Hostname: page-component-7dd5485656-zklqj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-10-31T12:18:19.207Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Centrality and cooperation in networks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Boris van Leeuwen ,
Abhijit Ramalingam Open the ORCID record for Abhijit Ramalingam [Opens in a new window] ,
David Rojo Arjona  and
Arthur Schram
Boris van Leeuwen*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Abhijit Ramalingam*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC, USA
David Rojo Arjona*
Affiliation:
Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA
Arthur Schram*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, EUI (Florence) and CREED, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
*
b.vanleeuwen@uvt.nl
ramalingama@appstate.edu; abhi.ramalingam@gmail.com
rojoarjo@chapman.edu
schram@uva.nl
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, groups with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.

Keywords

CooperationCentralityPublic goodsNetworks

JEL classification

H41: Public Goods D02: Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , 15 March 2019 , pp. 178 - 196
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9592-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

References

Ahn, TK, Isaac, M, & Salmon, TC (2008). Endogenous group formation. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 10(2), 171–194. 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00357.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, LR, Mellor, JM, & Milyo, J (2008). Inequality and public good provision: An experimental analysis. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 37(3), 1010–1028. 10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.073CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bénabou, R, & Tirole, J (2006). Incentives and prosocial behavior. American Economic Review, 96(5), 1652–1678. 10.1257/aer.96.5.1652CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buckley, E, & Croson, R (2006). Income and wealth heterogeneity in the voluntary provision of linear public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 90(4–5), 935–955. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.06.002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burt, RS (1992). Structural holes: The social structure of competition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carpenter, J, Kariv, S, & Schotter, A (2012). Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments. Review of Economic Design, 16, 93–118. 10.1007/s10058-012-0120-zCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chan, KS, Mestelman, S, Moir, R, & Muller, RA (1999). Heterogeneity and the voluntary provision of public goods. Experimental Economics, 2(1), 5–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Charness, G, Feri, F, Meléndez-Jiménez, MA, & Sutter, M (2014). Experimental games on networks: underpinnings of behavior and equilibrium selection. Econometrica, 82(5), 1615–1670. 10.3982/ECTA11781Google Scholar
Charness, G, & Yang, C-L (2014). Starting small toward voluntary formation of efficient large groups in public good provisions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 102, 119–132. 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.03.005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cherry, TL, Kroll, S, & Shogren, JF (2005). The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on public good contributions: evidence from the lab. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 57(3), 357–365. 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.010CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cinyabuguma, M, Page, T, & Putterman, L (2005). Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment. Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1421–1435. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coricelli, G, Fehr, D, & Fellner, G (2004). Partner selection in public good experiments. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(3), 356–378. 10.1177/0022002704264143CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cornes, R, & Sandler, T (1996). The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 10.1017/CBO9781139174312CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cross, R, & Prusak, L (2002). The people who make organizations go—Or stop, Cambridge: Harvard Business Review.Google ScholarPubMed
Dekel, S, Fischer, S, & Zultan, R (2017). Potential pareto public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 146(C), 87–96. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.12.007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eckel, C, Fatas, E, & Wilson, R (2010). Cooperation and status in organizations. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12(4), 737–762. 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01472.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ehrhart, K-M., & Keser, C. (1999). Mobility and cooperation: On the run. CIRANO Working Papers, 99s-24, CIRANO.Google Scholar
Fatas, E, Meléndez-Jiménez, MA, & Solaz, H (2010). An experimental analysis of team production in networks. Experimental Economics, 13, 399–411. 10.1007/s10683-010-9248-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E, & Gächter, S (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980–994. 10.1257/aer.90.4.980CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischbacher, U, Schudy, S, & Teyssier, S (2014). Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods. Social Choice and Welfare, 43(1), 195–217. 10.1007/s00355-013-0763-xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fisher, JR, Isaac, RM, Schatzberg, JW, & Walker, JM (1995). Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism. Public Choice, 85(3/4), 249–266. 10.1007/BF01048198CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gangadharan, L, Nikiforakis, N, & Villeval, MC (2017). Normative conflict and the limits of self-governance in heterogeneous populations. European Economic Review, 100, 143–156. 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.07.013CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gërxhani, K, Brandts, J, & Schram, A (2013). The emergence of employer information networks in an experimental labor market. Social Networks, 35, 541–560. 10.1016/j.socnet.2013.08.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goyal, S, & Vega-Redondo, F (2007). Structural holes in social networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1), 460–492. 10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gunnthorsdottir, A, Houser, D, & McCabe, K (2007). Disposition, history and contributions in public goods experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 62(2), 304–315. 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.03.008CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hargreaves Heap, SP, Ramalingam, A, & Stoddard, BV (2016). Endowment inequality in public goods games: A re-examination. Economics Letters, 146, 4–7. 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.015CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirshleifer, D, & Rasmusen, E (1989). Cooperation in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma with ostracism. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 12, 87–106. 10.1016/0167-2681(89)90078-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isaac, RM, & Walker, JM (1988). Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 179–199. 10.2307/1882648CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreps, DM, Milgrom, P, Roberts, J, & Wilson, R (1982). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 245–252. 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leibbrandt, A, Ramalingam, A, Sääksvuori, L, & Walker, JM (2015). Incomplete punishment networks in public good games: Experimental evidence. Experimental Economics, 18(1), 15–37. 10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moir, R (1998). A Monte Carlo analysis of the Fisher randomization technique: reviving randomization for experimental economists. Experimental Economics, 1(1), 87–100. 10.1023/A:1009961917752CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nikiforakis, N, Noussair, CN, & Wilkening, T (2012). Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement. Journal of Public Economics, 96(9–10), 797–807. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.014CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Noussair, C, & Tan, F (2011). Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 13(5), 661–693. 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01516.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Page, T, Putterman, L, & Unel, B (2005). Voluntary association in public goods experiments: Reciprocity, mimicry and efficiency. The Economic Journal, 115, 1032–1053. 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01031.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reuben, E, & Riedl, A (2013). Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations. Games and Economic Behavior, 77(1), 122–137. 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosenkranz, S, & Weitzel, U (2012). Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis. Games and Economic Behavior, 75(2), 898–920. 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schram, A, Brandts, J, & Gërxhani, K (2018). Social-status ranking: A hidden channel to gender inequality under competition. Experimental Economics, 10.1007/s10683-018-9563-6Google Scholar
Tan, F (2008). Punishment in a linear public good game with productivity heterogeneity. De Economist, 156(3), 269–293. 10.1007/s10645-008-9094-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Leeuwen, B., Ramalingam, A., Rojo Arjona, D., and Schram, A. (2015). Authority and centrality: Power and cooperation in social dilemma networks. SSRN working papers. (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2573348). Accessed 18 Sept 2018.Google Scholar
Weng, Q, & Carlsson, F (2015). Cooperation in teams: The role of identity, punishment, and endowment distribution. Journal of Public Economics, 126, 25–38. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: File

van Leeuwen et al. supplementary material

ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL (ONLINE ONLY)
Download van Leeuwen et al. supplementary material(File)
File 297.6 KB