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Kant, the State, and Revolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2013

Reidar Maliks
Reidar Maliks*
Affiliation:
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo
*
Email: reidar.maliks@nchr.uio.no
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Abstract

This paper argues that, although no resistance or revolution is permitted in the Kantian state, very tyrannical regimes must not be obeyed because they do not qualify as states. The essay shows how a state ceases to be a state, argues that persons have a moral responsibility to judge about it and defends the compatibility of this with Kantian authority. The reconstructed Kantian view has implications for how we conceive authority and obligation. It calls for a morally demanding definition of the state and asserts that the primary personal responsibility is not to evaluate the morality of every single law but to evaluate the moral standing of the polity.

Keywords

authorityjudgementKantrevolutionthe state

Information

Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 29 - 47
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2013

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