Navigating Otherness in Ethnonationalist Populist Politics—Case Selection

The highly contentious and fragmented nature of Israeli politics makes it a fruitful case for examining minority identity (Hermann Reference Hermann2020; Ram Reference Ram, Reuven, Dowty, Hofnung and Rahat2018). Increasing divisiveness and polarization within politics across country cases, particularly regarding “identity”, suggests that Israel is likely more representative than previously acknowledged (Enos and Gidron Reference Enos and Gidron2018; Gidron and Ziblatt Reference Gidron and Ziblatt2019). Israeli society is highly diverse with a significant national minority population (approximately 20% of the population are Palestinian/Arab citizens of Israel)Footnote ¹ . Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, and Halperin (Reference Canetti-Nisim, Ariely and Halperin2008, 92) state that, “Israel’s ethnonational character as a Jewish state, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, [and] the complex relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel […] have turned Israel into a laboratory conducive to the study of the development of negative political attitudes toward various minority groups.” Building on this, Enos and Gidron (Reference Enos and Gidron2018) argue that exclusionary attitudes among Jewish-Israelis towards Palestinian Citizens of Israel resemble perceptions of Muslim immigrants in Western Countries as security threats (Enos and Gidron Reference Enos and Gidron2018; Hellwig and Sinno Reference Hellwig and Sinno2016). Additional research compares the Israeli Nation-State Law to other countries with Majority Nationalism Laws, for example, those whose citizenship tests require demonstrating proficiency in the official state language, history, and values (Barrak-Cohen, Feldman, and Gidron Reference Barrak-Cohen, Feldman and Gidron2018; Adamo Reference Adamo2008; Van Houdt, Suvarierol, and Schinkel Reference Van Houdt, Suvarierol and Schinkel2011). Consequently, Israel enables exploring the relationship between social diversity and political strategies and attitudes.

Major political issues include the high cost of living, the role of religion in the state, the ethnonational identity of the state, and national security. Women politicians in Israel, therefore, must figure out how to fit into elite political institutions that are hostile to women and into political discourses and issue areas that are highly masculinized and promote “machoistic norms that legitimize women’s marginality” (Lachover and Lemish Reference Lachover and Lemish2018). It is this specific historical situation and in relation to these specific peoples that certain social divisions gain greater salience (Yuval-Davis, Reference Yuval-Davis2006). The emphasis on the ethnonational and religious identity of the state, alongside the role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, presents significant obstacles for women’s participation in formal politics. Women who are Palestinian citizens of Israel are particularly vulnerable in this ethnocratic system (Smooha Reference Smooha2017; Smooha Reference Smooha, Reuven, Dowty, Hofnung and Rahat2019) because their patriarchal oppression is interwoven with their national oppression (Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Daher-Nashif Reference Shalhoub-Kervorkian and Daher-Nashif2013; Lachover Reference Lachover2017).

Like many other countries, Israel has seen a rise in extreme populism that occurs on the radical right and democratic backsliding/erosion (Mudde Reference Mudde2013; Haggard and Kaufman Reference Haggard and Kaufman2021; Gidengil, Stolle, and Bergeron-Boutin Reference Gidengil, Stolle and Bergeron-Boutin2022). There is a growing body of work on democratic erosion in Israel that also raises interesting questions about “Nativism, Authoritarianism, and Populism” within the Israeli political right (Perlinger and Pedahzur Reference Perlinger, Pedahzur and Rydgren2018). These processes allow for the exploration of how aspirations for “ethnic/religious homogeneity” impact minority women politicians.

Diversity in Politics, Democratic Erosion, and the Middle East

This research contributes to scholarship in three different ways. Firstly, this paper compares historically marginalized identities within a Middle Eastern country. Consequently, it provides important theoretical insights, improving scholars’ ability to analyze intersecting racialized identities within the Middle East and North Africa region. Also, this paper has considerable implications for intersectional theories of political representation (Montoya et al Reference Montoya, Bejarano, Brown and Gershon2022) and presents a model that challenges key assumptions predicated on a U.S. context. Finally, I provide insight into how democratic erosion and populism interact with diverse legislatures. I will expand on these three contributions in the following section.

Existing scholarship on Israeli politics explores questions of identity as discrete categories. Most of the research on women in politics evaluates their presence and participation as a single group and rarely considers how intersectional identity categories interact with gender. Similarly, research on minorities in Israeli politics considers ethnicity and does not address the interaction with gender identity. Such scholars explore the process of integration of Jewish-Israeli subgroups into politics, such as Mizrahim, Jews of Middle Eastern and North African descent (Chetrit Reference Chetrit2000; Averbukh Reference Averbukh2017), or post-Soviet immigrants and their descendants (Khanin Reference Khanin2000). Research on Palestinian-Israelis in politics looks at how their approach to the state has changed over time and to the development of a Palestinian identity that is both in solidarity with their nation and confronting the reality of possessing Israeli citizenship (Ghanem Reference Ghanem1997; Ghanem Reference Ghanem2001; Hitman Reference Hitman2013; Halabi Reference Halabi2014; Haklai and Rass Reference Haklai and Rass2022). Currently, the only research that explores two intersecting identities within the Israeli political system looks at the experiences of Palestinian-Israeli women (Herzog Reference Herzog2004; Herzog and Yahia-Younis Reference Herzog and Yahia-Younes2007; Daoud Reference Daoud2006; Daoud Reference Daoud2009; Sabbah-Karkabi and Herzog Reference Sabbah-Karkabi, Herzog and Shamir2020). Additionally, there is work on the impact of gender and geographic residence within Israel on ideological voting patterns and voter turnout (Atmor and Friedberg Reference Atmor and Friedberg2019). The goal of this research is to develop a broad theoretical framework for considering multiple intersecting identities within Israeli politics. That is to say, I seek to enable comparison between various subgroups operating in the Israeli political landscape rather than maintaining the current approach of studying each group in isolation.

Scholarship on minority women in U.S. politics addresses the construction of racial identities in a particular social and historical context. For example, a significant amount of attention has been given to issues of presentation and respectability among Black candidates for office and analyzing their choice of hairstyle, clothing, and vernacular (Brown Reference Brown2014; Lemi and Brown Reference Lemi and Brown2019, Reference Lemi and Brown2020). The physicality of race and ethnicity is constructed within a history of European colonialism and imperialism, yet this is particularly pronounced in the United States due to the impact of slavery and immigration on the demographic makeup of the population.

The Israeli case is useful for bridging some of the gaps between the United States and other country cases as it is more representative of how race and ethnicity play out in non-American contexts. Firstly, racial and ethnic identities are explicitly tied to religious identities. Ronit Lentin argues that Israel is a racial state in which the differentiation of groups is based on cultural and ethnic markers rather than on biological reasoning or color as a signifier of race (Lentin Reference Lentin and Lentin2008). Secondly, while racial identities in Israel/Palestine may include visual performative cues, they may also not. The lack of othering visual cues does not significantly diminish discrimination and marginalization. This is because the state believes it needs to “defend itself against internal and external threats by targeting specific groups that pose a numerical risk and threaten state sovereignty” (Zureik Reference Zureik2015, 54). As Ozcelik argues, the politics of “whiteness” has been transplanted in the Middle East and enabled the institutionalization of racial hierarchies and reproduced supremacist power structures (Ozcelik Reference Ozcelik2021).

