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Between Communal, Emphyteutic, and Private Property: Liberal Experimentation on Agricultural Land in Nineteenth-Century Bolivia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 September 2025

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Pol Colàs*
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Universitat de Barcelona, Spain
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Email: polcolas@ub.edu
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Abstract

This paper examines the gradual imposition of private property on agricultural land, mostly occupied by Indigenous communities, in the early nineteenth century by Andean republics’ ruling classes. The state’s weak authority and the Indigenous resistance to economic and political border advance impeded the immediate destruction of previous power structures, resulting in genuine statal formations in the region and clashes for the imposition of the newly adopted liberal ideas. This paper focuses on two early agricultural property privatization attempts in Bolivia, which have not been properly analyzed yet. First, José Ballivián’s governmental project, which resolved to dismantle the Indigenous communities through capitalist education, by placing “good examples” of white and mestizo colons between Indigenous lands using the legal formulation of emphyteusis, thus expanding the liberal conception of property and taxation and then making the existence of communal lands futile, achieving social homogeneity, enforcing capitalist production, and widening executive authority. Second, Jorge Mallo’s posterior pamphlet, which gave continuity to Ballivián’s policies through public opinion and linked them to the ones finally imposed in the second half of the century. Both initiatives were not successful but were remarkable steps in the process of Indigenous land usurpation by the state and white-mestizo colons.

Keywords

Boliviastate-buildingindigenous communitiesliberalismland

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The Americas , First View , pp. 1 - 24
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
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© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Academy of American Franciscan History

In Lo nacional popular en Bolivia, René Zavaleta presents Bolivian society as “abigarrada” from its very formation. For the author, in the country—and more broadly, in the Andean region—different historical periods and forms of social organization overlapped simultaneously, thereby complicating the homogenization that the liberal model seemed to aspire to,Footnote 1 a tendency toward unification that he identified in political, social, and economic terms, but which can also be extended to the realm of legal equality and property rights.Footnote 2 Precisely, this paper aims to analyze one of the attempts to break the abigarrado condition of land property in Bolivia, following the weak post-independence efforts of Antonio José de Sucre to extend liberalism to the Bolivian countryside, and preceding the decisive blow to the communal land property of the ayllus and their legal personality, which would be dealt by the government of Mariano Melgarejo. The boundaries between the different layers of the social map proposed by Zavaleta were ever-changing, and therefore, the establishment of specific studies that explore the initiatives for the advancement or regression of these internal limits should enable a more nuanced understanding of the general process of political–economic liberalism’s expansion in the Andes.Footnote 3

In this regard, we position ourselves during the presidency of José Ballivián, from 1841 to 1847. His government was one of extensive liberal and reformist ambitions, which, among various issues tackled, sought to address the transformation in both the ownership, and most notably, the nature of land property.Footnote 4 To this end, marked by significant political experimentation and liberal innovation, he drew upon the lessons learned from the previous experience of Sucre, whose government recognized the impossibility of creating a legally and ethnically homogenous society, given that state survival depended on Indigenous contributions, particularly the agricultural output essential for the nascent internal market.Footnote 5 Moreover, pluralism, linked with the “abigarramiento,” was an ever-present political concept that delegitimized any radical shifts in legislation taking place.

The government of José Ballivián was more cautious than that of Sucre and did not seek a direct confrontation with indigenous ways of life. It adopted a legal concept rooted in Roman law, with a long medieval and modern tradition, which had been introduced into republican Latin America through colonial practices: emphyteusis. This arrangement allowed for the leasing of land usage to a peasant or agricultural investor while retaining the eminent domain under state authority. It served as a beneficial legal instrument for political classes hesitant to an abrupt transition directly from the Ancien Régime’s framework—characterized by compulsory labor and corporatist tributes—to a modern individual property system, particularly due to the resistance that such changes could incite.Footnote 6

During Ballivián’s administration, the key document for understanding economic and political border expansion through land ownership legislation in the Bolivian altiplano was the circular of December 14, 1842. This document declared land held by originarios as state property, positioning indigenous individuals as leaseholders who owed a emphyteutic canon to the Bolivian state; then it implemented emphyteusis as a type of imperfect property on Indigenous-held lands. Such a framework facilitated the redistribution of land, leasing portions to white-mestizo individuals committed to capitalist, export-oriented agricultural practices, thereby providing ayllus with models of the “correct” methods of cultivation beyond mere subsistence farming or production for local markets.Footnote 7

Indigenous resistance and the questionable legality of the circular led to significant difficulties for the government in making emphyteusis enforceable.Footnote 8 That process will be analyzed in these pages. However, it is considered that although Ballivián’s governmental actions were largely unsuccessful, they represent a crucial link between the inherited colonial structure and the subsequent imposition of total land ownership by Melgarejo, and they represent remarkable steps in the process of Indigenous land usurpation by the state and white-mestizo colons, as will be shown as well as that immediate failure made heterogeneity an essential component in explaining the broader process of state formation in Bolivia and Latin America.

This analysis also engages with a text by Jorge Mallo. Mallo was a significant figure in nineteenth-century Bolivia. Curiously, he appeared as a defendant in a failed rebellion against President José Ballivián in 1842, for which he served a prison sentence.Footnote 9 However, in the 1860s and 1870s, Mallo held important public positions related to the Ministry of Finance, such as chief accountant. Although, beyond these details, his biography remains largely unknown, he was involved in several public debates in Bolivia, particularly one concerning land ownership. In this regard, he wrote Aplicación económica cambiando el sistema rentístico de la República conforme a las costumbres modernas in 1861, under the name of citizen Jorje Mallo, as a pamphlet that aimed, without a doubt, at influencing the political–legal reality. The text was positioned as a significant mediator between emphyteusis and the eventual policies that emerged in the 1860s, aiding in the examination of the relationship between liberal politics and agricultural land in Bolivia. It is difficult to ascertain whether the text truly had a political impact, although its intertextual connections with Ballivián’s earlier laws and Melgarejo’s later ones suggest that it may have. Regardless, what is undeniable is that it is a document of considerable interest, illustrating the connection between emphyteutic policies and the usurpation of indigenous land in Bolivia, a process that continued to evolve within public opinion during the intervening decades.

What has been said thus far holds historiographical significance, as the topic of agricultural emphyteusis, viewed as an example of nineteenth-century political experimentation in Latin America, has been scarcely explored in the historical literature. However, this policy significantly impacted agricultural property legality during the first half of the century. The better documented case of Argentina serves as a paradigmatic example. Infesta argues that emphyteusis emerged as a practical legal tool in various contexts, adopted by governments with diverse political ideologies and social bases. From Argentina’s independence through the administrations of Rivadavia and Rosas, its primary application was to agricultural lands designated for colonization rather than altering the status of previously held lands.Footnote 10 Rubinstein illustrates that Rivadavia sought to enhance land values while maintaining control over them.Footnote 11 Similarly, Juan Manuel de Rosas effectively implemented emphyteusis,Footnote 12 although the offers of emphyteutic leases threatened the land market by drastically lowering prices, a situation exacerbated by the seemingly endless parcelization of lands to the south and west.Footnote 13 Gelman notes that, despite the presence of emphyteutic tenants in rural Buenos Aires, they failed to generate the expected revenue.Footnote 14

Outside the province of Buenos Aires, some sources indicate that emphyteusis did not prevent the alienation of Argentine public lands.Footnote 15 The province of Jujuy exemplifies this, as in 1839, emphyteusis became a pathway between alienation and full leasing, progressively liberalizing land while avoiding ideological contradictions, in a region geographically close to Bolivia.Footnote 16 Nevertheless, the rapid expansion of larger estates ultimately marginalized emphyteusis in favor of private ownership.Footnote 17

In Brazil, emphyteusis similarly shaped the relationship between tenants and their land, as illustrated by Osorio Silva. The colonial sesmarias—analogous to emphyteusis but focused on land development without tenant payment—were abolished in 1822.Footnote 18 However, the legislation intended to replace sesmarias was not enacted until 1850.Footnote 19 This prolonged transition resulted in disorder and fraud in land transactions, pressuring legislators to adopt alternative forms of property, such as emphyteusis, while sesmarias retained critical importance in land occupation.Footnote 20

