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6 - Trumpism and the Future of Impunity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 October 2025

Thomas Gift
Affiliation:
University College London

Summary

Chapter 6 closes with several forward-looking discussions about the impact of Trump’s overt challenges to the law of war. Section 6.1 highlights practical takeaways from the book for IHL policymakers and practitioners. Section 6.2 explores what, if anything, can be done to curb the impunity agenda at its source. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 examine the future of Trump’s impunity agenda, both in America and globally, including in major conflicts involving Russia and Israel. Section 6.4 poses questions for further research.

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Type
Chapter
Information
Killing Machines
Trump, the Law of War, and the Future of Military Impunity
, pp. 200 - 259
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NC
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

6 Trumpism and the Future of Impunity

It is hard to imagine any other U.S. president responding with such contempt for the law of war. In November 2019, Trump was preparing to offer clemency to Mathew Golsteyn, Clint Lorance, and Eddie Gallagher. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley recalled the chilling response he received when urging Trump to reconsider. After telling him, “Mr. President, we have military ethics and laws about what happens in battle. We can’t do that kind of thing. It’s a war crime,” Trump reportedly demurred: “You guys … are all just killers. What’s the difference?”Footnote 1 The words were telling. Trump saw U.S. servicemembers as agents of death, as “killing machines.” For him, the Geneva Conventions were mere formalities, not to be taken seriously, and not to be shown public deference.

Chapters 15 explained how Trump has shattered a consensus, solidified after the signing of the Geneva Conventions in 1949, that Western leaders would at least pay lip service to international humanitarian law (IHL). But as the impunity agenda escalates, what lessons can be drawn from Trump’s experience, and his return to power? This final chapter closes with several forward-looking discussions. Section 6.1 highlights practical takeaways from the book for IHL policymakers and practitioners. Section 6.2 explores what, if anything, can be done to curb the impunity agenda at its source. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 examine the future of Trump’s impunity agenda, both in America and globally, including in major conflicts involving Russia and Israel. Section 6.4 poses questions for further research.

6.1 Practical Takeaways

For policymakers and practitioners, several practical takeaways from the book stand out. Most notably, for stewards of the Geneva Conventions, the Trump case underscores the imperative of not taking for granted public deference to IHL as a “first duty” of signatory nations. Historically, most of the focus on the Geneva Conventions has been on ensuring point-by-point, legalistic compliance with technical provisions. However, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions formally demands that party states first “undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”Footnote 2 This requires two-sided reciprocity: nations must publicly uphold IHL to qualify for its safeguards by demonstrating broad deference to its principles and values.Footnote 3

This first duty is even more demanding than it appears. In 2016, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published a new “Commentaries” on the Geneva Conventions for the first time in over sixty years, clarifying that party states have both a “positive” and a “negative” duty to uphold IHL.Footnote 4 Under the conventional, negative duty, “High Contracting Parties may neither encourage, nor aid or assist in violations of the Conventions by Parties to a conflict.” Under the positive duty, however, they must go beyond this requirement to “do everything reasonably in their power to prevent and bring such violations to an end.” This positive duty can again be construed as a responsibility to proactively ensure that third parties and other nations visibly respect IHL.

These obligations matter because, for centuries, armed fighters have committed atrocities on the battlefield, often with the tacit or explicit support of political leaders. By viewing the recent past, an era defined by a professed commitment to the Geneva Conventions, as the exception, experts can more appropriately weigh the risk of open challenges to IHL in the West. The failure of even party states to outwardly defer to the Geneva Conventions may give fodder for skeptics to question the integrity of their protocols. The public may lose confidence in the institution, especially given an inability to prevent many atrocities. A “domino effect” may also result in leaders of party states refusing to pay public respect to IHL when others do the same. This, in turn, could aid in delegitimizing IHL.

The Trump case not only underlines the limits of U.S. hegemony in fostering public respect for the law of war abroad. It also raises a question of how much other nations will follow suit when America’s leader expressly champions illicit acts in combat. Given its superpower status and military dominance, a key source of America’s “soft power” has traditionally been setting normative precedents regarding outward respect for the Geneva Conventions.Footnote 5 By failing to live up to its own ethical standards, however, the U.S. will be unable to admonish other countries that fail to honor the Geneva Conventions. Unless other nations step into this role, it again heightens the risks that other leaders will also “revise deviancy downward,” and ultimately, overtly reject IHL.

Shifting next to Western militaries, this book highlights the importance of taking concrete steps to preempt public challenges to the law of war. This includes efforts to inoculate troops against ideological subcultures where unofficial norms inspired by political actors can degrade the military’s official ethos. Under Trump, respect for IHL was jeopardized not just via policies but also verbally to a rare degree. Trump showed how political messaging could contravene rules and norms that servicemembers learn in basic training. This may inform what types of counter-messaging can blunt its negative effects. Commanders, trainers, and legal officers within Western militaries could leverage lessons to improve curricula, operations manuals, and field exercises related to IHL.

As part of this training, Western militaries need to instill in troops, in apolitical terms, that upholding the law of war is not just an ethical imperative but a strategic one. Discounting the value of IHL or committing war crimes can jeopardize long-term tactical objectives, especially in contexts with high levels of interaction with local populations. As political scientist Janina Dill has observed, “Figuring out how to fight wars without the long-term alienation of the civilian population is the critical strategic task…. (whispered: it’s also a legal requirement & moral imperative.)”Footnote 6 Ethical lapses in conflict put a target on the backs of Western combatants, even in peacekeeping missions, and also make affected populaces more likely to align with rebel groups or terrorist organizations.

In the U.S. military, Trump’s presidency also exposed worrying levels of right-wing extremism among current and ex-servicemembers who devalue IHL. Military leaders insist that they have a “no tolerance” policy for extremism, and that existing regulations already bar memberships in hate groups.Footnote 7 However, as evidenced by January 6, enforcement remains inadequate. Needed is more systematic screening of recruits and training of commanders about how to identify and deal with threats. The balance, however, comes in distinguishing between radical behavior and simply right-leaning opinions. The perception that militaries are targeting Republicans or Trump voters will not only provoke backlash and hurt recruitment effortsFootnote 8 but also weaken military readiness.

For judges, prosecutors, and other legal actors within Western militaries, the Trump case further calls attention to the limits of their authority. Ultimately, a commander-in-chief can overrule lower-ranking officials in prosecutions and sentences. This raises the stakes of getting as close to “right” as possible elements of jurisprudence that subordinates do control. Flaws in the court system increase the likelihood that future leaders, legitimately or not, grant military clemencies. This could make such interventions seem more routine, and thus justifiable. In the U.S., achieving just outcomes may require conceding that some proposals for military justice reform, such as the requirement for unanimous verdicts,Footnote 9 have merit or that judicial procedures could be made better or more transparent.

Next, for civilian governments in the West, the Trump case offers reason to rethink how existing democratic guardrails fail to guarantee public commitments to IHL. In the U.S., much of the attention on Trump’s rule-breaking has centered on institutions such as Congress, elections, or the free press.Footnote 10 Experts have observed the hazards of Trump’s military leadership,Footnote 11 especially for civil-military relations,Footnote 12 but without a paradigm for how it fits into a larger political agenda. However, Trump relied on many of the same tactics and allies to disrupt both domestic checks on his power and the law of war. This calls attention to an emergent, but often overlooked, threat: how open attacks on IHL and those on national institutions can go hand in hand.

The failures of democratic guardrails to impede the impunity agenda heighten the responsibility of civic leaders, when possible, to strengthen cultural respect for the law of war. For elected officials, the institutionalization of efforts to minimize civilian harm and strengthen the military justice system should be paramount. While such initiatives may not always prevent leaders from flagrantly violating the law of war, they may reduce collateral damage. Task forces and “blue ribbon” commissions can get these initiatives underway. However, “bureaucratizing” reforms, through the creation of permanent, inter-agency administrative and staffing positions, may be more effective.Footnote 13 Advice and input from military experts can secure buy-in and forge bipartisan consensus.

In the U.S., notable developments have occurred on this front, even if it is unclear whether some can survive four more years of Trump. One is the 2023 creation of the DoD’s Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CP CoE), which emerged from the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan approved by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in 2022. The Center’s aim is to serve as “the hub and facilitator of Department-wide analysis, learning, and strategic approaches” that “institutionalize[s] good practices for civilian harm mitigation and response during operations.”Footnote 14 As part of the initiative, the CP CoE supports operational command, crafts policy doctrine, and facilitates research. Following Trump’s inauguration, however, the administration put in place potential plans to “disestablish” the office.Footnote 15

Structural reform also took root during the Biden administration in how criminal charges are brought within the military. Traditionally, senior military commanders have held nearly total discretion over charging crimes in their units, with little oversight. The result had been acute disparities in charge rates that have fueled suspicions of selective prosecutions.Footnote 16 In 2022, Congress used the National Defense Authorization Act to transfer prosecutions for numerous crimes away from commanders and to military lawyers who report to civilian service secretaries.Footnote 17 In 2023, Joe Biden signed a largely bipartisan executive order amending the UCMJ to assign decision-making in serious offenses, including murder, to specialized, independent military prosecutors.Footnote 18

Although not applying to U.S. combatants, Congress in 2022 also passed the Justice for Victims of War Crimes Act, which aims to promote accountability for global violations of IHL.Footnote 19 Under the prior War Crimes Act of 1996, U.S. authorities had been restricted from prosecuting alleged war criminals unless either the victim or offender was an American national. With the reform, the only requirement for bringing charges is that the suspect be arrested on U.S. soil. While the bill was introduced in response to Russia’s atrocities in Ukraine, it extends to any foreign combatant accused of war crimes visiting or residing in the U.S. Advocates say that the law reflects America’s commitment to ensuring that the country does not become a safe haven for war criminals.

Finally, for humanitarian organizations seeking to advance IHL and security sector reform, this book highlights that large-scale programming cannot be enacted divorced from political context. Despite outsized investments into initiatives to bolster IHL promotion,Footnote 20 much is unknown about how macro-level political variables interact with meso-level leadership to foster, or undermine, humanitarian goals. Practitioners typically concentrate on instilling combat ethics at the unit or subunit level. Yet the Trump experience reveals how leaders, alongside other state and nonstate actors, can openly subvert law of war principles. Programmatic efforts to uphold IHL may fail when influential figures, to whom combatants have a political affinity, dismiss its basic precepts.

These insights can encourage global human rights organizations, such as the ICRC or Geneva Call, to recognize vulnerabilities caused by state leadership that impinge on military ethics programs. An impediment, however, is the paucity of knowledge about how the effects of training initiatives are conditioned by politics. When organizations like the ICRC partner with armed groups to help instill norms of restraints, evaluations are critical to assess efficacy and identify “best practices.” However, internal and external politics, budget constraints, and fears of exposing poor performance may disincentivize scrutiny. This underlines the importance of donors and contributing governments insisting on the establishment of long-term, independent monitoring of IHL programs.

These challenges highlight the need for humanitarian organizations to apply appropriate social science methods to test pro-IHL initiatives. While surveys and randomized controlled trials are indispensable tools, researchers cannot always manipulate political dynamics that affect military cultures surrounding IHL. This makes it essential to integrate innovative empirical techniques, such as exploiting natural and quasi-natural experiments, to explore a wider set of questions and to improve causal identification.Footnote 21 In-depth qualitative case studies may also help to illuminate causal chains from how a leader’s behavior shapes the attitudes of combatants toward IHL. Collaborating with academics, think tanks, and freelance scholars can enhance evaluation quality.

6.2 Can Anything Stop Impunity at the Source?

Besides addressing its downstream consequences, can the impunity agenda be stopped at its source? Later, several possible remedies are examined. These include “nonbinding” methods that lack enforcement power but could tilt public opinion away from impunity or make the calculus of overtly straining IHL less appealing. They also include “binding” methods that could legally constrain executives or hold them accountable for wrongdoing. The main challenge, however, lies in execution. In light of both Trump’s return to power and international obstacles to change, the prospects for short- to medium-term reform appear bleak. U.S. presidents are highly likely to retain considerable discretion, both formal and informal, in whether to defer to the law of war.

Nonbinding Methods

Appeals from Military Voices

First, greater pressures from U.S. military voices might discourage presidents from overtly challenging IHL.Footnote 22 Even modest pleas could raise public awareness given the high regard with which Americans, and conservatives particularly, hold the military.Footnote 23 While Democrats and left-wing media routinely attacked Trump on military matters, accountability may carry more weight from inside the organization.Footnote 24 Some high-profile military leaders did criticize Trump’s attacks on IHL. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Martin Dempsey, for instance, called Trump’s war crime clemencies an “[a]bdication of moral responsibility.”Footnote 25 Ret. Gen. David Petraeus also declared that Trump’s pardons “tell … the world that Americans abroad can commit the most heinous of crimes with impunity.”Footnote 26 Yet many were silent, while others endorsed Trump’s acts.

