeva2007, 262) omits the Almaty mayor’s office, only including the examples mentioned above of the historical restoration of Jeltoqsan. Such inclusion represents an influence of the political discourse on the Jeltoqsan.

The Oskembaev et al. (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019) textbook offered a narrative plot that highlighted the revival of historical justice for Jeltoqsan under Nazarbaev’s presidency, with a twist emphasizing his inaugural role as it was printed during his departure from the presidency. This supported official narratives. For example, this textbook mentioned that Nazarbaev canceled the decree on issuing awards to security officials who dispersed the protesters and rehabilitated the imprisoned and prosecuted demonstrators. Oskembaev et al. (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019) underlined, “The monument of the Jeltoqsan was opened with the participation of the First President.” The re-run versions of Oskembaev et al. (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2024, 89–96) and Aiagan et al. (Reference Aiagan, Satenov and Satanov2024, 83–86) have offered the same narrative plot.

“Events” or “Uprising”

The examined textbooks illustrate the discursive struggle between the official and the Jeltoqsanshylar narratives over the descriptors for Jeltoqsan, oscillating between “events” and “uprising.” Official narratives mix the Soviet-coined terminology “events” with the terms “movement” and “uprising” from Kazakh-speaking historiography and literature (Kasymbekov Reference Kasymbekov2010a, Reference Kasymbekov2010b, Reference Kasymbekov2010c). The latter refers to the spiritual nature of the discontent for a more significant cause and builds the narrative on the three-centuries-long struggle of Kazakhs for independence, starting from Tsarist colonization and culminating in Jeltoqsan (Kozybayev Reference Kozybayev1997, Kekilbayev Reference Kekilbayev2016). The official narratives’ avoidance of adopting a consistent term for Jeltoqsan by blending all three demonstrates a reluctance to signify its importance which might lead to sequential remembrance of Jeltoqsan, Janaozen, and Qantar in the collective memory. It is worth mentioning that blending does not mean excluding the meaning of the term “uprising”; instead, it reflects an avoidance of consistent adherence to sticking to one term. Non-official narratives build a linear connection between the Jeltoqsan, Janaozen, and Qantar. The movement or uprising titling increases Jeltoqsan’s salience in the collective memory. Although the analyzed textbooks avoid connecting these three watershed moments into a cohesive trope, they selectively use terms such as “event(s),” “movement,” and “uprising” to nullify or signify Jeltoqsan’s place in collective memory. The use of the term “uprising” in textbooks conveys a tangential endorsement of Jeltoqsanshylar chronicles.

In the narrative plot of the textbooks by Aiagan et al. (Reference Aiagan, Nurpeisov and Jaksylykov1993, Reference Aiagan, Shaimerdenova and Tkashenko2005) and Zhukeshov et al. (Reference Zhukeshov, Kozybaev and Nurpeis2005), the word “events” has been used to describe factual information, to quote excerpts from incident reports, and to describe the progression of discontent. References are “events in Alma–Ata, mass riots, demonstration, Jeltoqsan events in Kazakhstan” (Aiagan et al. Reference Aiagan, Nurpeisov and Jaksylykov1993, 90–94), “the events of Jeltoqsan, incidents in Almaty, and the Jeltoqsan events have enriched Kazakhstan’s young democracy with valuable experience” (Zhukeshov et al. Reference Zhukeshov, Kozybaev and Nurpeis2005, 162, 165, 166). Aiagan et al. preferred the wording of “events” since the authors of this textbook accentuated that Jeltoqsan did not reach the level of an uprising in Kazakhstan’s history and has already received a political assessment in a meeting with a survivor of Jeltoqsan (Aitbaiuly Reference Aitbaiuly2019, 398). Nevertheless, a third re-run version of Aiagan et al. (2013, 262) indicated that “historians practiced different titling when describing Jeltoqsan, such as an event, movement, and uprising,” which suggested the influence of feedback from this textbook’s external reviewers whose stance leaned towards supporting the uprising title (interview with the textbook reviewer, September 2019, Almaty).

