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  3. Deontic Morality and Control
  • Cited by 62
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      July 2009
      July 2002
      ISBN:
      9780511498794
      9780521813877
      9780521039185
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498794
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.58kg, 304 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.452kg, 304 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Philosophy: General Interest, Logic, Philosophy
      Series:
      Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
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    • Selected: Digital
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    Subjects:
    Philosophy: General Interest, Logic, Philosophy
    Series:
    Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
    Information

    Book description

    This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified.

    Reviews

    ‘Readers interested in recent debates not only in its main field but in virtue ethics, or on the relation of morality to practical reason, will find the work impressively up to date and incisively engaged.’

    Source: Journal of Moral Philosophy

    'rigorous and thought-provoking work, … Haji's arguments are meticulous and intriguing and I found much in the work in which I agreed. … Haji has addressed a problem that has not received sufficient attention. For whilst the literature on control and responsibility is huge, far less has been said about control and deontic morality.'

    Source: Philosophical Writings

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    Contents

    Contents
    References
    References
    References
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