Existing research shows a significant relationship between state racial minority population, the proportion of racial minority welfare recipients, and state levels of racial resentment with the proposal and adoption of punitive welfare policies. This article contributes to the extant literature by expanding on Ledford’s (2018) 2008–2014 analysis of state drug testing proposals by evaluating state-level racial factors and the diffusion of drug testing proposals from 2009 to 2018. Moreover, the author accounts for the potential influence of drug-related variables on the proposal probability by including variables measuring opioid overdose deaths and illicit drug use estimates. Event history analyses do not find that the size of a state’s Black population or the percentage or proportion of Black welfare recipients significantly affects the proposal rates. However, higher estimates of state-level racial resentment increase the likelihood of proposing drug testing for welfare legislation, supporting Ledford’s conclusion that racial biases matter in the diffusion of these policies. In addition, the author has found evidence that while opioid overdoses are negatively associated with the likelihood of proposal, estimates of illicit drug use have the opposite effect. Finally, analyses suggest that liberalism in state governments actually increases the probability of a proposal.

Redistricting is often a hotly contested affair within states as the party in power attempts to maximize its chances for electoral success through injecting partisanship into the process. Previous works have evaluated how different redistricting practices can influence elections, but little is known about how redistricting can impact citizen attitudes toward government. Using an original survey with a unique experiment, we evaluate the relationship between how redistricting is performed and how satisfied citizens are with the state of democracy in the United States. We find that the mere perception of redistricting being done in a partisan manner leads to decreased levels of system support. Furthermore, our models show that independent redistricting commissions tend to reduce the perceived prevalence of gerrymandering and boost citizens’ evaluations of the democratic process.

In the field of American state politics, the tension between majoritarian institutions and equality has largely been ignored. Do state institutions that empower majority preferences exacerbate disparities in social outcomes? Under what conditions do majoritarian institutions exacerbate inequalities in the American states? Our argument is that equality is most likely to be threatened under majoritarian institutions when (1) there are systemic participatory biases and/or (2) there are widespread prejudices about particular groups in society. We find that more majoritarian institutions are associated with larger disparities between White and Black life expectancy and poverty rates across the American states, but not differences in educational attainment. We also find that this effect is moderated by racial context, with majoritarian institutions being associated with greater disparities for states with diverse racial contexts and smaller disparities in more homogenous states. These findings suggest that majoritarian institutions operate to the benefit of the White majority, while coming at the cost of minority population outcomes when a racial threat is perceived, and presumably, public opinion is biased.

Separate from their feelings of national pride, Americans may also feel proud of the state where they live. I explore the political consequences of these feelings of state pride. I propose that when people feel proud of the state they reside in, they are more willing to empower their state governments to take action to address state challenges. Using survey responses from a module of the 2020 Cooperative Election Study, I find that people who express greater pride in their state are more likely to advocate for state spending on social programs. Feelings of state pride are also associated with support for policy devolution and the belief that state governments should have more influence over policymaking within the federal system. State governments have incentives to try to cultivate feelings of state pride, as those who feel proud of their state are more willing to empower their state government to effect change.

The 2020 Black Lives Matter protests dramatically increased the salience of police reform, yet the US Congress failed to pass any reforms. In contrast, state governments have passed hundreds of police-related bills since 2020. I summarize the plethora of state reforms passed over this period by grouping them into 18 key areas, including 14 I classify as pro-reform and four I classify as anti-reform. Next, I describe how party control and public opinion relate to state reforms. I find that state party control is a robust predictor of enacting pro-police reform policies, and that reforms are more likely in states with more Democratic and more pro-reform publics. While police reforms are responsive to public opinion, they are also typically incongruent.

