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Obligatory Actions, Obligatory Maxims

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2020

Samuel Kahn
Samuel Kahn*
Affiliation:
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
*
Email: kahnsa@iupui.edu
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Abstract

In this article, I confront Parfit’s Mixed Maxims Objection. I argue that recent attempts to respond to this objection fail, and I argue that their failure is compounded by the failure of recent attempts to show how the Formula of Universal Law can be used to demarcate the category of obligatory maxims. I then set out my own response to the objection, drawing on remarks from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals for inspiration and developing a novel account of how the Formula of Universal Law can be employed to determine the deontic status of action tokens, action types and maxims.

Keywords

Kant’s ethicsKantian ethicsParfitMixed Maxims ObjectionOn What MattersFormula of Universal Lawpositive dutygeneral dutyobligationaction description problem

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Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 1 - 25
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

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