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The Parity and Disparity between Inner and Outer Experience in Kant

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 May 2019

Katharina Kraus
Katharina Kraus*
Affiliation:
University of Notre Dame
*
Email: kkraus2@nd.edu
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Abstract

This article advocates a new interpretation of inner experience – the experience that one has of one’s empirical-psychological features ‘from within’ – in Kant. It argues that for Kant inner experience is the empirical cognition of mental states, but not that of a persistent mental substance. The schema of persistence is thereby substituted with the regulative idea of the soul. This view is shown to be superior to two opposed interpretations: the parity view that regards inner experience as empirical cognition of a mental object on a par with outer experience and the disparity view that denies altogether that inner experience is empirical cognition.

Keywords

inner experienceself-knowledgeselfobjectivitypersistenceRefutation of Idealism

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Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , June 2019 , pp. 171 - 195
Copyright
© Kantian Review, 2019 

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