The evidence for an upwelling in small donor contributions is evident not just in response to presidential and congressional campaigns, but in statewide elections as well. The general question for this vein of research is whether growth in the donorate contributing $200 or less can be detected in states that would neither be considered hotly competitive battlegrounds nor especially visible in national party politics in terms of size or media attention. Specifically, we gather and examine campaign contribution records for individuals extending back to the early 2000s for Washington State gubernatorial contests. Given that this state has a low ceiling on total campaign contributions to state and local candidates ($2,400 per cycle for governor, $1,200 for state legislative and local offices), there is reason to expect an increasing reliance on small donors as campaign costs have risen. Unlike states with no campaign contribution limits on individuals (e.g., Texas, Pennsylvania, Oregon), candidates in the Evergreen State must go to more donors to raise the same large sums. An important related question is whether the parties are relying on the same locales to harvest small donations that they have traditionally relied upon for larger ones. We see that even in a state that would be considered out of the glare of the national spotlight, the small donor surge is democratizing campaign finance by spatially diffusing financial support. These developments fuel social science curiosity about the causes and effects of these new patterns of participation.

What role does racial/ethnic diversity in the American states play in racialized partisan and partisan-ideological sorting? We expand the commonly employed empirical frame of Whites’ partisan and partisan-ideological reactions to minority groups at the national level by leveraging the variation in racial/ethnic populations in the American states and accounting for both out-group and in-group size across White, Black, Latino, and Asian respondents. Using the pooled 2012–22 Congressional Election Study, the results demonstrate that Whites tend toward Republican orientations in states with larger Black and Foreign-Born populations and display stronger partisan-ideological sorting in more diverse states with large Black, Latino, or Asian populations. The analyses also reveal that partisan-ideological sorting is asymmetrical along both racial and partisan identities. White partisan-ideological sorting across state racial/ethnic contexts is driven by both Republican and Democratic identifiers, while Black, Latino, and Asian respondents show few signs of elasticity to state context in partisan identity or partisan-ideological sorting. The asymmetries in both PID and partisan-ideological alignment lead to larger racial/ethnic gaps in attachment and alignment in more diverse state contexts. These are well-understood conditions for greater partisan and factional conflict and polarized party and electoral politics.

The literature on representation has shown that those who reflect the characteristics, traits, and/or experiences of a group (descriptive representation) are more likely to represent that group’s interests (substantive representation). In this paper, we argue that questions about representation should be considered with regard to generational identity. Drawing upon research that shows the importance of the Millennial Generation identity for understanding Millennials’ attitudes and policy preferences, we look at whether this identity matters for the legislative representation of group interests by examining bill sponsorship activity in 31 state legislatures. Our results tentatively support the expectation that the Millennial generation identity conditions the sponsorship of Millennial interest bills. Millennial legislators are more likely than non-Millennial legislators to sponsor bills that disproportionately impact their group members. This result is observed among both Democrat and Republican legislators, but at different magnitudes and for different issue priorities. These findings suggest that the Millennial generation identity is a meaningful determinant of legislative behavior, even when examined alongside partisanship.

Court restructuring has become a salient national political issue, with proposals to increase the number of justices on the US Supreme Court gaining traction in response to various Court controversies. However, relatively little attention has been paid to state-level efforts, some successful, to increase the number of justices on state supreme courts. Although the number of justices on the US Supreme Court has not been changed since 1869, the size of most state supreme courts has been less stable. To place recent state supreme court expansions into context, this article analyzes the historical dynamics of state supreme court expansion. Analyzing an original dataset that includes every change made to the size of a state supreme court since 1789, it finds that court expansion has been more likely when the political competitiveness of a state is low and when state judicial selection and retention systems provide for lower levels of judicial independence.

Which electorates suit which women candidates for higher office? This question becomes increasingly important as greater numbers of women run for office in American elections. Consistent with previous research, we posit that women candidates will win a greater percentage of the vote share in so-called women-friendly electorates. However, we suggest that these contextual effects will vary based on the interaction between candidate partisanship and race. To test these expectations, we use a unique dataset created by the authors to examine 264 women – 209 white, 55 non-white –who ran for executive office in the American states during the 10-year period between 2010 and 2019. We find support for our expectations. There are strong contextual effects that diverge along party and racial lines. Non-white Democratic women candidates’ vote share increases by up to 25 percentage points as the electorate becomes more women friendly; white Democratic women’s vote share increases by 10 percentage points. In contrast, white Republican women candidates’ vote share is highest in less women-friendly electorates. These analyses pose important questions about recruitment, representation, and intersectional identities in American politics. As the pool of candidates for both parties diversifies, these findings may explain patterns of emergence and success.

