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Thinking about the body as subject

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Daniel Morgan Open the ORCID record for Daniel Morgan [Opens in a new window]
Daniel Morgan*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of York, York, UK
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Abstract

The notion of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) has played a central role in discussions of first-person thought. It seems like a way of making precise the idea of thinking about oneself ‘as subject’. Asking whether bodily first-person judgments (e.g. ‘My legs are crossed’) can be IEM is a way of asking whether one can think about oneself simultaneously as a subject and as a bodily thing. The majority view is that one cannot. I rebut that view, arguing that on all the notions of IEM that have so far been successfully defined, bodily first-person judgments can be IEM.

Keywords

De sefirst-personimmunity to error through misidentificationmemoryquasi-memoryproprioceptionprivileged accessintrospection

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Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 4 , June 2019 , pp. 435 - 457
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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