One obvious hindrance to more military voices speaking out is the predominantly right-leaning bent of the officer corps. Political scientist Heidi Urben, for example, has summarized that, even more than enlistees, “[p]ast surveys have shown senior military officers to generally be conservative and identify with the Republican Party, a trend which has solidified with the advent and professionalism of the all-volunteer force.”Footnote 27 Because of this right-leaning composition, a nontrivial fraction of high-ranking officers may either favor the impunity agenda or inhabit social circles where pressures exist to toe the party line. This may be especially true amid rising levels of polarization within the U.S. military, which reflect broader divides in American politics, compounded by Trump’s return to commander-in-chief.Footnote 28

Among Trump’s detractors, other reservations may mute criticism of the impunity agenda. Most practically is the UCMJ’s formal ban on active-duty officers expressing “contemptuous words against the President.”Footnote 29 Although retired leaders are subject to fewer legal checks, years of acculturation can make them disinclined to speak out. Additionally, veterans may have principled concerns against using their uniforms as “political currency.”Footnote 30 Trump critics may also be reluctant to admit that the military will fall victim to direct challenges to IHL. After Trump’s war crime clemencies, for instance, Gen. Mark Milley insisted that the U.S. military “will not turn into a gang … raping, burning and pillaging.”Footnote 31 This reflects a belief that the military is immune to the worst effects of overt attacks on IHL.

Pushback from Moderate Republicans

Pushback from moderate Republican politicians might also raise awareness about the dangers of the impunity agenda. Centrist voices could balance out the party’s advocacy for direct breaches of the law of war. A small minority of Republicans on Capitol Hill did raise concerns about war crime clemencies and urged Trump to reevaluate his stances during his first term. Most notably, Sen. Mitt Romney of Utah, a frequent Trump critic, called pardoning war criminals “a terrible idea” and “unthinkable.”Footnote 32 Sen. Joni Ernst of Iowa, a veteran of the Iowa National Guard, more modestly conceded that there could be “some issues” with war crime clemencies.Footnote 33 Such defections, however, were notable exceptions. GOP criticism was mostly dwarfed by either support for Trump’s interventions or silence.

One reason why more moderate Republicans are unlikely to speak out is simply their small and diminishing numbers.Footnote 34 Particularly in the U.S. House, electoral trends and institutional setups coinciding with polarization have sidelined many “establishment” figures. Scholars point to causes like gerrymandering (the drawing of districts to create “safe” seats),Footnote 35 the growth of out-of-state donor contributions (which encourages politicians to court moneyed interests that are ideologically extreme),Footnote 36 and the role of low-turnout primaries (which drive candidates to court fringe voters).Footnote 37 Given growing right-wing clout and Trump’s re-ascendance to power, Republicans who fail to support the Trumpian line on IHL may fear retribution, such as losing committee memberships or being shut out of fundraisers.

Even if moderate Republicans did take stronger stands in favor of IHL, there is reason to doubt that large blocs of conservative voters would reject the impunity agenda. It could even be counterproductive. Many MAGA Republicans, for example, have worn criticism from moderates as “badges of honor” that boost their right-wing credibility.Footnote 38 To the degree that impunity sympathizers in Congress stand in opposition to moderates, they can depict themselves as “true conservatives” fighting against “RINOs” (“Republicans in name only”). This likelihood is especially high given Trump’s reclaiming of the White House.Footnote 39 In some policy areas, more belligerent wings of the “MAGAverse” have arguably even radicalized beyond Trump,Footnote 40 including on U.S. military justice issues.

Critiques from Conservative Intellectual Circles

Conservative intellectual circles, encompassing right-of-center think tanks, research institutes, and policy organizations, could counter open challenges to IHL.Footnote 41 Operating with a degree of independence from partisan politics, a muscular defense of the law of war from well-known conservative entities could be influential. During the first Trump administration, for example, the Heritage Foundation played a pivotal role in shaping the White House’s policy agenda.Footnote 42 With Project 2025, a right-wing policy manual outlining plans for Trump’s second term, Heritage is again poised to guide Trump’s second term.Footnote 43 Similarly, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) provided the intellectual groundwork for George W. Bush’s Iraq invasionFootnote 44 and major battlefield strategies like the 2007 troop “surge.”Footnote 45

Scholars at such institutions, however, have shown limited engagement with IHL controversies and might even be open to more military clemencies. As of early 2021, website searches revealed only three articles in total on Trump’s war crime interventions penned by experts at Heritage, AEI, and the Hudson Institute. Although none clearly endorsed the interventions, neither did any unequivocally condemn them. For example, a group of Heritage scholars observed that “executive leniency … is best done after serious consultation…, and only when leniency is deserved.”Footnote 46 Gary Schmitt of AEI said that “pardons are a tool to be used decisively” albeit “rarely.”Footnote 47 Hudson senior fellow Rebeccah L. Heinrichs argued that “[w]ith war-crime pardons, President Trump should proceed with an abundance of caution.”Footnote 48

AEI, in particular, has also housed two experts arguably most associated with recent White House challenges to IHL. John Yoo, a visiting scholar at AEI and a former Justice Department lawyer, authored George W. Bush’s infamous “torture memos,” which rationalized his enhanced interrogation program.Footnote 49 Moreover, John Bolton, previously a senior fellow at AEI before serving as Trump’s national security adviser, consistently questioned the right of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to uphold various facets of IHL. This included calling the ICC an “illegitimate court” and claiming that the Trump White House would “let the ICC die.”Footnote 50 If anything, these affiliations offer reason to doubt that such major conservative organizations will defend against direct threats to IHL.

“Guerrilla Sabotage”

Another mechanism for curbing overt challenges to IHL is for critics to defy ostensibly unlawful orders by the commander-in-chief or to resist implementation. A large literature on “guerrilla sabotage” in government, for example, explains how public servants, often obliquely or through subterfuge, thwart “unprincipled” superiors.Footnote 51 In essence, this amounts to what Trump labeled the “deep state.” A case in point was Navy Secretary Richard Spencer, who refused Trump’s command to restore Eddie Gallagher’s SEAL status.Footnote 52 Only after his termination did Spencer go public, writing a stinging op-ed in the Washington Post accusing Trump of having “very little understanding of what it means to … fight ethically or to be governed by a uniform set of rules and practices.”Footnote 53

Guerrilla sabotage, however, carries risks, particularly when it implicates the possibility of high-stakes battlefield incidents. Law professor Rosa Brooks, for instance, has written that “military leaders – and, for that matter, lower-ranking service members – have only one legally permissible response if confronted with a presidentially initiated unlawful order: ‘No, sir.’”Footnote 54 At the same time, even orders that seem to conflict with IHL can often be ambiguous. Noncompliers may be labeled mutinous. As the National Constitution Center’s Lyle Deniston has written, “[I]t is not the function of the military to make a decision that the policy choices of civilian government leaders are outrageous, or even that they violate norms of international law.”Footnote 55

Besides its legal pitfalls, crossing military superiors can imperil careers. Servicemembers may face punishment, harassment, or even threats of dishonorable discharge. At higher levels, the Trump White House offered extreme warning shots on this count. For example, in 2020, Trump staffers leaked a “hit list” of alleged “deep state” members who they wanted to eliminate from government roles.Footnote 56 In a non-IHL context, Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman was subjected to what he called “bullying, intimidation and retaliation,”Footnote 57 as well as death threats,Footnote 58 after acting as a “whistleblower” in Trump’s impeachment trial over Ukraine. In a second Trump term, an unwillingness of U.S. servicemembers to risk rejecting orders may explain why many are likely to submit even to a president who defiles IHL.

Cabinet Resistance

Cabinet members, by resigning and speaking out against the commander-in-chief, could try to sway public opinion against U.S. presidents for openly challenging IHL. Likely candidates would include the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, or State. Such acts are not unprecedented, even if most resignations result from policy disagreements or are preemptive moves before firings. During Trump’s first term, for example, Defense Secretary James Mattis resigned in protest in 2018 largely over disputes about Syria. Similarly, after January 6, a string of top officials, including multiple cabinet members, abruptly left the White House.Footnote 59 Such resistance helps to explain why Trump was so intent on nominating loyalists to his cabinet for a second term, including Pete Hegseth to lead the DoD.Footnote 60

Practically, however, even cabinet secretaries who resist a president are unlikely to possess enough influence to impact a president’s approvals. Pronouncements about resignations tend to quickly fade from the news cycle. Moreover, even protest resignations often result in cabinet officials soft-pedaling their criticism. In his resignation letter, for example, Mattis stated merely that Trump deserved a Defense Secretary whose views were more “aligned” with his own.Footnote 61 One account of Mattis’s book said that his “disapproval [of Trump] is so veiled that it is practically shrouded.”Footnote 62 It took Mattis roughly two years to label Trump a threat to the Constitution after resigning.Footnote 63 Meanwhile, Trump earned praise from GOP supporters for calling Mattis “the world’s most overrated general.”Footnote 64

Another problem is that principled resignations could actually increase, not decrease, the chances of a president openly challenging IHL. When cabinet officials who serve as the “adults in the room” resign, they leave a void often filled by “yes men.”Footnote 65 When Trump took office in 2017, for instance, some critics were reassured that his cabinet was comprised of esteemed public servants who could check his more unfiltered impulses. However, Trump had more cabinet turnover in his first eighteen months in office than Reagan, Clinton, the two Bushes, and Obama had in their whole first terms.Footnote 66 As officials left, most were replaced by party loyalists or others lacking commensurate experience, leaving fewer top officials willing or able to rein in Trump on IHL.

“Self-Policing” by Other Western Leaders

By calling out behavior clearly inconsistent with IHL, other Western leaders can create normative incentives for U.S. presidents not to openly flout the law of war. This aligns with a substantial scholarship on “social deterrence” in IR – the extralegal, informal mechanisms that shame or shun leaders into complying with globally recognized standards. Political scientists Hyena Ho and Beth Simmons, for example, have pointed out that social deterrence “may be especially relevant precisely when norms are strong but the formal institutions of law – policing, courts, and formal confinement – are weak.”Footnote 67 Social deterrence could morph into “prosecutorial deterrence” if Western leaders also call for their peers to face charges before the ICC.

Some Western leaders have accused non-Western autocrats of war crimes. President Joe Biden, for example, said that Russian President Vladimir Putin “clearly committed war crimes” in Ukraine and that ICC efforts to prosecute him were “justified.”Footnote 68 Yet a willingness to hold other leaders accountable generally does not extend to the “inner sanctum” of Western allies. Such leaders have strong incentives not to upset bilateral relations, especially with powerful countries like the U.S., because of fears of blowback, such as countersanctions or diplomatic isolation. An even greater disincentive, however, may be the “karma effect.” By publicly assigning liability, Western leaders put themselves at greater risk for legally dubious decisions that they take as heads of their own militaries.Footnote 69

Furthermore, criticisms from other Western leaders could actually be politically empowering for U.S. presidents who overtly challenge IHL. As both a candidate and as president, for example, Trump has consistently tapped into populist, “anti-globalist” sentiments to rally his base.Footnote 70 This has included not just attacks on international organizations like the UN and NATO, but also ad hominem, “bully” attacks on individual Western leaders.Footnote 71 In the same way that pushback from moderate Republicans could galvanize support for a Trump-like leader, so too could pushback from Western allies who could be denigrated as cosmopolitan “elitists.” Trumpist leaders might welcome criticism from their peers, which they could exploit as evidence of “shaking up” the international system.

UN Resolutions

Passing a UN resolution, requiring a simple majority of party states, could be another means to reproach a U.S. president like Trump for overtly defying IHL. Article 14 of the UN Charter stipulates that the General Assembly “may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation … which it deems likely to impair the general welfare … among nations.”Footnote 72 Such a measure would be nonbinding. Only Security Council measures carry the force of law, and as a permanent member, the U.S. would hold veto power over any resolution that reprimanded an American leader. However, a nonbinding resolution might widen the set of possible countries willing to rebuke a U.S. president. American actions have been criticized, albeit rarely, in UN resolutions in the past, such as in its 1983 invasion of Grenada.Footnote 73

Still, the possibility of a UN resolution against a U.S. leader like Trump is unlikely. Arriving at a simple majority for passage remains a high bar. The same reasons why Western leaders might not call out a U.S. president – fear of antagonizing the U.S. or being subject to the same type of resolution themselves – might dissuade other nations from signing. Even UN resolutions that observers might think would be uncontroversial have had trouble reaching majority support in the past. For example, after the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks in Israel, a UN resolution could not garner a majority to name Hamas in its official condemnation.Footnote 74 A resolution that pointed a finger at a U.S. leader would prove exponentially more difficult, especially without evidence of flagrant crimes.