Existing scholarship investigates the influence of out-of-state donors in state-level candidate politics; however, comparatively little attention is given to out-of-state contributions in direct democracy campaigns, such as ballot initiatives and referenda. This study is the first to investigate out-of-state donations to direct democracy campaigns, focusing on the scope and characteristics of individual out-of-state donors across the United States. Utilizing an original dataset of contributions to direct democracy committees from 2006 to 2022, I present three key findings. First, out-of-state contributions to direct democracy campaigns have increased over time, with notable spikes in recent election cycles. Second, a large majority of out-of-state individual contributions total $100 or less, primarily to measures related to social issues and substance use regulation. Third, out-of-state contributions to direct democracy campaigns tend to share certain characteristics. A significant portion of these contributions comes from zip codes with lower to average incomes and states without direct democracy processes of their own. Finally, based on these characteristics, I develop a potential theory for why these donors contribute, arguing that individual out-of-state donors to direct democracy campaigns are primarily motivated by a combination of ideological and consumption-oriented considerations.

How does the mass public form attitudes on electoral rules and reforms? Existing research on this question reveals a trade-off between principles, such as fairness, and partisan self-interest. I use two survey experiments on state legislative redistricting to explore how voters weigh principles against partisan self-interest when forming opinions on electoral reforms. First, I ask whether the public’s partisan self-interest motivation stems more from individual representation considerations or broader partisan power considerations. I find that both considerations provide a powerful enough incentive to activate partisan self-interest regarding preferences for state legislative district maps. Unexpectedly, the two considerations have quite similar effects on public support for redistricting reforms. Second, I explore the principles versus partisan self-interest trade-off through the lens of loss aversion, a concept developed in behavioral economics. In line with expectations, I find that preventing loss provides a more powerful incentive for Americans to violate democratic principles than achieving partisan gain. In sum, this research sheds light on voters’ decision between principles and partisan self-interest in the formation of opinion on electoral reform.

States began passing legislation that bans transgender athletes from competing on teams that match their gender identity in 2020. Republican lawmakers largely introduced and supported athlete bans, but were party preferences the only predictor of support for these bills? What effect did legislator demographics or district-level attributes have on the likelihood that a state legislator would support or oppose an athlete ban? This study explores the voting preferences of individual state legislators in states that passed athlete bans from 2020 to 2023. Using an original dataset and multilevel modeling, this analysis looks beyond party affiliation to determine whether a relationship exists between support and less apparent indicators such as district ideology and composition, gender, race, and electoral success. While party identification is a significant predictor of support, legislators representing districts characterized by lower educational attainment and a high proportion of evangelical Protestants are more likely to support transgender athlete bans.

Paid sick leave, or the ability to remain home from work in the event of illness and receive compensation, has risen in prominence after the COVID-19 pandemic. Among the OECD countries, all but two, the United States and South Korea, have national paid sick leave (PSL) policies. Yet despite federal inaction in the United States, states have been adopting PSL, with 15 plus the District of Columbia having done so by the end of 2020. In the absence of federal policy, what drives states to adopt PSL mandates? In this article, we investigate two possible explanations – women in politics and jurisdictional competition. In the former, we suggest that increases in female representation in state-level governance make it more likely that a state will adopt a PSL policy. In the latter explanation, we suggest that jurisdictional competition in the form of cities or counties adopting municipal PSL policies creates pressure on the state-level government to enact statewide policies to harmonize policy, in a process of “bottom-up” federalism. To evaluate our hypotheses, we create a dataset of all state and municipal PSL policies in the United States. We find strong support for the gender representation argument, but not for the jurisdictional competition argument.

This article proposes that elections with substantial amounts of campaign activity change the substance of a state supreme court’s legitimacy from one derived from the court’s legalistic nature to one derived through representation. Using a national survey, it shows that because of this change the perceived legitimacy of courts with robust elections does not induce acceptance of their decisions. Only nonrepresentative courts with the legalistic form of legitimacy can convert their institutional legitimacy into decisional acceptance. This means that even highly legitimate courts with robust elections are ineffective at inducing acceptance. This hinders the ability of those courts to build public support for their decisions, which is essential for the effective functioning of the judiciary. Additional analyses show this effect is not caused by the politicization associated with campaigning but rather through the representation provided by elections.

