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  3. Coming to our Senses
  • Cited by 16
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      January 2010
      October 1995
      ISBN:
      9780511609190
      9780521495431
      9780521498876
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609190
      Dimensions:
      (216 x 138 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.6kg, 352 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (216 x 138 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.41kg, 352 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Philosophy: General Interest, Logic, Philosophy, Language and Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
      Series:
      Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
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    • Selected: Digital
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    Subjects:
    Philosophy: General Interest, Logic, Philosophy, Language and Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
    Series:
    Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
    Information

    Book description

    Michael Devitt is a distinguished philosopher of language. In this book he takes up one of the most important difficulties that must be faced by philosophical semantics: namely, the threat posed by holism. Three important questions lie at the core of this book: what are the main objectives of semantics; why are they worthwhile; how should we accomplish them? Devitt answers these 'methodological' questions naturalistically and explores what semantic programme arises from the answers. The approach is anti-Cartesian, rejecting the idea that linguistic or conceptual competence yields any privileged access to meanings. This new methodology is used first against holism. Devitt argues for a truth-referential localism, and in the process rejects direct-reference, two-factor, and verificationist theories. The book concludes by arguing against revisionism, eliminativism, and the idea that we should ascribe narrow meanings to explain behaviour.

    Reviews

    ‘On the whole, this is a serious, realistic piece of applied philosophy, one that this particular much-polluted piece of the intellectual landscape can very well do with.’

    Source: Philosophy

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