For example, Aida Touma-Suleiman is Palestinian Israeli and has no physical or clothing markers indicating an “othered” and “racialized” identity. She was raised Christian and does not wear a hijab, as that is a Muslim marker/item. As mentioned, people in Israel/Palestine have multiple possibilities of presentation on the race/ethnicity axis (Khazzoom Reference Khazzoom2003). These are underexplored factors because the field of race and ethnic politics has relied on US-based definitions and understanding of racial identity. Another example of complications to American conceptualization is Knesset Member Pnina Tamano-Shata, who is of Ethiopian-Jewish descent. Unlike Touma-Suleiman, Knesset Member Tamano-Shata’s Blackness marks her as other; however, she is also Jewish and belongs to the main group identified with the Jewish nation-state. Her Black experience is contingent upon her religious identity (Ozcelik Reference Ozcelik2021), which also has significant implications for her legal status within Israel [see Law of Return and Nation-state Law]. Scholarship on race requires a more nuanced approach to considering the construction of racial identities and should not over rely on physical attributes to determine categories. We must take seriously the constructedness of race and ethnicity.

Another complicating dynamic to this study of intersecting gendered and racialized identities is the many parallel processes occurring in Israeli politics. The reality of an intransigent and violent conflict influences the framing of racialized identities and in-group out-group dynamics. The out-group is, therefore, understood as an existential threat not just as a theoretical or cultural concern but in tangible and physically harmful ways (Ben-Porat and Filc Reference Ben Porat and Filc2020; Levi and Agmon Reference Levi and Agmon2020).Footnote ² As feminist international relations scholars demonstrate, the nation-state project promotes a strict gendered and racialized regime (Nagel Reference Nagel1998; Vickers Reference Vickers2006). The militarized nation-state designates “women and children” as the protected, requiring subservience and gratitude for this marginalized status (Young Reference Young2003). Within this process of designating who is to be protected, the state further identifies those populations deemed threatening or a fifth column. In the case of Israel, the ongoing ethnonational conflict with the Palestinian National Movement has contributed to the resilience and rigidity of these socially constructed categories (Balf Reference Balf2019a; Yakter and Tessler Reference Yakter and Tessler2022).

In addition to contributing to our understanding of minority political representation in Israel, I also engage with minority representation in a context of growing ethnonationalism and democratic backsliding and erosion. A significant body of work on right-wing and populist parties has argued that such parties use the presence of women to signal moderation. Furthermore, voters find such claims compelling. Clayton, O’Brien and Piscopo show that when women participate, voters interpret their presence positively and as reflective of democratic practice (Clayton, O’Brien, and Piscopo Reference Clayton, O’Brien and Piscopo2019). Similarly, the presence of women in right-wing parties causes voters to view the party itself as less extreme regardless of stated policy positions (O’Brien Reference O’Brien2019; Adams et al Reference Adams, Bracken, Gidron, Horne, O’Brien and Senk2023). Thus, voters use the presence of women as an informational shortcut to imbue democratic meaning on parties and politicians who promote anti-democratic and discriminatory policies. I expand on this work by exploring how women politicians utilize gendered and racialized identities strategically within an environment of right-wing populist politics.

Democratic Erosion and Right-Wing Extremism—Background and Institutional Context

In the following section, I discuss the various processes and institutional factors that contributed to democratic erosion in Israel. The coalescing of power in the executive pressures women politicians to toe the line and increases the penalty risk for defecting or rebelling. Additionally, the normalization of radical right-wing politics in Israel creates a hostile environment that delegitimizes inclusive practices and tolerance.

Scholarship on democratic erosion states that this process is defined by democratically elected incumbents seeking to undermine existing democratic institutions without abolishing them altogether (Laebens and Lührmann Reference Laebens and Lührmann2021). More specifically, “executive powers are used in a step-by-step fashion to weaken institutions of horizontal accountability, oppositions, and political and civil liberties. In contrast to military coups or other abrupt authoritarian seizures of power, the incremental nature of this process makes it difficult to identify any single abuse that tips the balance decisively toward autocracy” (Kaufman and Haggard Reference Kaufman and Haggard2019, 418). As I will discuss below, there is significant precedent among consecutive Israeli administrations to strengthen the executive and systematically weaken opposition forces.

The global rise in extreme populism and democratic backsliding/erosion is apparent in Israel. Importantly, Israel lacks several of the checks and balances found in Western democracies, and always had a relative concentration of power in the executive, resulting in a relatively weak and fragile democracy. Israel does not have a constitution and, therefore, lacks an extensive bill of rights. Although “basic laws” have quasi-constitutional standing, most are easily amendable. Additionally, Israel does not have local power centers as it has a single electoral district (Gidron Reference Gidron2023). The founding political leadership chose to establish an electoral system in which the governing coalition has a great deal of power, and the opposition forces are weak (Neuberger Reference Neuberger2019). This is due to the parliamentary system, a unicameral legislature in which the executive is derived directly from the majority governing coalition. As a result, cabinet members are also active members of the legislature, and there is almost no separation between the executive and legislative branches. The lack of a second chamber further limits accountability and regulation of executive function (Mahler Reference Mahler2004).

Furthermore, the nascent Israeli state was a welfare state with a large and highly centralized bureaucracy (Kimmerling Reference Kimmerling2001). Although Israel has undergone significant processes of privatization and promoted neoliberal economic policies in the last fifty years—the bureaucratic infrastructure established in the first few decades of the state remains. This infrastructure contributes to the concentration of power in the hand of the executive and to its effectiveness in Israel. This was on full display during the coronavirus pandemic and the massive vaccination effort by the state. All of this is to say that although democratic erosion is more recent, the conditions enabling it already existed (Mahler Reference Mahler2004; Gidron Reference Gidron2023).

Recently, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, alongside the Minister of Justice and the Chair of the Law and Justice Committee, attempted to amend quasi-constitutional laws and politicize the process of judicial appointments both within the courts and in cabinet ministries as well (Wittes et al Reference Wittes, Cohen, Shany, Sachs and Patja2023; Gidron Reference Gidron2023). The barrage of judicial reform legislation introduced by the Netanyahu government includes changing the hiring process for governmental legal advisers from public tenders to direct appointments by cabinet ministers. Similarly, the coalition introduced a bill to change the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee, giving the government majority status in the committee. Another example is the government’s efforts to eliminate legal doctrine entitled “the Reasonableness clause” or exclude elected officials from it. Under current Israeli administrative law, the Supreme Court may strike down patently unreasonable decisions of the executive branch, which run contrary to human rights or good governance. Towards this end, the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, developed an intricate web of grounds for review of executive action (Cohen and Shany Reference Cohen and Shany2023). All together, these judicial reforms seek to obstruct the Israeli Judicial Branch’s ability to provide input or guidance on executive policy and action.

Such processes have occurred alongside the coalition’s efforts to expand the role of the state in the West Bank and ramp up annexationist policies. In February 2023, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant signed an agreement with the Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich for the transfer of governmental powers in the West Bank to the latter. This was a result of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s coalition deal with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The agreement transfers broad administrative authorities pertaining to the majority of the governing powers in the West Bank into hands that are not of the military commander of the occupied territory. This is relevant for Israel’s claim that the military occupation of the West Bank adheres to international law and constitutes a major challenge to Israel’s claim of democratic governance.

