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Response to critics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 November 2018

OONA A HATHAWAY  and
SCOTT J SHAPIRO
OONA A HATHAWAY*
Affiliation:
Yale Law School, 127 Wall Street, New Haven, CT06511, USA
SCOTT J SHAPIRO*
Affiliation:
Yale Law School, 127 Wall Street, New Haven, CT06511, USA
*
*Email: oona.hathaway@yale.edu
†Email: scott.shapiro@yale.edu
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Type
Special Articles
Information
Global Constitutionalism , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , November 2018 , pp. 374 - 382
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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References

1 See, e.g., Geis, Barkawi and Diggelmann articles.

2 See Follesdal, who presents an explanation in a similar vein, inspired by Machiavelli, whereby states are playing an assurance game and the outlawry of war helps move states from a less to more favourable equilibrium.

3 This should help respond to Follesdal’s trigger objection.

4 Geis provides a good summary of the existing literature.

5 The Covenant of the League of Nations (1924) arts 12, 13, 15 and 16.

6 John Bolton, ‘Protecting American Constitutionalism and Sovereignty from International Threats’ (10 September 2018).