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Deliberating in the presence of manipulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Yishai Cohen
Yishai Cohen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, Portland, ME, USA
*
E-mail: yishai.cohen@maine.edu
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Abstract

According to deliberation compatibilism, rational deliberation is compatible with the belief that one’s actions are causally determined by factors beyond one’s control. This paper offers a counterexample to recent accounts of rational deliberation that entail deliberation compatibilism. The counterexample involves a deliberator who believes that whichever action she performs will be the result of deterministic manipulation. It is further argued that there is no relevant difference between the purported counterexample and ordinary doxastic circumstances in which a determinist deliberates.

Keywords

Deliberationdeterminismcompatibilismincompatibilismmanipulation

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Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , 2018 , pp. 85 - 105
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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