The emphasis on the term “uprising” reflects the aforementioned prominence in the discursive struggle between official and Jeltoqsanshylar narratives. Qoigeldiyev et al. (Reference Qoigeldiyev, Toleybaev, Qasimbaeva, Dalaeva and Qalieva2007) offer a narrative plot for the three centuries-long struggle for independence culminating with Jeltoqsan’s “uprising.” Specifically, it includes anti-colonial resistance during significant junctures in Kazakhstan’s history, such as the Junggar–Kazakh Khanate war, anti-colonial rebellions of hordes against Tsarist Russia, the 1916 revolt against the World War I military draft, the Alash movement’s resistance against Soviet rule, and socio-economic ethnic protests in the Soviet period. Qoigeldiyev et al. (Reference Qoigeldiyev, Toleybaev, Qasimbaeva, Dalaeva and Qalieva2007) compare the violence at Jeltoqsan to the suppression of the 1916 revolt by the Tsar’s regime. Qoigeldiyev claims that the strand’s connection in such a way that includes Jeltoqsan belongs to him. According to him, “we are a nation that has lost its statehood since the eighteenth century. We did not have a state. We were part of an empire. Therefore, the struggle for independence and statehood was difficult for us. We lost a lot along the way. We have barely reached this life [post-1991 period]. Therefore, as I understand it, the liberation movement [struggle for independence] should be presented in the textbook as much as possible and in a conceptually interconnected way” (interview, September 2019, Almaty). He is the chief editor of twenty volumes of books on continuous national liberation movements from the Tsarist Russia period, including Jeltoqsan (Qoigeldiyev et al. Reference Qoigeldiyev, Toleybaev, Qasimbaeva, Dalaeva and Qalieva2007).

Although Turlygul et al. (Reference Turlygul, Joldasbaev and Kojaqeeva2007), published in the same year and for the same grade as Qoigeldiyev et al. (Reference Qoigeldiyev, Toleybaev, Qasimbaeva, Dalaeva and Qalieva2007), follow the curriculum by using “the uprising” as the title, they apply the word “events” throughout the text on Jeltoqsan and only use movement and uprising on two occasions. The plot of the narrative describes the protest dynamics with a focus on the role of Nazarbaev in historical restoration. This textbook leaned towards the official narratives with a narrative plot that merely described the occurrence in Jeltoqsan. The latter refers to the shift from peaceful protests to violence to emphasize the negative character of the protests. One of the textbook’s authors of this period (interview, September 2019, Almaty) demonstrated an awareness of self-censorship, indicating that if something is written not in a governmental view, it will not pass the review and will not be published. This suggests that such awareness played a role in refraining from consistently using the term “uprising.” Notably, the teacher guide for this textbook (2007, 10) distinguishes the “Jeltoqsan uprising” as the sixth stage of Kazakhstan’s Soviet period of history hinged on categorization by Qozybaev.

The prevalence of more recent textbooks’ event descriptors suggests greater control by the official narratives in the context of the call for a unified term (Tolepbergen, Toleu and Qasymbaeva Reference Tolepbergen, Ainur and Dinara2011, 65). Oksembaev et al. (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019) adhere to the educational program throughout their textbook by using “events” in theme and subsection titles within some differences in Kazakh and Russian languages. The narrative plot illustrated a description of the causes, courses, and consequences of the Jeltoqsan, with a focus on the situation before leading to Jeltoqsan and a focus on the 1960s to the 1980s. Throughout the textbook, the wording choice of event prevailed both in Kazakh and Russian language, but the former referred to movement and uprising in highlighting the historical significance of the Jeltoqsan and the martyrship of the protestors (94–97) – while the descriptor of the event was used throughout the text on Jeltoqsan (92–97). Such differentiation suggests that the emphasis on national pride and the struggle for independence in the Kazakh language has a more neutral and less transformative meaning given in the Russian language. However, both the Kazakh (94) and Russian versions (96) of this textbook encourage pupils to ask critical questions in the student activity sections. Among the three specialists who typically write textbooks, the school teacher rephrases questions to ensure they are age-appropriate. For the assignment on “Jeltoqsan – is not an event; it is an uprising,” students are recommended to watch Qaldybai Abenov’s film Allazhar (94, 97) about the Jeltoqsan uprising, which was not widely released.