Moreover, even if a UN resolution were passed, it could again play into the domestic political hands of Trump or a Trump-like leader. During his first term, the Trump administration repeatedly attacked the UN to score political points. For instance, at a speech before the UN General Assembly, Trump declared that “the future does not belong to the globalists.”Footnote 75 His UN ambassador, Nikki Haley, announced in 2018 that the U.S. would withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council, calling it a “self-serving organization.”Footnote 76 For his second term, Trump has appointed GOP firebrand Elise Stefanie as UN ambassador, who has been critical of the UN’s position on the Gaza war.Footnote 77 The chance to berate the UN as engaged in a “witch-hunt” against the U.S. would likely be welcomed by Trump.

Binding Methods

Limit to Executive Powers

In terms of “binding” methods for constraining leaders from overtly challenging IHL, one way to check presidential overreach is for Congress to formally limit executive powers. In the specific case of disallowing war crime clemencies, many experts agree that this would align with customary law under IHL, a legal framework inherent to the general functioning of militaries. For example, Lt. Col. Dan Maurer of the U.S. Military Academy has written about the potential of Congress to introduce a “war crime pardon exception,”Footnote 78 which would carve out criteria under which the president could not grant clemencies. Article 2 of the Constitution grants broad purview to the president to pardon federal crimes, but this authority could be constrained through either an amendment or reform of the UCMJ.

Either pathway, however, seems infeasible, even without a GOP-controlled Congress. Passing a constitutional amendment – requiring two-thirds support in both congressional chambers, combined with state ratification – has only happened twenty-seven times in U.S. history. Likewise, the odds of achieving UCMJ reform given executive veto power are negligible. Furthermore, even if checks on war crime interventions were agreed upon, questions would arise about implementation. As law professor Charles J. Dunlap has pointed out, despite the common usage of the phrase “war crimes,” none of the U.S. servicemembers granted clemency by Trump were actually prosecuted for war crimes. Rather, they are charged with breaches of the UCMJ.Footnote 79 Therefore, a statute preventing clemencies for war crimes might rarely, if ever, technically apply.

Even if politics were no barrier and lawmakers could agree on a pragmatic definition of “war crimes,” other objections may abound. Future military cases, for example, could arise where a defendant’s rights were legitimately violated. Military, as well as civilian, courts are not foolproof against prosecutorial indiscretion or judicial errors. It may be unfair to single out U.S. servicemembers as a special class ineligible for clemencies, especially as presidents routinely pardon political associates or the well-connected. An additional concern relates to “slippery slopes.” If war crime pardons were forbidden, it could trigger calls for further narrowing clemency powers. This might extend to civilian contexts, such as for nonviolent offenses, where commutations might be more justified.

Executive Order

Besides a war crime carveout, an executive order could also curb presidential power over military clemencies. In a future administration after Trump, the idea would be to reform how petitions for war crime clemencies are vetted and arrive at the president’s desk. A common critique is that evaluations are often done on an extemporary or political basis. A case in point involved Trump’s war crime interventions, which were spotlighted on Fox News and championed by Republican Congress members. By technically binding future presidents to a formal clemency review procedure, circumventing it would raise political risks. It would not only require that a president grant a controversial clemency. It would also require overturning an executive order that sought more impartiality in the process.

One widely discussed idea, proposed by legal scholars Rachel E. Barkow and Mark Osler, is to form a federal “clemency commission” operating outside of the Justice Department’s purview that would review clemency requests.Footnote 80 The solution would apply to all potential clemencies, meaning that the effect on war crime cases would be indirect. The idea, however, has direct roots in President Gerald Ford’s “Presidential Clemency Board,” which made recommendations for conditional pardons related to misconduct in the Vietnam War.Footnote 81 Reforming military clemencies via broader clemency reform would remove the optics of servicemembers being singled out as less likely to receive commutations, thereby reducing political hurdles.

An executive order such as the one described earlier could plausibly be taken up by a reform-minded president. Yet because the act would not be passed as a law through Congress, presidents could overturn it unilaterally, albeit with political challenges. To the degree that presidents most likely to abuse clemency powers generally might also be the most likely to hand down unjust war crime clemencies, the commission might not survive executive transitions. Indeed, the Trump White House considered a presidential clemency commission in 2018, but rejected it.Footnote 82 Although several Democrats have expressed interest in broad-based clemency reform, including through the proposed Abuse of the Pardon Prevention Act,Footnote 83 the Biden White House took no concrete actions on the issue.

Accession to ICC Jurisdiction

Legislation acceding to ICC jurisdiction over the U.S. could theoretically improve accountability for alleged war crimes. One reason why war crime clemencies have an effect is because there is no “backstop” institution to prosecute U.S. servicemembers besides military courts. In 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (ASMPA), often called the “Hague Invasion” Act, which grants authority to the president to “by all means necessary” shield U.S. troops from ICC prosecutions.Footnote 84 Revoking this law could lessen the incentive for federal commutations, since U.S. combatants would still be subject to global prosecution. At the very least, it would lessen the impacts of such interventions if U.S. servicemembers could still be held criminally liable by the ICC.

Future legislation acceding to ICC jurisdiction, however, would likely be dead on arrival, even with a progressive in the White House. First, there was general bipartisan agreement in favor of the ASMPA when it originally became law. When Congress enacted it as an amendment in the wake of 9/11, it did so with large majorities, 280-138 in the House and 75-19Footnote 85 in the Senate.Footnote 86 The justification by George W. Bush and others was that the ICC could disproportionately target American combatants. In 2001, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned that the ICC could be used as an “instrument of political warfare.”Footnote 87 While empirical evidence has casted doubt on this claim,Footnote 88 fears of the ICC detaining U.S. servicemembers for political reasons persist among both parties.

In 2022, the Repeal Hague Invasion Act was introduced by Democrat Rep. Ilhan Omar of Minnesota, one of the most liberal members of the House of Representatives, and cosponsored by other leftist “squad” members Rep. Rashida Taleb of Michigan and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York. It did not pass.Footnote 89 Although recently Republicans have been more hostile to the ICC, even many Democrats remain wary of extending ICC jurisdiction to the U.S. For example, in 2021, the Biden White House declared that it “continues to object to the ICC’s assertions of jurisdiction over personnel of such non-States Parties as the United States … and will vigorously protect current and former United States personnel from any attempts to exercise such jurisdiction.”Footnote 90

Impeachment

Impeachment could serve as a penalty for presidents who overtly transgress IHL. Numerous critics, for example, have argued that Trump’s war crime clemencies constituted an abuse of power that rose to the level of “high crimes and misdemeanors.”Footnote 91 Likewise, in reference to Trump’s threats to use disproportionate force in war, one journalist suggested that “Congress may have no other choice but to redeploy the ultimate check [impeachment] against a rogue president bent on committing atrocities [in war].”Footnote 92 There is some precedent for this maneuver. In 2008, Democrat Rep. Dennis Kucinich proposed thirty-five articles of impeachment against George W. Bush, including those pertaining to war crimes, although none ultimately reached a full House vote.Footnote 93

Practically, however, impeachment carries limitations. First, it would almost invariably not result in a president’s conviction and removal from office. As evidenced by Trump’s two impeachment trials, meeting the Senate’s two-thirds threshold of voting members is virtually impossible.Footnote 94 Impeachment may also reify existing partisan divides. To the extent that impeachment is more a political tool than one rooted in criminal law,Footnote 95 it is likely to be viewed through a partisan lens, blunting the impact on public opinion. Especially when it involves controversial charges related to the military, impeachment could even backfire. Voters may perceive it as a power grab or “weaponization” against the commander-in-chief,Footnote 96 helping the president’s support.Footnote 97

Broader concerns may also augur against using impeachment to rein in a president’s overt strains on IHL. One is the precedent that it sets of Congress encroaching on enumerated executive powers. With war crime pardons, for example, sanctioning a president for exercising a clearly specified constitutional right might itself be construed as an abuse of legislative oversight. Another worry is “normalizing” impeachment regarding military decision-making.Footnote 98 This might creep into areas of legitimate policy disagreement, such as use-of-force questions. Finally, if a president were impeached over IHL, it would almost certainly be over a concrete act of noncompliance. It would not cover the kinds of verbal threats that defined many of Trump’s public attacks on IHL.

Domestic Prosecution

Domestic prosecution by a federal court could theoretically hold a president accountable for war crimes, or deter such actions. In a normal scenario, the U.S. Justice Department has a longstanding norm of not prosecuting a sitting president.Footnote 99 However, as David Scheffer, former U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, has argued, this norm could potentially be discarded for a president accused of committing “atrocity crimes of the worst character” that inflict “deaths and injury of thousands.” “Imagine,” Scheffer says, “trying to explain the ‘not while president’ position to any of our allies, most of which, unlike the United States, joined the International Criminal Court and waived any rationale to immunize top leaders from accountability.”Footnote 100

Setting aside the remoteness of the hypothetical, and that none of Trump’s acts would have risen to the “atrocities” threshold, even grievous war crimes might not result in a domestic prosecution. Practically, a president facing a federal indictment for war crimes could, in effect, unilaterally terminate the charges. Although the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) enjoys quasi-independence, it sits within the executive branch. Therefore, the president could install an attorney general to end criminal proceedings. A comparable possibility was floated during the Mueller probe into Trump’s alleged Russian collusion in the 2016 election. President Richard Nixon also pressured the resignation of several DOJ officials to end his special counsel investigation during Watergate.Footnote 101 Trump’s election in 2024 also led to the vacating of all federal charges against him.Footnote 102

Even without this option, the DOJ’s norm against prosecuting a president could still hold in a war crime case. The Constitution does not explicitly bar prosecutors from charging presidents with crimes. Yet deference to precedent means that the DOJ’s norms would likely take priority. The DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel has concluded that indicting a sitting president “would unduly interfere with the ability of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned duties.”Footnote 103 Moreover, a 2024 Supreme Court ruling involving Trump suggests a wide scope of presidential immunity.Footnote 104 Upon leaving office, a president could plausibly claim immunity for actions taken pertaining to executive duties. Consequently, any indictments might only fall on lower-level planners and executors who were complicit in the alleged war crime.Footnote 105

Global Prosecution

Global criminal prosecution is another mechanism that might hold presidents accountable for openly challenging IHL. Even if under domestic law executives may take actions like unjustifiably pardoning American troops, they may still breach international law by doing so. As described earlier, several experts have claimed that at least some of Trump’s war crime clemencies likely violated the “command responsibility” principle of IHL.Footnote 106 Liability requires that leaders have purview over an armed group, be aware of actual or potential criminal activity, and fail to intervene or punish guilty parties. These requirements, however, presuppose a judicial body with extradition power and regimes willing to cooperate in handing over an accused party. Neither would be the case with a U.S. president and the ICC.

Although not unprecedented, prosecutions of world leaders have normally been reserved for the most heinous of crimes.Footnote 107 Notorious examples include former Liberian president Charles Taylor, found guilty in 2012 of aiding and abetting rebel combatants in Sierra Leone; former Côte d’Ivoire president Laurent Gbagbo, acquitted in 2019 at the Hague on charges of fomenting post-election violence; and former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, who died in 2006 during a multi-year trial at the Hague over his role in the Balkans conflict that ended in 200,000 fatalities.Footnote 108 Perceived lesser acts have generally not triggered foreign tribunals. As stated before, there has been no documented case of an executive facing trial for war crimes due solely to issuing a pardon.Footnote 109

The ICC’s lack of effort to investigate, much less prosecute, Trump for his war crime clemencies suggests that future leaders who committed a similar act would likely encounter the same fate. George W. Bush also did not face any attempt by the ICC to hold him accountable for alleged war crimes. Practically, hauling American leaders before the ICC poses immense political and logistical hurdles.Footnote 110 Although the UN Security Council has the power to make referrals to the ICC, America’s status as a permanent member makes this moot. An alternative is to arrest U.S. perpetrators upon foreign travel, but this also has little precedent. While controversial, current leaders could also petition for head of state immunity in the unlikely scenario of a prosecution.Footnote 111

Reforming the Insurrectionist Act

Narrowing the ability of U.S. presidents to deploy the military domestically, namely through reform of the Insurrectionist Act, is a final mechanism that could help to curb the impunity movement. Although only indirectly bearing on IHL, Trump’s record suggests that any efforts to thwart the impunity agenda require combating abuse of the military within America’s borders. Trump, for example, threatened to invoke the Insurrectionist Act to quell unrest in the U.S. and to get even with his political adversaries.Footnote 112 Calls for reform have been broad-based. The Washington Post Editorial board has described the Insurrectionist Act as a “ticking time bomb ripe for abuse.”Footnote 113 In 2024, a bipartisan group proposed a legal blueprint to address such concerns.Footnote 114

Reform, however, is unlikely even after Trump leaves office. One reason concerns the federal separation of powers. Although the Posse Comitatus Act generally prevents American presidents from summoning the military as an instrument of law enforcement, the Insurrectionist Act offers a sweeping exception with few constraints.Footnote 115 According to Supreme Court precedent, the president has sole discretion to determine when the act can be invoked. Only Congress can limit it by passing new legislation, which, if vetoed, would require a supermajority to override. Consequently, presidents enjoy a near “blank check” on calling up the military – a power that has been used thirty times since the law’s inception and one that some presidents may not want to relinquish.Footnote 116

A second obstacle stems from partisan politics. Even if some Republicans and Democrats agree on a reform bill to the Insurrectionist Act, and even if a new law would equally apply to a future president of either party, it would inevitably be seen as an effort to “Trump proof” the military. As previously noted, reports suggest that some of Trump’s advisers urged him to invoke the Insurrectionist Act on January 6 to delay or prevent the peaceful transfer of power.Footnote 117 While Congress did pass the bipartisan Electoral Count Reform Act in 2022 with similar attachments to Trump,Footnote 118 the Insurrectionist Act could prove more sensitive because of concerns about politicizing the military. MAGA Republicans might balk at reforms that limit the powers of a future, Trumpist commander-in-chief.

6.3 The End of IHL?

When Trump first took over as commander-in-chief in 2017, many experts predicted that his most controversial pledges to openly challenge the law of war would be stifled. The logic was that governing was different than campaigning, and that attacking IHL would fade into the backdrop. While some of Trump’s promises turned out to be hollow, others clearly did not. What Trump did prove was that it was not impossible for an American executive to put the Geneva Conventions in the crosshairs. He also proved it was not disqualifying of a second term. Whether Trump’s excesses marked the start of a new trend, or were simply the byproduct of an anomalous presidency, remains unclear. What seems inevitable is that the political dividends paid to the impunity coalition will not be lost on other leaders.

Skeptics may doubt the transformative impact of Trump’s ongoing record on IHL. Their case is that Trump’s war crime clemencies, despite being widely condemned, were still isolated events. Moreover, despite his bellicose language, absent from Trump’s resume are some of the most reckless military misadventures that marred his predecessors. Before Trump, every American president since Jimmy Carter had embroiled the U.S. in a new foreign war.Footnote 119 Trump’s Pentagon, at least so far, has not been marked by a full-scale return to torture or stained by acts of prisoner abuse. There has been no broad, official pullback from within the military in fulfilling combat ethics. Trump has crowed about carrying a big stick and taking a cocked-and-loaded gun to the Geneva Conventions. But his words have frequently ended in bluffs.

Certain observers still see Trump as operating within conventional parameters of international law, albeit with a marked aversion to the global, laws-based system. For example, political scientists Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry have claimed that Trump is simply one component of “an ongoing and necessary, if sometimes ugly, equilibration of the arrangements underlying the institutions of the liberal world order.”Footnote 120 Yet even as prior U.S. leaders may have gone further in obvious noncompliance, Trump’s undermining of the existential need for IHL has culminated in an important set of “firsts.” Trump is the first U.S. commander-in-chief to openly attack the value of the Geneva Conventions. He is also the first to offer a stark, opposing vision of how the rule of law should apply, if at all, to military justice.

These firsts diverge fundamentally from past American leaders who flouted the laws of war, but always in private or with rationalizations. Trump favors overturning IHL to reforming it from within. He disregards not only specific legal statutes, but the very concept of IHL as a dispensable anachronism. This is why many experts see Trump as a much more radical saboteur of international law. For instance, barrister Stefan Talmon has dubbed Trump a “gravedigger of international law” and accused him of ushering in a new era of “international law nihilism.”Footnote 121 Law professor Oona Hathaway has claimed that “the Trump administration … waged an assault on international law unparalleled in the post-war era”Footnote 122 and that IHL now faces an “existential challenge.”Footnote 123

While an intellectual defense of Trump on IHL might emphasize the layers of restrictions the U.S. has placed on combatants that exceed those required by the Geneva Convention, such arguments are rarely made with nuance. Instead, the administration’s tendency has been to attack the foundations of IHL. Pete Hegseth, for instance, summed up the Trump view of IHL as follows: “what an America-first national security policy is not going to do … is hand its prerogatives over to international bodies that make decisions about how our men and women make decisions on the battlefield.”Footnote 124 If Trump was trying to send a signal about his approach toward IHL in a second term, his pick of Hegseth could not have made a more emphatic declaration.

If Trump does represent a new prototype of Western leader averse to paying outward deference to the Geneva Conventions, this still does not mean that respect for IHL is careening toward inevitable, or even likely, collapse. Public deference to the law of war may be less sturdy than supposed. But it is not anchored in shifting sand. Democratic leaders, including in America, have historically paid lip service to IHL not because of the law’s overriding enforcement power, but because of perceived constraints that other executives, unlike Trump, may still be hesitant to challenge. In most Western countries, respect for IHL remains intact. Yet even if high costs of deviation promote public deference to the Geneva Conventions, Trump proves that this status quo is not absolute, even in the West.

Trump’s second election offers reason to think that public respect for IHL is tenuous. This is true within America. It looks even truer in conflict zones abroad. Nowhere has this been more visible than with Israel and Russia in their respective wars against Hamas and Ukraine. While the wars themselves are enormously different, and neither involves Western democracies, clear parallels to Trump’s impunity agenda can be seen in each. Both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin have made statements inimical to IHL. Like Trump, they have also relied on state and media actors to press their agenda, with military support. The cases are particularly relevant given America’s close alliance with Israel and Trump’s past rapport with Putin.

With Israel, debates continue to rage over whether the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have perpetrated war crimes as part of retaliating against Hamas following the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks.Footnote 125 Despite disagreements over casualty numbers, estimated death tolls in the tens of thousands in Gaza have intensified accusations of genocide.Footnote 126 The ICC has alleged crimes against Netanyahu including “starvation of civilians,” “willfully causing great suffering,” “intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population,” and “other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity.”Footnote 127 One UN spokesperson cited Israel’s “impunity.”Footnote 128 Yet regardless of opinions on Israel’s compliance with the law, it is undeniable that many of the nation’s leaders have publicly diminished the significance of IHL.

As leader, Netanyahu has made several explicit statements calling into question military norms of restraint. Reportedly, he told Joe Biden that alleged disproportionate bombings in Gaza were justified because the U.S. “carpet-bombed Germany” and “dropped the atom bomb” during World War II where “[a] lot of civilians died.”Footnote 129 In a now-deleted comment on X, Netanyahu claimed that Israel’s fight was against “the children of darkness” who followed “the law of the jungle.”Footnote 130 In a TV address referencing Palestine, Netanyahu alluded to the “Amalekites,” a group in the Bible whom God commanded to be annihilated, including women, children, and infants. According to a journalist, “Amalek is a code word … for a ruthless enemy that must be crushed without mercy.”Footnote 131

Inside government, public statements by several Israeli officials have shown even greater disregard for IHL. For example, Israeli President Isaac Herzog suggested that the Palestinian people could be militarily targeted because “[i]t’s an entire nation out there that is responsible [for terrorism],” including “civilians.”Footnote 132 More explicit was Tzipi Hotovely, Israel’s ambassador to the UK, who pronounced that “‘every school, every mosque, every second house’ in Gaza is a legitimate target for the Israeli military.”Footnote 133 Israeli Heritage Minister Amichay Eliyahu further advocated detonating a nuclear bomb in Gaza because “no uninvolved” civilians lived there.Footnote 134 Agriculture Minister Avi Dichter said that Israel had no option except to foment a “Gaza Nakba,” meaning “catastrophe.”Footnote 135

Outside of government, Israeli leadership has relied on the media to bolster public favorability for its conduct. For example, a writer for a left-leaning British newspaper claimed that “[t]he far right infiltration of Israel’s media is blinding the public to the truth about Gaza.”Footnote 136 Another journalist accused Israeli news outlets of serving as a “propaganda arm” that is “completely ignoring Palestinian casualties.”Footnote 137 As part of its information campaign, Israel passed legislation enabling it to shutter any global media network that it deemed biased against the war effort. Authorities banned the Al Jazeera network from operating inside the countryFootnote 138 and seized video equipment from the Associated Press.Footnote 139 Experts have also raised concerns about Israeli media self-censorship in light of government crackdowns.Footnote 140

Inside Israel’s military, language directly contrary to IHL has spread among high-ranking officials. For example, IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari avowed that Israel’s primary military focus was on inflicting “what causes maximum damage” in Gaza.Footnote 141 Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant disparaged Palestinians as a “beastly people” while bragging about executing “a complete siege of the Gaza Strip,” where there would be “no electricity, no food, no fuel.” He added that “[w]e are fighting human animals, and we act accordingly.”Footnote 142 The words prompted a rebuke from the UN’s top human rights officer, who affirmed that “sieges that endanger the lives of civilians by depriving them of goods essential for their survival [are] … prohibited under international humanitarian law.”Footnote 143

On the battlefield, IDF combatants have sparked international outrage for gloating about exploits against noncombatants. This includes using TikTok and other social media platforms to broadcast the destruction of civilian sites in Gaza. A New York Times analysis, for instance, found evidence of more than fifty videos of the IDF using “bulldozers, excavators and explosives to destroy what appear to be houses, schools and other civilian buildings.” In one video, an IDF reservist overlaid clips of a destroyed Gaza house while playing a parody of the popular Israeli tune “This Was My Home.”Footnote 144 A Wall Street Journal report discovered social media posts revealing “stripped and blindfolded Palestinian prisoners and troops inside homes in Gaza boasting about looting property.”Footnote 145

As evidence of the overtness with which IHL has been challenged in Israel, one group of well-known Israeli lawmakers, scientists, and scholars penned an open, eleven-page letter in January 2024 lamenting what they called “the discourse of annihilation, expulsion and revenge” that had become rife among public and military officials, media figures, and others. The letter stated that “[f]or the first time that we can remember, the explicit calls to commit atrocious crimes … against millions of civilians have turned into a legitimate and regular part of Israeli discourse.” It further raised concerns about the potential military impact, noting that “[n]ormalised discourse which calls for annihilation, erasure, devastation and the like is liable to impact the manner by which soldiers conduct themselves.”Footnote 146

Trump, according to one analysis, has mostly responded to the Gaza conflict by “not publicly call[ing] for Israel to show restraint or try to limit civilian casualties.”Footnote 147 One of Trump’s key GOP allies, Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, said on Fox News that Israel should “level” Gaza.Footnote 148 Notable is that Trump worked with Netanyahu in 2020 as part of an attempt to sanction the ICC. While the effort was largely aimed at forestalling prosecutions against U.S. forces, the ICC’s scrutiny of Israel also played a role.Footnote 149 Echoing Trumpian language, Netanyahu called the court “obsessed with carrying out a witch-hunt against Israel and the United States.”Footnote 150 Later, he urged the Biden White House to maintain sanctions on the ICC following a judgment that its jurisdiction included occupied Palestinian land.Footnote 151

The Trump–Netanyahu relationship shows how foreign policy interactions can advance the impunity agenda across borders. For example, in the 2024 U.S. election, the broad consensus was that Netanyahu clearly preferred Trump over Vice President Kamala Harris, with one expert noting, “If Netanyahu were able to vote, he would have gladly cast it for Trump … because he believes a Trump administration would be far more deferential toward Israel.”Footnote 152 According to polling, Netanyahu’s military aggression in Gaza arguably made it more difficult for Harris to win over Arab-American and pro-Palestinian voters, a key demographic in swing states like Michigan. Simultaneously, Trump’s win made it more probable that Netanyahu could carry out military actions with limited regard for IHL.