These institutional changes are not occurring in a vacuum, rather, they are a result of the mainstreaming of the Israeli radical right and the ethnocentric and populist messaging of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his coalition partners (Perlinger and Pedahzur Reference Perlinger, Pedahzur and Rydgren2018). Using Cas Mudde’s framework of three ideological pillars of the populist radical right (Mudde Reference Mudde2007), Perlinger and Pedahzur (Reference Perlinger, Pedahzur and Rydgren2018) demonstrate the presence of “Nativism, Authoritarianism, and Populism” within the Israeli political right. Although they identify some of these processes as dating back to 1967, their work focuses on the expansion of this ideological space in recent decades. Nativism is reflected both in “territorial nativism” and in aspirations for “ethnic/religious homogeneity.” Territorial nativism refers to the territorial control over all territories designated “Israel” by these right-wing ideologues, for example, Minister Smotrich and his role as governor of the West Bank. The nativism calling for ethnic/religious homogeneity is reflected in the nation-state law in 2018, defining Israel as “the historical homeland of the Jewish people” and the “nation-state of the Jewish people, in which it actualizes its natural, religious, and historical right for self-determination.”Footnote ³

Israeli authoritarianism, in which the executive is indistinguishable from the state and rules over a highly subordinate population using highly stringent laws, is evident not only in the more recent judicial overhaul but also in legislation targeting human rights organizations fifteen years ago. For example, “the boycott bill” of 2011 called for imposing a financial penalty on any Israeli citizen who publicly supports any boycott of the state of Israel, thus dramatically limiting freedom of speech in favor of what was perceived by the Israeli legislature as national interest. In Israel, religious fundamentalism intertwines with authoritarian trends, as evidenced in the previously mentioned efforts to expand the role of religion in the state. Religious authoritarian adherents in Israel aspire to transform the state into a theocracy (Bermanis, Canetti-Nisim, and Pedahzur Reference Bermanis, Canetti-Nisim and Pedahzur2004).

Similar to the particularistic Jewish ethnonational authoritarianism, Israeli populism also differs from other cases in its fixation on security (Levi and Agmon Reference Levi and Agmon2020). Israeli security-driven populism feeds on anxieties and imagery related to national security. The populist argument by the Israeli radical right claims that the Jewish left is anti-Jewish, anti-Zionist, and anti-Israeli. Jewishness, Zionism, and Israeliness are the constitutive components of Israeli Jews’ political identities—left and right alike (Yadgar Reference Yadgar2017). For this reason, the meaning of the populist argument is that Israeli lefties should not be considered part of the “real people.” As a result, elite institutions must be purged of leftist elites who do not reflect the true Jewish nature and character of the Israeli people (Perlinger and Pedahzur Reference Perlinger, Pedahzur and Rydgren2018).

Strategizing Gendered and Racialized Identity—Four Women Knesset Members

In this study, former minister and current Member of Knesset Merav Michaeli is the baseline for considering how class, gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity operate in Israeli politics. Michaeli spent most of her career in the opposition and briefly served as Labor Party leader and as Minister of Transportation.Footnote ⁸ The purpose of this study is to consider how women navigate and leverage their identities to maintain a political career, i.e., stay in office. Therefore, I do not analyze whether or not they are able to access leadership or decision-making positions based on those identities.

In terms of her background, Michaeli grew up in Tel Aviv, the social and cultural hub of Israeli society. Her parents were both from prominent families, and she is of Ashkenazi descent. Within the hierarchy of Israeli society, Michaeli is from the elite/hegemony in terms of her ethnic identity (“white”/“European descent” Jew) and her cultural and economic background. Consequently, she is a more typical candidate for entry into public office. Furthermore, she chose to join the Labor party, who was instrumental to the establishment of the state of Israel and maintained control over Israeli politics until 1977 (Hazan Reference Hazan, Hazan, Dowty, Hofnung and Rahat2018). The public stereotype of party members and voters is that the Labor party is made up of Ashkenazi urbanites from Tel Aviv (Shamir and Gedalya-Lavy Reference Shamir and Gedalya-Lavy2015). As a member of key elite groups in Israeli society, Merav Michaeli has relied on her gender to set her apart from men peers.

Legislation as Position Taking

Early on in her career, Michaeli appeared to focus on gender-related legislation. She advocated heavily against gender-based violence, criminalizing clients of sex workers, addressing the gender pay gap, and establishment of quotas for women in elected office. This approach of focusing on women differed from the broader Labor party line. After the 2011 tent protests, which centered on the growing cost of living in Israel, the Labor party endeavored to pivot from being identified with the failed peace process to socioeconomic concerns and improving government services (Lebel and Hatuka Reference Lebel and Hatuka2016). For example, Stav Shaffir, who rose to prominence as a leader of the 2011 tent protests, was elected to the Labor party at the same time as Michaeli, attempted to garner public support for regulating government finances and demanding budget transparency. Michaeli’s legislative agenda reflected her feminist activism prior to entering politics and was perceived as “authentically” feminist rather than strategic messaging (Lachover and Haytin Reference Lachover and Haytin2024). Thus, she was able to strategically use her gender identity to differentiate herself from other left-wing politicians and develop a “public brand” as the firebrand feminist.

Leading by Example—Conditional Feminism

In preparation for a campaign for Labor party leadership, Michaeli began introducing her policy positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the economy, religion, and state. They largely reflected the median position in the Labor party. She expressed support for negotiation with Palestinians but not without guarantees for security, and she promoted welfare state policies and was critical of religious institutions. Notably, her foreign affairs and national security policies are not articulated within a feminist framework. The one exception is her support for the implementation of UN Resolution 1325, requiring women to participate in all post-conflict processes (Harkov Reference Harkov2015). Michaeli’s feminism corresponds with liberal feminist efforts that emphasize an Aristotelian definition of equality and is less aligned with critics of liberal feminism (Warnke Reference Warnke1993). In 2021, Michaeli became leader of the Labor party and ran a campaign she characterized as “feminist,” this took place in the context of a growing feminist scene in Israel (Fogiel-Bijaoui Reference Fogiel-Bijaoui, Ben-Rafael, Julius, Sternberg, Glöckner and Weberling2016; Itzkovitch-Malka Reference Itzkovitch-Malka, Reuven, Dowty, Hofnung and Rahat2021) and prominent feminist activism primarily around gender-based violence and harassment (Kleiman Reference Kleiman2021; Benski Reference Benski and Daher2023).

Another example of the limitations of Michaeli’s feminist solidarity concerns the case of a former Knesset Member from the Labor party, Ibtisam Mara’ana, who is a Palestinian-Israeli woman. Former MK Mara’ana ran as a candidate on the Labor party list in the 2021 elections after Michaeli became the leader of the party. A Labor party member colleague coordinated and led, alongside extremist right-wing political activists, a petition to the Central Elections Committee to disqualify her candidacy. The petition relied on a 2012 Facebook post of Mara’ana’s in which she publicly refused to observe Israel’s Memorial Day. Mara’ana’s detractors argued that she is anti-Zionist and opposes the state of Israel, and therefore, should not hold public office. Ultimately, Mara’ana publicly apologized for the post, and the Israeli Supreme Court overturned the Central Elections Committee’s disqualification of her candidacy. In response to the public outrage, Michaeli asserted that the efforts to disqualify Mara’ana were part of a program of incitement against her, similar to attacks against Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin prior to his assassination in 1995.Footnote ⁹ Instead of acknowledging a Palestinian woman’s right to criticize the state of Israel from her vantage point as a Palestinian with legitimate grievances—Michaeli coopted and reframed the event in a Jewish-Zionist pro state lens. Her approach demonstrates the silencing of critical voices in a highly ethnonationalist and populist environment.

