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TWO WRONGS DO NOT MAKE A RIGHT: RESPONSIBILITY AND OVERDETERMINATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 July 2012

Carolina Sartorio
Carolina Sartorio*
Affiliation:
University of Arizonasartorio@arizona.edu
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Abstract

In this paper I critically examine Michael Moore's views about responsibility in overdetermination cases. Moore argues for an asymmetrical view concerning actions and omissions: whereas our actions can make us responsible in overdetermination cases, our omissions cannot. Moore argues for this view on the basis of a causal claim: actions can be causes but omissions cannot. I suggest that we should reject Moore's views about responsibility and overdetermination. I argue, in particular, that our omissions (just like our actions) can make us responsible in overdetermination cases. I go on to provide an account of how this may be possible.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Theory , Volume 18 , Special Issue 4: MICHAEL MOORE'S CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY , December 2012 , pp. 473 - 490
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

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