Trump’s rhetoric concerning the war in Gaza only hardened after his 2024 election, strengthening the perception that he was willing to give a “green light” to Netanyahu’s military plans. In a tweet before his inauguration and in advance of the cease-fire brokered in January 2025, Trump demanded that unless Hamas released Israeli prisoners, there would be “ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East.” Trump further declared that “[t]hose responsible will be hit harder than anybody has been hit in the long and storied History of the United States of America.”Footnote 153 One expert noted that “Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election could not have come at a better time for … Netanyahu” as the Israeli leader pursued a Middle Eastern realignment that included a decisive Israeli victory and the stymieing of Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

Shortly after entering office, Trump again provoked widespread denunciation in February 2025 after he declared from the White House that the U.S. might “take over” Gaza and “own it,” turning it into the “Riviera of the Middle East.”Footnote 154 Trump’s comments led UN Secretary-General António Guterres to warn against “ethnic cleansing” in Gaza.Footnote 155 They also led some to accuse Trump of sounding “more like a real estate developer than an American president.”Footnote 156, Footnote 157 The remarks came on the heels of earlier comments by Trump that Gaza was essentially a “demolition site” and that the U.S. may have to “clean out the whole thing” while resettling Palestinians.Footnote 158 The threat, if carried out, would almost certainly violate international law prohibiting the forced transfer of populations.Footnote 159

Apart from Israel, Russian leadership has also been condemned for openly disregarding IHL. Specifically, Putin has been accused of committing numerous war crimes, including genocide, as part of his 2022 invasion of Ukraine.Footnote 160 In March 2023, the ICC charged Putin with the IHL violation of abducting and deporting Ukrainian children.Footnote 161 Reports have documented Russian strikes on civilian centers, including hospitals, schools, and playgrounds.Footnote 162 As one analyst observed, “[Russia] is not … waging war according to the laws of war and the Geneva Convention…. We are revisiting the rules we thought were a given.”Footnote 163 Another expert insisted that Putin’s war crimes “are part and parcel of what Russia is trying to achieve in Ukraine … they are a feature, not a bug.”Footnote 164

Putin has consistently used rhetoric against Ukraine that overtly dismisses global laws guaranteeing national sovereignty. As a rationale for Russia’s invasion, he explicitly attacked the idea of Ukrainian nationhood and self-determination.Footnote 165 Putin has also pushed zealously for what he labels “denazification” in Ukraine, which, as one journalist notes, implies “the elimination of people” and is used as a “justification for endless war and cleansing.”Footnote 166 In undercutting the principle of proportionality, Putin declared that if any nations tried to stop Russia from occupying Ukraine, they would trigger “consequences that you have never faced in your history.”Footnote 167 According to one journalist, Russia’s messaging on Ukraine has turned “fully genocidal.”Footnote 168

Inside government, prominent Russian officials have intensified such rhetoric. A 2024 article for Just Security published a comprehensive collection of “eliminationist rhetoric against Ukraine”Footnote 169 featuring numerous inflammatory quotes by Russian state leaders. Among them, Putin ally and deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitri Medvedev disparaged “pseudo-Ukrainian rabid mongrels with Russian surnames, choking on their toxic saliva.” Boris Chernyshov, a state Duma member, said that Russia’s war in Ukraine was “an expression of our hatred, our holy hatred” and called for Ukrainians to “freeze and rot.”Footnote 170 State Duma deputy Aleksey Zhuravlyov advocated “re-installing” the brains of Ukrainians, asserting that “a maximum of 5% are incurable” and should be “destroyed.”Footnote 171

Outside of government, Russian state media has played a significant role in justifying violence against civilians. A UN Human Rights Council official observed that “rhetoric transmitted in Russian state and other media may constitute incitement to genocide.”Footnote 172 For example, Pavel Gubarev, a public figure, said on Russian television, “We will kill as many … [Ukrainians] as we have to. We will kill 1 million or 5 million, we can exterminate all of you.”Footnote 173 Anton Krasovskyi, former broadcasting director of Russia’s RT network, declared that the proper response to Russia’s opponents is to “[s]hove them right into those huts and burn them up … [because Ukraine] is not supposed to exist at all.”Footnote 174 RT host Vladimir Solovyov compared Russia’s war in Ukraine to the “deworming” of a cat.Footnote 175

Within the Russian Armed Forces, high-ranking leaders have also used genocidal language targeted at Ukrainian civilians. For instance, Apti Alaudinov, a commander of the Akhmat Special Forces, demanded that Russia “purge … itself of this filth [Ukrainians] that permeates our society.”Footnote 176 Vasily Fatigarov, a retired officer in Russia’s military, called Ukraine a “cancerous tumor” that needs to be “purif[ied] … very precisely, very severely, … [to] ensure that that fascist infection doesn’t grow anywhere else.”Footnote 177 One Russian soldier said that his orders from the top were to “[k]ill everyone,” and that “[i]t does not matter whether they’re civilians or not.”Footnote 178 Ukrainian civilians have reportedly been told that they could be victimized by bioweapons.Footnote 179

On the conflict’s front lines, graphic content depicting war crimes, including executions and acts of sexual violence, has become common among pro-Russian groups.Footnote 180 In a particularly grisly case of rewarding such behavior, Putin granted an honorary military title to a unit implicated in a massacre resulting in mass civilian graves.Footnote 181 One analysis reported that the Ukraine war has so inured the Russian population to barbarity that “methods of torture once only spoken about in witness testimonials are now being promoted online by the perpetrators … for bragging rights.”Footnote 182 Another account described “no attempt [by Russia] to hide a desire to target ordinary people.”Footnote 183 One scholar remarked that Russian authorities are now “almost advertising genocide” by the military.Footnote 184

According to some analysis, Russia’s overt assaults on IHL in Ukraine had their precursors in the Trump years. For example, in late 2019, coinciding closely with Trump handing down his war crime clemencies, Putin made Russia the first country to formally revoke its commitment to Additional Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions, aimed at protecting noncombatants.Footnote 185 Legal scholar David M. Crane referred to the edict as part of a broader “movement away from a global approach to the rule of law” that, in a tie-in to Trump, had become apparent in the “Age of the Strongman.”Footnote 186 Later in 2023, Putin followed this act by de-ratifying the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which makes it illegal to participate in nuclear weapons explosions and testing.Footnote 187

Critics have accused Trump of emboldening Putin to commit atrocities. This included for failing to condemn Russia’s targeting of Ukrainian civilians, for calling Putin a “genius” and “savvy” for his incursion into Eastern Europe,Footnote 188 and even for saying that he might “encourage” Russia to attack NATO allies.Footnote 189 In refusing to expressly condemn Putin, Trump remarked, “If you say [Putin]’s a war criminal, it’s going to be a lot tougher to make a deal to make … [the war in Ukraine] stopped.” He further lamented, “If he’s going to be a war criminal, people are going to grab him and execute him.”Footnote 190 Later, Putin defended Trump against his own alleged criminality in an act described by one journalist as “Trump get[ting] a sympathetic shout-out from his favorite war criminal.”Footnote 191

Like with Netanyahu, Trump’s rapport with Putin arguably contributed to Trump’s 2024 election win, while simultaneously fueling the impunity agenda in Russia. Despite Putin jokingly expressing a preference for Kamala Harris,Footnote 192 the conventional wisdom held that Trump’s agenda for Russia’s war better served Putin’s interest. As one writer put it, “the biggest attraction for the Kremlin when it comes to Trump, of course, is his stance on Ukraine.”Footnote 193 Polling showed that Trump’s promise to end the war “in one day” and his running mate JD Vance’s sharp criticism of aid to Kiev appealed to war-weary American voters.Footnote 194 At the same time, it signaled to the Kremlin that Ukrainian land concessions and limited accountability for Putin would be the price to pay for any cease-fire.

In the cases of Netanyahu and Putin, the narrative is not merely one of the impunity agenda gaining traction in ways that parallel Trump. Instead, they demonstrate how this agenda can penetrate even more deeply in settings where formal and informal pushback against IHL violations is minimal. As established earlier, the U.S. should be a hard case in which to overtly challenge IHL because it has established guardrails and norms that protect against such behavior. Those constraints, however, are mostly weaker or absent elsewhere, allowing “strongman”-type leaders to make statements and to take military actions that openly flout the law of war. Where leaders want to enact an impunity agenda, clearing the path by removing executive constraints may be a first step for Trump imitators.

Nowhere are executive constraints more limited than in many fledgling nondemocracies. Beyond the Gaza and Ukraine wars, an important case comes from the civil conflict in Myanmar, where, according to political scientist Brian Klaas, Trump gave military leaders “fresh rhetorical ammunition” to carry out a coup in 2021, just weeks after he first left office.Footnote 195 After the siege, UN experts reported on a “dramatic increase in war crimes and crimes against humanity” that grew “increasingly frequent and brazen.”Footnote 196 In describing the junta’s violent overthrow, one writer observed “parallels” with Trump that were “striking.”Footnote 197 Former Trump national security adviser Michael Flynn later said that there was “no reason” a Myanmar-style coup should not happen in the U.S.Footnote 198

As these examples portend, Trump’s open disregard of IHL could have far-reaching consequences beyond the U.S., and even the West. Historian Anne Applebaum, for example, has observed that, in the aftermath of Trump’s first term, “We are heading into an era when there is no order, rules-based or otherwise, at all,” adding that “like the equally outdated Pax Americana that accompanied the rules-based world order – the expectation that the U.S. plays some role in the resolution of every conflict – we might miss the Geneva Conventions when they are gone.”Footnote 199 The dystopian notion of the U.S. entering a world of no rules-based order at all may be too strong. Yet what seems evident is that Trump has severely hampered global efforts to advance respect for IHL.

The Trump case reinforces the importance of individual leadership in shaping both national and global cultures around IHL. Although nation-states can be held accountable for violating the law of war, the Nuremberg trials emphasized an enduring lesson: “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract entities … [I]ndividuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state.”Footnote 200 These men (and women) include combatants expected to abide by international regimes that restrain the use of force. However, they also include leaders who maintain responsibilities to protect laws both ad bellum (laws governing the right to go to war) and in bello (laws governing conduct in war).

To be clear, there is no evidence that Trump has, implicitly or explicitly, endorsed the actual execution of grievous war crimes such as civilian targeting, rape, or torture. However, his incendiary remarks about the value of IHL, his insistence that rules of war be remade or expunged, and his handpicking of advisers who have not been shy about their desire to roll back the protections of the Geneva Conventions could erode respect for the law of war. Moreover, Trump’s turning a blind eye to war crimes by U.S. combatants, and downplaying their significance, increases the chance that a new precedent is being set – that following the law of war is voluntary. More war crime clemencies by Trump during his second term would only increase these concerns.

Almost certainly, Trump’s overt challenges to IHL have the potential to inspire more reneging from international law, both in Washington and globally. A grim reality is that even before Trump, the U.S. was already trending toward the adoption of policies that placed fewer restrictions on the use of military force – similar policies of which had been adopted by several of its allies and foes alike. Consider U.S. policies since 9/11 that have broadened the definitions of self-defense, as well as enabled fewer restrictions on strikes against “dual-use” targets, which serve both civilian and military purposes. The impunity agenda’s successes only make it more likely that future leaders will push for loosened interpretations of the law of war, without the need to publicly justify them.

Meanwhile, the normalization of an anti-IHL agenda in the US risks further hobbling efforts at both domestic and global accountability for alleged war crimes. Legal expert Michael N. Schmitt, for example, has warned of “attention deficit disorder” and “outrage fatigue” regarding the law of armed conflict, leading to desensitization to its breaches.Footnote 201 Similarly, the head of the ICRC has talked about the “increasing elasticity” in how militaries apply IHL, reducing the likelihood of prosecuting violations.Footnote 202 Some of these challenges may be attributable not just to doctrinaire debates over the interpretation of the Geneva Conventions – what is and is not permissible in combat – but how IHL as a general concept is treated and respected by leaders.

Such problems are only likely to intensify as technological advancements and more complex forms of combat, including cyberwarfare, become standard practice.Footnote 203 In areas where there is even less legal precedent and more ambiguity in how IHL applies, new norms may reflect the priorities of leaders. The U.S. government has declared that cyber operations can constitute an illegal use of force, comparable to dropping a bomb or carrying out a drone strike, though the determination is ultimately “effects-based.”Footnote 204 An open question is how states carry out their own modern fighting tactics in the context of IHL, such as potentially deadly computer network attacks and government-sponsored hacks. The second Trump White House may be the first U.S. administration to tackle these questions on a broad scale.

Related is how the Trump administration is likely to approach AI-enabled warfare. American software firm Palantir, for example, has been at the forefront in using algorithms, powered by satellite and sensor data, to increase battlefield lethality. This work involves executing so-called “kill chains” to automate the process of finding and eliminating adversaries. However, major questions loom over the protocols encoded into these algorithms, such as when controls shift from AI to humans and how civilian casualties are assessed. Palantir CEO Alex Karp has acknowledged that “one thing … that’s not quite understood is that there’s an ethics to AI in the military,” and that, for now, “you can’t just have … the algorithm decide when to engage … [and] what distance from a hospital or a school can a target be taken.”Footnote 205 Such questions will be left up to Trump’s DoD.

