Mind, Reason and Imagination: Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language

Jane Heal

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511615894

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Mind, Reason and Imagination

Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language

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Contents

Frontmatter
pp i-vi

Contents
pp vii-viii

Preface
pp ix-x

Sources
pp xi-xii

Mind, Reason and Imagination
pp xiii-xiv

1 - Introduction
pp 1-8

PART I - MIND, THEORY AND IMAGINATION
pp 9-10

2 - Replication and Functionalism
pp 11-27

3 - Understanding Other Minds from the Inside
pp 28-44

4 - Simulation, Theory and Content
pp 45-62

5 - Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability
pp 63-88

PART II - THOUGHT AND REASON
pp 89-90

6 - Co-Cognition and Off-Line Simulation: Two Ways of Understanding the Simulation Approach
pp 91-114

7 - Semantic Holism: Still a Good Buy
pp 115-130

8 - Other Minds, Rationality and Analogy
pp 131-150

PART III - INDEXICAL PREDICATES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
pp 151-152

9 - Indexical Predicates and Their Uses
pp 153-173

10 - On Speaking Thus: The Semantics of Indirect Discourse
pp 174-195

11 - Lagadonian Kinds and Psychological Concepts
pp 196-222

PART IV - THINKING OF MINDS AND INTERACTING WITH PERSONS
pp 223-224

12 - What Are Psychological Concepts For?
pp 225-249

13 - Moore's Paradox: A Wittgensteinian Approach
pp 250-272

14 - On First-Person Authority
pp 273-288

References
pp 289-296

Index
pp 297-302

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