Other notable examples in Latin America include Mérida, Venezuela, where the assumption of agrarian individualism followed emphyteutic legislation, significantly undermining communal ownership.Footnote 21 In Guatemala, emphyteutic payments dominated the relationships between ayuntamientos and Indigenous populations until the late nineteenth century.Footnote 22 Furthermore, emphyteusis was widely utilized in Europe, with studies on its practices during that century providing insight into the historical realities of agricultural property. Portugal and France are representative cases due to their long traditions of emphyteusis;Footnote 23 in Spain, emphyteusis had deep roots in Catalonia, dating back to 1486, and some protests even erupted in Barcelona in 1851 when its abrogation was proposed.Footnote 24

The cases reviewed thus far must have had an influence on the legal development in Bolivia, especially given the historical link with the Hispanic colonial administration and the geographic, political, and social proximity to contemporary Argentina. Moreover, considering the influence of Argentine politicians in the administration of José Ballivián, it is difficult to believe that such a connection did not exist.Footnote 25 Emphyteusis in Bolivia could not have arisen spontaneously, directly from a distant past; rather, it must have been influenced by that applied by its neighbors, which, in turn, was shaped by their own influences.

However, the case of Bolivia presents specific characteristics that justify a focused analysis of the relationship between state liberal reforms concerning land, Indigenous communities, and the state-building process. The evolution of the state’s legal strategies regarding agricultural property standardization is particularly evident in the altiplano. This case is historically compelling due to the strong presence of ayllus and the enduring perception of their “incompatibility” with liberal property models, which contrasted with the circumstances in Brazil and Argentina, where policies were more oriented toward new lands for colonization.

Thus, the following sections will analyze emphyteusis, its impacts, and its continuity in Bolivia, utilizing governmental communications, legislation, and Mallo’s study to interpret the dominant legal narrative surrounding Indigenous ownership, communal relations, and the state over the long term.

The December 14, 1842 Executive Circular: Land Emphyteusis and Economic Expansion

The 1840s have been recognized as a critical period for understanding state-building, the establishment of republican legitimacy, the introduction of new economic schemes, and the expansion of Bolivia’s internal capitalist frontiers.Footnote 26 As mentioend, the transition from communal to private property—and, consequently, the dismantling of Indigenous communities as they were traditionally known—necessitated a complex legal framework and a nuanced process of legitimation to avoid catastrophic consequences for the state’s existence. The challenges encountered prompted ruling elites, represented by the state, to engage in experimental politics, immersing themselves in a broad legal trend characterized by trial and error. The 1840s, particularly during the presidency of José Ballivián, saw an effort to implement new ways of political experimentation in this regard.

As mentioned in the previous introduction, the circular of December 14, 1842, was a key document during Ballivián’s administration for understanding how land ownership legislation expanded economic and political boundaries in the Bolivian altiplano. Issued by Hilarión Fernández, the Minister of Finance, this document aimed to clarify how public authorities could resolve disputes over Indigenous territories. It positioned Indigenous people as leaseholders, obligated to pay a emphyteutic rent to the Bolivian state, while declaring their land as state property. Upon the death or departure of these individuals, the provincial governor was empowered to redistribute land among ayllu members. This structure required the governor, the public administrator of provincial governance, to oversee land usurpation, lawsuits, and disputes arising within communities.Footnote 27 In cases where competing ayllus contested territory, jurisdiction was transferred to jueces de paz y de letras, lower-ranking judicial officials dedicated to such disputes in the provinces. The circular justified its existence by asserting that it sought to protect Indigenous people from prolonged and economically burdensome trials, while also safeguarding provincial governors from a loss of authority, thereby preventing erratic decision-making.Footnote 28

This justification sought to legitimize the legal actions taken. Internal doubts within the executive arose regarding the public acceptance of the circular, which the procedural approach weakened. Unlike a law or presidential decree, a circular lacked the immediacy and authority needed to assert its legitimacy. Ballivián’s presidency in 1842 was in its early stages and was not yet considered constitutional, but rather provisional. Consequently, this decision introduced uncertainty and a lack of legal foundation to the concept of emphyteusis.

In addition, the use of a circular to impose such a significant change as transferring eminent property of communal lands to the state suggested a perception of continuity rather than a radical shift. However, in the context of Sucre’s prior attempts to individualize land property and the ensuing quiet interregnum until 1842, Ballivián’s action represented a considerable legal transformation, compelling the executive to reinforce its decision. Indeed, Bolivian emphyteusis was among the least legally substantiated initiatives of its kind in mid-nineteenth-century Latin America, particularly in its initial phase.Footnote 29

To mitigate the absence of a robust republican legal tradition, the redaction of the circular drew on the existing colonial indigenous tributary structure to justify itself. The authorities interpreted tributo Footnote 30 as evidence of imperfect indigenous property rights, arguing that this payment indicated ayllus’ rights to land were equivalent to those of leaseholders or emphyteuta, who were required to pay a canon to the owner of the eminent domain—the colonial administration, and subsequently, the republican state.Footnote 31 This interpretation parallels similar cases in geographically and historically analogous contexts.Footnote 32 Consequently, the circular drew upon pre-liberal customary law and colonial legitimacy rather than a flawed republican framework concerning communal land.Footnote 33 This indicates not an improvisational approach but rather a deliberate legal experiment, albeit one marked by a lack of understanding of how to proceed with state-building through the dismantling of indigenous communities; a path fraught with contradictions.

The ambiguous nature of the circular and its complex interpretation necessitated further clarification from state authorities to bolster its legitimacy. To enforce emphyteusis, three resolutions and an order were made public: (1) a resolution on September 16, 1843 regarding judicial competencies over indigenous territories; (2) a resolution on January 31, 1845 that corrected the previous one; (3) an order on April 25, 1845 delineating the functions of judicial and political powers in the provinces, concerning communities; and (4) a resolution on November 13, 1845 clarifying the provincial governor’s role in overseeing the emphyteutic structure. Additionally, the economic dimension of emphyteusis was addressed in a law and its accompanying decree: (5) on November 4, 1844, a law was passed establishing how complete ownership of land could be attained by those holding useful domain under an emphyteutic contract; and (6) on December 1, 1844, a decree was issued further regulating the consolidation of that ownership. It is worth noting that these orders, resolutions, and laws were issued after the declaration of the constitutionality of Ballivián’s presidency in 1843, thereby solidifying the legitimacy of the executive. One could interpret that this renewed legitimacy was used to articulate legislation with greater clarity than in the case of the first circular.

First, the resolution of September 16, 1843, used the province of Chayanta, Potosí, as a case study to elaborate on the assertions made in the previous circular. Its provincial governor aimed to standardize the procedures arising from the possibilities introduced by emphyteusis, particularly regarding which authorities should adjudicate disputes over land between Indigenous communities (or individuals) and non-Indigenous landholders or hacendados. The governor petitioned the Ministry of the Interior on these terms. While disputes among Indigenous communards were common, the governor believed the circular could potentially exacerbate such conflicts, especially between iIndigenous people and hacendados. To prevent this, he requested that the executive provide the provinces with the necessary tools to address these disputes. The government’s response, issued by the Ministry of Finance, was somewhat vague, merely referencing adherence to “las reglas generales del derecho” and incorrectly asserting that disputes between different ayllus, or within the same one, should be resolved by the governor, thereby granting him the authority to adjudicate these conflicts.Footnote 34

Second, in the resolution of January 31, 1845, the Minister of Finance, Miguel María de Aguirre, amended inconsistencies from the prior resolution, returning to the original text of the circular and affirming the provincial jueces de paz y letras’ roles in land disputes between different ayllus for the whole of Bolivian territory.Footnote 35 This could have exacerbated Indigenous resistance to the measure, as, on paper, the lengthy land disputes they were attempting to avoid would still be channeled through provincial courts. However, we find no evidence to support this.

