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  3. Practical Reasoning about Final Ends
  • Cited by 101
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      June 2012
      November 1994
      ISBN:
      9781139174275
      9780521464727
      9780521574426
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174275
      Dimensions:
      (216 x 138 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.52kg, 344 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (216 x 138 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.442kg, 344 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Philosophy: General Interest, Logic, Philosophy
      Series:
      Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
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    Subjects:
    Philosophy: General Interest, Logic, Philosophy
    Series:
    Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
    Information

    Book description

    Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about our final goals. Richardson defuses the counter-arguments for the limits of rational deliberation, and develops interesting ideas about how his model might be extended to interpersonal deliberation of ends, taking him to the borders of political theory. Along the way Richardson offers illuminating discussions of, inter alia, Aristotle, Aquinas, Sidgwick, and Dewey, as well as the work of several contemporary philosophers.

    Reviews

    ‘This profound and important book challenges a common assumption about rationality: that all rational deliberation involves the selection of instrumental means to ends that are set by some non-rational process, for example by desires that are themselves impervious to reasoning. Drawing resourcefully on arguments of Aristotle and Plato, Richardson constructs an impressive account of the rationality involved in our selection and modification of our ultimate ends, and particularly of the ways in which a vague end can be more and more adequately specified by reflection. In the process, he offers the best account I have seen of the arguments for and against the claim that all values can be measured by a single common metric.’

    Martha Nussbaum - University of Chicago Law School

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