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Index

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 July 2025

Louise Kennefick
Louise Kennefick
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow

Information

Type
Chapter
Information
The Boundaries of Blame
Towards a Universal Partial Defence for the Criminal Law
 , pp. 325 - 334
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

Index

Footnotes are indicated by n. after the page number.

abnormality of mind/mental functioning, 184–185, 191–200, 252
Aboraya, Ahmed, 211
abuse, trauma from. See trauma
addiction, 147–149, 179, 195, 199–200, 203
Alexander, Larry, 18
Allsopp, Kate, 211
Anderson, Joel, 74
Antill, Gregory, 123
Arenella, Peter, 156–157
Ashworth, Andrew, 224
Austin, John L., 259n42
Australia, partial excuse doctrines, 158–159, 165–166, 265–266
autonomy and voluntarism. See also rational agency
behavioural science questioning, 94
circumstances undermining. See circumstances undermining autonomy/rational agency
duress defence, 85n27, 86, 228, 253–254,
feminist theory questioning, 57
liberal account, 53–54
recognitive justice to foster, 74–76, 139–140
volitional capacity assessments, 190–191, 243–244
voluntary act requirement, 225–230
vulnerability theory questioning. See vulnerability theory
Bargh, John A., 94
Baron, Marcia, 262
Barzun, Charles L., 237, 246
Bazelon, David L., 1–2, 219, 222
Bentham, Jeremy, 114
Bergelson, Vera, 261,
Berman, Mitchell N., 81–82, 102
Berry, Zachariah, 90
Billis, Emmanouil, 81
blame assessment. See culpability evaluation
Blom Cooper, Louis, 18
Bock, Stefanie, 18
Bottoms, Anthony E., 140
bounded causal theory of partial excuse
critiques addressed by. See causal excuse theories, critiques of
diminished responsibility, application to, 218–223
inculpation versus exculpation agency, 225–230, 236
outlined, 9–10, 222, 244–246, 254
summary of main arguments, 5, 216–218, 280
UPD based on. See Universal Partial Defence (UPD)
Braithwaite, John, 103
Brettschneider, Corey L., 39n156
Brink, David O.
on retributivism, 16–17, 44–45, 83n16, 84, 95, 99, 128, 175–176,
on stages of criminal proceedings, 169
on verdicts, 175–178
Brown, Darryl K., 19n50
Buchhandler-Raphael, Michal, 208
Canada, diminished responsibility doctrine, 157
capabilities approach to rational agency, 32–33, 39–40
capacity assessments
defences requiring. See diminished responsibility; insanity defence
emotional capacity, 58, 193, 253
for Universal Partial Defence (UPD), 191–194, 202–203, 205–208
volitional capacity, 190–191, 243–244
Caruso, Gregg D., 101
Carvalho, Henrique, 119–120, 126–127
causal excuse theories, critiques of
absolutist view of determinism underlying, 88, 149–150, 221–222, 234, 237–238, 280
bounded causal theory to address. See bounded causal theory of partial excuse
compatibilist view, 178–179, 224–225
crime response not universal, 217, 238–241
evidential problems, 217–218, 241–244
universal (full) legal excuse claim, 216–217, 230–238
Chalmers, James, 153, 266, 273–274
Chamberlen, Anastasia, 119–120, 126–127
character-based accounts of criminal responsibility, 21, 25, 124, 228
Chartrand, Tanya L., 94
Chiao, Vincent, 14, 32–33, 39–40, 112
Child, John, 226–228
childhood trauma. See trauma
Chiswick, Derek, 198
Christie, Nils, 176
circumstances undermining autonomy/rational agency
addiction, 147–149, 178–179, 195, 199–200, 203
cultural contexts, 255–258, 270–271
determinism critique. See causal excuse theories, critiques of
developmental immaturity, 185, 201–203
provocation. See provocation/loss of control
social deprivation. See social deprivation
trauma. See trauma
civil order objective of criminal law, 14–15, 29–30, 92
clinical model of criminal justice, 58–59, 101, 104–105, 111–112
Coca-Vila, Ivó, 34
Cohen, Stanley, 120
communicative function of criminal law, 10n2, 18–19, 103–104,