Third, the same Minister of Finance, in issuing the order of April 25, 1845, sought to ensure proper procedures for Indigenous communal land lawsuits in response to persistent complaints from the Indigenous peoples regarding corruption among provincial governors in land distribution. This order required governors to maintain an up-to-date record of their activities, which would be accessible to both individuals and the executive. If a party felt aggrieved by a governor’s decision, they could file a complaint with the prefecture, which would either confirm or amend the governor’s decision and possibly refer the matter to the judiciary if illegal actions were alleged.Footnote 36 Although we assume that such records may have had real continuity and must have existed, they are not referenced in the ministerial documentation.

Fourth, the resolution of November 13, 1845, issued by Minister Aguirre, further elaborated on the provincial governor’s role in applying emphyteutic legislation, as his Ministry had identified some malfunctions. In some cases, indigenous people sent their demands (though it is unspecified whether these were against other Indigenous people or white-mestizos) to the departmental prefect, bypassing the governor, even though both were public authorities appointed by the executive. The resolution strengthened the prefects’ capacity to oversee the governors’ activities while reaffirming the governors’ authority over legal matters related to land usurpation and boundary disputes.Footnote 37

Fifth, the law passed by Congress on November 4, 1844, addressed the economic aspects of emphyteusis, stipulating that those holding the usufruct of state-owned land under an emphyteutic contract could eventually attain full ownership by paying the land’s value, as determined by an expert, plus one-third of that value, using a combination of money and public credit vouchers.Footnote 38 In fact, the law contained inconsistencies that could have complicated its implementation, such as requiring government approval for the sale of certain emphyteutic estates, though it remains unclear whether this actually occurred. Notably, the law did not prevent indigenous individuals from using it to become property owners, which posed the risk of eliminating the communal payments owed to the state, although this risk ultimately did not materialize.Footnote 39 Additionally, we presume that the shift from a circular on emphyteusis to the enactment of a weakly drafted law in 1844 may have been perceived by prospective colonos as inadequately fortified to safeguard speculative interests and facilitate the physical encroachment of white-mestizos upon indigenous territories.

Sixth, the decree of December 1, 1844, signed by President Ballivián, sought to clarify the previous law by specifying the requirement for assessments from three experts to determine the land’s value for sale. One expert would be appointed by the individual seeking to acquire the land, one by the governor, and one by the departmental administration. The prescribed sum was to be paid by tenants seeking property ownership, with the stipulation that payment must occur within thirty days; failure to do so would result in physical punishment.Footnote 40 Furthermore, the decree did not clearly delineate the allocation of funds generated from sales of eminent property, apart from an eighth portion earmarked for police funding in regional capitals.Footnote 41 The fate of the remaining potential revenue was not specified in the legislation nor in the documentation exchanged between the executive power, the departments, and the provinces, making it difficult to determine its ultimate destination, other than attributing it to the administration itself.

Emphyteusis as a Central Policy to Understanding State-Building in Bolivia

It is crucial to quantify the number of ayllus that may have been impacted by this pivotal legal shift that the government of Ballivián, in alliance with the legislative power, attempted to implement. According to José María Dalence, in 1845, there were 106,132 Indigenous communities in Bolivia, compared with 5,135 haciendas, comprising a total of 478,084 members.Footnote 42 Those communities situated nearest to centers of state decision-making were the most likely to be immediately affected by the changes announced by Ballivián’s policy. As was later observed during the presidency of Mariano Melgarejo, these communities were predominantly located around La Paz.Footnote 43

However, historians have not reached a consensus regarding the real effects of emphyteusis on the thousands of communities potentially impacted; their assertions vary significantly. Peñaloza interprets emphyteusis as an assault on Indigenous rights, characterizing it as both unjust and absurd, while also emphasizing its connection to colonial practices. He argues that no substantial practical effects ensued, a viewpoint echoed by other scholars.Footnote 44 Often, discussions surrounding the analyzed circular merely draw a connection between the administrations of Sucre and Melgarejo, leaving a 30-year gap unexplained and resorting to a rather abstract and Manichaean narrative of progressive state empowerment in opposition to the downfall of the Indigenous communities.Footnote 45

Rodríguez Ostria rejects this overarching perspective, emphasizing the urgency of detailed and qualitative analyses on this issue.Footnote 46 Soux, in alignment with him, acknowledges the significant role of emphyteusis in the ongoing process of undermining the legal status of indigenous communities, which prompted either reorganization within the ayllus or negotiations with republican political actors, such as provincial governors. This policy instigated changes in inheritance practices, affecting internal relations within the ayllus and influencing their demands for land, thereby altering their relationships with public intermediary authorities.Footnote 47 Langer, Grieshaber, Platt, and Barragán have examined this relationship, also addressing Indigenous resistance to liberal policies and the changes and continuities noted in the latter half of the century.Footnote 48 Notably, Irurozqui’s work scrutinizes how indigenous land ownership became a catalyst for political engagement within the ayllus, manifesting both through insurrection and legal actions for participation. Indigenous communities defended their contributions, viewing them as a guarantee of land possession—something that emphyteusis began to jeopardize.Footnote 49

What is generally agreed upon by these scholars is that Ballivián’s policy served as an inspiration for Melgarejo’s administration, although it is also common to describe emphyteusis as an anecdotal step in the advancement of liberal land ownership in Bolivia. Consequently, both the temporality and the overall scope of this prolonged process are obscured by analyses that focus solely on its initial and final stages, hindering efforts to contextualize Bolivian emphyteusis within a regional framework and its historical evolution.

In fact, sources indicate that emphyteusis in Bolivia had a profound epistemological foundation, positioning it as a central policy for understanding the broader process of state-building, and there is compelling evidence that emphyteusis was not merely a procedural step, but a mechanism for legitimizing private property and liberalizing land markets on its own. Although the fundamental argument of this study regarding that was articulated by the visitador in Chayanta, Potosí, to the Minister of Finance in 1844, it is affirmed that the reflections he articulated resonated with the mentalities of the ruling classes, representing a deeply ingrained conceptualization. As such, his message accurately reflects the government’s intentions.

In his communication, the visitador revealed that some individuals (specifically whites and mestizos, who were not affiliated with the ayllus in Chayanta) sought government permission to lease land within community territories for cultivation, the establishment of mills, and even for constructing roads that would connect Potosí with Cochabamba. He noted that a significant agricultural investment would benefit local economy and asserted that it would not harm the communities.

Most critically, his discourse included the following statement:

“Todo esto me parece muy ventajoso a la Nación y a los intereces [sic] públicos. Advierto también que cultivados esos terrenos por manos más laboriosas y más inteligentes que las de los indíjenas [sic] ofreserían [sic] mayores y más variadas producciones. La mescla [sic] de personas racionales con los indíjenas [sic] mejoraría a estos y quisá [sic] después de algún tiempo viéramos confundidas estas castas. Esta práctica tampoco es nueva, y se halla establecida por el reglamento jeneral [sic] de revisitas, mas no he querido avanzarme de las atribuciones detalladas a mi comición [sic] por los supremos decretos del caso.”Footnote 50

These considerations expand the understanding of the role liberal land policies played in shaping Indigenous–state relations. The visitador’s remarks elucidated the potential offered by emphyteusis, particularly in relation to the figure of the colono (“rational person”). Embodying the power of “civilization,” the colonist was perceived as a vector of progress and the best opportunity for the capitalist frontier to penetrate Indigenous communities in regions such as Chayanta. Whites and mestizos were envisioned as instructive models for Indigenous peasants, enhancing production primarily of food for both the internal market and, more desirably, for exportation, ultimately aiming to homogenize the Bolivian countryside.Footnote 51

Numerous individual petitions to the government sought to use the legal provisions offered by emphyteusis to acquire agricultural lands within and between ayllus beyond those in Chayanta. In 1844, a visitador in Tacopaya urged the administration to lease communal lands to investors wishing to establish a mill, which would significantly enhance production and revenue.Footnote 52 In this instance, land distribution occurred not only to colonists, but also to landless Indigenous individuals, although the exact proportions remain unknown.Footnote 53 Landless individuals were included, as it was believed that, beyond providing “good examples” of agricultural exploitation among communal crops, the implementation of emphyteusis could improve “public morality and national convenience” by actively educating the “idle” in capitalist production. The Minister of Interior told provincial visitadores that:

