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  3. Truth and Truthmakers
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      September 2009
      May 2004
      ISBN:
      9780511487552
      9780521838320
      9780521547239
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487552
      Dimensions:
      (216 x 138 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.346kg, 172 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (216 x 138 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.25kg, 172 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
      Series:
      Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
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    • Selected: Digital
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    Subjects:
    Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
    Series:
    Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
    Information

    Book description

    Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory, which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is a recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book, first published in 2004, D. M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, modal truths, truths about the past and the future, and mathematical truths. In a clear, even-handed and non-technical discussion he makes a compelling case for truthmaking and its importance in philosophy. His book marks a significant contribution to the debate and will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in analytical philosophy.

    Reviews

    'Armstrong's systematic contribution in this book to the truth maker style of metaphysical enquiry is a very major one; we may well learn more from suggestions he makes … covers much more ground than its length would suggest.'

    Source: Journal of Philosophy

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    Contents

    Contents
    References
    References
    References
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