Ambivalent Supremacy

In 2018, Michaeli voted against the quasi-constitutional “Basic Law: Israel– The Nation-State of the Jewish People (the Nation-State Law)”. A bill that creates a new and excessive precedent for Jewish supremacy (Ben-Youssef and Tamari Reference Ben-Youssef and Tamari2018) by defining Israel as a “Jewish state” and omitting “democratic” (Navot and Fuchs Reference Navot and Fuchs2023). This is significant because in Israel’s declaration of Independence, a document that holds quasi-constitutional status, Israel is defined as both “Jewish” and “Democratic.” In fact, of the four women Knesset members in this study, only Miri Regev voted in support of the bill.Footnote ¹⁰ However, in cases of other blatantly racist legislation, Michaeli avoided voting on the floor entirely. For example, she did not vote on a bill increasing the penalty for cases of “racially motivated nationalist” sexual assault. This legislation was passed in July of 2023Footnote ¹¹ and states that a perpetrator of sexual assault due to racism, hostility, or terrorism will receive twice the punishment as other cases of sexual assault. The legislation was widely understood as specifically targeting Palestinian or Arab perpetrators of sexual assault, as it did not clearly define racially motivated or terrorism.Footnote ¹² Another vote she avoided was a temporary order preventing family unification. The order denies Palestinian citizens of Israel the ability to unite with spouses who are not citizens, i.e., Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza, or Arab states.Footnote ¹³

According to a report by Madar—The Palestinian Center for Israel Studies—during the 20^th Knesset [2015–2018], a total of 185 racist and annexationist bills were enacted (Jaraysi Reference Jaraysi2018). Only MK Aida Touma-Suleiman’s political faction consistently opposed this legislation. The centrist/center-right political parties, like that of MK Pnina Tamano-Shata, supported 39% of these bills, and center-left like MK Merav Michaeli’s supported 21% of the bills (Jaraysi Reference Jaraysi2018; Younes Reference Younes2018). Both Michaeli and Tamano-Shata oppose the judicial reform efforts by the government elected in 2022. They have both called out the elimination of checks and balances and executive overreach. Yet, the implication of legal discrimination and dehumanization of Palestinians is either completely avoided, as in the case of Tamano-Shata, or very selectively engaged with and reframed, as in the case of Michaeli.

Note: Image from Michaeli’s Facebook page expressing opposition to the Nation State Law, referring to it as a racist and discriminatory bill. The media image shows then Minister of Education Naftali Bennett with the captions “They are against the LGBTQ community, they are against the rule of law, they are against Arab citizens, they are against the elderly and differently abled, they are against women soldiers in the army.” It is worth noting Arabs are placed third, and that the term Palestinian is avoided entirely.

Media Strategy—Exploiting Tokenization

Michaeli is credited with introducing feminist discourse (Lachover and Haytin Reference Lachover and Haytin2024) into mainstream media and public discussion. When she entered politics, she was vocal about the choice to dress in monochromatic and simple black attire with the stated purpose of limiting her objectification. Her past as a model and television presenter partially informed this choice (Lev-On and Mann Reference Lev-On and Mann2018) so that the public would not “focus on her looks.” Additionally, Michaeli insisted on speaking in feminine conjugation (Muchnik Reference Muchnik2016). Hebrew is a gendered language and uses masculine conjugation as the “gender neutral” option. By opting to use feminine conjugation, Michaeli argued that she was shifting the discourse away from a man-centric discourse and highlighting women’s voices and perspectives. Israeli media fixated on these choices, enabling Michaeli to increase coverage and gain national visibility even as a freshman legislator. She used her gender identity to compete with other freshman Labor party legislators, like Omer Bar-Lev, who was a former Army Colonel and Commander of an elite commando unit [Sayeret Matkal].

Michaeli’s Facebook page demonstrates her media savvy (Haleva and Nahon Reference Haleva-Amir and Nahon2015). In the time period under analysis, February 2022 to December 2024, she regularly addresses popular political issues and comments on executive action [159 posts]. The images and videos she posts on Facebook focus on professional political activity: engaging with constituents [40 posts], giving speeches from the plenary floor [35 posts], or participating in a political event. Very few of her written posts or images pertain to her own private life [3 posts]. Michaeli is the only one for whom I was not able to identify a single post that implicitly or explicitly addressed her race or class identity. She also had the smallest number of posts on religion [3 posts]. Or as Shoshana states, “White transparency privilege is expressed by the fact that white individuals do not perceive themselves as socially marked and do not experience the oppressive social view of their color” (Shoshana Reference Shoshana2020, 148). In sum, Michaeli’s relative privilege enables her to depersonalize her Facebook account as her identity does not require explanation or justification.

When analyzing the content of her Facebook, she has similar levels of activity on gender-based violence or women’s issues [50 posts], national security [38 posts], and posts supporting the military [50 posts]. This finding demonstrates the militarized nature of liberal feminism in Israel, as well as research that argues that militarized states are likely to support gender-based violence policies (Forester, Reference Forester2019). Despite the demonstrated constraints to her feminism, right-wing political actors in Israel frequently reference Michaeli as an example of disconnected liberal elitism and “extreme” progressive values.

Outrage Politics—Owning “the libs”

Approximately half of Jews in Israel are of Middle East and North African descent, and yet they have only entered into politics in large numbers in the last few decades. Minister Miri Regev of the Likud party entered politics as a former Brigadier General in the Israeli military, where she served as the IDF Spokesperson. Prior to being promoted to this position, she served as the Chief Press and Media Censor (Lev-On and Mann Reference Lev-On and Mann2018). She followed a pipeline most commonly used by men, though admittedly, a smaller number of women have been able to enter politics after careers in the various Israeli security apparatuses. Regev first gained public attention by making inflammatory racist statements about African migrant workers in Southern Tel Aviv. Later, as Minister of Culture, she acknowledged the history of preferential treatment of Ashkenazi (European) Jewish culture by the state and active discrimination of Mizrahi (Middle East and North Africa) Jewish culture (Lintl Reference Lintl2016; Mautner Reference Mautner2020).

Regev was particularly active against asylum seekers who arrived in Israel, mostly from Sudan and Eritrea, and whom she considers “infiltrators.” She repeatedly presented them as a threat to the needs and welfare of the Jewish working-class population living in Southern Tel Aviv neighborhoods (home to most African asylum seekers). The Jewish-Israeli residents of Southern Tel Aviv are overwhelmingly Mizrahi, a group that experienced significant discrimination and marginalization by the state. Among her more controversial statements on the matter, she called Sudanese migrants “a cancer in the body of our nation” (Jerusalem Post, 16 July 2013) (Filc Reference Filc, Steiner and Önnerfors2018). In their study of reporters covering politicians, Lev-On and Mann provide the following quote on Miri Regev’s media strategy “[she] knows exactly what she wants when she is interviewed by the media or when she issues a press release, and even if sometimes it seems like a provocation, loud and out of control, you should know that 90% of the cases it is very timely and well planned” (Lev-On and Mann Reference Lev-On and Mann2018, 310).

