Truth, provability, necessity, and other concepts are fundamental to many branches of philosophy, mathematics, computer science, and linguistics. Their study has led to some of the most celebrated achievements in logic, such as Gödel's incompleteness theorems, Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth, and numerous accounts of the paradoxes associated with these concepts. This book provides a clear and direct introduction to the theory of paradoxes and the Gödel incompleteness theorems. It offers new analyses of the ideas of self-reference, circularity, and the semantic paradoxes, and helps readers to see both how paradoxes arise and what their common features are. It will be valuable for students and researchers with a minimal background in logic and will equip them to understand and discuss a wide variety of topics in philosophical logic.

‘This book provides a gentle introduction to contemporary discussions and results on truth and paradox, making these important topics accessible to a wider audience. In particular, the authors develop a theory of syntax independently of any arithmetical considerations, which makes the book intelligible also to readers without an extensive mathematical background. Strongly recommended to anyone interested in the traditional philosophical issues of epistemology and metaphysics.'

Cezary Cieslinski - University of Warsaw