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An Organizational Perspective of Corruption1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2015

Yadong Luo
Yadong Luo*
Affiliation:
School of Business Administration, University of Miami, USA
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Abstract

An organizational view of corruption is a frontier and challenging issue in the realm of management and organization research. This article elucidates four interrelated yet sequential issues that collectively constitute organizational explanations of corruption: (i) corruption and organizational environment; (ii) corruption and organizational behaviour; (iii) corruption and organizational consequences; and (iv) corruption and organizational architecture. Specifically, it (1) offers taxonomic metaphors that identify different corrupt organizations on the basis of corruption scale and hierarchical involvement; (2) defines task environments (oligopoly intensity, regulatory control and structural uncertainly) and institutional environments (opaqueness, injustice and complexity) that stimulate illicit acts; (3) confers a typology of corrupt behaviors that align with these task and institutional environments and correspond to different metaphors (system malfeasance, procedural malfeasance, categorical malfeasance and structural malfeasance); (4) develops the logic that corruption impedes organizational development through quadri-damages (evolutionary hazard, strategic impediment, competitive disadvantage and organizational deficiency; and (5) illuminates a corruption-resisting architecture comprising corporate culture, organizational structure and compliance system.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Management and Organization Review , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , March 2005 , pp. 119 - 154
Copyright
Copyright © International Association for Chinese Management Research 2005

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Footnotes

[1]

The author would like to thank Professor John Child and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable inputs.

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