“sin ocupación útil, la corrupción es necesaria, especialmente en la lista de los hombres, que por su condición propia se hallan más espuestos [sic], y se propuso S.E. evitar este mal a los indíjenas [sic] sin tierras, disponiendo, que les fueran adjudicadas […], porque arrancados así del ocio, y de la insignificansia [sic] infamante a que condena a los vagos el buen sentido público, no solo reportarán para si mismos los beneficios de la industria agrícola, obteniendo además la importancia, que en las relaciones sociales se da a los productos, sin que también fueran útiles al Estado, […] en la del aumento del fondo destinado, a conservar la ecsistencia [sic] nacional.”Footnote 54

As land constituted a leased public property, the executive could distribute it to whomever they deemed appropriate when emphyteutic contracts expired due to misuse or death. Moreover, through the authority of provincial governors, land could be allocated to Indigenous individuals lacking access to stable contracts for arable land. Such decisions could be enacted through provincial authorities, which were empowered to oversee land redistribution in accordance with the resolutions and orders outlined previously. This approach aimed not only to resolve recurrent judicial disputes over land within ayllus, thus freeing indigenous peasants to focus on production and resource acquisition for the payment of contributions, but also to address the deteriorating provincial judicial administration, which was mired in ongoing lawsuits regarding encroachments and boundary disputes over communal lands.Footnote 55 In fact, this policy of strengthening provincial authority also targeted the notorious land accumulation by caciques in the provinces of Omasuyos and Ingavi.Footnote 56

Furthermore, the emphyteutic legislation emphasized not only the educational advance of the capitalist frontier, but also its political dimension. If the state aimed to control and redistribute its leased properties, revisitas (inspections) were indispensable for assessing actual divisions, land use, leasing practices, and the expected contributions from communities.Footnote 57 This explains the government’s renewed interest in dispatching fiscal experts to various provinces during the 1840s, including Paria and Carangas (Oruro), Omasuyos and Ingavi (La Paz), Mizque (Cochabamba), and Chayanta, among many others.Footnote 58 Particularly, the aforementioned cases were significant due to the impracticality of conducting revisitas. The vast acreage requiring revision entailed considerable resource expenditure on an undertaking that, in many cases, could prove futile due to agricultural overcrowding or infertility. Land could not be redistributed without breaching contracts or facing diminishing returns, which could trigger political and economic disruptions.

The implicit dangers posed by the revisita were a cause for concern. A notable case occurred in Mizque in 1842, where the prefect of Cochabamba underscored the necessity of controlling and delineating land, as agricultural boundaries had been partially ignored since 1792.Footnote 59 The prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Justice acknowledged the value of conducting a revisita, but cautioned:

“que no podría practicarse la visita, sin quitar tierras de unos indígenas, añadir a las de otros, y espeler [sic] a los que se creyese detentadores […]; que acaso la visita proporcionaría golpes de autoridad para, sin audiencia de interesados ni formas legales, turbar y desatender la poseción [sic], título muy importante por derecho público, civil e internacional con respecto al goce de cualesquier bienes, y cuya privación se llama despojo o público, o privado […]; que de quitarse esas tierras, habría una gran pérdida en las costumbres, en la riqueza pública y en los más caros intereses de la nación, como lo prueba el ejemplo de la Inglaterra donde la estinción [sic] de los monasterios y adjudicación de sus posiciones urbanas y rurales al estado produjeron multitud de pordioseros.”Footnote 60

In this correspondence, the prosecutor explicitly argued against the liberal disengagement and confiscation of land, expressing concerns about poverty and even the potential for Indigenous rebellion should the state proceed to displace individuals from their lands. He was, therefore, advocating for a conservative approach. This discussion illustrates the existence of a debate among the ruling classes regarding a harsh application of liberal land ideals, exemplified by the prefect’s position, versus a more tempered approach that deferred the clash between models while not renouncing the foundational principles of private property. Should emphyteusis function as intended, it would facilitate the establishment of a developed economic frontier and a consolidated group of individualistic capitalist producers and exporters within the Indigenous population.

Nevertheless, the approach represented by Ballivián’s government was insufficient to achieve its principal objectives. The expansion of private property was limited, primarily due to two factors: the political actions of ayllu members against what was perceived as usurpation, coupled with the state’s lack of resources to impose its decisions; and the weakness of the policy in terms of republican legitimacy, which failed to provide white-mestizo colonists with adequate security for their investments and their encroachment upon Indigenous lands.

First, most of the revisitas during this period were halted not only due to economic inadequacy, but also because of Indigenous resistance and the possibility of revolt. In 1847, a resurgence of historically recurrent Indigenous rebellions occurred in the region.Footnote 61 The scarcity of public funds compelled the executive to demand that ayllus prepay their contributions, alienating indigenous support from Ballivián and shifting it toward alternative political options, such as José Miguel de Velasco, and notably, Manuel Isidoro Belzu.Footnote 62 Therefore, although it could be argued that Ballivián’s government was challenging the pact between the ayllus and the State, which was based on the payment of tribute in exchange for the respect of communal property, in practice, it actually reinforced this arrangement, placing greater emphasis on the Indigenous contribution as a source of revenue for the treasury. This situation underscored the capacity of Indigenous communities to manipulate legitimacy, thereby affirming their status as active political actors.Footnote 63 By demonstrating their political agency, these communities maintained their communal property over agricultural lands and their legal personality throughout the decade.Footnote 64

Although a civic–military uprising in 1847 succeeded, with widespread Indigenous support for the change, the loss of Indigenous backing for Ballivián’s government cannot be directly attributed to the emphyteutic legislation; however, the threat of losing their land undoubtedly influenced their direct involvement in the revolt. In sum, Indigenous resistance was not always linked to events directly related to violence and could be associated with the coercion of public employees or the fabrication of physical injuries to justify the non-payment of the tributo or a potential emphyteutic rent.Footnote 65

Secondly, a more hypothetical question arises from the preceding arguments: could it be that emphyteusis failed not only due to the state’s incapacity to impose it upon ayllus that resisted, but also because it was inadequately constructed to pass through the rituals of republican legitimation? The vacillation, indecisiveness, and inconsistencies evident in the legal framework reflect hidden realities regarding the relationship between the ostensibly liberal state and Indigenous communities, particularly the former’s inability to integrate the latter under terms of individual property and capitalist agriculture.Footnote 66 The transition from a circular on emphyteusis (introduced in 1842) to a law in 1844, which was drafted in ambiguous and evasive terms, likely appeared insufficiently robust to potential colonos, who may have perceived it as inadequate for protecting speculative interests and enabling the physical encroachment of white-mestizos onto indigenous lands. Consequently, the capitalist frontier could not advance as desired, perpetuating usurpation as a preferred method for acquiring land by colonists, provincial governors, and public officials. This practice was antithetical to the state, intent on controlling the influx of colonists onto ayllu lands as part of a managed liberal expansion.Footnote 67

In summary, while the enactment of legislation was the primary vector in the state-building process, in the context of land ownership, the actions of the ruling classes adapted to Indigenous resistance, striving to promote the advancement of the capitalist frontier through the controlled introduction of “civilized” colonists as instructive “good examples.” Concurrently, this approach aimed to undermine communal property, homogenizing agricultural ownership and taxation. Jorge Mallo, a Bolivian intellectual actively engaged in politics during that decade, recognized this attempted process and sought to refine it, ensuring continuity of Ballivián’s policies over time.

A Brief Look at the Emphyteutic Legacy in Jorge Mallo’s Work

Considering the previous analysis, the connection between Ballivián’s policies and the conflict between Melgarejo’s administration and the ayllus in the 1860s has remained elusive in most historical works, likely due to a significant lack of sources. As will be shown below, the potential for establishing this link lies not in legal frameworks, but in the public sphere. Jorge Mallo’s pamphlet serves as a crucial point in this narrative, presenting a hybrid proposal that bridges the approaches of José Ballivián and Mariano Melgarejo.

