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RAZ ON THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2011

Mark McBride
Mark McBride*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, National University of Singaporemarkmcbride1978@gmail.com
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Abstract

This article addresses the question of whether judges can take the internal point of view toward—accept—their legal system's rule of recognition for purely prudential reasons. It takes a fresh look at an underappreciated conceptual argument of Joseph Raz's that answers: no. In a nutshell, Raz argues that purely prudential reasons are reasons of the wrong kind for judges to accept their legal system's rule of recognition. And should Raz's argument succeed, an important necessary connection between law and morality would be established.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Theory , Volume 17 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 227 - 236
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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