Also unclear is how far Washington will go in trying to prevent IHL violations from being carried out with American dollars and weaponry.Footnote 206 While U.S. domestic law prohibits military and intelligence support that could be deployed to breach IHL, critics argue that some U.S. aid has done exactly that. In 2024, for example, Amnesty International accused the U.S. of “complicity” in alleged Israeli war crimes.Footnote 207 Another report found that U.S. officials in Israel “have gone to great lengths to preserve continued access to US weapons for the units responsible for … alleged violations,” fostering what it called a “sense of impunity.”Footnote 208 Compared to the Biden White House, the Trump team, marked by an indifference to IHL, may place even less emphasis on ensuring accountability for U.S. aid.

Ultimately, Trump’s “America First” agenda accords with a broader, inward-looking approach to the law of war. Its neo-sovereigntist critique – which views international law, including IHL, as robbing countries of their own abilities to govern – rejects counter-party rules as a basis for foreign policy.Footnote 209 In its place, Trump’s agenda supports “go-it-alone” pursuits where countries become solo arbiters of the law. Such belligerent isolationism could lead to the gratuitous discounting of IHL because it fails to recognize the centrality of binding constraints. This includes constitutional checks regarding when and how the president wields force abroad. Law professor Tess Bridgeman, for example, has stated that Trump will be remembered for his “expansive – and sometimes lawless – claims of authority to take military action.”Footnote 210

At stake, therefore, may not just be America’s posture toward IHL specifically, international law generally, or even the particular foreign policies of a president or sequence of presidents. In the worst case, it may be respect for the transnational, Kantian order.Footnote 211 The hard-earned victories achieved by diplomats, world leaders, and military attachés that resulted in the signing of the Geneva Conventions did not spontaneously emerge. Instead, they were the product of labor to curb centuries of unspeakable tragedies in war. America has played a central role in this project, even if it has been imperfect in complying. Conceivably, in the long run, Trump’s overt denigration of IHL could prove destabilizing. Dents to IHL may not lead to its wholesale fracturing. However, the risk is that more cracks will.

The fact that some of these overt challenges to the norms of restraint could spill over into the U.S. military’s use domestically only deepens the stakes. January 6 showed the damage that could be wrought by a sizable military population with a leader’s prodding. A concerning prospect is a U.S. president formally summoning the military against American civilians. Trump has threatened that, if given the chance again, he is “not waiting” to deploy the military to quell turbulences at home.Footnote 212 He has also talked ominously of purging the “enemy from within.”Footnote 213 While the picture of “tanks rolling down Main Street,”Footnote 214 as suggested by one writer, remains highly unlikely, even its suggestion could erode expectations for what constitutes an appropriate use of force by the U.S. military.

Adding to this scenario is Pete Hegseth, the man tapped by Trump to lead the Defense Department. Hegseth has issued his own call to arms for MAGA supporters, urging them to prepare for violence domestically: “If you don’t own a gun, buy one. Train to use it. Then buy more.” The reason, Hegseth says, is the inevitability of “some form of civil war.”Footnote 215 Although much of his attention has been on loosening U.S. rules of engagement in war,Footnote 216 Hegseth has also been preoccupied by a cadre of liberal radicals at home that he says have infiltrated its institutions. To confront this threat, Hegseth has declared, America must “mock, humiliate, intimidate, and crush our leftist opponents.”Footnote 217 Hegseth has also kept open the possibility of using the military to shoot U.S. civilians.Footnote 218

6.4 Why Trump 2.0 Could Be Worse for IHL

Against this backdrop, there are several reasons to believe that a second Trump term could prove even more detrimental to IHL than the first. One, which bears emphasizing, is Trump’s decision to put Pete Hegseth at the helm of the Pentagon, the figure central to every consequential decision that Trump has made regarding the U.S. military justice system. By selecting the former Fox News anchor to reestablish what he calls a “warrior culture” at the DoD,Footnote 219 elevating him to sixth in line to the presidency, Trump offers little equivocation about his intent for more impunity.Footnote 220 While some of Hegeth’s controversial views on IHL faced scrutiny during his Senate confirmation hearing, Trump almost certainly chose him because of, not despite, his overtly hostile stance to the laws of war.

On this point, Hegseth could be well-poised to advance his aim of reducing the role of international law in constraining U.S. military conduct. Hegseth has been criticized as the least-credentialed modern Defense Secretary, having never led a large organization despite being tasked to oversee 1.3 million active-duty servicemembers and a budget of $849 billion.Footnote 221 However, Hegseth brings several personal attributes uniquely suited to advancing the impunity agenda. His media-savvy persona, honed at Fox News, on which he continues to appear, is chief among them. Hegseth’s celebrity among conservative rank-and-file servicemembers and deep connections with organizations that have lobbied for jailed U.S. servicemembers position him to reshape the military’s ethos of accountability.

Another likely contributor to military impunity during Trump’s second term is the composition of his administration beyond Pete Hegseth. During his first term, Trump filled high-level military and nonmilitary posts with longstanding public servants. By contrast, the main criterion on which Trump has chosen his second-term picks is loyalty.Footnote 222 Military leaders who were previously moderating influences on Trump, such as Mark Esper, Jim Mattis, and Mark Milley, are gone and may be replaced with loyalists. If so, advocates of the impunity movement will no longer need to fight from the outside against the “Washington insiders.” They will be the insiders. Trump’s trust in figures under Hegseth is likely to grant them considerable latitude in both crafting and executing IHL-related policy.

Trump has already made several aggressive moves on this front. Shortly after re-entering office, as part of a purge of six senior Pentagon officials, Trump fired Gen. Charles Q. “C.Q.” Brown, Jr. as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, replacing him with a lesser-known retired three-star officer, Lt. Gen. Dan “Razin” Caine. Pete Hegseth had previously criticized Brown, who is black, for being preoccupied with DEI and “woke” initiatives, saying “Either you’re in for warfighting, and that’s it.”Footnote 223 Alongside Brown, Trump also fired Adm. Lisa Franchetti, the first female chief of operations of the Navy; Gen. James Slife, the vice chief of the Air Force; and three high-ranking military lawyers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. One expert described the purge as “praetorianism, pure and simple.”Footnote 224

Perhaps even more than Brown’s termination, the firings of the three top military lawyers – judge advocate generals (JAGs) – provide the clearest indication of how Hegseth intends to approach the law of war as Secretary of Defense. One report, for example, said that the firings represented “an opening salvo in [Hegseth’s] push to remake the military into a force that is more aggressive on the battlefield and potentially less hindered by the laws of armed conflict.”Footnote 225 There was no evidence that the JAG terminations reflected a specific confrontation with Hegseth. However, Hegseth in his book War on Warriors had mocked military attorneys as “jagoffs,”Footnote 226 and many experts have commented that Hegseth’s goal is to lessen the role of lawyers in constraining battlefield conduct.

Along these lines, Trump has also made efforts to lessen oversight at the Pentagon, which could provide room for rolling back norms of restraint. After taking office in 2025, Trump terminated the contracts of more than a dozen independent inspectors general, including at DoD.Footnote 227 The terminations were targeted at government “watchdogs” charged with minimizing waste and abuse. Trump refused to provide the Senate with the required thirty-day notice of the firings, leading to questions about their legality. More importantly, however, the firings were decried for sharply departing from executive norms, as inspectors general typically stay in place during presidential transitions.Footnote 228 The moves could be a harbinger of Trump’s broader intent to sideline independent accountability agents in the military, including over IHL.

In tandem with these actions, Trump has made clear that internal dissent will not be tolerated at the DoD. In January 2025, Trump signed an executive order revoking the security clearances of forty-nine former national security agents related to their alleged “misleading and inappropriate political coordination with the 2020 Biden presidential campaign.”Footnote 229 One expert called the moves “the most politically saturated security action since the [J. Robert] Oppenheimer case in the 1950s.”Footnote 230 Pete Hegseth also ordered an inspector general probe into Ret. Gen. Mark Milley’s tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which critics condemned as political retribution.Footnote 231 While not relating specifically to IHL, the actions could prove a warning for U.S. military personnel inclined to oppose Trump’s stance on the law of war.

Another factor militating against IHL in the Trump 2.0 presidency stems from the actions of Trump’s predecessor. Even more than his preemptive pardons of Gen. Mark Milley and members of the January 6 House committee,Footnote 232 Joe Biden’s pardon of his son, Hunter Biden, for tax evasion and gun charges sparked bipartisan criticism.Footnote 233 Some experts suggest that Biden’s pardon could establish a precedent for Trump to exploit, which might include more crime clemencies. Political scientist Sean J. Westwood has warned, “Democratic erosion is an iterative game. Biden just gave Trump an excuse to further abuse presidential pardons.”Footnote 234 According to one columnist, “Biden … by his nepotistic act adds to the pile of rancid pardons…, including Trump’s first-term grants to … war criminals.”Footnote 235

Trump’s pardon spree for January 6 rioters is the clearest example of his readiness to deliver on a campaign pledge to aid those with military backgrounds who had violently broken the law. Altogether, Trump granted clemencies for more than 200 current or ex-U.S. servicemembers, including 21 members of the Oath Keepers and 27 members of the Proud Boys.Footnote 236 While Republicans largely defended the moves, Democrat Rep. Jamie Raskin of Maryland pilloried the decisions by asking whether the Capitol rioters were “being released as a reserve army of political foot soldiers to act on behalf of MAGA and Donald Trump.”Footnote 237 Under Trump, the DoD has also not foreclosed the possibility that active-duty and National Guard servicemembers granted pardons could continue their military careers.Footnote 238

A further concern for IHL in Trump’s second administration is that the strategy for the impunity coalition has already been written. Given a full term behind him, Trump has a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of power within the Pentagon and the military – not only how to navigate them but also how to remove checks on his agenda. As one expert notes, “Trump has certainly learned from his first term in office and is stepping into this second term with an eye toward removing every guardrail that stood in the way of his lawless impulses before.”Footnote 239 After his first inauguration, more than two years elapsed before Trump issued a war crime pardon. This time, Trump could start the process earlier, meaning more opportunities for clemencies and other acts that openly flout IHL.

Also heightening the likelihood of Trump openly defying IHL is the perceived strength of his electoral mandate, which could embolden him to further advance the impunity agenda. Although debatable, political scientist Francis Fukuyama referred to Trump’s 2024 win as a “blowout victory,”Footnote 240 while one former adviser for Bill Clinton said that “[t]he 2024 election marks the biggest shift to the right in our country since Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980.”Footnote 241 Unlike in 2016, when Trump lost the popular vote but won the Electoral College, his sweep of every swing state in 2024 means that Trump will likely interpret the victory as a sign that America is four-square behind the impunity agenda. As noted earlier, most relevant for the functioning of the Pentagon is that 65 percent of U.S. veterans supported Trump over Kamala Harris, according to 2024 exit polls.Footnote 242

Beyond the mandate itself, Trump 2.0 has already demonstrated a bold governance style, which could play into Trump’s plans for the military.Footnote 243 By shattering norms at a breakneck speed and inundating the media with relentless policy proposals, the odds are greater that any isolated transgressions, including overt challenges to IHL, go unnoticed or unchallenged. Consider that, in his first several weeks in office, Trump signed more than fifty executive orders and floated radical proposals, including ending birthright citizenship, seizing Greenland, making Canada the fifty-first state, retaking the Panama Canal, enacting tariffs on a scale not seen since the 1930s, shuttering the U.S. Agency for International Development, and carrying out the largest migrant deportation in history.

The constant chaos appears to be a feature, not a bug of Trump 2.0. Any semblance of the Trump “resistance” may be unable to keep pace, creating political cover for Trump to push controversial agendas like overtly challenging IHL. As former Trump strategist Steve Bannon put it, Trump’s goal is to “Attack! Attack! Attack! Keep driving it. Flood the zone. Overwhelm ‘em.”Footnote 244 Trump’s former White House lawyer, Ty Cobb, echoed this idea, saying that Trump 2.0 is pursuing “a naked power grab” intended to “flood the zone with as much unconstitutional activity as possible, with the hope that they get away with some or all of it.”Footnote 245 Against this political backdrop, Trump’s open challenges to the law of war may receive less pushback, bolstering incentives to press forward.