Written in 1861, Mallo’s work offers a comprehensive historical context for the social and economic conditions in 1860s Bolivia. It critiques the tax system, particularly its impact on Indigenous communities, stating that those who suffer from “no crime but simplicity” and “natural ignorance” have become worse off than any serfs or enslaved persons. Furthermore, Mallo presents a project aimed at fundamentally reforming the country’s fiscal policy, backed by detailed economic data from the 1857 state budget. His text also addresses issues related to currency, public debt, and customs.Footnote 68

Despite its depth, Mallo’s work has largely been overlooked by historians, with notable exceptions such as Irurozqui’s analysis.Footnote 69 Irurozqui emphasizes that Mallo was not alone in discussing land tenure during the 1860s, as public debates around this topic were increasing.Footnote 70 The significance of Mallo’s text lies in its ability to experiment with liberal ideas while occupying a middle ground between the two administrations mentioned.

Mallo explicitly aimed to improve the conditions of the indigenous population. He condemned the contribution tax, viewing it as a tyrannical remnant of vassalage that curtailed individual freedom, rendered the land market irrelevant, and constrained labor within speculative industries.Footnote 71 He argued that the collection of this tax led to a deterioration in the living conditions of Indigenous people since Latin American independence movements.Footnote 72 However, this humanitarian sentiment was quickly overshadowed by his underlying economic motivations. Mallo believed that Bolivia’s independence, achieved through political revolution, was incomplete without concurrent economic and fiscal reform. He posited that the contribution tax, the tributo, posed the greatest obstacle to advancing a liberal economic model. Without its reform, Bolivia would remain trapped in a colonial legacy, perpetuating subsistence agriculture.Footnote 73

His proposals were far from conventional. While seeking to foster legal and social homogeneity in line with the dominant discourse, he did not advocate for the abolition of communal property or the dismantling of the ayllus. Instead, he focused on protecting Indigenous agricultural production. His solution echoed Bolivian legal traditions, resembling emphyteusis in several respects, while simultaneously laying the groundwork for the eventual establishment of private property and capitalist agriculture.

Although the document under consideration is a pamphlet intended for public distribution, Mallo employed a literary strategy designed to imbue it with political significance and to stimulate debate: he framed his ideas as though they were a four-article legislative proposal to be presented before Congress. The first article proposed the abolition of the Indigenous tributo within 18 months. The second prohibited the demand for personal services, such as pongos or mitanis, from both private individuals and the state. The third transformed the contribution into a tax on the absis of the amount of land an Indigenous individual possessed, allowing them to retain their land as property while preventing its sale to avoid pressure from haciendas. The fourth outlined how to publicly assess the value of Indigenous lands.Footnote 74 As might be expected, that proposal did not reach Congress.

Mallo cleverly anticipated the potential revenue loss for the state resulting from the abolition of the contribution by proposing new mechanisms to replace those funds.Footnote 75 He argued that eliminating the contribution would not incur costs for the state treasury but would provide significant benefits for Indigenous people, promoting their legal equality with white-mestizos and alleviating the economic discrimination associated with the contribution. Additionally, Mallo’s emphasis on individual taxation and property linked his ideas to those of Melgarejo and subsequent proposals.Footnote 76

Moreover, the implementation of Mallo’s law would have ramifications beyond the legal sphere. His arguments echoed those of the visitador in Chayanta, directly connecting his proposal to Ballivián’s policies. He stated:

“No esperemos de un día para otro la realización literal del nuevo sistema rentístico perfectamente adecuado a nuestra natural condición. La ociosidad de ra[z]a, la ineptitud hereditaria para las industrias i la libertad, no acabarán con razonamientos i amoniciones [sic]; acabarán por la presencia estimulante de poblaciones activas, formadas en la acción del trabajo, mediante un tiempo más o menos dilatado.”Footnote 77

The recurring theme of the “good example” underscored a strategy of production and political organization that positioned a “superior” or “civilized” way of life against the “inferior,” pre-liberal lifestyle that Indigenous people were perceived as stubbornly clinging to. For Mallo, this exemplary presence would facilitate economic development within Indigenous communities and encourage their transition to individualist agricultural practices. He believed that Indigenous people could not fully comprehend what was best for them and required public tutelage for their own benefit and that of the nation; he wrote, “[para que] comprendan poco a poco las ventajas del amor a la propiedad.”Footnote 78 Thus, parallels with Ballivián’s administration become clear, as Mallo sought outcomes similar to those Melgarejo would later pursue.

Additionally, both the Ballivián administration and Mallo’s proposals suggested that despite acknowledging their “corto ingenio,” the Bolivian ruling class believed that Indigenous people could learn and implement a form of capitalist agricultural production. This implies a confidence in the capacity of certain ayllu members to act as agents of capitalist progress, suggesting that their total disappearance, as a “raza de atraso,” was unnecessary. Therefore, while the juridical anomalies of Indigenous communities needed to be addressed, their members as living individuals were not to be eradicated. This perspective aligns with late colonial traditions of coexistence and diverges from later positions related to positivism and social Darwinism.Footnote 79

Recognizing the evident changes and continuities, Mallo’s proposals reflect both the legacy of Ballivián’s legislation and the anticipatory groundwork for Melgarejo’s policies. The author presented a series of proposals in his pamphlet, partially published in the form of a hypothetical law. It cannot be stated with certainty that these proposals had a decisive influence on the subsequent decisions that ultimately led to the disentangling of Indigenous lands. However, an intertextual relationship between Mallo’s text, Ballivián’s attempts, and Melgarejo’s policies did exist and can be interpreted as marks of a continuous chain. It follows that the political class’s concern with land ownership and its relationship with Indigenous communities—first initiated during the republican period under Sucre’s presidency and undergoing certain mutations during Ballivián’s era—did not disappear from the political scene and resurfaced with Melgarejo; rather, it never truly left it. Nevertheless, this discussion should not be sought in executive debates or legislative sessions but in the public sphere. From there, Mallo, in a privileged position as chief accountant, was able to influence the debate. Thus, we argue that not only Jorge Mallo, but also the broader public sphere took up the task of advancing economic and political boundaries in Indigenous agriculture, continuing the dialogue surrounding land ownership and setting the stage for the legal homogeneity imposed in the 1870s.

Final Remarks

The process of state-building in Latin America created an oscillating continuum that reflected the strengths and weaknesses of the various political actors involved. Taking the region as a whole, on one side were those advocating for the establishment of a republican state; on the other, those defending local interests and alternative forms of property rooted in pluralism, tradition, and Indigenous sociopolitical structures. This dynamic, particularly evident in Andean countries, constituted what Zavaleta described as an “abigarrada” social formation—a layered society divided into dominator and dominated.Footnote 80 However, this framework is not as straightforward as it may seem; societal layers interacted with one another, and from these “unliberal” relations emerged a broader evolving social process.Footnote 81

The contradictions evident during the state-building efforts of nineteenth-century Latin America can be viewed as part of a political experimentation process involving both society and its rulers. These actors attempted to mold new states and nations to fit their conditions, often lacking clear guidance and having to improvise solutions.Footnote 82 Given that reforms frequently strayed from liberal orthodoxy, states had to adapt in response to the actions of citizens, the public sphere, and specifically, Indigenous communities. The actions of the ayllus actively delayed the rural institutionalization of republican power structures by presenting a threat of rebellion from a maximalist perspective while also exerting influence through less spectacular means, such as judicial demands, land disputes, and protests directed at the governors. Their understanding of the state’s economic urgency positioned them as a tangible local counter-power, capable of counteracting state moves and affirming the validity of communal property.Footnote 83 This relationship between Indigenous people and agricultural land was common across many Latin American countries throughout the nineteenth century, prompting questions about whether the existence of communal lands and communities was truly contradictory to liberalism, given their significant role in the regional state-building process. The conclusions of this article support the argument that heterogeneity in land ownership was an intrinsic part of the process of state formation in Latin America.

