This article addresses recent work on empire and colonisation which calls for a reappraisal of how agency and resistance manifests among groups responding to structural marginalisation. We argue that approaching these questions from within the colonial order reveals important idiosyncrasies regarding how groups understood resistance, agency, and popular organising as possible responses that emerged from within imperial landscapes. Using the example of race as a central regulatory category and practice of colonial power, we analyse two cases which we suggest benefit from an account of agency and resistance within colonial order: the Black Loyalists in English America and the Indigenous royalists of New Granada, two groups which pursued emancipation by choosing to remain under colonial rule. The resulting analysis produces a more dynamic account of resistance and emancipation which responds to the far-reaching influence of colonial order for resistance movements at local, national, and international levels. This account contributes to recent debates which call for theoretical analysis of “middle actors” and popular thinking as it relates to international politics, postcolonial movements, and studies of empire.

Debates on reparations for colonial atrocities highlight the relationship between international law, political time, and (in)justice. This paper examines Germany's foreclosure of reparation claims raised by descendants of survivors of its 1904–8 colonial genocide. The analysis draws on parliamentary interpellation records (1989–2021) around the question of German reparations to Namibia's Ovaherero and Nama. I argue that Germany mobilizes temporal rules of international law, especially the non-retroactivity of the Genocide Convention, to deflect from such claims. This strategy first confines the political question of colonial reparations to the international legal realm, only to then invalidate it via the temporal rule of law's non-retroactivity. I argue that this strategy enables a ‘chronopolitics of deflection’, by which Germany has pointed away from colonial reparations while directing attention to development assistance payments to Namibia. The paper relates these findings to theories of political time, arguing that Germany's reliance on the non-retroactivity of the Genocide Convention yields what I call a ‘projection of history as normatively temporalized time’. The paper concludes with critiques of the relationship between international law and colonial reparations, arguing that current invocations of inter-temporal and non-retroactive international law implicitly reiterate colonial law, thereby locking in place an unjust legal past.

Observers have noted that world politics is replete with shame. Whether they observe this concerning the apologies regarding past atrocities, the felt necessity for revenge after a humiliating defeat, the feelings that populist leaders find antithetical to the greatness of their nation, or the affective responses to the latter's election, shame seems to be ubiquitous. Vital to understanding the particular politics of this emotion is the concept of state shame. However, the origins, divergent effects, and social and moral roles of state shame are left obscure in International Relations (IR) scholarship, making the concept undertheorized and in need of further elaboration. The primary goal of this research is to (re)conceptualize state shame as a narrative on the social position of the state by building on insights developed by IR theory, sociology, and social psychology. Moreover, the article proposes four types of state shame narratives, namely situational shame, narcissistic shame, aggressive shame, and deferential shame, that can separately account for the divergent effects and social and moral roles that the emotion can be attributed with. These four types, and the politics that characterize them, aim to capture and explain lived practices and meanings that state shame can come to hold.

Affective ties encompass a broad family of emotional phenomena, including love, affection, attachment, and devotion. Affective ties may appear deeply personal, and they most certainly are. But they are also important resources for the exercise of political power in international politics – not only as vulnerabilities that can be exploited for coercion but also, and more significantly, as means to mobilise action and sacrifice. Viewed from the vantage point of political agents, affective ties are thus power resources whose distribution in the international system shapes their strategies and choices. Viewed from the perspective of the system, the international realm is not only characterised by struggles over material capabilities or ideas but also competition over affective ties. Correspondingly, nationalism is not simply an identity. It is a collection of techniques and practices for generating and capturing affective ties that has emerged as a highly effective contender in this contest, with crucial implications for how the international system is organised. That being said, other forms of eliciting affective ties also persist.

This article identifies a sub-category of norm contestation I've termed ‘norm weaving’, where actors contest the constitution of norm clusters, instead of the validity of individual norms. This occurs through processes of stretching or reproducing individual strands of existing norm clusters before weaving them together to create behaviour guides in undergoverned issue areas that are greater than the sum of their individual parts. I identify two examples of weaving in the world-leading actions of Fiji and Vanuatu around domestic climate mobilities. Using these two cases, we can see that existing models of norm dynamics need to be developed to better explain and understand weaving-like processes of norm contestation. There are two areas where norm weaving extends our understanding – in how clusters of norms emerge and change, and in how contestation applies to groupings of norms. Clarifying what norm weaving looks like in these cases could open the door to further examples being identified in other contexts and a more complete understanding of how norms operate in global politics.

Speaking after the addition of The Forth Bridge on UNESCO’s World Heritage List (WHL), a Scottish minister described it as an ‘honour that shows this is a great industrial treasure not just to the city, to Scotland or the United Kingdom, but the entire world.’ A few years later, the delegation of Indonesia took the floor after the inscription of Ombilin Coal mines. Dubbed Indonesia’s first industrial world heritage site, the mines had been owned by the Dutch East Indies government. Thus, the delegation had to describe the industrial heritage as a colonial imposition before noting that the area became ‘modern and integrated.’ If both Scotland and Indonesia received international recognition as modern, industrial subjects, they got there differently. In apprehending that difference, this article extends social-structural theories of international recognition. Approaching these structures as providing uneven recognition possibilities, I develop three modes of recognition pursuits that mediate the challenges of such uneven terrain. I probe the traction of these modes by analyzing speeches state delegations deliver after placing their sites on the WHL. This framework and analysis extend our understanding of international recognition pursuits by pointing to the hold of symbolic structures, and their transformation under creative state engagements.

Colonization processes have resulted in the naturalization and universalization of a particular Eurocentric construction of political ordering. As a result, Indigenous claims of sovereignty – especially significant in settler colonial contexts since the 1960s and 1970s – have historically been obfuscated and are still construed as anomalies or impossibilities. Based on poststructuralist international relations theory and Indigenous political theory, as well as interviews conducted with Māori actors participating in the mobilization of sovereignty politics, this article advances two main contributions. Firstly, it develops a particular approach to the state-Indigenous contention of political ordering by calling attention to the metaphysical foundations of the particular conceptions of sovereignty they respectively deploy. Secondly, it contends that Māori political actors are enacting a ‘metaphysical revolt’ through their reconceptualization of sovereignty theory and practice; one that contains potential for a decolonial rearticulation of political ordering. Through its direct engagement with Indigenous political mobilization and the theorizing sustaining it, this article illustrates how Indigenous theories of sovereignty translate into conceptual alternatives that break away from the colonial roots and underpinnings of paradigmatic sovereignty. Therefore, this article contributes to exploring alternative models of political ordering by illuminating the links between Indigenous thought and decolonial imagination.

A prominent theory of political obligation argues that, to avoid the dangers of statelessness (basic needs deprivation, rights violations, and political disenfranchisement) people should establish, maintain, and obey states. This theory underwrites a statist ideal that presents states as the primary guarantors of justice and democracy. I challenge this statist ideal, arguing that statist institutions are ill-equipped to provide full justice, especially for stateless people. I argue that statelessness is a product of the state system’s structure and that eliminating the dangers of statelessness therefore requires challenging the core organising principles of the state system. I conclude that stateless people have broad prima facie moral permissions to resist the state system’s constitutive norms, practices, and institutions; that others may have obligations to support their efforts; and that addressing the dangers of statelessness requires resisting rather than obeying statist institutions. I also offer a corrective to the literature on refugees’ political obligations, illuminating how even obedience to a relatively just state or camp authority can uphold a state system that is unjust overall. I examine these issues in conversation with empirical scholarship on stateless people’s activism, like Hong Kong’s ‘Refugee Occupy’ movement.

In this rejoinder, we engage with the recent International Theory symposium on Global IR, situating it within the broader literature and outlining intellectual pathways for advancing Global IR’s agenda. We explore how the main critiques identified by the symposium – namely, essentialism, geo-epistemologies, disciplinary reformism, and ahistoricism – have been and can be further addressed through recent developments in Global IR. This rejoinder is not an attempt to prioritise one version of Global IR over another; rather, it emphasises that Global IR comes in multiple versions, and these versions should continue to be a collective work in progress. Our engagement with the evolving debates in Global IR seeks to fulfil the promise of a more global and diverse discipline.

What is ontological (in)security? Recent scholarship on ontological security in International Relations has increasingly turned to the concept's theoretical origins in psychoanalysis and existential philosophy to address the field's (meta)theoretical limitations. This article argues that this development also necessitates an interrogation of the concept of ontological security itself to address the field's theoretical tensions. Further developing the nascent Kleinian approach to ontological security, this article conceptualises ontological (in)security as two distinct positions that denote the different ways in which subjects, be they individuals, groups, or states, manage anxiety. To develop this proposition, the article draws on Melanie Klein's work on the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions to elucidate these positions of ontological (in)security, their respective defence mechanisms against anxiety, and their socio-political implications. This Kleinian approach facilitates a clear theoretical distinction between security and insecurity, providing an analytical toolbox to differentiate the various ways in which anxiety is managed in different positions. This framework particularly underscores the ethical, reparative, and transformative potential of the position of ontological security, aspects that have received limited theoretical and empirical attention to date.

This reply responds to criticism of our original symposium, ‘Global IR and the Essentialism Trap.’ We respond to four particular charges and end with a call for Global IR to move beyond its current emphasis on creating a more diverse, equal, and inclusive discipline to identifying specific research programs that demonstrate the necessity of moving beyond the West. We nominate global order and disorder.