consequentialist accounts of criminal law, 15–16, 18–19, 102–103, 114, 118
contractarianism (social contract theory), 24–25, 35, 39
control theory, 21
Coppola, Federica
on emotional capacity, 253, 253n19
partial excuse proposals, 182, 193, 203n131,
on rational agency, 52–53
Cornford, Andrew, 169n130
Corrado, Michael, 221–222
Crewe, Ben, 135
Crichton, John H. M., 198
criminal law, objectives of. See also public nature of criminal law
civil order, 14–15, 29–30, 92
consequentialist accounts, 15–16, 18–19, 102–103, 114, 118
moral order. See moral dimension of criminal law
recognitive justice. See recognitive justice
relational justice, 18n38, 103
retributivist account. See retributive justice
social justice. See social justice objective of criminal law
victim remediation, 104, 124–125
criminal responsibility
absolute or scalar, 94–95, 105, 145, 178–179
assessment of. See culpability evaluation
autonomy assumption. See autonomy and voluntarism
causal theories. See causal excuse theories, critiques of
character-based accounts, 21, 25, 124, 228
collective responsibility theories, 30
diminished. See diminished responsibility
moral responsibility and, 20–22, 25–26, 54, 59
‘non-affective’ blame recognition, 58–59
rational agency assumption. See rational agency
therapeutic model (responsibility without blame), 58–59, 101, 104–105, 111–112
time and space contingency of, 60–61
criminalisation, debates on, 15, 27–29, 108–110
critical feminist criminology, 56–57, 73, 262
Crocker, Phyllis, 169–170
culpability evaluation. See also criminal responsibility
at different stages of criminal proceedings, 169–171
formalism claim for, 120
fundamental attribution error of decision-makers, 88–94
by juries. See jury decision-making
mens rea assessments, 124, 156–157
multivalent verdicts, 175–178, 271
parsimony problem. See parsimony principle
proportionality problems. See proportionality problems
real-world approach to, 42–44, 60
retributivist paradigm, hegemony of, 17–23
RPA. See Real Person Approach (RPA)
social justice objective, need for. See social justice objective of criminal law
state values underpinning, 250
UPD. See Universal Partial Defence (UPD)
cultural contexts, 255–258, 270–271
Dagan, Netanel, 103
Darjee, Rajan, 198
Darwall, Stephen L., 61–62
Delgardo, Richard, 219
Dell, Susanne, 167
Dershowitz, Alan M., 200
‘desert’, conflicting ideas of, 24–25
determinism critique. See causal excuse theories, critiques of
deterrence theories, 15–16
developmental immaturity, 185, 201–203
diminished responsibility
abnormality of mind/mental functioning requirement, 184–185, 191–200, 252
bounded causal theory account, 218–223
causal link requirement, 206–207, 268–269
cross-jurisdictional variations, 156–160, 182, 195–198
evolution of doctrine, 151–155, 194–195
flexible applications by courts, 87, 181–182, 185–186, 195, 212–213, 221
normative function of jury, 208–209, 213–215
partial defences generally, 53, 145–146, 155–156, 167–168, 179–180
provocation defence, proposed merger with, 266, 273
psychiatric expert testimony, limitations of, 208–213
recognised medical condition requirement, 194–202
scalar notion of criminal responsibility acknowledged by, 171–172
substantial impairment requirement, 203–205, 251–254
Universal Partial Defence (UPD) approach, template for, 5, 182–185, 191–194, 202–203, 205–208, 215, 269–270
volitional capacity assessments, 190–191, 243–244
disproportionality. See proportionality problems
distributive justice, 10, 23–27, 38–39
domestic abuse cases, 164–167, 257–260, 263–265
Dressler, Joshua, 88, 160–161, 231, 262–263
Dripps, Donald A., 91–94
due process rights, 39–40
Duff, Anthony
on criminal law objectives, 14, 29
on parsimony, 114
on public nature of criminal law, 33
on rational agency, 31, 122n83,
on retributivism, 10n2, 102–103