However, emphyteusis did not in fact result in significant practical changes in territorial organization, as the regulatory structures of traditional power persisted, albeit with some adaptation in their strategies. As demonstrated by Soux, emphyteusis impacted 1840s Bolivia by altering inheritance processes and the relationship between Indigenous institutions. It also introduced a degree of capitalist elements into ayllu lands, aimed at promoting capitalist advances through agrarian education, even if the results did not meet government expectations. Furthermore, Ballivián’s initiatives undeniably influenced public opinion, as seen in Mallo’s work, and shaped future liberal policies.

In conclusion, the clash between private and communal property allowed Indigenous people to participate in the state-building process. They engaged in local politics, paid contributions, and contributed to internal market movements, all while feeling that their legal status was protected and that they were expressing popular will.Footnote 84 The studied process, initiated by Sucre and continued by Ballivián, was culminated when increased state revenues rendered the contribution tax unnecessary for the budget, which prompted the juridical disappearance of the ayllu in 1874.Footnote 85

Acknowledgements

This work is part of the I+D+i project PID2023-147467NB-I00, “Las alteridades de la nación. América Latina, mediados del siglo XVIII-mediados del siglo XX.” I am grateful to Charles Walker and José Juan Pérez Meléndez for our conversations on this topic during my time as a visiting scholar at the University of California, Davis. This text owes much to the mentorship of Pilar García Jordán and her scholarly contributions. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the members of the editorial board of The Americas for their insightful comments, which have helped shape the final version of this article.

Author Biography

Pol Colàs is a researcher and substitute professor at the Universitat de Barcelona (Spain). He is the author of La Presidencia de José Ballivián (1841–1847). Construcción del Estado e imposición de un proyecto nacional en Bolivia (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2024).

References

1 René Zavaleta Mercado, Lo nacional popular en Bolivia (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1986).

2 Oscar Oszlak, “Reflexiones sobre la formación del Estado y la construcción de la sociedad argentina,” Desarrollo económico XXI (1982): 1–2; Brooke Larson, Trials of Nation Making. Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810–1910 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 13; Ingrid de Jong and Antonio Escobar Ohmstede, “Un contexto comparativo del papel de los indígenas en la creación y la conformación de las naciones y los estados en la América Latina del siglo XIX.” In Ingrid De Jong and Antonio Escobar Ohmstede, coord., Las poblaciones indígenas en la conformación de las naciones y los Estados en la América Latina decimonónica (Mexico City/Zamora: El Colegio de México – CIESAS – El Colegio de Michoacán, 2016), 14; Marta Irurozqui, “Ciudadanía armada versus caudillismo. Tres historias bolivianas sobre violencia y ley constitucional, 1841–1875.” In Núria Tabanera and Marta Bonaudo, coord., América Latina de la independencia a la crisis del liberalismo, 1810–1930, vol. V (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2016), 107; Hilda Sábato, Republics of the New World: The Revolutionary Political Experiment in 19 th -Century Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).

3 The legacy of this tense framework between Indigenous communities and the state persists to the present day, manifesting in historical resistances and collaborations, including strategies of adaptation, negotiation, and avoidance regarding these power structures. This reality has been canalized by violence, but also by law or language (Rossana Barragán, “The census and the making of a social ‘order’ in nineteenth-century Bolivia.” In Laura Gotkowitz, Histories of Race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Duke University Press, 2011), 113).

4 Pol Colàs, La Presidencia de José Ballivián (1841–1847). Construcción del Estado e imposición de un proyecto nacional en Bolivia (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2024).

5 William Lofstrom, La presidencia de Sucre en Bolivia (La Paz: Biblioteca del Bicentenario de Bolivia, 2017 [1983]); Erick D. Langer, “Bajo la sombra del Cerro Rico. Redes comerciales y el fracaso del nacionalismo económico en el Potosí del siglo XIX,” Revista Andina 37 (2003): 77–94.

6 As stated in Ligia Maria Osorio Silva and María Verónica Secreto, “Terras públicas, ocupação privada: elementos para a história comparada da apropriação territorial na Argentina e no Brasil,” Economia e sociedade 12 (1999): 118–119.

7 In terms of “capitalist education,” following what has been said by Marta Irurozqui, “The sound of the Pututos. Politicisation and indigenous rebellions in Bolivia, 1826–1921,” Journal of Latin American Studies 32:1 (2000): 85; Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, Violencias (re)encubiertas en Bolivia (La Paz: La Mirada Salvaje – Editorial Piedra Rota, 2010), 40–41.

8 Antonio Mitre, “Modernización, reforma política y unidad estatal en Bolivia,” Universum 23:1 (2008): 135–136.

9 Jorge Mallo, Defensa hecha por la parte del ciudadano Jorje Mallo en la causa criminal seguida contra él por tentativa de delito de rebelión en la noche del 28 de mayo último (Sucre: Prensa de Castillo, 1842).

10 See María Elena Infesta, La Pampa criolla. Usufructo y apropiación privada de tierras públicas en Buenos Aires, 1820–1850 (La Plata: Archivo Histórico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 2003).

11 Juan Carlos Rubinstein. Filiación histórica y sociopolítica de la enfiteusis rivadaviana (Buenos Aires: Fundación Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 1984), 9–15.

12 María Verónica Secreto, “Procesos judiciales y recorridos administrativos. La conflictiva propiedad de los Díaz Vélez, Buenos Aires, siglo XIX,” Prohistoria 5 (2001): 230–232; María Valeria Ciliberto, “La tierra pública periurbana: arrendamiento, enfiteusis y ventas en el entorno agrario de Buenos Aires (San José de Flores, 1800-1862),” Trabajos y Comunicaciones 35 (2009): 1–2.

13 Juan Carlos Garavaglia and Jorge Gelman, “Mucha tierra y poca gente: un nuevo balance historiográfico de la historia rural platense (1750–1850),” Historia Agraria 15 (1998): 40; Valeria D’Agostino, “Enfiteutas, propietarios, agregados y ocupantes en el ‘nuevo sur’: los partidos de Arenales y Ayacucho (1823–1860),” Mundo Agrario 7:14 (2007): 4.

14 Jorge Gelman, “Producción y explotaciones agrarias bonaerenses entre la colonia y la primera mitad del siglo XIX. Rupturas y continuidades,” Anuario del IEHS 12 (1997): 61.

15 Diego Escolar, “Huarpe archives in the Argentine desert: Indigenous claims and state construction in nineteenth-century Mendoza,” Hispanic American Historical Review 93:3 (2013): 460.

16 Cecilia A. Fandos and Ana A. Teruel, “‘¿Cómo quitarles esas tierras en un día después de 200 años de posesión?’. Enfiteusis, legislación y práctica en la Quebrada de Humahuaca (Argentina),” Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Études Andines 41:2 (2012): 215.

17 María Verónica Secreto, Fronteiras em movimiento: História comparada – Argentina e Brasil no século XIX (Niterói: Editora UFF, 2012), 239.

18 Ligia Maria Osorio Silva, Terras devolutas e latifúndio (Campinas: Ed. da UNICAMP, 1996), 95–97.

19 With an uneven impact through Brazilian geography (Vilma Eliza Trinidade de Saboya, “A Lei de Terras (1850) e a política imperial—Seus reflexos na Província de Mato Grosso,” Revista Brasileira de História 15:30 (1995): 115–136).

20 Osorio Silva, Terras devolutas, 334–336.

21 Edda O. Samudio A., “De propiedad comunal a propiedad individual en el escenario agrario republicano de Venezuela. El caso de Timotes, Mérida,” Procesos Históricos 26 (2014): 216–227.

22 Aquiles Omar Ávila Quijas, “Interpretaciones sobre la redención de censos enfitéuticos en Guatemala a finales del siglo XIX. Los casos de Antigua Guatemala, San Felipe y San Mateo Milpas Altas,” Mundo Agrario, 13:25 (2012): 1–2.

23 Gérard Béaur and Jean-Michel Chevet, “Droits de propriété et croissance: l’émergence de la propriété «parfaite» et l’ouverture du marché foncier, moteurs de la croissance agricole?,” Histoire & Sociétés Rurales 48:2 (2017): 49–92; Rosa Congost and Pablo F. Luna, ed., Agrarian Change and Imperfect Property: Emphyteusis in Europe (16 th to 19 th Centuries) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018).