However, Aiagan et al. (Reference Aiagan, Satenov and Satanov2019, 46–78) employed both “event” and “movement” descriptors with a neutral narrative plot, using the latter to highlight Jeltoqsan’s role in Kazakhstan’s national liberation history and its impact on the national consciousness. Both the Kazakh and Russian versions of these textbooks are identical in terms of usage. This illustrates blending of both the official and Jeltoqsanhsylar narratives. The re-run editions of Oskembaev et al. (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2024, 89–96) and Aiagan et al. (Reference Aiagan, Satenov and Satanov2024, 83–86) remain unchanged in their narratives from the original versions.

Finally, Jandosova (Reference Jandosova2019, 185) incorporated Jeltoqsan into the tenth-grade textbook’s overarching narrative of Kazakhstan’s path to nationhood since the establishment of the Kazakh Khanate in the fifteenth century. However, Jeltoqsan had a single paragraph, presenting it as a step toward independence. One of the authors of the textbooks printed since 2019 indicates that no expert historians from the leading history institutions participated in creating the standards curriculum as it did before (interview, September 2019, Astana).

(None) the Ethnic Angle of Jeltoqsan

Among all four themes presented in this article, most of the examined textbooks uniformly followed official narratives with a non-ethnic interpretation of Jeltoqsan. However, few of the textbooks presented implicit ethnic perspectives of Jeltoqsan. Official narratives’ dominance of non-ethnic codification is explained by a core ideology of President Nazarbaev’s running the country through multi-ethnic stability discourse (Kudaibergenova Reference Kudaibergenova2020). A Presidential Administration’s brief suggested that “media materials should adhere to maintaining and further enhancing stability and inter-ethnic accord in the society” when interpreting the Jeltoqsan. The recommendation of this brief for Kazakh language media was “not to seek any revision of any negative assessments voiced by the Slavic population at the protest.” In contrast, Russian language media should provide “a robust rebuff to any slight attempt to recover the Soviet explanation of the protests as “hard-core nationalism.” (Sarsenbayev and Tazhin Reference Sarsenbayev and Tazhin1996). Along with domestic constraints, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy relations with Russia are another factor influencing the non-ethnic portrayal of Jeltoqsan. Gorshenina (Reference Gorshenina, De Cordier, Fauve and Den Bosch2021, 202) argued that the Central Asian country’s present relationship with Russia affects its assessment of the Tsarist and Soviet periods as colonial or not.

Klerides (Reference Klerides2008) argued that a textbook’s multifunctional domain transforms knowledge and changes prejudiced opinions. The examined textbooks emphasized that the discontent was not directed against any ethnicity. They dismantled Soviet interpretations that blamed the Jeltoqsanshylar for ‘Kazakh nationalism’ and labeled them as ‘hooligans, partisans, and antisocial individuals.’ It contained the following phrases: ‘The demonstration did not contain attacks against other peoples’ (Aiagan et al. Reference Aiagan, Nurpeisov and Jaksylykov1993, 162), ‘was not directed against other peoples, including Russians’ (Zhukeshov et al. Reference Zhukeshov, Kozybaev and Nurpeis2005, 165), ‘the actions of Kazakh youth at the beginning stage were not characterized by opposition to rights’ (Aiagan et al. Reference Aiagan, Shaimerdenova and Tkashenko2005, 271), [Jeltoqsan]’ did not carry a nationalist character’ (Oskembaev et al. Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019, 93). The multi-ethnic stability discourse influenced what was permissible to include (dismantling Soviet interpretations) without examining whether the ethnic aspect was present during the protests.

