Common Sense: A Contemporary Defense

Noah Lemos

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511498800

In this 2004 book, Noah Lemos presents a strong defense of the common sense tradition, the view that we may take as data for philosophical inquiry many of the things we ordinarily think we know. He discusses the main features of that tradition as expounded by Thomas Reid, G. E. Moore and Roderick Chisholm. For a long time common sense philosophers have been subject to two main objections: that they fail to give any non-circular argument for the reliability of memory and perception; and that they pick out instances of knowledge without knowing a criterion for knowledge. Lemos defends the appeal to what we ordinarily think we know in both epistemology and ethics and thus rejects the charge that common sense is dogmatic, unphilosophical or question-begging. Written in a clear and engaging style, this book will appeal to students and philosophers in epistemology and ethics.

"...Academic libraries wanting a solid philosophy collection should acquire this book." CHOICE May 2005

"clear and straightfoward" - Amy M. Schmitter, University of Alberta

References

Selected Bibliography

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Common Sense

A Contemporary Defense

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Contents

Frontmatter
pp i-vi

Contents
pp vii-viii

Acknowledgments
pp ix-x

Preface
pp xi-xvi

1 - The Common Sense Tradition
pp 1-23

2 - Common Sense and Reliability I
pp 24-47

3 - Common Sense and Reliability II
pp 48-66

4 - Reid, Reliability, and Reid's Wrong Turn
pp 67-84

5 - Moore, Skepticism, and the External World
pp 85-104

6 - Chisholm, Particularism, and Methodism
pp 105-134

7 - Common Sense and A Priori Epistemology
pp 135-156

8 - Particularism, Ethical Skepticism, and Moral Philosophy
pp 157-180

Conclusion
pp 181-182

Selected Bibliography
pp 183-186

Index
pp 187-192

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A Contemporary Defense

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