24 Llorenç Ferrer i Alòs, “La formació d’una estructura de la propietat de la terra a la Catalunya Vella (segles XVI–XIX),” Manuscrits. Revista d’Història Moderna 33 (2015): 69.

25 Pol Colàs, “Félix Frías y el giro a los Orientes bolivianos de José Ballivián”, Revista de Indias LXXXI:283 (2021): 525–557.

26 Janet Groff Greever, José Ballivián y el Oriente boliviano (La Paz: Empresa Editora Siglo Ltda., 1987); Pilar García Jordán, Cruz y arado, fusiles y discursos: la construcción de los Orientes en el Perú y Bolivia, 1820–1940 (Lima: IFEA – IEP, 2001), 251–252; Carlos Pérez, “The political origins of the Cinchona Bark Lobby of La Paz, 1840–1847,” Bolivian Studies Journal 14 (2007): 213–234; Pol Colàs, “Estrategias en pugna para el control del guano y la cascarilla en Bolivia,” Secuencia: Revista de historia y ciencias sociales 115 (2023): 1–29.

27 Chosen by executive decision, the governors were heads of provincial governments, with the explicit function of centralizing and delivering the product of the indigenous contribution to the public treasury, enforcing the legality approved by Congress and the orders and decrees of the administration, defending the legitimacy of elections, overseeing the police, restoring roads, schools, and prisons, providing provisions to stationed troops, supervising the functions of jueces de paz y de letras, conducting provincial statistics and censuses, proposing mayors, and ensuring the proper functioning of the clergy; in Pol Colàs, “En los intersticios de la localidad. La institucionalización legal del poder local en Bolivia,” Boletín Americanista 87 (2023): 19.

28 “Son de la propiedad del estado, las tierras que poseen los originarios, no debiéndose considerar estos, sino como una especie de enfiteutas que pagan cierta cantidad al Sr. del dominio directo por el usufructo, y cuando fenecida la familia de los poseedores, quedan vacantes dichas tierras, toca al Gobernador que representa al estado, y a cuyo cargo corre la recaudación, adjudicarlas a otro indíjena [sic], y solo a él pertenece también el derecho de recojer [sic], las que hayan sido usurpadas, para darles igual destino que a las vacantes. Por lo cual, y porque informado S.E. el Presidente de la República, ya de que en las provincias los jueces de letras y de paz, dando el carácter de contenciosas a las disputas, que se suscitan entre los indígenas originarios sobre terrenos, se han avanzado hasta a anular los títulos dados por los gobernadores, y aun a calificarlos de expoliativos, causando de este modo alteraciones de las matrículas; ya además, de que los miserables indígenas, en sus pequeñas diferencias sobre límites, hacen gastos excedentes al valor de lo litigado, con lo que se arruinan e incapacitan para continuar contribuyendo; oído el dictamen del M.I.S. Fiscal de la Corte Suprema de justicia, se ha servido resolver: que en cuestiones de usurpación de terrenos pertenecientes a originarios, en adjudicación, y en las de límites, den entender privativamente los gobernadores de provincia, quedando únicamente reservadas a los jueces, las que se entablen entre comunidad y comunidad. Consiguientemente, ninguna autoridad judicial tiene jurisdicción para injerirse en estas medidas, que son puramente económicas y gubernativas” (Colección Oficial de Leyes, Decretos, Órdenes y Resoluciones Supremas que se han expedido para el Régimen de la República Boliviana, (Sucre: Imprenta de López, 1858) [hereafter Colección]: vol. 8).

29 Mostly compared with the case of Mérida, Venezuela, analyzed by Samudio A., “De propiedad comunal a propiedad individual,” 227.

30 The Indigenous tributo, known as the contribution during republican times, was essentially a colonial inheritance that underwent little change and formed the basis of public budgets in countries such as Bolivia and Peru during the first half of the nineteenth century. It was collected within the same communities by kurakas, who, in turn, forwarded the payment to the provincial governors. In this article, the term “tributo” is used to emphasise its connection with colonial administration.

31 Ana A. Teruel, “La desvinculación de la propiedad comunal indígena a comienzos del siglo XIX en la provincia de Sud Chichas: pervivencias y transformaciones,” XI Jornadas Interescuelas/Departamentos de Historia. Universidad de Tucumán (2007): 8.

32 Fandos and Teruel, “‘¿Cómo quitarles esas tierras en un día después de 200 años de posesión?’,” 215.

33 As, in part, happened much later in Mendoza, as shown by Diego Escolar, “Mitologías soberanas: tierras indígenas y construcción de la propiedad privada en Mendoza a fines del siglo XIX,” Memoria americana 28:1 (2020): 92–116.

34 “Juez para las cuestiones de terrenos de originarios”, Colección: vol. 8.

35 “Los Jueces de Letras de Provincia son competentes, para conocer de las cuestiones de comunidades de indígenas”, Colección: vol. 9.

36 “Modo de proceder en las demandas verbales sobre terrenos de indígenas. Apelación”, Colección: vol. 10.

37 “Atribución de los Gobernadores de Provincia en los asuntos de terrenos de indígenas”, Colección: vol. 10.

38 “Consolidación del dominio directo de fincas enfitéuticas del Estado”, Colección: vol. 9.

39 “Consolidación de dominio de fincas enfitéuticas de Beneficencia”, Colección: vol. 10.

40 “Reglamenta la consolidación del dominio de fincas enfitéuticas”, Colección: vol. 9.

41 “Parte correspondiente a la Policía en el dinero que se oblare, por consolidación de dominio de fincas enfitéuticas”, Colección: vol. 10.

42 Even with those numbers, Dalence tried to undermine communities’ importance, detaching them from a continuity with the mythical Inca past and affirming its close expiration, using emphyteusis as an undeniable practical reality (José María Dalence, Bosquejo estadístico de Bolivia (Sucre: Imprenta de Sucre, 1851), 233–237).

43 Following Erick D. Langer, “El liberalismo y la abolición de la comunidad indígena en el siglo XIX,” Historia y Cultura 14 (1988): 1880–1930.

44 Luis Peñaloza, Nueva historia económica de Bolivia. De la independencia a los albores de la Guerra del Pacífico, (La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1983), 84–88.

45 Herbert S. Klein, Haciendas y ayllus en Bolivia, ss. XVIII y XIX (Lima: IEP, 1995), 165.

46 Gonzalo Rodríguez Ostria, “Entre reformas y contrarreformas: las comunidades indígenas en el valle bajo cochabambino (1825–1900),” Data. Revista del Instituto de Estudios Andinos y Amazónicos 1 (1991): 172.

47 María Luisa Soux, “El problema de la propiedad en las comunidades indígenas.” In Rossana Barragán, Dora Cajías and Seemin Qayum, comp., El siglo XIX: Bolivia y América Latina (Lima: IFEA, 1997), 497–505; what created a relationship on the basis of dependence, according to Roberto Choque Canqui, “La servidumbre indígena andina de Bolivia.” In Rossana Barragán, Dora Cajías and Seemin Qayum, comp., El siglo XIX: Bolivia y América Latina (Lima: IFEA, 1997), 438–444.

48 Erwin P. Grieshaber, “Survival of Indian communities in nineteenth-century Bolivia: a regional comparison,” Journal of Latin American Studies 12:2 (1980), 223–269; Erick D. Langer, “Persistencia y cambio en las comunidades indígenas del sur de Bolivia en el siglo XIX,” Data. Revista del Instituto de Estudios Andinos y Amazónicos 1 (1991), 61–83; Rossana Barragán, “¿Ladrones, pequeños empresarios o trabajadores independientes? K’ajchas, trapiches y plata en el cerro de Potosí en el siglo XVIII,” Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos 15 (2015), 1–2.

49 Irurozqui, “The Sound of the Pututos,” 85–92.

50 Visitador of Chayanta to the Ministry of Finance, August 15, 1844, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda [MH], 96/21, Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia [hereafter ABNB]. The original writing is conserved, as done with the following texts.