Implicit support for the Jeltoqsanshylar narratives demonstrated the call for highlighting Kazakhness-led initiatives in the official nation-building (Laruelle Reference Laruelle and Omelicheva2014). The narrative plot in Zhukeshov et al. (Reference Zhukeshov, Kozybaev and Nurpeis2005) demonstrated implicit referencing to the ethnic elements of the discontent supporting Jeltoqsanshylar narratives. Zhukeshov et al. (Reference Zhukeshov, Kozybaev and Nurpeis2005) mentioned how the use of druzhinniki caused a deterioration in the relations between Kazakhs and Russians in the country. For example, the “creation of detachments at factories from representatives of Russian and other Slavic peoples, whose number reached 16 thousand people, armed with metal bars and chains, drove a wedge into the relations of the peacefully coexisting two peoples, Russian and Kazakh, [this] gave rise to the psychology of hostility” (Zhukeshov et al. Reference Zhukeshov, Kozybaev and Nurpeis2005, 162). The sentence underscores 16,000 Russian and Slavic suppressors over the protestors. One of the textbook authors of this period maintained that security forces could have bypassed the use of violence against the protestors focusing on the suffering of the protestors: “They [security forces] could have dispersed the protestors without sending soldiers and without freezing them in the freezing weather. [Instead] they used sapper shovels and sent the trained dogs then, loaded them into the spray trucks and dumped them into the outskirts of the city [Almaty].” (interview, September 2019, Almaty).

The narrative plot Qoigeldiyev et al. (Reference Qoigeldiyev, Toleybaev, Qasimbaeva, Dalaeva and Qalieva2007) focused on the suppression of the protestors. Qoigeldiyev et al. (Reference Qoigeldiyev, Toleybaev, Qasimbaeva, Dalaeva and Qalieva2007, 75) cited Shakhanov’s report to highlight that by order of the KSSR, “European nationalities” (75) in the Kazakh language and “non-indigenous ethnicities” in Russian were given “fittings, rubber batons, chains, cable cuttings” to use against the protesters (72). At the same time, Qoigeldiyev et al. (Reference Qoigeldiyev, Toleybaev, Qasimbaeva, Dalaeva and Qalieva2007, 75) highlight that no ethnic Kazakh was among those who suppressed the protestors (74). This textbook uses an active voice to underline the suppressor’s implicit ethnic affiliations. Advocacy of the Supreme Soviet of the KSSR, such as Shakhanov, to establish the 1990 commission on Jeltoqsan became the premise to include the sufferer’s position in the textbook. It is worth mentioning that the remaining textbooks did not contain any information about the ethnic aspect or comment on the Kazakh–Russian relationship during Jeltoqsan. Including ethnic elements in these two textbooks was a preference to articulate Jeltoqsanshylar position.

Turlygul et al. (Reference Turlygul, Joldasbaev and Kojaqeeva2007) included a narrative plot emphasizing that internal instability may arise during periods of Kazakh disunity, making the country vulnerable to external threats and thus supporting official narratives. It incorporates Nazarbaev’s interview, in which he used the Kazakh saying “bolingendi bori jeidi,” which in Kazakh means “the wolf ate the herd that separated from the herd” (2007, 262). This saying indicates that lessons were learned from Jeltoqsan, such as the need for consolidation of Kazakhs’ internal unity and fostering inter-ethnic harmony in Kazakhstan. Officials in the Nazarbaev and Toqaev presidencies use this narrative to highlight the preoccupations of Kazakhstani opposition politicians solely with domestic political struggles, causing them to overlook external threats (Qarin Reference Qarin2019).

A more recent textbook by Oskembaev et al. (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019, Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2024) reflects a societal shift, driven by generational changes, toward reassessing the Soviet past from anti-colonial and de-colonial perspectives, which is implicitly reflected in the official narratives of the current government. According to Gorshenina (Reference Gorshenina, De Cordier, Fauve and Den Bosch2021, 203), Kazakhstani officials are moving toward reconsidering the Soviet past, emphasizing glorifying the ancient past. In the narrative plot Oskembaev et al. (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2019, Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2024) list tensions in the nationalities question and Russification as one of the characteristics of the Soviet administrative and command system that led to Jeltoqsan. The examples include, before Jeltoqsan, the use of the Kazakh language was restricted by the decline in schools teaching in Kazakh and the limited practice of conducting official documentation in Kazakh. As per this textbook, such an approach to the Kazakh language caused a rift in Kazakh history, literature, and traditions. Protestors also raised the language issue by chanting, “May our language not disappear; may our land not be plundered” (Reference Oskembaev, Saqtaganova and Mukhtaruly2024, 91).