Populist Culture Wars

In response to critics, Regev said in an interview (Jerusalem Post, 20 June 2015)—

“I, Miri Regev-Siboni from Kiryat Gat, daughter of Felix and Marcelle Siboni [distinctively Mizrahi names], have never read Chekhov and almost never went to plays as a child. I listened to Jo Amar [a Moroccan-Israeli singer, pioneer in introducing Moroccan Jewish liturgy music in Israel] and Sephardic songs, and I’m no less cultured than all the consumers of Western culture.”

At times, her criticism was well received, and in other cases when her language was perceived as extreme, she was widely condemned and ridiculed for being “uncouth” (Hirsch Reference Hirsch2020). While endeavoring to garner attention for long-ignored Mizrahi cultural content, Regev also pursued discriminatory policies towards any art or cultural activity that highlighted Palestinians within Israel or outside of it. She was hostile to artists that she viewed as critical of the state of Israel (Lynfield Reference Lynfield2015; Filc Reference Filc, Steiner and Önnerfors2018; Mazria-Katz and Zonszein Reference Mazria-Katz and Zonszein2018). She framed her nativist-xenophobic views and her anti-elitism in populist terms, claiming that key state institutions like the army and the judiciary reflected the elite’s detachment from the people’s needs (Jerusalem Post, 29 July 2015).

Decoy for Democracy—Conservative Minority Women

Regev publicly supported the social exclusion of Palestinian-Israelis (Ben Shitrit, Elad-Strenger, and Hirsch-Hoefler Reference Ben Shitrit, Elad-Strenger and Hirsch-Hoefler2017) including “actively supported Gapso [the Nazareth Illit mayor] and his racist campaign regarding the Arab inhabitants of Nazareth Illit in the municipal elections” (Jerusalem Post, 3 November 2013). She called Arab parliament members “Trojan Horses” because of their opposition to the activities of a priest who encouraged Arab Christians to enlist in the Israel Defense ForcesFootnote ¹⁴ (IDF) (Jerusalem Post, 22 September 2014).

At the height of public attention, she was frequently used as an aggressive surrogate (Grebelsky-Lichtman and Mabar Reference Grebelsky-Lichtman and Mabar2021) and advocate for Benjamin Netanyahu and the Likud party. Her visibility as a Mizrahi woman at a time in which the Likud and Netanyahu became increasingly aligned with religious ethnonationalist extremists may be due to party efforts to signal political moderation to their voters (Ben Shitrit, Elad-Strenger, and Hirsch-Hoefler Reference Ben Shitrit, Elad-Strenger and Hirsch-Hoefler2022). As her career progressed within the Likud party, her inflammatory statements and provocative populist policies have declined. However, post October 7, 2023, Israeli political discourse is increasingly genocidal (Sorek Reference Sorek2025). Simultaneously, Netanyahu and the Likud have fully embraced an extremist right-wing image and do not appear invested in creating daylight between the party and extremism.

The Unavoidable Gender Lens

Unlike Michaeli, Regev highlighted her ethnic background over her gender identity, thus differentiating her from Ashkenazi peers. Regev’s electoral strategy reflects an effort to mobilize fellow Mizrahi voters and benefit from co-ethnic voting (Czuba Reference Czuba2023). Furthermore, addressing her ethnic identity directly was an acknowledgment of her racialization by the Israeli public. However, Regev downplayed and ignored how public reception was deeply gendered. Her ethnic identity did not distract from her gender identity. As intersectional theorizing would suggest, ethnic and gendered identities interact to create unique experiences and activate particular stereotypes (Lachover Reference Lachover2017). Media outlets routinely mocked Regev as “the angry Mizrahi woman” a racialized and orientalized caricature not dissimilar to the racist stereotype of “the angry Black woman.” Despite having an impressive military career and running successful campaigns in the Likud party primaries (a notorious boys club), politicians, journalists, and public figures presented her as being low-class or “trashy.”

Her Facebook Page posts mostly fit into three categories: her ministerial portfolio [Culture, Transportation, etc.] [55 posts], the military [49 posts], and religious Jewish content [46 posts]. Her religious Jewish posts often discuss the weekly Torah portion and apply its content to current events in Israel. Thus, we observe her using religious scriptures to frame national political discourse. Interestingly, her gender is more likely to be addressed within such Jewish-religious Facebook posts [17 posts]. For example, she frequently posts images of herself lighting Shabbat candles with her hair covered as well as holding freshly baked Challah. Although the actual text of the post does not necessarily address gender or women, the image of such highly gendered Jewish ritual practice primes viewers and constituents. The implication is that of performing proper Jewish womanhood, of authentic belonging to the people. It is also a nod to the high rates of religiosity and Masorti [conservative] Jewish practice of Mizrahi Jewry. Fresh-baked Challah serves as a signal that, despite all the ways in which Regev transgresses gender norms, she is ultimately a “good” and “real” woman. Regev attempts to defuse her gender as “othering” by emphasizing her Jewishness, reflecting her populist political ideology. Her conservative voter base interprets this as a form of womanhood that is respectable and committed to Jewish supremacy. Regev’s self-presentation both formally and informally emphasizes her authentic representation of the true people of Israel. She relies on her racialized identity as an informational shortcut and innate opposition to a corrupt elite.

Note: An example of a Facebook post from December 2024 in which Minister Regev discusses the victory of the Maccabees over the Greeks [Non-Jews] and the weekly Torah portion in which Joseph saves the Jewish people from famine. The picture included with the text shows Minister Regev reading religious scripture in the light of a Hanukkiyah.

Bypassing Elite Gatekeeping through Civil Society

While Michaeli and Regev entered politics from more elite mainstream spaces, journalism and the military, MKs Aida Touma-Suleiman and Pnina Tamano-Shata began their journeys in the public sphere in grassroots activism.

Aida Touma-Suleiman is a prominent advocate for Palestinian women and a long-time member of the Communist Party of Israel (a faction within the political party al-Jabha/Hadash). In 1992, Aida Touma-Suleiman co-established the Palestinian women’s organization Women Against Violence (WAV) in Nazareth. Later on, in 1996, she participated in a working group of Palestinian-Israeli women seeking to address the gap in a Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) report submitted by Jewish-Israeli women. The working group criticized the Israeli state of discrimination against Palestinians and ignoring the gendered implications of this discrimination (Hermann Reference Hermann2003). It is in this time period that Palestinian-Israeli women shifted away from their previous two-staged approach. Palestinian feminist and women’s activism until the first Intifada, late 1980s, prioritized national identity discrimination and oppression over patriarchal oppression; as such, they argued that in the first stage, they will support Palestinian national liberation and only once that is achieved, they would fight for gender equality. However, in the 1990s, Palestinian-Israeli women increasingly criticized both Jewish feminists and Palestinian nationalists for dismissing the particular needs and concerns of Palestinian women. Aida Touma-Suleiman was a leading figure in the gender-oriented Palestinian activism of the 1990s. She was also the first woman to serve as a member of the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel, the leading national organization representing Arab interests in Israel. She is widely regarded as progressive, e.g., her vocal support for the LGBTQ community, and supporting the mainstreaming of Palestinian secular spaces in Israel (Aburabia Reference Aburabia2024).