51 Ministry of Finance to José Ballivián, January 11, 1842, Fondo Ministerio del Interior [MI], 91/11, ff. 1-1r, ABNB; Governor of Muñecas to Prefecture of La Paz, November 11, 1843, MI, 96/51, ABNB.

52 Visitador of Tacopaya to the Ministry of Finance, July 30, 1844, MH, 98/39, f. 1, ABNB.

53 Visitador of Chayanta to the Ministry of Finance, August 18, 1844, MH, 96/21, ABNB.

54 Ministry of Finance to visitadores, April 26, 1844, MI, 83/27, ABNB.

55 Governor of Tapacarí to Prefecture of Cochabamba, March 14, 1842, MH, 86/19, ff. 58–59, ABNB; Agent to Prefecture of Cochabamba, August 3, 1842, MH, 86/19, ff. 60-61, ABNB (“son también muy comunes las usurpaciones que se notan, pues que hay indígenas que se han apropiado de asignaciones vacantes y se hallan en poseción [sic] de dos y tres mientras que los demás careciendo de terrenos para el cultibo [sic] se ven impociblitados [sic] para el pago de la contribución de su clase y sirviendo como colonos a los usurpadores que no satisfacen más que una contribución en perjuicio de los intereses del Estado”).

56 What effectively limited the production of the community destined to exportation, at the expense of what was pursued by the executive (Visitador of Omasuyos and Ingavi to the Ministry of Finance, June 25, 1844, MH, 96/21, ABNB).

57 “Por la Suprema Circular de 11 de Diciembre de 1842 se hallan declarados propiedad del Estado todos los terrenos que poseen los indíjenas [sic] orijinarios [sic], con nombre de comunidad. El artículo 19 del Código de procedimientos ordena que los Jueces de Letras de las Capitales de Departamento conoscan [sic] privativamente en todos los negocios en que se versen intereses del Estado. Conforme a este artículo, el juez de letras primero de la Capital debería conocer de todos los litigios a que sobre estas tierras se ventilan en las ocho Provincias de que consta el Departamento” (Corte Superior de La Paz to the Ministry of Finance, January 13, 1845, MH, 99/3, f. 1, ABNB).

58 Governor of Paria to Prefecture of Oruro, March 4, 1844, MI, 102/28, ff. 2-3, ABNB; Visitador of Chayanta to the Ministry of Interior, June 30, 1844, MI, 102/29, ABNB; Agent to Prefecture of Cochabamba, August 3, 1842, MH, 86/19, f. 60, ABNB; Visitador of Chayanta to the Ministry of Finance, July 22, 1844, MH, 96/21, ABNB.

59 “La seguridad de las propiedades territoriales y el conocimiento de sus límites, es, sin duda, una de las grandes ventajas que ofrece la civilización, y de esta ventaja todavía no gozan los aboríjenas [sic]” (Prefecture of Cochabamba to the Ministry of Finance, October 11, 1842, MH, 86/19, f. 191, ABNB).

60 Prosecutor of the Corte Suprema de Justicia to Prefecture of Cochabamba, November 5, 1842, MH, ff. 192–192r, ABNB.

61 Recurrent as one can follow a clear path of rebellions dating from the eighteenth century (Leon G. Campbell, “Recent research on Andean peasant revolts, 1750–1820,” Latin American Research Review 14:1 (1979), 3–49; Charles F. Walker, The Tupac Amaru Rebellion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014)).

62 Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Interior, May 27, 1846, MI, 113/17, ABNB; May 30, 1846, MI, 113/17, ABNB. Both oppositors were to be the following presidents of Bolivia; Velasco took the oath for only few months (Irurozqui, “The Sound of the Pututos,” 92). Belzu’s presidency would be more decisive.

63 In this case, using violence to defend what they perceived as their rights (see Marta Irurozqui, Ciudadanos armados de ley. A propósito de la violencia en Bolivia, 1839–1875 (La Paz: Plural Editores – IFEA, 2018)).

64 Tristan Platt, “Liberalismo y etnocidio en los Andes del sur,” Autodeterminación 9 (1991), 20; J. Gutiérrez Ramos, “Comunidades indígenas, liberalismo y estados nacionales en los Andes en el siglo XIX,” Anuario de Historia regional y de las fronteras 4:1 (1998), 314. Then, emphyteusis was part of a cautious liberal offensive, but this extreme necessity of the contribution contradicted the political movement in its own basis.

65 Colàs, La Presidencia de José Ballivián (1841–1847), 142–143.

66 Gutiérrez Ramos, “Comunidades indígenas, liberalismo,” 304–314.

67 Governor of Tapacarí to Prefecture of Cochabamba, March 14, 1842, MH, f. 58, ABNB; Visitador of Omasuyos and Ingavi to the Ministry of Finance, June 25, 1844, MH, 96/21, ABNB.

68 Jorge Mallo, Aplicación económica cambiando el sistema rentístico de la República conforme a las costumbres modernas por el ciudadano Jorje Mallo (Sucre: Imprenta de Beeche, 1861).

69 Marta Irurozqui, “Las paradojas de la tributación. Ciudadanía y política estatal indígena en Bolivia, 1825–1900,” Revista de Indias LIX:217 (1999), 706–707. Also, one must consult Víctor Peralta and Marta Irurozqui, Por la Concordia, la Fusión y el Unitarismo. Estado y caudillismo en Bolivia, 1825–1880 (Madrid: CSIC, 2000), 86.

70 It is not the intention of this paper to analyze that debate, with authors, apart from Mallo, such as Melchor Urquidi, José Vicente Dorado, Miguel María Aguirre and Pedro Vargas, as accurately shown by Irurozqui, “Las paradojas de la tributación,” 721–722.

71 “La independencia de América, práctica para todos los americanos, i aún los estranjeros [sic] que han entrado en posesión del comercio libre, no lo es para el indíjena [sic] que sigue con esa marca de basallaje [sic] impuesta por la mano férrea del fanático Felipe 2º” (Mallo, Aplicación económica, 12).

72 Which, in fact, is rejected by investigations such as those of Antonio Mitre, El Monedero de los Andes: región económica y moneda boliviana (La Paz: HISBOL, 1986), 11; or Tristan Platt, Estado boliviano y ayllu andino. Tierra y tributo en el Norte de Potosí (La Paz: Biblioteca del Bicentenario de Bolivia, 2016), 81.

73 Mallo, Aplicación económica, 27.

74 Mallo, Aplicación económica, 15–16.

75 Taking his pretended law as basis, “se reduciría esta contribución de 836,606 pesos a lo siguiente por lo que pagan los indíjenas [sic] con terrenos, según la Memoria del Ministerio de 1857: Orijinarios [sic] con tierras 248,000—Agregados id. 11,000—Forasteros id. 23,500—Total 282,500. Quedan para remplazar 554,106” (Mallo, Aplicación económica, 16).

76 Brooke Larson, Indígenas, élites y Estado en la formación de las repúblicas andinas, 1850–1910 (Lima: IEP – PUCP, 2002), 151–154.

77 Mallo, Aplicación económica, 11–12.

78 Mallo, Aplicación económica, 14.

79 At least, for the Indigenous people submitted to statal authority. In Platt, “Liberalismo y etnocidio,” 12; Rivera Cusicanqui, Violencias (re)encubiertas en Bolivia, 40.

80 René Zavaleta Mercado, El Estado en América Latina (La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1989), 175–177.

81 Oszlak, “Reflexiones sobre la formación del Estado,” 1; Irurozqui, “The Sound of the Pututos,” 87.

82 Antonio Annino and Marcela Ternavasio, coord., El laboratorio constitucional iberoamericano: 1807/1808–1830 (Madrid: AHILA – Iberoamericana-Vervuert, 2012), 9.

83 Louis Dumont, “La Communauté anthropologique et l’idéologie,” L’Homme 18:3–4 (1978), 89.

84 Marta Irurozqui, “El espejismo de la exclusión. Reflexiones conceptuales acerca de la ciudadanía y el sufragio censitario a partir del caso boliviano,” Ayer 70:2 (2008), 63–67.

85 Platt, Estado boliviano y ayllu andino, 77–80.