duress defence, 85n27, 86, 228, 253–254,
Durham rule (‘product’ test of insanity), 232–234
Edgely, Michelle, 35–36
emotional capacity assessments, 58, 193, 253
emotional disturbance defence. See provocation/loss of control
end state justice theory, 38
Endicott, Timothy, 186
ETHOS project, 42
exculpation versus inculpation agency, 225–230, 236
excuse doctrine
bounded causal theory. See bounded causal theory of partial excuse
Brink’s account, 44–45
critiques of causal theories. See causal excuse theories, critiques of
full excuses. See duress defence; insanity defence
partial excuses. See diminished responsibility; provocation/loss of control; Universal Partial Defence (UPD)
proportionality problem of, 84–88, 91–92, 94–95
situational vulnerability and excuse, 71–72
fair opportunity theory, 21
fair trial rights, 39–40
Falk, Patricia J., 217, 235, 241–242
Farmer, Lindsay, 14, 28–30, 55, 133, 218–219
Feldman, Guy, 127, 131
feminist criminology, 56–57, 73, 262
Ferzan, Kimberly K., 18
Fineman, Martha A., 63, 66, 68–69, 77
Fingarette, Herbert, 177
Fletcher, George P., 27–29, 34–35, 88
formalism claim for culpability evaluation, 120
Foucault, Michel, 132
Fraser, Nancy, 40–44, 134
Frederickson, Joel, 90
Fricker, Miranda, 139
Fulford, K. W. M., 210
fundamental attribution error, 88–94
Galoob, Stephen R., 20n55
Garland, David, 132
gender-based theories of crime, 239–240, 262
gender-based violence cases, 164–167, 257–260, 263–265
Germany, excuse doctrines, 178
Gibson, Matthew, 213
Gordon, Gerald H., 174
Green, Stuart P., 10n3
guilt. See criminal responsibility
Hallett, Nicholas, 189–191, 206–207
Hanson, Jon, 59
Harré, Rom, 56
Hart, H. L. A., 16n24, 220, 226n34,
Hart, Henry M., 12n8, 20,
Hasse, Anne Fingarette, 177
Heffernan, William C., 24–25
Heider, Fritz, 89
Herring, Jonathan, 56, 65
Higgins, Raymond L., 91, 138
Hill, Rachael, 170
Hirsch, Andrew von, 81, 113
Honneth, Axel, 70, 74–75, 77
Honoré, Tony, 13, 220, 226n34, 228,
honour-based violence, 257–258, 261–262
Horder, Jeremy, 218–219, 262
Hoskins, Zachary, 35n137
human dignity studies, 66–67
Husak, Douglas, 99, 102, 105, 123
idealised account of rational agency. See rational agency, liberal account
Ievins, Alice, 135
Ikeda, Janice, 131
immaturity, developmental, 185, 201–203
inculpation versus exculpation agency, 225–230, 236
inherent vulnerability of human beings, 66–67, 70–71, 96, 147
insanity defence
cross-jurisdictional variations, 53, 86, 232–234
generally, 22, 239–240
jury hesitance to acquit, 149, 213, 267
M’Naghten Rules, 53, 85–87, 154, 188–189, 243
instrumentalist accounts of criminal law, 15–16, 18–19, 102–103, 114, 118
intoxication, 199–200
Irarrázaval, Cristián, 34
Ireland
diminished responsibility defence, 154, 187, 195–196, 204n132, 207–208, 268–269,
insanity defence, 53, 86
provocation/loss of control defence, 161–162, 264n73,
sentencing practice, 272
‘irresistible impulse’ assessments, 190–191, 243–244
Jackson, Bernard S., 176
Jaworska, Agnieszka, 141
Johnston, E. Lea, 252n10, 272,
jury decision-making
bias affecting, 92–94, 273–274
insanity defence, hesitancy to acquit, 149, 213, 267
normative, 77, 208–209, 213–215, 232–234, 267–269, 273–275
just deserts idea, 83–84
justice, criminal. See criminal law, objectives of
Katz, Leora D., 103
Kaye, Anders
on causal excuse theories, 234–238
on partial defences, 151n18, 179, 222,
on situational vulnerability, 60
Kelly, Erin, 27–28, 31–32, 100–101, 112
Kenny, Anthony, 224n31
King, Anna, 118
Knijn, Trudie, 39–41, 43
Knobe, Joshua, 124
Knust, Nandor, 81
Kubota, Jennifer T., 92
Kymlicka, Will, 36, 176n165,
Lacey, Nicola
on criminal law as state power, 18, 55
on culpability evaluation, 124, 218
on punishment (with Pickard), 32, 35, 100, 128
therapeutic model of criminal justice (with Pickard), 58–59, 101, 104–105, 111–112
Laird, Karl, 214–215
Lambert, Elisabeth W.