Finally, and maybe most important, Trump’s second term could be more harmful for IHL because Trump has nothing to lose politically. Although Trump has mused about amending the Constitution to serve more than eight years, he is unconstrained by future elections due to term limits. As one writer put it, Trump’s second administration might best be described with a simple phrase: “You ain’t seen nothing yet.”Footnote 246 A Trump White House unburdened by elections could pursue war crime clemencies regardless of whether they are politically beneficial, potentially opening a wider set of war crime cases that could prove controversial even in the eyes of some conservative voters. Additionally, without the added pressure of courting public opinion, Trump could use the bully pulpit and commander-in-chief powers to more radically attack IHL with few repercussions.

Although the future of military impunity in the U.S. post-Trump is uncertain, Trump’s 2024 staging of the most significant comeback in modern American politics underscores his persistent appeal with the GOP base. While much of Trump’s success owes to domestic issues like inflation and immigration, his approach to foreign policy and the military also deserves credit. Central to this agenda is an unabashed disregard for IHL. Looking ahead to 2028 or beyond, a question is whether Trump’s Republican heir will continue his direct challenges to IHL, or escalate them. The degree to which America drifts from the once-unassailable consensus that IHL should be given public deference may hinge on how much Trump disregards this principle during his last four years in office.

Within the U.S., the idea that support for publicly challenging IHL could actually increase in a future devoid of Trump is consistent with him being both a symptom and a cause of the impunity agenda. To the extent that Trump has gone beyond any modern U.S. president in overtly rejecting the validity of IHL, he has tapped into preexisting demands from the conservative electorate and openness to the agenda from the military community. If support for the impunity agenda has gained a self-perpetuating momentum, it may no longer require Trump. Future presidents willing to carry Trump’s mantle, with help from allies in the media and on Capitol Hill, could become more extreme, given clear backing from right-leaning voters with flimsier commitments to the laws of war.

6.5 Where to Go from Here

This book raises a number of questions for future research. Among the most pressing is how the Trump case generalizes to other Western democracies. Put differently, do “means, motives, and opportunity” typically exist for overtly challenging IHL, waiting for leaders to exploit? Or are they relatively rare conditions? When it comes to means, the essential element of the impunity agenda has been Trump’s partnership with Fox News and Republican Congress members. Yet it is unclear whether analogous enablers can be found in most Western democracies or whether the political landscape Trump inherited, marked by a twenty-four-hour right-wing news cycle and polarization on Capitol Hill, is distinct. It is also unclear whether other Western leaders hold the same kinds of authority as U.S. presidents to attack IHL.

In the U.S., seminal work on the “two faces” of the presidency suggests that executives wield more power over foreign policy and the military than domestic policy.Footnote 247 However, given the robustness of “checks and balances” in America’s federal system, one could argue that Trump’s overt challenges to IHL were unlikely to stem from idiosyncratic weaknesses of executive constraints. Fundamentally, this may underscore how authority over civilian and military concerns determines whether leaders are poised to attack IHL. In the U.S., one salient, if not unique, tension is the competing, enumerated responsibilities of the president: first, to ensure the faithful execution of laws; and second, to preside over the military as commander-in-chief.Footnote 248

This dual role places U.S. presidents in a position where enforcing the laws can inherently conflict with combat-level management of troops, both of which may be influenced by politics. While this tension may be irresolvable in the U.S., where Article 2 powers of the president are firmly delimited in the Constitution, it provides a point of comparison for thinking about whether leaders are able to strain IHL in different settings (e.g., in Western democracies that meaningfully divide the roles of heads of government and state, or where executives have differing responsibilities over military justice). It is plausible that more diffuse executive powers could reduce, if not eliminate, the capacity of democratic leaders to directly challenge IHL.

In terms of motive, it is equally unclear whether the Trump era has been a particularly propitious moment to score political points by openly attacking the law of war, or whether Trump is simply the first U.S. president willing to take such a chance. One possibility is that Trump has been singularly prescient in activating the Republican base through brazenly attacking IHL, even as he is less concerned by its ethics or the risks of alienating moderate voters. In terms of opportunity, it is also a question whether all militaries are prone to deep-seated, ideological subcultures that can be persuaded to abandon norms of restraint. The extent and pervasiveness of these subcultures could vary across settings, making some militaries more susceptible to activation than others.

Future studies in these areas could analyze historical cases. An example might be to contrast support for the U.S. troops granted clemency by Trump with that for William Calley, Jr., who, as noted earlier, was implicated in the 1968 “My Lai” massacre in Vietnam. After Calley’s court-martial and sentencing, Democratic Sen. Adlai Stevenson reportedly had his mailbox filled with letters from Americans registering 200 to 1 in his defense. A poll also showed that approximately two-thirds of citizens viewed Calley as a “scapegoat,” and one local VFW post fundraised on his behalf.Footnote 249 His story shows the groundswell of support that has previously existed for a convicted American war criminal, but without an ironclad effort by a president to herald his case.

Researchers could also analyze responses to war crime controversies outside the U.S. One approach might compare how leaders in non-Western contexts have explicitly undermined IHL, such as above with Israel and Russia. Another might probe how other advanced democracies have grappled with war crime cases differently than Trump. Consider Australia. Shortly after Trump lost his election in 2020, the inspector general of the Australian Defence Force published the “Brereton Report,” a 500-plus page document detailing the alleged killings of thirty-nine noncombatants in Afghanistan at the hands of its special forces from 2005 to 2016.Footnote 250 Unlike the impunity agenda in the U.S., however, there were no widespread efforts by Australian politicians to exonerate the implicated ADF servicemembers.

Concerning the U.S. case, one priority for research is to unpack further the Trump-Fox News “feedback loop.”Footnote 251 A central part of the impunity movement’s success is that Fox News does not just defend the impunity agenda. It also helps to create it. This shift, from partisan media as a sponsor of government activities to its progenitor, is worthy of more inquiry. Although analyses have identified elements of this change in other areas,Footnote 252 most remain observational. For example, a recent journalistic study coded more than a year’s worth of transcripts from “Fox and Friends” to document how Fox News cultivated two audiences: the American public and Trump himself.Footnote 253 These dynamics are consistent with the impunity movement. Trump takes cues from Fox News, and vice versa.

A related question is the extent to which Trump’s other main ally in openly challenging IHL, congressional Republicans, initiated or has simply perpetuated the impunity agenda. One interpretation is that GOP lawmakers were already pursuing a nascent impunity agenda pre-2016, and Trump proved useful for leading on these policies. In this way, Trump ramped up an existing trend. However, another reading is that, after Trump proved his willingness to attack the validity of IHL, Republican allies forced him to go further. Trump may have even become subordinate to the impunity movement that he created, giving him less room to maneuver if he wanted to retain support on Capitol Hill. Under this scenario, Trump instigated the impunity agenda, and GOP lawmakers accelerated it.

A final question regards the long-term impacts of the impunity agenda on the actual behavior of U.S. servicemembers in battle. Even if combatant attitudes toward IHL have become laxer under Trump, understanding whether this translates into more crimes in war requires on-the-ground conflict data. Capturing IHL violations and measuring effect sizes both pre- and post-Trump would be instructive. Skeptics have questioned whether negative effects materialize. Eddie Gallagher even sarcastically asked critics to “preach to me again the dangers of moral hazards,” referring to the apparent incentive his clemency could have in inducing combatants to disregard IHL.Footnote 254 Yet many experts have argued that excusing the bad behavior by U.S. troops degrades order and discipline.Footnote 255

In the end, Trump will, for good reason, be remembered for his blistering attacks on domestic institutions, such as Congress, the free press, and the U.S. electoral system. Yet as this book has shown, he also has another, ongoing legacy of impunity: one tied to the military. Trump has not only redefined norms for undermining IHL. He has discarded even the pretense of valuing the law of war. That legacy is a critical part of the Trump era and will define his final four years in office. This book calls for revisiting the consensus that, once established, public respect for IHL is self-sustaining. The seeds for openly challenging IHL may be embedded in Western democracies. If overt affronts to the law of war can materialize in the U.S., which has long supported the Geneva Conventions, they could plausibly happen in other regimes.

Footnotes

1 Golberg, Jeffrey. Sept. 21, 2023. “The Patriot.” Atlantic. www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2023/11/general-mark-milley-trump-coup/675375/.

3 U.S. State Department. “Digest of United States Practice in International Law.” www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2017-Digest-Chapter-18.pdf

5 Nye, Jr. Joseph S. 1990. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books.

7 Garamone, Jim. Jan. 14, 2021. “No Place in DOD for Extremism, White Supremacy, Officials Say.” U.S. Department of Defense. www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2472928/no-place-in-dod-for-extremism-white-supremacy-officials-say/.

8 Jan. 25, 2021. “Dems Pushing to Purge Military of Political Opponents.” Fox News. www.foxnews.com/video/6226110921001

9 Maurer, Dan. 2023. “Why Are Non-Unanimous (Court-Martial) Guilty Verdicts Still Alive After Ramos?American Criminal Law Review 60(1): 127.

10 Howell, William G., and Terry M. Moe. 2020. Presidents, Populism, and the Crisis of Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jacobs, Lawrence R. 2002. Democracy under Fire: Donald Trump and the Breaking of American History. New York: Oxford University Press. Peters, Jeremy W. 2022. How Republicans Lost Their Party and Got Everything They Ever Wanted. New York: Penguin Random House.

11 Dombrowski, Peter and Simon Reich. 2017. “Does Donald Trump Have a Grand Strategy?International Affairs 93(5): 10131037. Lynch, Timothy. 2020. In the Shadow of the Cold War American Foreign Policy from George Bush Sr. to Donald Trump. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

12 Binkley, John C. 2022. “Civil–Military Relations During the Trump Administration: Rejection of Military Professionalism and the Deterioration of Civil–Military Relations.” Armed Forces & Society 50(1): 5580. Feaver, Peter D. 2023. Thanks for Your Service. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. 2021. “Maximum Toxicity: Civil-Military Relations in the Trump Era.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 15(2): 99119. Schake, Kori. 2020. “The Military and the Constitution Under Trump.” Survival 62(4): 3138.

13 Hodges, Doyle. Feb. 10, 2021. “Bureaucratizing to Fight Extremism in the Military.” War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/bureaucratizing-to-fight-extremism-in-the-military/

14 U.S. Department of Defense. 2023. “Report on the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence.” https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/CHMR/Report-on-the-Civilian-Protection-Center-of-Excellence-Final-Report.pdf

15 Ismay, John. Jan. 23, 2025. “U.S. Army Plans to Eliminate Office for Reducing Civilian Harm in War.” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2025/01/23/us/pentagon-civilian-deaths.html

16 VanLandngham, Rachel. Jan. 5, 2024. “The U.S. Military Moves Closer to Just Military Justice – But More Work Remains.” Just Security. www.justsecurity.org/91004/the-u-s-military-moves-closer-to-just-military-justice-but-more-work-remains/

18 July 28, 2023. “FACT SHEET: President Biden to Sign Executive Order Implementing Bipartisan Military Justice Reforms.” The White House. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/07/28/fact-sheet-president-biden-to-sign-executive-order-implementing-bipartisan-military-justice-reforms/

19 Kavi, Aishvarya. 2022. “Congress Votes to Expand U.S. Power to Prosecute International War Crimes.” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2022/12/22/us/politics/congress-war-crimes.html

20 Blank, Laurie R. and Gregory P. Noone. Law of War Training: Resources for Military and Civilian Leaders. US Institute of Peace. https://law.emory.edu/_includes/documents/sections/clinics/law-of-war-training-manual-01.pdf/ Oberleitner, Gerd. 2015. Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Law, Practice, Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

21 Sekhon, Jasjeet S. and Rocio Titiunik. 2012. “When Natural Experiments Are Neither Natural nor Experiments.” American Political Science Review 106(1): 3537. Jones, Benjamin F. and Benjamin A. Olken. 2005. “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(3): 835864.

22 David, Jovana. Jan. 15, 2021. “Should the Military Leadership Speak Up on Partisan Politics?” U.S. Army War College. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/partisan-politics/

24 Bovens, Mark, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans, eds. 2014. The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199641253.001.0001 Keohane, Robert O. 2006. “Accountability in World Politics.” Scandinavian Political Studies 29(2): 7587.

