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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 August 2025
How do local officials in China initiate and sustain policy experiments within a bureaucratic system that often obstructs innovation? This article examines local policy experimentation through the lens of bureaucratic power networks, identifying three key challenges: agenda-setting challenges related to superiors, coordination challenges involving peers and implementation challenges concerning subordinates. When formal power networks fail, entrepreneurial officials develop informal interpersonal networks, positioning themselves as “uninvited advisors” to superiors, “rhetorical allies” to peers and “supportive mentors” to subordinates. Using the case of “police–business cooperation” in Shanghai, the study reveals how the committee on comprehensive management of public security mobilized property management companies to maintain social stability. This article contributes to research on policy experimentation by situating experiments within bureaucratic power dynamics and highlighting the role of informal networks in overcoming institutional barriers. It also reveals the mechanisms by which the Party assigns social control tasks to commercial entities.
在常常抑制创新的科层体制中, 中国地方官员如何发起并推动政策试验?本文从科层权力网络的视角出发, 分析地方政策试验过程中面临的三重挑战: 来自上级的议程设定困境、与平级部门的协调难题, 以及下级执行过程中的落地障碍。当正式的权力网络难以推动试验时, 具有政策企业家精神的官员往往通过构建非正式的人际关系网络来破解困局, 分别在上级面前扮演“非正式顾问”、在平级之间成为“话语盟友”、在下级中担当“支持型导师”。以上海“警务物业联动”案例为基础, 本文揭示了综治委如何动员物业公司参与基层社会治理, 以维护社会稳定。本文的研究拓展了政策试验的研究视角, 强调应将试验置于科层体制的权力网络之中考察, 并突出非正式关系在突破制度障碍中的关键作用。同时, 文章也揭示了党政体制如何将社会控制任务分派给商业力量的具体机制。