on partial excuse proposals, 148, 182, 193, 231–232, 250, 270
poverty/scarcity defence, 207, 254n21, 255,
Lemke, Thomas, 132–133
Lepianka, Dorota, 39–40, 43
Leverick, Fiona, 274
Levine, Kay L., 257, 270–271
Lewis, Rachel, 119–120, 126–127
liberal account of rational agency. See rational agency, liberal account
Liebenberg, Linda, 131
Lippke, Richard L., 114–116
Loader, Ian, 111, 113, 115
Locke, John, 35
loss of control defence. See provocation/loss of control
Loughnan, Arlie, 54, 57, 60–61, 159
Mackay, Ronnie
on diminished responsibility (with Mitchell), 189–190, 195, 206, 266n78, 273,
on insanity defence, 86
Mackenzie, Catriona, 68–72, 75, 77, 96
marginalisation of offenders, 30, 34–35, 72–73, 126–128, 133–134, 136
Maruna, Shadd, 118
masculinity, criminogenic, 239–240, 262
Matravers, Matt, 51–52
Matthews, Roger, 117
McEwan, Jenny, 210
McNeill, Fergus, 135, 140n167,
McPherson, Rachel, 264n71
mens rea assessments, 124, 156–157
mental health disorders
defences based on. See diminished responsibility; insanity defence
prisoners with, 37, 86–87, 239–240
mercy killing cases, 208, 212–213, 221, 275
Miller, David, 23–24
misrecognition of criminal subjects. See also recognitive justice
doctrinal mechanisms of, 120–125, 135–137
injustice arising from, 41, 68–69, 116–117, 121–122, 134–135
pathogenic vulnerability arising from. See pathogenic vulnerability
punitiveness giving rise to, 34, 63, 117–125
Mitchell, Barry, 189–190, 195, 206, 266n78, 273,
mitigation at sentencing, 150–151, 167–172, 174
M’Naghten Rules. See under insanity defence
Moore, Michael S.
on causal excuse theories, 224, 229–231, 235–236,
on retributivism, 21, 45
moral dimension of criminal law
communicative function, 10n2, 18–19, 103–104
Darwall’s respect thesis, 61–62
emotional capacity framed in moral terms, 193, 253
moral essentialism risk of culpability evaluation, 120–125
moral responsibility for wrongdoing, 20–22, 25–26, 54, 59
normative decision-making by juries, 77, 208–209, 213–215, 232–234, 267–269, 273–275
political dimension, relationship to, 28–29, 32
of punishment, 21, 31–32
retributive justice, morality-based critiques of, 100–102
social justice accounts of, 31
Morris, Norval, 113–114, 235
Morse, Stephen J.