The failure of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) has been attributed to various organized interests, including the New Right and insurance companies. This study examines trends in lobby efforts regarding the amendment and correlations between lobby efforts and roll call votes among state legislators. Lobbyists active on the amendment appeared most often in states they perceived were most likely to approve. A second data set consisting of 6,952 votes reveals that explicitly pro- and anti-ERA lobby efforts were correlated with votes cast only by Republican state legislators. Lobby efforts by insurance companies were not correlated with any votes. The efforts of pro- and anti-amendment lobbyists, however, likely had no effect on the ultimate fate of the proposed amendment. Women and non-white legislators voted more often for the amendment, regardless of party. Moreover, changes in public support for the amendment led to partisan differences in legislators’ votes.

Increasingly, governments report on public service quality, which has the potential to inform evaluations of performance that underlie voters’ opinions and behaviors. We argue these policies have important effects that go beyond informing voters. Specifically, we contend that the format in which policymakers choose to report information will steer the direction of opinion by exacerbating or mitigating biases in information processing. Using the case of school accountability systems in the United States and a variety of experimental and observational approaches, we find that letter grade systems for rating public school performance, as opposed to other reporting formats, exacerbate negativity bias. Public opinion proves more responsive to negative information than to positive information in letter grade systems than in alternate formats. Policymakers, then, do not simply inform public opinion; rather, their decisions about how to present information shape the interpretations that voters ultimately draw from the information provided.

Political work requires alliance building, but antagonism and divisions dominate legislatures and society in many democracies. How do legislators handle being pulled in both directions simultaneously? We use the anthropological method of ethnography and the political science method of network analysis and show how their combination enhances understanding of cross-party cooperation among Representatives even when such work is not depicted in the media and may clash with expectations of constituents. This interdisciplinary project utilizes a case study of the Texas House of Representatives, which provides a tough case for cooperation given the intense polarization of the state’s politics. Through observational and interview research methods of anthropology, we discovered how and why Representatives work across party lines. We then used network analysis to assess what traits of Representatives are associated with bill coauthoring and joint authoring to systematically measure cooperation. More senior Representatives, Hispanic, African American, and Asian Representatives but not women, and Representatives who join a bipartisan caucus most often build networks across party lines.

Asian Americans are the fastest growing racial group in the US electorate, yet they are significantly under-represented in political office. How do predominantly immigrant groups like Asian Americans close this representation gap? We build on existing theories of minority representation and immigrant assimilation by highlighting the importance of a group’s political incorporation into American society. We argue that the representation of minority immigrant groups in political office requires social integration and the acquisition of civic resources, processes that can take considerable time. Using new data on Asian American state legislators spanning half a century, we find that immigration in prior decades is associated with greater political representation, while contemporaneous population size has either no independent impact or a negative one. Other indicators of immigrant social integration, including citizenship status, language ability, education, and income, also predict the likelihood of co-racial representation in political office. Our results suggest political representation gaps of immigrant groups narrow over time, though this may be a non-linear process. Our findings also imply that the least integrated members of immigrant groups are the most likely to be affected by representational deficits.

Interest groups are an important influence in the subnational policymaking process. Previously, environmental policy scholars measured the strength of environmental groups in the American policymaking subnational process by using proxies like state-level group membership in major nationwide environmental organizations (e.g., Sierra Club). Although these prior measures of group strength have face validity, recent scholarship suggests that the utilization of group financial resources is a better measure of the influence of interest groups in state-level models. We take this approach and provide a new way to measure state-level environmental interests by using aggregated financial information (income and assets) from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data obtained via the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). This measure provides several advantages over previous approaches because it varies over time, is derived from easily accessible public data, includes a greater diversity of environmental organizations, and it is considered reliable by prior scholars. We demonstrate its empirical value by deploying our measure in a model of state policy adoption. We encourage researchers to further utilize this new measure in their analysis of environmental advocacy at the subnational level.