Hostname: page-component-cb9f654ff-fg9bn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-08-31T14:48:11.461Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

EXPLAINING COMPENSATORY DUTIES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 August 2010

Matthew S. Bedke
Matthew S. Bedke*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbiambedke@interchange.ubc.ca
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In some cases, harming another gives rise to a duty to compensate for harm done. This paper argues that the influential explanations of such duties of compensation—that they are somehow derived from rights intrusions, or breaches of duties not to harm—fail. I offer and defend an alternative explanation for why certain harms and not others give rise to compensatory duties, an explanation that seeks to derive them from wide-scope duties not to harm or to compensate for harm done.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Theory , Volume 16 , Issue 2 , June 2010 , pp. 91 - 110
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

REFERENCES

Bedke, M. (2009) “The Iffiest Oughts.” Ethics 119.4: 672–698.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Botterell, A. (2008) “In Defence of Infringement.” Law and Philosophy 27: 269–292.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Castaneda, H.N. (1981) “The Paradoxes of Deontic Logic: The Simplest Solution to All of Them in One Fell Swoop,” In Hilpinen, R., ed., New Studies in Deontic Logic, 37–85 (Dordrecht: Reidel).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Epstein, R. (1973) “A Theory of Strict Liability.” Journal of Legal Studies 2.1: 151–204.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feinberg, J. (1978) “Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7.2: 93–123.Google ScholarPubMed
Gardner, J. (2001) “Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts.” In Cane, Peter and Gardner, John, eds., Relating to Responsibility: Essays for Tony Honoré (Oxford: Hart Publishing).Google Scholar
Goldberg, J. and Zipursky, B. (2007) “Tort Law and Moral Luck.” Cornell Law Review 92: 1123–1175.Google Scholar
Honoré, T. (1999a) “Responsibility and Luck.” In Responsibility and Fault (Oxford: Hart Publishing).Google Scholar
Honoré, T. (1999b) “Can and Can't.” In Responsibility and Fault (Oxford: Hart Publishing).Google Scholar
Keeton, R. (1959) “Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts.” Harvard Law Review 72.3: 401–444.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nagel, T. (1979) “Moral Luck.” In Mortal Questions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Oberdiek, J. (2008) “What's Wrong with Infringements (Insofar as Infringements Are Not Wrong): A Reply.” Law and Philosophy 27: 293–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oberdiek, J. (2004) “Lost in Moral Space: On the Infringing/Violating Distinction and Its Place in the Theory of Rights.” Law and Philosophy 23: 325–346.Google Scholar
Perry, S. (2001) “Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk and the Law of Torts.” In Postema, Gerald, ed., Philosophy and the Law of Torts, 72–130 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Perry, S. (1992) “The Moral Foundations of Tort Law,” Iowa Law Review 77: 449–514.Google Scholar
Ross, A. (1941) “Imperatives and Logic.” Theoria 7: 53–71.Google Scholar
Thomson, J. (1986a) “Some Ruminations on Rights.” In Parent, William, ed., Rights, Restitution & Risk, 49–65 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
Thomson, J. (1986b) “Rights and Compensation.” In Parent, William, ed., Rights, Restitution & Risk, 66–77 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
Von Wright, G.H. (1968) An Essay in Deontic Logic and the General Theory of Action (Amsterdam: North Holland).Google Scholar
Vranas, P. (2007) “I Ought, Therefore I Can.” Philosophical Studies 136.2: 167–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wedgwood, R. (2007) The Nature of Normativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, B. (1981) “Moral Luck.” In Moral Luck (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar