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When Some Are More Equal than Others: National Parliaments and Intergovernmental Bailout Negotiations in the Eurozone

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2017

Manuela Moschella Open the ORCID record for Manuela Moschella [Opens in a new window]
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Abstract

This article argues that the integration of financial assistance capacity in the eurozone, which was meant to remedy institutional shortcomings and mitigate the distributional implications of financial support in the European Monetary Union (EMU), has instead contributed to a deepening of the existing political cleavages and the creation of new ones. This dysfunctional effect reflects the empowerment of some national parliaments in decisions on financial assistance. These arguments are tested against the empirical examination of the negotiations of the three adjustment programmes for Greece. Specifically, the article shows that negotiations moved towards the radicalization of creditors’ positions and increased divisions between creditors in conjunction with the development of financial assistance capacity. While advancing its theses, the article strikes a note of caution regarding the argument that the empowerment of national parliaments in EU policymaking is one of the most powerful antidotes to its legitimacy deficit and thus a safeguard for the integration project.

Keywords

EMUfinancial assistancenational parliamentsintergovernmental negotiationsGreeceESM

Information

Type
Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 52 , Special Issue 2: Democracy without Solidarity: Political Dysfunction in Hard Times , April 2017 , pp. 239 - 265
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s). Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press 2017 

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Footnotes

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Manuela Moschella is Associate Professor in International Political Economy at the Scuola Normale Superiore and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). Contact email: manuela.moschella@sns.it.

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