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MORAL RELATIVISM AND THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 December 2015

David O'Connor
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Abstract

What makes a morally right action morally right and a morally wrong action morally wrong? For clarity's sake, let us divide the question. First, what makes a particular action the morally right action in some situation, that is, what makes it morally obligatory? Second, what makes a particular action a (but not the) morally right action in some situation, that is, what makes it morally permissible (and optional)? And third, what makes a morally wrong action morally wrong (that is, morally impermissible) in some situation?

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Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 15 , Issue 42 , Spring 2016 , pp. 71 - 78
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2015 

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References

Note

1 Without tying him to my thesis or argument, I am grateful to Stephen Law for a useful suggestion.