on causal excuse theories, 231–232, 235–236, 239–240, 242–243
on culpability evaluation, 94–95, 170–171, 231
partial excuse proposals, 148, 182, 191–193, 202–203, 260, 269, 272n99,
on rational agency and volitional capacity, 52n13, 53, 252,
multivalent verdicts, 175–178, 271
Munro, Vanessa E., 274
Naffine, Ngaire, 57, 66, 133
Nathan, Rajan, 189, 214
Nelken, Dana K., 128
neoliberal responsibilisation discourse, 128–134
New Zealand, partial excise doctrines, 159–160, 166–167
Norman, Wayne, 36, 176n165,
normative decision-making by juries, 77, 208–209, 213–215, 232–234, 267–269, 273–275
Norrie, Alan
on diminished responsibility, 153–154, 184
on rational agency, 26, 55–56, 121
on retributivism, 19
not proven verdict (Scotland), 175n153, 178, 274n110,
Olusanya, Olaoluwa, 170
O’Malley, Tom, 20
Ormerod, David, 214–215
overcriminalisation, debates on, 15, 27–29, 108–110
Parekh, Bhikhu, 256
parsimony principle. See also proportionality principle
definitions and role, 112–116
for Real Person Approach (RPA), 108–115, 125
punitiveness (absence of parsimony). See under misrecognition of criminal subjects
scholarly discourse trends, 109–112
summary of main arguments, 63, 107–108, 141–142
partial defences. See diminished responsibility; provocation/loss of control; Universal Partial Defence (UPD)
pathogenic vulnerability. See also vulnerability theory
‘abnormality’ tests contributing to, 184–185, 191–200, 252
definition, 72–73
marginalisation of offenders, 30, 34–35, 72–73, 126–128, 133–134, 136
mental health disorders, prisoners with, 37, 86–87, 239–240
punitiveness reconceptualised as, 108–117, 125–126
therapeutic model of criminal justice, 58–59, 101, 104–105, 111–112
penal parsimony. See parsimony principle
Perlin, Michael L., 267
personhood in criminal law
autonomy assumption. See autonomy and voluntarism
generally, 50–52
idealised under liberal account, 36–37
misrecognition injustice. See misrecognition of criminal subjects
‘non-ideal’ theories of, 37–38, 42
psychiatric expert evidence and, 211–212
rational agency assumption. See rational agency
relational theories of, 54–62
vulnerability and personhood, 66–67, 70–71, 96, 147
Petherbridge, Danielle, 70
Pettit, Dean, 124
Pettit, Philip, 103
Pfeffer, Elizabeth Gordon, 118n57
Pickard, Hanna
on punishment (with Lacey), 31–32, 35, 100, 128
therapeutic model of criminal justice (with Lacey), 58–59, 101, 104–105, 111–112
Pleasants, Nigel J., 237
Porro, Costanza, 136
post-traumatic stress disorder. See trauma
poverty. See social deprivation
‘product’ test of insanity (Durham rule), 232–234
proportionality principle. See also parsimony principle
just deserts idea and, 83–84
for Real Person Approach (RPA), 82–83, 95–100
significance and meaning, 80–82
proportionality problems
degrees of desert, failure to recognise, 94–95, 105, 145, 178–179
excuse doctrine, disproportionate blame arising from, 84–88, 91–92, 94–95
summary of main arguments, 4, 62–63, 79–80, 105–106
vulnerability, failure to recognise, 97
provocation/loss of control
controversies respecting, 164–167, 258–259
cross-jurisdictional variations, 160–164, 182, 196–197, 260–261
diminished responsibility defence, proposed merger with, 266, 273
generally, 152, 183, 240
loss-of-control test, 191, 259–261, 264n73,
partial defences generally, 53, 145–146, 155–156, 167–168, 179–180
Universal Partial Defence (UPD) of, 258–266
volitional capacity assessments, 190–191, 243–244
psychiatric expert testimony, limitations of, 208–213
PTSD. See trauma
public nature of criminal law
citizen protections, offenders’ entitlement, 33–36, 39–40, 44–45
culpability evaluation, state values underpinning, 250
political theory approach generally, 27–33
public law principles. See parsimony principle; proportionality principle
state duties, recognitive justice account. See recognitive justice
punishment. See also sentencing
communicative function of, 10n2, 18–19, 103–104
consequentialist account of, 15–16, 114
moral dimension, 21, 31–32
as retribution. See retributive justice
parsimony principle. See parsimony principle
pathogenic vulnerability arising from. See pathogenic vulnerability