25 Gage, John. May 21, 2019. “Obama’s Top General Slams Trump Military Pardons as ‘Abdication of Moral Responsibility.’” Washington Examiner. www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/obamas-top-general-slams-trump-military-pardons-as-abdication-of-moral-responsibility

26 Rubin, Trudy. Dec. 27, 2020. “Petraeus, Crocker: Trump’s Pardons to War Criminals Undermine Rule of Law, Endanger U.S. Troops.” Philadelphia Inquirer. www.inquirer.com/opinion/trump-pardons-ryan-crocker-david-petraeus-nisour-square-iraq-20201227.html

27 Urben, Heidi A. 2010. Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War. Georgetown University. Ph.D. Dissertation. https://nation.time.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2012/11/urben-diss-1-5.pdf

28 Kirisci, Mustafa, Ibrahim Kocaman, and Cagil Albayrak. Mar. 3, 2023. “Why Polarization in the Military Is a Growing Concern for Democracies.” National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-polarization-military-growing-concern-democracies-206267

30 Dunlap, Charlie. Sept. 21, 2019. “Why an Apolitical Military Is So Important in an Era of an ‘All-Volunteer’ Force.” Lawfire. https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2019/09/21/why-an-apolitical-military-is-so-important-in-an-era-of-an-all-voluntary-force/

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102 Reid, Paula, Tierney Sneed, and Devan Cole. Nov. 25, 2024. “Special Counsel Jack Smith Drops Election Subversion and Classified Documents Cases against Donald Trump.” CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/25/politics/trump-special-counsel-jack-smith/index.html

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106 Ford, Stuart. 2020. “Has President Trump Committed a War Crime by Pardoning War Criminals?American University International Law Review 35(4): 757820.

107 Krcmaric, Daniel. 2020. The Justice Dilemma: Leaders and Exile in an Era of Accountability. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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110 Mansfield, Michael. Mar. 19, 2013. “Why Bush, Blair Should Be Charged with War Crimes over Iraq Invasion.” CNN. www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-bush-blair/index.html

111 Akande, Dapo. 2018. “The Immunity of Heads of States of Nonparties in the Early Years of the ICC.” AJIL Unbound 112: 172176.

112 Nunn, Joseph. Nov. 17, 2023. “Trump Wants to Use the Military Against His Enemies. Congress Must Act.” Slate. https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2023/11/trump-second-term-military-nightmare-congress.html

113 Editorial Board. May 5, 2024. “There’s Still Time for Congress to Trump-proof the Insurrection Act.” Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/05/05/insurrection-act-trump-abuse-reforms/

116 Nunn, Jospeh and Elizabeth Gooitein. Apr. 25, 2022. “Guide to Invocations of the Insurrection Act.” Brennan Center. www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guide-invocations-insurrection-act

117 Alschuler, Albert W. Aug. 16, 2022. “Trump and the Insurrection Act: The Legal Framework.” Just Security. www.justsecurity.org/82696/trump-and-the-insurrection-act-the-true-legal-framework/

118 Bauer, Bob and Jack Goldsmith. Dec. 27, 2023. “Trump Is Not the Only Reason to Fix This Uniquely Dangerous Law.” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2023/12/27/opinion/insurrection-act-congress-trump.html

119 Cole, Brendan. Nov. 25, 2020. “Donald Trump Is First President Since Jimmy Carter Not to Enter U.S. Troops into New Conflict.” Newsweek. www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-first-president-since-jimmy-carter-not-enter-us-troops-new-conflict-1549037

120 Deudney, Daniel and John G. Ikenberry. 2018. “Liberal World: The Resilient Order.” Foreign Affairs 97(4): 1624.

121 Talmon, Stefan. 2019. “The United States under President Trump: Gravedigger of International Law.” Chinese Journal of International Law 18(3): 645668.

122 Hathaway, Oona A. Oct. 2, 2020. “Reengaging on Treaties and Other International Agreements (Part I): President Donald Trump’s Rejection of International Law.” Just Security. www.justsecurity.org/72656/reengaging-on-treaties-and-other-international-agreements-part-i-president-donald-trumps-rejection-of-international-law/

123 Hathaway, Oona. Apr. 23. 2024. “War Unbound Gaza, Ukraine, and the Breakdown of International Law.” Foreign Affairs. www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/war-unbound-gaza-hathaway

124 Bump, Philip. Jan. 14, 2025. “Pete Hegseth Seems Open to Ordering Soldiers to Shoot Protesters.” Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/01/14/hegseth-seems-open-to-ordering-protesters-shot/

125 McGreal, Chris. Oct. 31, 2023. “Have War Crimes Been Committed in Israel and Gaza and What International Laws Apply?” Guardian. www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/have-war-crimes-been-committed-in-israel-and-gaza-and-what-international-laws-apply

126 Roberts, Les. Mar. 15, 2024. “The Science Is Clear. Over 30,000 People Have Died in Gaza.” TIME. https://time.com/6909636/gaza-death-toll/

127 May 20, 2024. “Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for Arrest Warrants in the Situation in the State of Palestine.” International Criminal Court.

128 Ahmatović, Šejla. Apr. 5, 2024. “Israeli Military Admits ‘Serious Mistake’ in Killing of 7 Food Aid Workers.” POLITICO Europe. www.politico.eu/article/israeli-military-forces-admit-serious-mistake-killing-7-food-aid-world-central-kitchen-workers/

129 Egan, Lauren. Dec. 12, 2023. “Biden Says Netanyahu ‘Has to Change,’ Accuses Israel of ‘Indiscriminate Bombing.’” POLITICO. www.politico.com/news/2023/12/12/biden-says-netanyahu-has-to-change-00131399

130 Sheth, Sonam. Oct. 17, 2023. “Netanyahu Deleted a Post on X about a Struggle against ‘Children of Darkness’ around the Time of a Tragic Hospital explosion in Gaza.” Business Insider. www.businessinsider.com/netanyahu-deleted-children-of-darkness-post-gaza-hospital-attack-2023-10

131 Kristof, Nicholas. Nov. 1, 2023. “The Words in the Middle East That Are Breaking My Heart.” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2023/11/01/opinion/israel-hamas-gaza-children.html

132 McGreal, Chris. Oct. 16, 2023. “The Language Being Used to Describe Palestinians Is Genocidal.” Guardian. www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/oct/16/the-language-being-used-to-describe-palestinians-is-genocidal

133 Brawn, Steph. Jan. 4, 2024. “LBC: Israeli Ambassador to UK Says EVERY Gaza Building Is a Target.” The National. www.thenational.scot/news/24026946.lbc-israeli-ambassador-uk-says-every-gaza-building-target/

134 Goldenberg, Tia. Jan. 18, 2023. “Harsh Israeli Rhetoric against Palestinians Becomes Central to South Africa’s Genocide Case.” Associated Press. apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-south-africa-genocide-hate-speech-97a9e4a84a3a6bebeddfb80f8a030724

135 Da Silva, Chantal. 2023. Nov. 13. “‘Nakba 2023’: Israel Right-wing Ministers’ Comments Add Fuel to Palestinian Fears.” NBC News. www.nbcnews.com/news/world/gaza-nakba-israels-far-right-palestinian-fears-hamas-war-rcna123909

136 Nechin, Etan. Jan. 9, 2024. “The Far Right Infiltration of Israel’s Media Is Blinding the Public to the Truth about Gaza.” Guardian. www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/09/israel-media-gaza-benjamin-netanyahu-settler-movement

137 Cohen, Ido David. Dec. 25, 2023. “How Israeli Media Became a Wartime Government Propaganda Arm.” Haaretz. www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-25/ty-article-magazine/.premium/how-israeli-media-became-a-wartime-government-propaganda-arm/0000018c-a0d3-d957-a98f-aed3ea560000

138 June 6, 2024. “Israeli Government Seeks to Extend Controversial Al Jazeera Ban as High Court Hears Arguments against Media Law.” CNN. www.cnn.com/2024/06/06/media/israel-al-jazeera-ban-media-law/index.html

139 Fischer, Sara and Barak Ravid. May 21, 2024. “‘Act of Madness’: Israeli Officials Seize AP Equipment, Cut Live Feed of Gaza.” Axios. www.axios.com/2024/05/21/israel-ap-equipment-seized-al-jazeera

140 May 30, 2024. “As Press Freedoms Decline in Israel, People There See the War Differently from the Rest of the World.” CBC. www.cbc.ca/news/world/israel-gaza-war-press-freedom-1.7218365

141 McKernan, Bethan and Quique Kierzenbaum. Oct. 10, 2023. “‘We’re Focused on Maximum Damage’: Ground Offensive into Gaza Seems Imminent. Guardian. www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/10/right-now-it-is-one-day-at-a-time-life-on-israels-frontline-with-gaza

142 Speri, Alice. Oct. 9, 2023. “Israel Responds to Hamas Crimes by Ordering Mass War Crimes in Gaza.” Intercept. https://theintercept.com/2023/10/09/israel-hamas-war-crimes-palestinians/

143 Oct. 12, 2023. “Is Israeli Bombing of Gaza a Violation of International Laws?” Al Jazeera. www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/12/is-israeli-bombing-of-gaza-a-violation-of-international-laws

144 Toler, Aric, Sarah Kerr, Adam Sella, Arijeta Lajka and Chevaz Clarke. Feb. 6, 2024. “What Israeli Soldiers’ Videos Reveal: Cheering Destruction and Mocking Gazans.” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2024/02/06/world/middleeast/israel-idf-soldiers-war-social-media-video.html

145 Cloud, David S. Feb. 21, “Israel Military Investigates Soldiers for Criminal Offenses in Gaza War.” Wall Street Journal. www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-military-investigates-soldiers-for-criminal-offenses-in-gaza-war-8fe2d947

146 Graham-Harrison, Emma and Quique Kierszenbaum. Jan 3, 2024. “Israeli Public Figures Accuse Judiciary of Ignoring Incitement to Genocide in Gaza.” Guardian. www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/03/israeli-public-figures-accuse-judiciary-of-ignoring-incitement-to-genocide-in-gaza#:~:text=“For%20the%20first%20time%20that,an%20everyday%20matter%20in%20Israel.”

147 Samuels, Brett. Nov. 28, 2023. “Trump Gives Mixed Messages on How He’d Handle Israel-Hamas War.” The Hill. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4331958-trump-mixed-messages-on-how-hed-handle-israel-hamas-war/

148 McGreal, Chris. Oct. 16, 2023. “The Language Being Used to Describe Palestinians is Genocidal.” Guardian. www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/oct/16/the-language-being-used-to-describe-palestinians-is-genocidal

149 Ravid, Barak. Jun 11, 2020. “Trump Administration Coordinated ICC Sanctions with Israel.” Axios. www.axios.com/2020/06/11/international-criminal-court-trump-israel

150 Borger, Julian. Jun 11, 2020. “Trump Targets ICC with Sanctions after Court Opens War Crimes Investigation.” Guardian. www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/11/trump-icc-us-war-crimes-investigation-sanctions

151 Feb. 25, 2021. “Israel Asked US Not to Lift Trump-era ICC Sanctions: Report.” Al Jazeera. www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/25/israel-asked-us-not-to-lift-trump-era-icc-sanctions-report

152 DePetris, Daniel. Nov. 7, 2024. “Trump’s Win Means Benjamin Netanyahu Has a Freer Hand to Do What He Wants.” MSNBC. www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/netanyahu-trump-election-win-israel-gaza-rcna178956

153 Lipner, Shalom. Nov. 25, 2024. “Israel’s Trump Delusion.” Foreign Affairs. www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/israels-trump-delusion

154 Feb. 5, 2025. “What Donald Trump Said about His Plans to ‘Take Over’ Gaza.” Al Jazeera. www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/5/what-donald-trump-said-about-his-plans-to-take-over-gaza

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215 Will, George F. Jan. 25, 2025. “There Were Ample Reasons, Not about His Personal Life, for Rejecting Hegseth.” Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/01/24/pete-hegseth-defense-department-unqualified/

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220 Shuham, Matt. Nov. 26, 2024. “Trump Defense Secretary Pick Thinks ‘Marxists Are Our Enemies’.” HuffPost. www.huffpost.com/entry/pete-hegseth-war-on-warriors-defense-department-nominee_n_674624e2e4b0733bf01de02a

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223 Schmitt, Helene Cooper, and Jonathan Swan. Feb. 21, 2025. “Trump Fires Joint Chiefs Chairman Amid Flurry of Dismissals at Pentagon.” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2025/02/21/us/politics/trump-fires-cq-brown-pentagon.html

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226 Kelly, Kate. Jan. 14, 2025. “Hegseth Spars with Senator Over What He Meant by Slang Term.” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2025/01/14/us/politics/hegseth-jagoff-confirmation-hearing.html

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232 Sentner, Irie, Kyle Cheney, and Nicholas Wu. Jan. 20, 2025. “Biden Issues Preemptive Pardons for Fauci, Milley, Jan. 6 Committee and others.” POLITICO. www.politico.com/news/2025/01/20/biden-pardons-fauci-milley-jan-6-committee-00199244

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