The limited research on Palestinian women and politics in Israel argues that participation in politics remains a closed-off arena (Daoud Reference Daoud2009). This is due to their intersecting marginalization as Palestinians and as women. The discrimination and marginalization of the Palestinian citizens of Israel by the state and patriarchal societies create nearly insurmountable obstacles for the entry of Palestinian women into both local and national politics (Zaher-Karayanni Reference Zaher-Karayanni2023). In municipal-level politics, the epicenter of political power and influence for Palestinian-Israelis, men maintained a strict monopoly. At the national level, Palestinian parties were themselves excluded, and Palestinian women sidelined.

The first Palestinian woman to become a Knesset member was Hussniya Jabara, from a Muslim family in Tayibe, who ran on a minor leftist Jewish political party list in 1999. Her election catalyzed a broader debate about women in Palestinian politics and raised questions as to Palestinian women’s exclusion from parties claiming to represent them (Daoud Reference Daoud2006). The second Palestinian woman elected to Knesset was Nadia Hilou, a Christian from Jaffa, who ran on the Labor party list in 2006. All evidence suggests that Jewish parties have limited seats for Palestinian-Israelis, and they overwhelmingly prefer Palestinian-Israeli men for those select spots. More than a decade after Jabara’s election, the first Palestinian-Israeli woman from a Palestinian party was elected. Member of Knesset Hanin Zoabi was an outspoken political activist and legislator, garnering the ire of many Jewish-Israelis and becoming a favorite target of the Israeli right-wing. Only in 2015 were there two Palestinian women in the Israeli Knesset serving in the same session, representing a historic record. According to a focus group study conducted by the Abraham Initiatives ahead of the 2013 elections, Palestinian voters expressed a clear desire for increased integration of women in Palestinian party lists (Sabbah-Karkabi and Herzog Reference Sabbah-Karkabi, Herzog and Shamir2020).

Nationalizing Religions

As a Palestinian-Christian, MK Touma-Suleiman belongs to a religious minority among Palestinians. Of the 1.6 million Palestinian Citizens of Israel, 83% are Muslim, 9% are Christian, and 8% are Druze (Adalah 2024).Footnote ¹⁵ About 60% of Palestinian citizens of Israel live in the Galilee in Northern Israel, 20% live in the “triangle” (located close to the Green Line in central Israel),Footnote ¹⁶ and 15% in the Naqab/Negev Southern desert region. In Table 2, it is apparent that most Palestinian women in national politics emerge from major Palestinian population centers where there is a growing Palestinian middle class (Haidar and Bar-Haim Reference Haidar and Bar-Haim2022), most notably the Haifa region.Footnote ¹⁷ Much of the research on Palestinian citizens of Israel, examines Palestinians as a minority group within Israel without disentangling Palestinian-Christian and Palestinian-Muslim identities (Mana et al Reference Mana, Sagy, Srour and Mjally-Knani2012; Rouhana Reference Rouhana1997). Khalidi claims that the “imagined” Palestinian national identity grew out of an understanding that Palestinians protect the holy sites on their land (Khalidi Reference Khalidi1997). This religious protectionism as an articulation of national identity is apparent in Touma-Suleiman’s Facebook and legislative efforts. Her Facebook posts on religion either feature Christian religious leaders or address the ongoing tension surrounding administration and control of the Al-Aqsa Mosque/ Haram al-Sharif. She presents Christian religious leaders as local leaders addressing the needs of the Palestinian community, and does not discuss Christian theology or religious scriptures. Consequently, she endeavors to demonstrate that she represents Palestinians of all denominations.

Table 2. List of all Palestinian citizens of Israel women politicians who served in the Knesset since 1949

Note: Most Palestinian women national politicians emerged from Palestinian population centers in Northern Israel. This reflects both the region where the majority of Palestinian citizens of Israel live, and also locations where Palestinian political parties are particularly active. Source Knesset website*

Another reason it is uniquely difficult to disentangle religion and national identity in the case of Palestinian citizens of Israel is due to institutional conditions. Palestinian citizens of Israel are not recognized or categorized as a national minority. Instead, since its establishment in 1948, Israel has opted to formulate and define policy on Palestinians based on religious denomination and local communities. As a result, it is the Ministry of Religious Affairs that was charged with addressing Palestinian interests within the executive. Additionally, Israel empowers local village leadership in an effort to undermine national group cohesion (Rouhana Reference Rouhana1997; Ghanem Reference Ghanem2001). This institutional approach serves to deny the rights of Palestinians as a national group, while performatively acknowledging their religious identities (Benzima and Mansour Reference Benzima and Mansour1992; Korn Reference Korn2018). Palestinian politicians in the Knesset must rhetorically address a national group, while deliverable policy is de facto and de jure delineated according to the conditions and definitions circumscribed by the state; i.e., religious and local identity.

Gaining Formal Entry—Palestinian Women in the Knesset

Despite her decade-long leadership in Palestinian activism, Touma-Suleiman’s first successful campaign for the national legislature was not until 2015. At the time, she was the fourth Palestinian woman to be elected to the Israeli legislature since the establishment of the state and only the second to be elected from a Palestinian party. This reflects known patterns among Palestinian-Israeli women attempting to enter elite professions—they often face barriers within the Arab community because of discriminatory practices towards women, and face barriers in mainstream Israeli institutions because of their Arab-Palestinianness (Jamal Reference Jamal2020; Jamal and Lavie Reference Jamal and Lavie2020; Lachover Reference Lachover2023).

As a long-time feminist activist, Touma-Suleiman uses intersectional framing of her policy objectives and public presence (Welchman and Hossain Reference Welchman and Hossain2005). In 2015, soon after entering the Israeli legislature, she was chosen by unanimous vote to be the Chair of the Standing [permanent] Committee on the Status of Women and Gender Equality. On the one hand, her professional background in feminist activism made her an ideal candidate for this authority position within the legislature. While on the other, such a position pressures a politician to be more accommodating to institutional norms and emphasizes state centrality. Due to her identity as a Palestinian woman, Touma-Suleiman was required to engage in challenging tradeoffs when navigating the Israeli legislature, often receiving greater support for gender issues framed in mainstream and hegemonic ways. When Touma-Suleiman vocalized criticism of government policy as a Palestinian, she was immediately penalized. For example, in November 2023, the Knesset Ethics Committee suspended her and MK Iman Khatib Yassin for two months because of their criticism of Israel’s military actions in Gaza.

Advancing Palestinians Priorities while avoiding “Palestinian Nationalism”

Touma-Suleiman is a highly active legislator, proposing nearly 1500 bills during her tenure in the legislature between 2015 and 2024. Of her private member bill proposals, only five had the word “nation” [le’om in Hebrew], and most of these proposals were an effort to cancel the 2018 Nation-State LawFootnote ¹⁸ . Similarly, Touma-Suleiman proposed two bills with the terms “Palestine” or “Palestinian,” one of the bills was a quasi-constitutional law [Basic Law]Footnote ¹⁹ recognizing a Palestinian state. However, sixty-five private member bills addressed the “Arab” population in the state of Israel. Thus, we can extrapolate that Touma-Suleiman likely made a strategic choice to use the Israeli hegemonic definition of the Arabic-speaking native population as an Arab minority rather than a national group in order to improve her ability to achieve implementable policy goals. Touma-Suleiman may refer to Palestinians as a national group in her rhetoric; however, to pass a bill into law, she must conform to institutional conditions.

