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‘Situational Analysis’ and Economics: an attempt at clarification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 January 2019

Alfonso Palacio-Vera
Alfonso Palacio-Vera*
Affiliation:
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Pozuelo de Alarcón (Madrid) 28223, Spain
*
Email: apv@ccee.ucm.es
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Abstract

Popper’s ‘Situational Analysis’ (SA) constitutes his methodological proposal for the social sciences. We claim that the two hallmarks of SA are: (i) that scientists assume they possess a ‘wider’ view of the problem-situation than actors do, and (ii) use the model as an ideal ‘benchmark’ scenario to identify the deviation of actors’ actual behaviour from the former. We argue that SA is not a generalization of the neoclassical theory of individual behaviour but captures instead the methodology adopted by modern behavioural economists. Last, we argue that SA highlights a way of acquiring knowledge that has gone unnoticed in the literature.

Keywords

behavioural economicsPopperrationality principlesituational analysistheoretical models

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Article
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , November 2019 , pp. 479 - 498
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© Cambridge University Press 2019 

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