punitiveness. See under misrecognition of criminal subjects
therapeutic model, 58–59, 101, 104–105, 111–112
Ramsay, Peter, 70–71, 218–219
rational agency. See also autonomy and voluntarism
capabilities approach, 32–33, 39–40
circumstances undermining. See circumstances undermining autonomy/rational agency
cognitive bias errors, 88–95
emotion theory questioning, 58, 193, 253
liberal account. See rational agency, liberal account
neuroscientific views on, 22
partial defences, lower threshold permitted, 53, 189–190
social psychology studies questioning, 59–60, 240n110,
vulnerability theory questioning. See vulnerability theory
rational agency, liberal account
as idealised construct, 36–37
misrecognition injustice arising from. See misrecognition of criminal subjects
neoliberal responsibilisation, link with, 128–134
problems arising from. See parsimony principle; proportionality problems
reasons-responsiveness thesis, 31, 52–53, 94–95, 122–125, 192
retributivist underpinnings, 25–27
variations of, 31–32
Rawls, John, 23–37
Real Person Approach (RPA)
determinism critique. See causal excuse theories, critiques of
feasibility and reconciliation with retributivism, 76–77, 80, 97–105, 140–141
objective of, 12–14, 23, 42, 62–63
parsimony principle aligned with, 108–115, 125
personhood issues. See personhood in criminal law
proportionality principle aligned with, 82–83, 95–100
real-world approach to culpability evaluation, 42–44, 60
recognitive justice promoted by. See recognitive justice
summary of main arguments, 3–4, 49–50, 77–78, 277–279
UPD proposal. See Universal Partial Defence (UPD)
vulnerability recognition for. See vulnerability theory
reasons-responsiveness thesis, 31, 52–53, 94–95, 122–125, 192
recognitive justice. See also social justice objective of criminal law
future-orientated, 74–76, 139–140
generally, 17, 97, 137
mechanisms to promote. See Real Person Approach (RPA); Universal Partial Defence (UPD)
misrecognition injustice. See misrecognition of criminal subjects
present-orientated, 138–139
respect thesis (Darwall), 61–62
social justice conceived as, 38–42, 76
Reeves, Craig, 56–57
relational justice, 18n38, 103,
relational theories of personhood, 54–62
remorse, 19, 169, 193, 253
representative justice, 40
republican theories of criminal law, 103, 114–115
respect thesis (Darwall), 61–62
responsibilisation discourse, 128–134
responsibility assessment. See culpability evaluation
retributive justice
at culpability evaluation stage, 17–23, 76–77, 80, 97–105
definition and types, 10, 16–17, 98–99, 102–103
distributive justice as main competing paradigm, 23–27, 38–39
just deserts idea, 83–84
morality-based critiques of, 100–102
parsimony, retributivist accounts of, 110, 118
punitiveness. See under misrecognition of criminal subjects
rational agency assumption. See rational agency
resistance to criminal justice reforms, 87–88, 149–150
RPA and UPD proposals reconciled with, 76–77, 80, 97–105, 140–141, 228–229
Ripstein, Arthur, 22n63
Ristroph, Alice, 21–22, 21n57, 137,
Roberts, Julian, 103
Robinson, Paul
on causal excuse theories, 239–241, 266
partial excuse proposals, 177, 183, 207, 250, 267–268, 274–275
on provocation/loss-of-control defence, 163, 273
‘vengeful desert’ idea, 124
Rosen, Michael, 67
Ross, Lee, 89–90, 92–93
‘rotten social background’ defence. See social deprivation
RPA. See Real Person Approach (RPA)
Rui, Jon Petter, 81
scapegoating offenders for social wrongs, 126–127, 133–134
Scheffler, Samuel, 25
Schmitt, Carl, 35
Schulhofer, Stephen J., 11
Scots law
not proven verdict, 175n153, 178, 274n110,
partial excuse doctrines, 151–153, 164–165, 186–187, 196–198, 202, 204–205
selfhood. See personhood in criminal law
Sen, Amartya, 39, 44
sentencing. See also punishment
mitigation at, 150–151, 167–172, 174
Universal Partial Defence (UPD) success and, 271–273
Shaver, Kelly G., 89, 93
Simester, Andrew P., 209n164
Singh, Sarah, 73
situational vulnerability, 71–72, 91–92, 96
situationist psychology, 59–60
Slovenko, Ralph, 199
Snyder, C. R., 91, 138
social contract theory, 24–25, 35, 39
social deprivation. See also causal excuse theories, critiques of
causal theories based on, specific critiques, 231–232, 237–238