Most of her legislation addresses issues and policies that are of high priority for Palestinian citizens of Israel. For example, she has proposed more than sixty bills dealing with planning and building policies in which Palestinian municipalities (Khamaisi Reference Khamaisi2004; Khamaisi Reference Khamaisi2013; Jabareen Reference Jabareen2014; Totry-Fakhoury and Alfasi Reference Totry-Fakhoury and Alfasi2017; Diab, Shdema, and Schnell Reference Diab, Shdema and Schnell2022), Palestinian neighborhoods in mixed cities (Yiftachel and Yacobi Reference Yiftachel and Yacobi2003), and Palestinian residents are significantly discriminated against. This is due to the prioritization of planning, permits, and housing in Jewish communities, which Yiftachel and Yacobi refer to as “urban ethnocracy” (Yiftachel and Yacobi Reference Yiftachel and Yacobi2003, Reference Yiftachel and Yakobi2004). Other policy areas that Touma-Suleiman works on include health care and transportation. Both are major concerns due to lack of access (Barak Reference Barak2012; Barak Reference Barak2021; Shibli, Aharonson-Daniel, and Feder-Bubis Reference Shibli, Aharonson-Daniel and Feder-Bubis2021), as most healthcare facilities are located in Jewish communities as well as the limited availability of public transportation in Palestinian-Israeli towns and municipalities. This legislation on provision of public services often does not specify that it is intended to address the specific needs of the Palestinian community in order to enable collaboration and co-sponsorship with Jewish legislators (Balf Reference Balf2019b).

Despite her legislative efforts to have mainstream appeal, Touma-Suleiman’s public persona is decidedly Arab and Palestinian. On her public professional Facebook page, her name first appears in Arabic, followed by Hebrew, and no English. Compare this to the other women politicians included in this study, all three of whom have their names in Hebrew and then in English on their public professional Facebook page. The vast majority of the posts on her page are in Arabic, as are most of the graphics. This reflects the common use of Facebook among constituents in Israel and the acknowledgement that her audience is Arabic-speaking [Palestinian-Israeli voters]. Such posts also enable Touma-Suleiman to reinsert a Palestinian framing into her policy goals and achievements, including addressing the conflict and other politically charged/divisive issues. Notably, her most common forms of Facebook posts are speeches from the plenum [76 posts] and posts addressing Palestinian national group concerns both within ’49 borders and in the Occupied Palestinian territories [83 posts]. Therefore, when navigating elite state institutions like the legislature, Touma-Suleiman strategically obfuscates Palestinianness, yet when she is unhindered by statist gatekeeping, she is able to present her national identity.

Gender and Palestinianness—Competing Interests?

Contrary to Merav Michaeli, who uses her gender as a strategy to differentiate herself among elites, for Aida Touma-Suleiman, her gender identity and focus on gender issues make her less threatening. The difference in perceptions over how these two feminist women politicians utilize gender is reflective of their positionality within Israeli society. Similarly, for Miri Regev, her racialized identity can be leveraged for strategic claims-making among mainstream audiences; the same cannot be said of Touma-Suleiman. Her ethnic identity as an “Arab” other, a perceived fifth column, means that outside of the Palestinian community, her “Palestinianness” is not an asset but a liability. On the national stage within hegemonic institutions, Aida Touma-Suleiman’s gender marks her as “more similar,” while her ethnic identity marks her as “other.” These two identity categories operate in opposite ways for both Merav Michaeli and Miri Regev. Michaeli uses gender from the center of society to say that she understands “otherness.” While Regev uses ethnicity to claim that she is able to “speak for” a major subpopulation within Israeli society. Neither strategy is available to Aida Touma-Suleiman or similarly situated Palestinian-Israeli women in Israeli politics.

Feminist Elasticity and Ethnonationalism

One of the most interesting contrasts between self-presentation in a more formal setting and an informal setting is the gap between Touma-Suleiman and Michaeli’s gender-related legislative activity and their relative lack of posts signaling or framing their own femininity. On Facebook, they address women as a political issue, but rarely address their own womanhood. Whereas they are highly active on gender-related issues within the legislature and are frequently asked about their womanhood in interviews. Miri Regev, who includes the most “woman” coded imagery on Facebook, is the least active on gender-related legislation, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Gender-related legislative proposals by MKs in case study.

Note: Data from Knesset Legislative Database, additional information available in appendix

The discrepancy between Michaeli’s feminism and Touma-Suleiman’s feminism highlights a core criticism of Palestinian activists regarding the “white feminism” of Jewish activists. They argue that Jewish feminists either deliberately avoid challenging Jewish supremacy in Israel or actively promote it. Consequently, Palestinian feminists often find themselves being sought after for initiatives pertaining to gender-based violence but silenced when they try to address broader racialized systems of oppression and power structures. Although Jewish women’s complicity in maintaining racialized supremacy in Israel is longstanding, the ethnonationalist extremist political environment increases the risk for Palestinian feminists and virtually eliminates coordination along mutual interests.

Black AND Jewish

Of all four women, MK and former Minister Pnina Tamano-Shata most visibly fits into commonly understood American racial categories. She emigrated from Ethiopia as a toddler with her family and presents “Black.” After completing her law degree and training in the legal profession, Tamano-Shata became involved in “at risk youth” activism, primarily in Petah Tikvah, the city she grew up in. Later, her activism expanded to include advocacy specifically for the Ethiopian-Jewish community, highlighting anti-Black racism and discrimination. In the years prior to running for office, she worked as a news anchor and legal commentator for channel 1 in Israel. She joined the newly established centrist “Yesh Atid” party in 2012 and was elected to the national legislature in 2013 (Kayam Reference Kayam2016). Much of her legislative activity has focused on immigration to Israel, including serving as the Minister of Immigration and Absorption in the years 2020–2022 (Binhas Reference Binhas2020) as well as combating racial discrimination. She was a fierce advocate for a bill criminalizing racial discrimination in products, services, and entry into private businesses and public facilities.

Supporting Ethnonational Supremacy while Black

Jewish immigration is a longstanding core objective and pillar of the Zionist movement and the Jewish nation-state project. The importance of establishing a demographic majority in the territory of Mandatory Palestine (Halamish Reference Halamish and Michael2020) and later within the modern state of Israel has concerned Jewish political leadership since the 19th century (Robinson Reference Robinson2013). Although the state largely outsourced Ethiopian immigrants’ services to the Jewish Agency (Binhas Reference Binhas2016), as with previous immigration, the state still emphasized a “melting pot” approach defined by acculturation into mainstream [Ashkenazi hegemonic] society (Yuchtman-Yaar Reference Yuchtman-Yaar2005). Research and media coverage on Ethiopians focused on their acclimatization hardships as an outcome of intercultural gaps rather than prejudicial attitudes (Kayam Reference Kayam2016). Prior to arriving in Israel, most Ethiopian-Jews would not define themselves as “Black” but rather as Jewish (Yerday Reference Yerday2016; Dorchin Reference Dorchin2020, Dorchin and Djerrahian Reference Dorchin and Djerrahian2020). Black identity is a learned category for Ethiopian-Jews stemming from their classification by the Ashkenazi “white” gaze (Yerday Reference Yerday2019).

