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ON ONTOLOGY AND REALISM IN MATHEMATICS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 February 2012

HAIM GAIFMAN
HAIM GAIFMAN*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Columbia University
*
*PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY NEW YORK, NY 10027 E-mail:hg17@columbia.edu
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Extract

The paper is concerned with the way in which “ontology” and “realism” are to be interpreted and applied so as to give us a deeper philosophical understanding of mathematical theories and practice. Rather than argue for or against some particular realistic position, I shall be concerned with possible coherent positions, their strengths and weaknesses. I shall also discuss related but different aspects of these problems. The terms in the title are the common thread that connects the various sections.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , September 2012 , pp. 480 - 512
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2012

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References

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