indices measuring, 242
Lambert’s poverty/scarcity defence, 207, 254n21, 255,
neoliberal responsibilisation discourse on, 131–134
situational vulnerability concept, 71–72, 91–92, 96
social justice objective of criminal law
distributive justice, social justice equated with, 23–27, 38–39
political obstacles to acknowledgement, 30
public law–based rationale. See public nature of criminal law
retributive justice hegemony, passivity towards, 17–25
social justice as recognition. See recognitive justice
summary of main arguments, 1–3, 9–12, 45–46
Sola, Javier C., 68–69, 71–73, 75–76
South Africa, provocation defence, 163–164
stigmatisation of offenders, 30, 34–35, 72–73, 126–128, 133–134, 136
substantial impairment, 203–205, 251–254
Tadros, Victor, 22n63, 240n110
Tetlock, Philip E., 92
therapeutic model of criminal justice, 58–59, 101, 104–105, 111–112
Thorburn, Malcolm, 28, 31
Tonry, Michael, 81, 114, 116n47,
transitional justice, 38
trauma
clinical diagnosis problems, 199, 211
emotional capacity assessments taking account of, 58, 193, 253
as partial excuse, current recognition, 170, 195, 198, 200–201
as partial excuse, proposed recognition, 203, 263–265
trivalent verdicts, 175–178, 271
Tsee Chee, Kuan, 244
Ungar, Michael, 131
United States
cultural defence, 257–258
insanity defence, 232–234
partial excuse doctrines, 156–158, 162–163, 182, 201, 260–261
Universal Partial Defence (UPD). See also Real Person Approach (RPA)
bounded causal theory for. See bounded causal theory of partial excuse
capacity assessment for, 191–194, 202–203, 205–208
circumstances considered for. See circumstances undermining autonomy/rational agency
complexity objection, 273–275
coordination objection, 172–178
criminal responsibility, scalar concept requirement, 178–179
current partial defences. See diminished responsibility; provocation/loss of control
evidential issues, 269–271
feasibility and reconciliation with retributivism, 76–77, 105, 228–229
full excuse alternative, 149–150
mitigation at sentencing alternative, 150–151, 167–172, 174
objective of, 12–13, 41, 149
outcomes of successful UPD, 271–273
recognitive justice promoted by, 76, 137–138
summary of main arguments, 2–3, 5–6, 145–147, 179–180, 215, 249–250, 275–276, 280–281
test for, 249–251
substantial impairment, 251–254
arising from condition or circumstance, 254–255, 266–267
such that reduced responsibility recognition is morally appropriate, 267–269
universality of, 73, 147–149, 171–172, 202
Valentini, Laura, 37–38, 66n88,
verdicts, multivalent, 175–178, 271
victim-centred criminal justice, 104, 124
volitional capacity assessments, 190–191, 243–244
voluntarism. See autonomy and voluntarism
vulnerability theory
autonomy questioned by, 55–56, 69, 71–72
concept of vulnerability, 64–66
generally, 42, 63
Mackenzie’s typology applied to culpability evaluation, 69–73
non-recognition of vulnerability as proportionality problem, 97
paternalism risk arising from, 77
pathogenic vulnerability. See pathogenic vulnerability
personhood and vulnerability, 66–67, 70–71, 96, 147
rational agency questioned by, 67–69
situational vulnerability, 71–72, 91–92, 96
Walker, Nigel, 209–210
Ward, Tony, 214
Wasik, Martin, 167–168, 172–174
Watson, Gary, 123n85
‘weak’ form retributivism, 98–100
Williams, Glanville, 213, 244
Wilson, William, 243
Wolf, Susan, 123n85
Wolff, Jonathan, 42
Woodward, Kitaj, 159–160
Zehr, Howard, 20

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  • Index
  • Louise Kennefick, University of Glasgow
  • Book: The Boundaries of Blame
  • Online publication: 26 July 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009386142.016
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  • Index
  • Louise Kennefick, University of Glasgow
  • Book: The Boundaries of Blame
  • Online publication: 26 July 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009386142.016
Available formats
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  • Index
  • Louise Kennefick, University of Glasgow
  • Book: The Boundaries of Blame
  • Online publication: 26 July 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009386142.016
Available formats
×