Because “immigration,” specifically Jewish immigration, is viewed as a project that contributes to the existence and perseverance of a Jewish nation-state, Pnina Tamano-Shata benefits from her association with it. Unlike in other country cases where advocacy for immigrant populations and supporting increased immigration is viewed as threatening to the state (Donovan and Redlawsk Reference Donovan and Redlawsk2018), the opposite is true in Israel. Tamano-Shata’s political work on immigration is a nationalist state-centric strategy that has a moderating impact on her perceived otherness and Blackness. Recent research demonstrates that Israeli officials were aware of the existence of a Jewish community in Ethiopia but avoided any large immigration efforts for decades. Only after the Sephardi Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef ruled that Ethiopian-Jews were halachically Jewish, and his ruling was accepted by the Chief Rabbinate Council in the 1970s, did the state actively begin encouraging Ethiopian-Jewish immigration (Yerday Reference Yerday2025). Thus, I would argue that a core part of Tamano-Shata’s political project is to challenge the demeaning treatment of Ethiopians and the questioning of their Jewish identity by legitimizing them as a mainstream and “normal” story of Jewish-Zionist immigration to the state.

Ambition in Israeli Politics—Choosing Gender

Tamano-Shata was appointed as the Chair of the Standing [permanent] Committee on the Status of Women and Gender Equality in the spring of 2023. In an article in a popular women’s magazine [la-Isha], she claimed that she was given the choice between the Women and Gender Equality Committee Chairpersonship and the Immigration and Absorption Committee Chairpersonship, and she opted for the former because “it was obvious that women are my strength. I come from a house of strong women, I have five sisters who knew how to fight for their rights.”Footnote ²⁰ This shift in legislative focus from immigration to women’s issues reflects existing research (Balf, Reference Balf2019b) that shows that as women in the Israeli Knesset gain seniority, they increasingly focus on gender issues.

Furthermore, some research suggests that Black women in Israel are seen as less threatening than Black men (Lachover Reference Lachover2022). Relatedly, gender and politics scholars argue that gender-related policy is a strategic choice women politicians make (Balf Reference Balf2019b; Höhmann Reference Höhmann2020; Balf Reference Balf2025). For Tamano-Shata, expanding her political reputation and brand beyond her Ethiopian identity to highlight her gender increases her electoral appeal and value to her political party. It is reasonable to argue, therefore, that her Black womanhood and deep commitment to core state objectives enable her to navigate elite, androcentric, and white institutions.

The two legislative proposals she presented on the plenum on her first day, during her first term, August 3 2013, reflected the two core pillars of her political identities. One private member bill addressed preventing racist advertising in corporate documents, and the second private member bill called for appropriate representation of women in local politics.Footnote ²¹ Notably, it was the latter bill that advanced despite ultimately failing to become law. This demonstrates how minority women often must create false distinctions between gender identity and race/ethnic identity. Also, because legislation promoting women’s access to power is likely to benefit elite women [see liberal feminism], it has greater mainstream appeal.

In fact, many of her legislative proposals do not include anti-racist language or framing, rather, it appears that MK Tamano-Shata attempts to address racialized inequality without directly naming it as such. Instead, many of her private member bills approach racialized inequality by focusing on groups with more mainstream appeal, for example, legislation dealing with lone soldiers.Footnote ²² This is further evident in Tamano-Shata’s social media presence that heavily features Israeli Defense Forces soldiers of Ethiopian descent. When searching through her 374Footnote ²³ legislative proposals, she has proposed nearly equal numbers of bills with the word “soldier” [17] as with the word “women” [19].

Deracializing Blackness in Israel

MK Pnina Tamano-Shata is the first Ethiopian-born woman to be elected to the Israeli legislature and has enjoyed greater political success than the few Ethiopian men who preceded her in political office. While her gender may contribute to diminishing the perceived “threat” or otherness of her Blackness, I would argue that the primary explanation for her successful navigation of Israeli politics is due to her efforts to deracialize Blackness (Sinclair-Chapman and Price Reference Sinclair-Chapman and Price2008; Lewis, Ford Dowe, and Franklin Reference Lewis, Ford Dowe and Franklin2013; Stout Reference Stout2015). This has contributed to her ability to advance in politics during significant democratic erosion and increasingly constricted democratic discourse.

She does so first by framing Ethiopian-Jews as part of the broader Jewish diasporic tradition, thus placing them at the center of the Zionist-Statist narrative. This enables a proximity to the relative “whiteness” of Israeli Jewish society and justifies a distribution of resources to the Ethiopian-Jewish community. As part of the process of naturalization for those claiming Jewish identity or heritage, immigrants are entitled to various financial benefits and programsFootnote ²⁴ . Consequently, Tamano-Shata’s advocacy for Jewish Ethiopian immigrants prioritizes Jewishness over Blackness, obfuscating “otherness” and highlighting “sameness.” Reviewing Tamano-Shata’s Facebook page, going back to 2021, shows her efforts to emphasize the Jewishness and belonging of Ethiopian immigrants within Israel. For example, in a picture on her Facebook page from 2020, Tamano-Shata is seen walking next to Israeli President Herzog and a woman dressed in traditional Ethiopian dress carrying a small child holding a flag of Israel on the tarmac with a plane in the background.Footnote ²⁵ Her ability to convey this message successfully relative to Ethiopian men politicians may be due to her gender identity. Specifically, her work on immigration may be interpreted by Israeli voters as “care work” and maternal in nature.

Note: Image from MK Pnina Tamano-Shata Facebook June 1, 2022.

Secondly, she emphasizes a narrative of endeavoring to transcend race despite obstacles. Tamano-Shata thus engages in what Sinclair-Chapman and Price refer to as the dangerous project of “subsuming black demands in the category of ‘American’ without addressing the substantive benefits of membership, the recognition of difference, of power, or of suffering” (Sinclair-Chapman and Price Reference Sinclair-Chapman and Price2008, 740)—just replace “American” with “Israeli”. Her discussion of poverty subsumes racial issues within broader social inequality, and this is evident in the language of her legislative proposals. Lewis, Ford Dowe, and Franklin explain that “the deracialized candidate intends to transcend race by focusing on issues that appeal to all voters such as education, healthcare, and transportation” (Lewis, Ford Dowe, and Franklin Reference Lewis, Ford Dowe and Franklin2013, 131). Another characteristic of deracialization efforts involves the presence of a political intermediary who can defuse the racial impact; in Tamano-Shata’s case, this was largely the role of her party leader, both Yair Lapid of Yesh Atid and Benny Gantz of National Unity.

Her efforts to define Ethiopian Jewry as normalized members of the Jewish nation-state strengthen racialized ethnonationalism and do little to question or undermine such hierarchies. Instead, her core argument rests on the notion that citizens of the state of Israel who are Jewish should maintain privileged status relative to non-Jews, namely Palestinians. For Tamano-Shata, Jews of Ethiopian descent must be viewed as equal to all other Jews and thus enjoy privilege and resources within the ethnonational state.

Incitement—Dehumanizing Palestinians

An important pattern that emerged in my analysis of Facebook was the extreme rhetoric and incitement towards Palestinians by Miri Regev and Pnina Tamano-Shata, even prior to October 7, 2023. As discussed earlier, Miri Regev strategically employs provocative language to garner public attention and gain support from her right-wing voter base. More surprising, however, is MK Tamano-Shata’s consistent condemnation of Palestinians and calls for militarized violence, referring to Palestinians as “Bnei Mavet” [sons of death/ deserving of death]. This is notable in part because Tamano-Shata belongs to a party that is considered more centrist and part of the “anti-Netanyahu” political bloc. The use of genocidal rhetoric by a “Black” politician and a “PoC” politician directed at a racialized group [Palestinians] further complicates racial hierarchies and oppressive power systems.