Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness

William S. Robinson

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511498886

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Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness

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Contents

Frontmatter
pp i-vi

Contents
pp vii-x

Acknowledgments
pp xi-xii

Part I
pp 1-2

1 - INTRODUCTION
pp 3-13

2 - QUALITATIVE EVENT REALISM
pp 14-35

3 - DUALISM
pp 36-52

4 - REPRESENTATIONALISM
pp 53-72

5 - TRANSPARENCY
pp 73-86

6 - HIGHER ORDER THEORIES
pp 87-106

7 - MONITORING
pp 107-129

8 - FUNCTIONALISM
pp 130-142

9 - SKEPTICISM AND THE CAUSES OF QUALITATIVE EVENTS
pp 143-157

10 - EPIPHENOMENALISM
pp 158-180

Part II
pp 181-182

11 - UNIFIED DUALISM
pp 183-206

12 - PATTERNS AS CAUSES OF QUALITATIVE EVENTS
pp 207-226

13 - A POSSIBLE FUTURE
pp 227-250

References
pp 251-258

Index
pp 259-264

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