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  3. Virtue Theoretic Epistemology
  • Cited by 5
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      July 2020
      July 2020
      ISBN:
      9781108666404
      9781108481212
      9781108740463
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108666404
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.56kg, 272 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.41kg, 272 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy
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    Subjects:
    Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy
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    Book description

    Virtue epistemology is one of the most flourishing research programmes in contemporary epistemology. Its defining thesis is that properties of agents and groups are the primary focus of epistemic theorising. Within virtue epistemology two key strands can be distinguished: virtue reliabilism, which focuses on agent properties that are strongly truth-conducive, such as perceptual and inferential abilities of agents; and virtue responsibilism, which focuses on intellectual virtues in the sense of character traits of agents, such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage. This volume brings together ten new essays on virtue epistemology, with contributions to both of its key strands, written by leading authors in the field. It will advance the state of the art and provide readers with a valuable overview of what virtue epistemology has achieved.

    Reviews

    ‘This estimable collection presents essays from many of the most influential authors working in virtue epistemology - an approach to epistemology that either focuses on agent-centered factors to analyze important epistemic concepts such as knowledge, justification, reliability, or warrant or sees virtue epistemology as a fruitful way to conceive of values specific to cognition, such as open-mindedness or bias.’

    N. D. Smith Source: Choice

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